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Introduction

The Civilization of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilizations

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abstract: 'Civilization' has been a contested term since its inception in the 18th century. However, after the pioneering studies of Weber and Mauss, civilizational analysis dropped from sight in major reference works. The present issue is an endeavor to recapture the significance on the contemporary scene of civilizations and their dynamics as macro-units of analysis. Attention is given to the trio of 'second generation' figures, Sorokin, Elias and Nelson, and to more recent conceptualizations, including the controversial thesis of Huntington.

keywords: civilizational encounters ✦ civilization of modernity ✦ modernity

Civilisation means something more than energy and will and creative power. . . . How can I define it? Well . . . a sense of permanence. . . . By the year 1000 . . . the long dominance of the barbarian wanderers were over, and Western Europe was prepared for its first great age of civilisation. (Kenneth Clark, *Civilisation*, 1969)

. . . in the present world . . . the crucial question is no longer whether a particular nation-state begins or ends, but where a particular region of culture or civilisation begins or end. (Václav Havel, *New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1999)

Civilization, civilization, pride of Europeans and charnel-house of innocents . . . you have built your kingdom on corpses. Whatever you wish, whatever you do moves in lies. . . . You are not a torch, you are a conflagration. You devour whatever you touch. (René Maran, *Batouala*, 1922)

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'Civilization' as Discourse

Introduced into English by Boswell (Brinkman, 1942: 526), Samuel Johnson's biographer, the concept of civilization has close ties to modernity and the ideology of modernity. For succeeding generations of most of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was a sort of evolutionary benchmark of modernity that could be used to evaluate the distance traveled in the inexorable march of progress of humankind – a distance from one's ancestors as well as one's less developed contemporaries. It has also been previously and is presently a contested concept when used in an evolutionary sense of civilization as a higher stage of human development from a lower stage, usually 'barbarism' but also 'culture'.[1]

This is indicated in the three citations shown at the start of this article. Each author is dealing explicitly with civilization, implicitly with its antipode barbarism. But how the contrast is established is worth drawing out. Kenneth Clark, a master art historian, depicted the achievements of western civilization through art and architecture, relating creative genius to changes in society; there are blips to the story when a given societal level is beset by crisis and lack of confidence in itself, but for the past thousand years, the story goes on. Note, however, that *Civilisation* was published in 1969, a period of deep cultural crisis in the West, when the baby-boomer generation coming of age in the turbulent 1960s was challenging not only the authority of the state but also the cultural authority that undergirded it. In terms of esthetics and civility, it was tantamount to a rejection of what had been taken as objective features of western civilization. And this context is made patently clear in the blurb of the bookjacket of Clark's book, which reads:

> Kenneth Clark's purpose goes beyond historical synthesis, however stimulating. Civilisation has been imperiled in other ages; he sees it as again in jeopardy, threatened by a new upsurge of barbarism. He has here distilled the essence of all that is precious in our heritage.

Havel's remarks, made 30 years after Clark, were prompted by another crisis of civilization, namely the ferocious ethnic conflict in the Balkans as a byproduct of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Havel, whose Czech Republic resolved differences with its kindred republic Slovakia in a 'velvet divorce' in 1993, expressed horror at the power of states to whip up nationalism to curb ethnic minorities. His message (delivered in Canada) was that the power of nation-states to inflict punishment internally must be curbed, even if this means the end to the state doctrine of non-interference. The new century will see most states 'begin to change from cultlike entities charged with emotion into far simpler and more civilized entities' (*New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1999: 4). Havel looked

forward in the coming century to a world where larger entities would be cooperative and interactive, provided that 'each individual entity and sphere of culture and civilization must be clearly aware of its own identity . . . and accept that its difference is not a handicap but merely a highly specific contribution to the richness and variety of the global community' (*New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1999: 4).

