Reflections on Kidd's "Principles of Western Civilization"
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Source: *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Oct., 1906), pp. 78-99
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2376102
Accessed: 01/07/2013 02:46

national conduct to conform a little more closely to this ideal, and not in talking of the necessity of war, and burdening the people with military expenses.

War, then, may be truly considered as waste. Social economy demands that the vast stream of revenue which has hitherto been flowing out upon the sands of war, where it is drunk up unproductively and lost, should be directed out over the fields of education and peaceful industry, to fertilize the soil and cause it to produce in ever increasing abundance the flowers and fruit of a higher civilization.

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REFLECTIONS ON KIDD'S "PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION."

Although Mr. Kidd's book has now been before the public for some little time, and various criticisms have been passed upon it, it would not seem out of place to revert again to a consideration of its main features, particularly as the subject-matter dealt with is, and is likely to continue to be of engaging interest to all who concern themselves with the study of social phenomena. It is intended in the following pages to take an independent and impartial review of the arguments presented, with the sole purpose of discovering how