Maran presents a more startling perspective on civilization. It is the perspective of 'subaltern studies' before the term was used. Like Frantz Fanon a generation later, Maran was born in the French West Indies, assimilated in French culture, and as a civil servant became an administrator in West Africa. He saw at first hand how French colonists behaved and the abuses of the colonial system, while extolling the virtues of 'civilization' over 'barbarism' in the secular legacy of the Enlightenment, trumpeting the moral conquest of the West.[2] Part of the legitimation of colonization was achieved via a vast colonial literature which imparted to western readers a sense of the worth of western civilization. Maran, constrained in his criticisms by virtue of being a civil servant, engaged in a literary resistance in writing *Batouala* which he termed 'a real Negro novel' ('un véritable roman nègre'), making the protagonist of the novel an everyday African and his 'significant others' Africans. Not only was making colonial subjects the central rather than landscape figures a bold step, it was the preface to the novel which created a sensation in Paris for turning upside down the table on civilization and 'barbarism'.[3] In the name of civilization, Europeans had murdered each other by the hundreds of thousands in the First World War and had devastated and exploited ruthlessly colonial subjects in Africa. Maran's novel may be seen as the progenitor of a vast Francophone literature which broadly speaking was an integral part of the cultural movement of 'Négritude', which in various forms was highly critical of the claims to superiority of western civilization. If today western civilization as a subject matter has become so contested in the academic world, it is in part due to cultural (including 'postcolonial' and 'subaltern') studies of former colonial peoples (see Guha and Spivak, 1988; Spivak, 1999) which reject the superiority of western literature, art and philosophy as standards for modernity.

However, these three snippets are only meant to introduce the theme of civilization as a contested field. It is the goal of this special issue of *International Sociology* to reclaim for sociology the heuristics of comparative civilizational analysis as a lever for macro-sociology in the new century. 'World system analysis' and 'globalization analysis' have provided important models of trans-societal processes, but each has its limitation, if only by the presupposition that above the nation-state there is a determining whole, the world as a totality, which is the ultimate determinant of societal parts. Civilizational analysis takes as presupposition

that the reality of the world we live in has dynamic and interactive socio-cultural units larger than nation-states and smaller than a single socio-economic totality. To provide a new or a renovated conceptual framework for macro-sociology deploying civilization analysis, it is important to delve further into the emergence of the concept, the meanings and use it has been put to, and the coral structure, so to speak, that has grown around it.

Bruce Mazlish opens up the historical seed bed of civilization in his article by noting that 'civilization' appears in the 18th century at a critical juncture point when western reflexivity became obsessed with its secular perfectibility. The 'invention' of the term 'civilization' is put to use in viewing 'connections' linking people together – and also in separating them; that is, in separating 'non-civilized' from 'civilized'. Mazlish looks further in comparative-historical fashion by discussing, on the one hand, how the 'modern' westerners of the 18th and 19th century related to previous civilizations via 'archeology' as a new science of humankind, and on the other, how value-laden 'civilization' and its derivative 'civilized' became when used to relate to other contemporaries, and, as illustrated by the case of Japan, how others 'outside' the West appropriated the concept.

Wolf Schäfer extends the analysis introduced by Mazlish, first by an extensive discussion of the linkage of 'civilization' and 'culture' in anthropology and in German thought's antithesis between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, a contrast that was articulated by Kant, with culture having the connotation of 'higher goals of moral cultivation' and civilization with 'mere good behavior'. Schäfer traces the later semantic history of culture and civilization, with a combative use of culture as superior to civilization, or civilization being morally superior to culture, put to rest by the early analysis of Merton. What is in place, he argues, is an emerging global civilization 'with lengthening networks of technoscience' in 'the pluriverse of local cultures'. Such a technoscientific civilization claims no particular territory, and has no center but, as typified by the Internet, knows no state barriers. Schäfer's central theme of an emergent technoscientific civilization has close ties with the theme of 'civilization of modernity' found in my own remarks at the end of the present introduction and in the article of Shmuel Eisenstadt.

Hamid Dabashi critically examines a surrogate for Kenneth Clark, the noted cultural historian Jacques Barzun, who views civilization as having reached its pinnacle in the West and is now at the stage of decadence. Dabashi sees this as a conservative stance, a defensive strategy, shared by various intellectuals in the face of changing global material conditions with 'the moral correspondence to it as yet to come'. Dabashi, too, critically examines the evolving context of the idea of 'Western Civilization'

as it replaced Christendom in providing legitimacy to ruling regimes. 'Civilizational thinking', he proposes, provided during the Enlightenment phase of modernity 'a universal frame of collective identity' to the triumphant bourgeoisie which established national cultures. From whence the twin inventions of 'national cultures' and 'civilizational constructs' were deployed in hegemonic domination of the vast colonial empires. Yet, Dabashi does not end the story there: first he notes that the colonially constructed sites, such as 'Islamic', 'African' and other such, turned the tables on the cultural intruders by becoming sites of colonial resistance, and not the passive, inert entities constructed by 'Orientalists'. Second, he points to growing demographic cracks in the West and to the demise of national economies in the face of the new configuration of global capital and labor, generating its own culture 'which is at once post-national and as a result post-civilizational'.[4]

The 'Encyclopedic' Treatment of Civilization

It might be useful as a baseline to consider in some general reference works how the concept of civilization has been used at different intervals in the past century. Essentially, while the concept provides a very general and very familiar frame of reference, it has been much more of a domain field for the humanities than for the social sciences.

One hundred years ago the entry for 'civilisation' in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, the worthy descendant of the Enlightenment's *Encyclopédie*, used it to trace a broad historical sweep of humankind. Resulting from organized social life, civilization is what assured humankind of its dominance over other species and over nature. While Asia and Africa had early starts in the development of civilization, it is European civilization which has been shown to be more lasting and progressive: in the crucial interaction between nature and human, in Europe the tendency has been for nature to be subordinate, while outside Europe, it is the inverse. Hence, the article pursued, the comparative study of civilizations has a complementary task: outside Europe one must study the external environment actions on humans, while in Europe the 'determining causes' are industry and intellectual activity.[5] The evolutionary and evaluative use of the concept was clearly shown in this differentiation of 'the West and the rest'.

Four decades later, in the midst of the Second World War (which Maran would have recognized as another 'charnel house'), the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* gave explicit reference to the Enlightenment origin of the concept and its characteristic tie-in to the progress of society and humankind. The article noted that its use in America and Western Europe, as if civilization and progress were uniform, was rejected by Germans and Slavs (Brinkman, 1942: 526) – just as a generation later this would be

rejected by intellectuals from Africa and Asia. The *Encyclopedia* article, introduced as a critique of the previous canon, stated that the restricted use of 'civilization' qua part of the march of western progress is antithetical to the anthropological and ethnological phenomena of so-called primitive people. It ended with the wise caution that humankind and civilizations are many (Brinkman, 1942: 529), albeit the article did not explicitly propose a comparative study of civilizations.

Ten years later, and perhaps as stemming from the global aspect of the Second World War and a new awareness of the world's people as a totality,[6] a greater awareness of the anthropological significance of the cultural and material achievements of the non-West became felt. This was shown in a new bilingual journal, *Civilisations*, the review of the International Institute of Political and Social Sciences Concerning Countries of Differing Civilisations. It began publication in Belgium in January 1951. The editorial preface is worth citing regarding the approach of the journal and its focus on the scientific study of the problems arising in certain countries from the encounter between different civilizations.

> The International Institute . . . will . . . thus serve as a coordinating center between free nations in the defense of their respective civilizations. . . . In a domain so subject to controversy as is the one of the differences between civilizations, and of their agreements in an effort to achieve concord and peace, the freedom of ideas and of their expressions must be ensured. This is the only engagement that the Institute can enter into. (*Civilisations*, 1951)

During the Cold War era, the most important reference work was *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968). Like its predecessor, it was published during a deep cultural crisis in various societies, from the USA and Mexico in North America to France and Germany in Eastern Europe and as far east as Poland and then Czechoslovakia. The crisis was in part a conflict of generations, centered around the university; it was a crisis that entailed challenges to all forms of authority but also to various forms of civility. In some respects, the rising generation seemed to be challenging the major premises of western civilization. However, the *International Encyclopedia* did not make 'civilization' an autonomous entry; instead an article conceptualized it under the broader rubric of 'urban revolution' (Armillas, 1968). The author gave it a broad evolutionary perspective tied to the dynamic role of cities, as formulated by anthropologists Childe and Redfield (Armillas, 1968: 221).

After the 1968 *Encyclopedia*, 'civilization' seemed to have lost visibility in major sociological reference works. Smelser's widely acclaimed *Handbook of Sociology* (1989) has no mention of 'civilization' and neither does another major work published in English in the same year, the English edition of the imposing *Critical Dictionary of Sociology* by the eminent

French sociologists Boudon and Bourricaud (1989).[7] Nor does the cumulative index of the *Annual Review of Sociology* contain entries for 'civilization' or its derivatives.

What may be gleaned from this cursory overview is that 'civilization' and 'civilizational analysis' have not been incorporated in mainstream sociology, remaining almost invisible in the periphery of macro-sociology. However, this needs to be tempered by a consideration of some important pioneering efforts that merit mention in the next section.

Recovering the Sociological Tradition of Civilizational Analysis

In the 'classic' age of sociology, and bequeathing a legacy of immense weight to this day, is the comparative civilizational analysis of Max Weber. Ultimately, Weber's writings constitute the *terminus a quo* of much of the challenging issue of civilizational analysis. Reference to Weber runs implicitly and explicitly through several of the contributions to this issue. Thus, Arpad Szakolczai makes use of Weber's central term, charisma, but adds boldly to Weber's perspective in relating it to the civilizing process of restraining and eventually eliminating violence from human relations. In the closing article, after all is said and done anew, John Hall gives us an ultimate look at Weber's core concern: what accounts for the 'Rise of the West'? Hall's 'Eurocentric confession' gives weight to the breakthroughs of the West, not in the moral/ideational sphere usually associated with Weber, but with structural factors, socioeconomic processes and even luck (in access to material resources). Hall grants the economic dynamism of the West, but leaves with a paradox: 'the West caused a jump in social evolution most of all because of its relative failure as a civilization'.

Even where he is not explicitly addressed, Weber's presence tacitly provides an ongoing stimulus for many other articles, just as Marx in the 19th century provided implicitly if not explicitly the challenge for later interpreters of the social order of modernity. Weber implicitly dealt with western civilization as a dynamic, interactive 'total phenomenon', and not a static entity: economy, polity and culture (predominantly but not exclusively the religious life), in various combinatorial forms, were motor forces that had provided and would continue to provide the West with its peculiar rationalist and expansionist capitalist ethos. If the 'objectivity' which is so cardinal in his methodological approach (Weber, 1949) guided him in unpacking western civilization, it falters when he considered other civilizations. Weber was 'human, all-too-human' in being western-centric, as disclosed at the very start of his 'Author's Introduction' to his comparative essays in the sociology of religion:

> A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization . . . only, cultural phenomena have appeared which . . . lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value. Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize today as valid. (Weber, 1958: 13)[8]

It may be drawn from this that in effect Weber saw in the development of the West the essential features of the development of *a civilization of modernity.* In that respect, Weber is a latter-day echo of the Enlightenment, though with less of the optimism in the goodness of humankind and the virtues of reason that the *encyclopédistes* held. Weber's comparative studies of 'axial age' religions (as surrogates for civilization) as alternative centers of modernity have an evolutionary dimension. The image that comes to mind is that of a tree, with lower branches being the civilizations of China, India and Ancient Judaism, and the treetop that of modern, western civilization. In fact, his comparative studies of the non-West, however appreciated by some Weberian pundits and a few sociologists of religion like Robert Bellah (in his *Tokugawa Religion*; Bellah, 1957), stood largely ignored by social scientists for more than half a century.

They regained visibility in the past quarter-century from several sources. First, Edward Said's seminal critique, *Orientalism* (Said, 1978), pointed an accusing finger at Weber's studies of non-rational aspects of non-western civilizations as another justification for cultural imperialism. Second, the unexpected economic vitality of East Asia on the world scene led some to rethink the role of 'sinitic' civilization and its values in *promoting* rather than *hindering* economic development, and more generally, a new cultural pride in 'Confucian values' led to a critical reappraisal of Weber's work on the religion of China (Hofheinz and Calder, 1982; Tu Wei-ming, 1996; de Bary and Tu Wei-ming, 1998). Yet another stimulus for the discovery of Weber's comparative analyses has come from the prodigious efforts of S.N. Eisenstadt, with the elaboration of a comparative research program of civilizations and their multiple modernities, drawing from cues in Weber regarding the role of 'heterodoxies' and 'antinomies' as sources of tension with the mainstream 'center' of a civilization (Eisenstadt, 2000a, 2000b).

Weber's comparative studies of civilization are the realization of a project he formulated as a teenager, an ambitious project, not surprisingly, of understanding 'the entire history of civilized nations and [seeking] to clarify "the laws governing their development" ' (Marianne Weber, 1975: 46). For the 16-year-old *Wunderkind*, his essay differentiated between Orient and Occident, East and West, and the fundamental antipathy between two main branches of the 'Caucasian race': the Semitic and the

Indo-European, an antipathy reflected in fluctuating historical struggles down to the Middle Ages. Perhaps drawing from Nietzsche, the young Weber saw in 'Semiticization' the defeat of Aryan culture; his stark political conclusion was that 'the Indo-Europeans could bear neither an intellectual intermixture nor the "despotic" forms of government peculiar to the Semites' – only a constitutional government would do (Marianne Weber, 1975: 47). I draw attention to this little known background of Weber only because in its own formulation it foreshadows one of the pivotal reorientations of civilizational analysis in the 1990s, namely, the 'clash of civilizations' theme, more about which shortly.

If Weber is the rightful mainstay of civilizational analysis in 'classical' sociology, there is an overlooked Gallic contribution stemming from Durkheim and Mauss. This gets attention in the article of Johann Arnason, who points out that their approach emphasized the plurality of civilizations as an alternative to the prevalent unilinearist views. Mauss even provided explicit attention to theorizing civilizational phenomena as being social but not bounded by a given society, for example language, food, religion (Mauss, 1969: 458). Civilizational phenomena, he proposed, are essentially international and extranational, common to several societies more or less related, related by extended contact and by permanent networks. Although his theorizing did not progress beyond programmatic formulation, Mauss grasped the potentiality of civilizational analysis in holding that the study of civilizational facts facilitates hypotheses and hypotheses testing of comparative-historical aspects of human development (Mauss, 1969: 461).

Implicit in the Durkheim–Mauss comparative emphasis is the valorization of 'other', that is non-Western civilizations as authentic, cognitive frameworks, irrespective of their level of economic and technological development relative to the West. The condensed article by T. N. Madan, a testimony to the penetrating analysis of Louis Dumont regarding the central Indian 'value-idea' of 'hierarchy', has its grounding in Durkheim and Mauss via Durkheim's younger collaborator with his dissertation at a distance on the Indian caste system and via Mauss's own student, the great comparativist of religion and myths, Georges Dumézil. As Madan makes clear, India's caste system must be taken seriously as an authentic civilizational scheme and not as a product of 'social degeneracy'; analyzing it provides a complementarity with its opposite ideology, western individualism. Madan is careful to note that, on the one hand, there is significant regional variation within India, and, on the other, that western capitalist societies, though their central 'value-idea' is that of equality and individualism, are characterized by 'class divisions and socio-economic inequalities'. It is tempting, one might infer, to view 'homo hierarchicus' and 'homo equalis' as Weberian ideal types, heuristic in the comparative study of civilizations.

The Second Generation: The Dynamics of Civilization

The brutal rupture of the First World War from the 'halcyonic' Victorian Age and the economic and political morass of the 1930s did much to unsettle the image of western civilization as an evolutionary or Olympian pinnacle of humankind that had entered some sort of steady state needing just fine tuning to maintain itself. The manifest debacle of Western Europe made it impossible to maintain an intrinsic cultural superiority of *its* civilization and its values over those of the 'others'. Paradoxically, this led to a greater sociological reflexivity regarding western civilization. Three sociological approaches in roughly the period from the mid-1930s to the 1980s provide what may be termed a 'second generation' of sociological analysis of civilizations. Though operating from different cultural and epistemological perspectives, each underscored civilization as a dynamic entity, really as a process of actualization rather than as a finished entity suitable to be admired as a museum piece.

Pitirim Sorokin prepared a monumental empirical study of the dynamics of civilization using western civilization as a vast case study of the 'infrastructure' of western institutions (Sorokin, 1937–41). Perhaps it was that his American sociological audience could not swallow his 'integralist' epistemology which did not privilege the truth of rationality over the truth of superrational faith and intuition.[9] Perhaps it was that the unit of analysis, civilization, may have appeared too unwieldy for those accustomed to the contemporary nation-state as the empirical referent of 'society'. Perhaps, too, the basic American optimism fueled by pragmatism did not feel at ease in Sorokin's evaluation of late modernity being in a decaying 'sensate' phase. For whatever reasons, Sorokin's civilizational analysis, with its 'principle of limits' and the 'principle of imminent change' (Tiryakian, 1968) gathered no followers seeking to apply them to other civilizations. Although none of the articles in the present issue seeks to pick up the Sorokin trail to civilizational analysis, there are signs that this may happen, in view of recent evaluations and testimonies of his monumental contributions (Johnston, 1995; Ford et al., 1996). As aspects of these 'signs', this writer participated two years ago in an impressive tribute to Sorokin in his native Russia, sponsored by the Kondratiev Institute. Of greater import, yet less tangible, is the resurgence of religion in the public sphere, including dialogues between eminent scientists and theologians: Sorokin did anticipate that after a sensate value-matrix would become exhausted in extremes of hedonism and violence, a new 'ideational' or 'idealistic' infrastructure would replace it.

Another sociological study of the dynamics of civilization that received scant attention when it appeared, perhaps because it appeared at another

sad moment of western civilization, was the masterful study of Norbert Elias in 1939, *The Civilizing Process* (see Elias, 2000). Elias provided rich comparative historical materials to study how the civilizing of conduct took place in the West over the course of centuries, and in the process, how the distancing of children from adults psychically and behaviorally not only meant that children had to be civilized anew in each generation, but also facilitated treating 'others' (such as women and colonial subjects) in terms of being 'childlike'. For Elias, changes in social structure in the underlying curbing of violence as intrinsic to the process of civilization had functional significance in status and power relations. There is a good deal in the analysis of Elias which anticipates later cultural explorations of Bourdieu and Foucault, but this would take us well beyond the scope of this introduction. However, reference to Elias is to be found in several of the articles, notably those of Arnason and, in particular, of Szakolczai.

The third contributor to civilizational analysis in that 'second generation' was Benjamin Nelson. He drew upon his wide-ranging knowledge of the sociological classics, European history, comparative religious studies, psychoanalysis and science to examine variations in time and space of 'civilizational complexes'. Unlike Sorokin and Elias, Nelson had a certain success in institutionalizing the study of civilizations in the USA, for in 1970 he became the first American president of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations,[10] which has continued meeting since and publishes the *Comparative Civilizations Review.*

Although Nelson was not a systemic analyst of civilizations, he did produce some seminal essays having as a focus critical contacts between civilizations, which he termed 'intercivilizational encounters'. And it was the encounters between the sciences of great societies – notably China and the West – which fascinated him in particular (Nelson, 1981: 164–98), but also encounters within a civilization, for example in 12th- and 13th-century Europe, in encounters of Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

This issue testifies to the thrust of Nelson's civilizational analysis, to his valorization of different paths to modernity taken by different civilizations and their coming together at important juncture points.[11] One of Nelson's students at the New School, Donald Nielsen, in his article provides the reader with an extensive discussion of Nelson's conceptual framework that framed the emergent sociology of civilizations (note the plural). Randall Collins provides vindication for a focus on intercivilizational encounters in laying out an ecology of civilizational prestige; his empirical materials on intercivilizational attraction in the case of Muslim Spain point to several religious components interactive with one another. He finds similar patterns in Asia, for example in the case of Indian Buddhists who went north to China and were well received as 'propagators of highly respected wisdom'. Cho-Yun Hsu in his article

considers differential outcomes in intercivilizational encounters within a single setting, namely China. He considers the factors which made for the receptivity and institutionalization of Buddhism, on the one hand, and, on the other, despite efforts by Jesuit missionaries, the abortive attempt at introducing Christianity. He proposes several factors that produced different outcomes, including level of participation of intellectuals and level of popular support in the general populace. A third 'empirical' essay that relates to Nelson is Saïd Arjomand's meticulous comparative study of medieval Islam and its civilizational interaction (or encounter) with Perso-Indian and Greek political ideas. Why, asks Arjomand, was there a differential reception of Greek philosophy, as exemplified by Aristotle, but not his equally available *Politics*? This puzzle opens up a broad vista for the sociology of civilizational analysis, for it suggests that not all parts or values of a given civilization are readily assimilated into another, even if the encounter is not violent or involuntary.

The Third Generation: Eisenstadt and Huntington

In the past decade, marked by the unanticipated implosion of the Soviet system (which in due time may come to be seen as an aborted socialist civilization), S. N. Eisenstadt and Samuel Huntington have had a significant impact on civilizational analysis. Eisenstadt's comparative study of the multiple paths of modernity undertaken by various civilizations extends the trail laid by Weber and Nelson. He finds the dynamics *within* 'Axial Age Civilizations' by examining the tensions between 'orthodox' and 'heterodox' orientations and their followers. The tensions and struggles are never resolved once and for all; there is a continuous 'development of multiple modernities', multiple interpretations of modernity. The clashes may be violent (think of the Chinese Cultural Revolution) but they are also creative, and in any case, they assure that there is no 'end of history'.[12]

The work that has clearly generated the greatest attention to civilization analysis is the conceptualization of Samuel Huntington that the new world order, the post-Cold War world order, is one fated to be characterized by a 'clash of civilizations' replacing conflicts between ideologies and nation-states (Huntington, 1993, 1996). At one level, it may seem innocuous for a political scientist of distinction to propose that the superpowers of tomorrow will be civilizations, operating in a zero-sum game of competition for scarce world resources. At another level, Huntington has touched a raw nerve in a world that strives to be ecumenical. His analysis is strongly contested, either directly or indirectly, by several articles in this issue for a variety of reasons. Dan Chirot's article provides a balance in relating the 'clash of civilizations' to 'uneven modernization'; he is as

critical of multiculturalists, who reject westernization altogether, as of 'Huntingtonians', who reject that 'the rest' can evolve with the West in a 'single modern type of social structure with a broadly common modern culture'. Thus, Chirot converges with Eisenstadt in a broad modernization perspective that opts for an emergent civilization of modernity.

This does not necessarily dispose of Huntington's jarring thesis. There are aspects of the contemporary world that provide some support for his contention, although the theaters of the 'clashes' are not in strict correspondence with his analysis. Chechnya, Indonesia, Mindanao, ex-Yugoslavia, the Sudan, Kashmir and the Taliban destruction of Buddhist statues all come to mind as sites of physical, social and cultural violence. So do the posters of most wanted criminals in a US post office, which have a majority of Arab/Islamic persons wanted for 'international terrorism'. These images have an unfortunate consequence of reinforcing in the public perception the reactionary view of 'barbarians at the gate'. They are contradicted by the fact that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the USA, with a 25 percent increase in mosques in the past six years taking place without conflict with other religious communities.[13]

Civilization of Modernity and Modernity of Civilizations

As the analyses of several contributors, and most notably that of Eisenstadt, suggest, the emergent global reality of the coming decades may well be a civilization of modernity. What are some of its characteristics? It is a civilization that is marked by high technologies that compress distance, that can alleviate traditional diseases of humankind, and that can with increasing efficiency harness resources on a global basis. It is a civilization which allows for a wide variety of lifestyles and patterns of individuation. It is a civilization which is decentered in terms of 'zones of prestige' and which facilitates extensive contacts and interactions, virtual and physical, between and within regions. What is harder to discern are the values that will anchor this civilization. It is at this point that we end this introduction, save for one last reflection.

The civilization of modernity has permeated the world we live in. That means that 'civilization' is no longer the exclusive domain of the West, no longer is western civilization per se the 'standard' of admission to international society (Gong, 1984). In one sense, the West has triumphed because so much, but not all, of its civilization has evolved beyond its frontiers into a civilization of modernity, which implies among other things that western societies are to be judged by the same normative standards as they have in the past judged 'others' by. Massive weapons of

environmental and human destruction, used to minimize the loss of one's troops at the expense of 'the other', are no less instances of 'barbarism'.

There is a dialectical process that needs to be noted. It is that the civilization of modernity entails *the modernity of civilizations*. All civilizations have representatives who accept the value of modernity, however differently this may be expressed. It is not only the representatives of familiar civilizations but also representatives of civilizations thought to have disappeared long ago, like Native Americans, Mayans, Incas and others. The interaction of these with high technology and with other contemporary civilizations, facilitated by processes of globalization, is a new chapter in the social evolution of humankind. To develop the conceptual and methodological framework to do justice to this emergent global reality is the challenge for the sociology of civilization.

Notes

1. For the 'sociogenesis' of the distinction between 'culture' and 'civilization' in modern western thought, see especially Elias (2000: Vol. I, Part 1).
2. Moral conquest meant via secular education, not religion (Hardy, 1917).
3. For his audacity Maran became subject to sanctions and subsequent editions omitted the offensive preface from which the citation is taken.
4. Dabashi's analysis converges with that of Leslie Sklair (1995), who proposes that the culture-ideology of the global system is provided by consumerism.
5. 'Ce qui caractérise la civilisation Européenne, c'est l'influence décroissante des lois physiques et l'influence croissante des lois mentales' (*La Grande Encyclopédie*, c. 1900: 514).
6. Recall Wendell Willkie's (1943) prophetic *One World*.
7. Their earlier French edition also contains no entry for 'civilisation'.
8. Readers of Parsons' translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* may not be immediately aware that Weber's 'Introduction' was written in 1920, well after his 'Protestant Ethic' essay, and intended as an introduction to the whole corpus of Weber's *Religionsoziologie*, which included far-ranging essays on Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism.
9. Husserl's phenomenological method and its *Wesenschau* met a similar reception in mainstream American philosophical circles.
10. The Society had been founded ten years earlier in Salzburg; interestingly, Sorokin was its first president.
11. An important extension of the analyses of Nelson and Elias is to be found in the focus of Kavolis (1982) on dynamic aspects of 'civilizational designs' and civilizational processes.
12. In a perspective congruent with Eisenstadt, I have proposed that the dynamics of western civilization feature the interaction, sometime symbiotic, sometime antagonistic, of three 'metacultures of modernity': Christian, Gnostic and Chthonic (Tiryakian, 1996).
13. According to the recently released report 'The Mosque in America: A National

Portrait', one-third of mosque worshippers are South Asians, 30 percent African-Americans and 25 percent Arab-Americans (*New York Times*, 27 April 2001: A12). Islam, it may be noted, is both a civilization and an umbrella of civilizations.

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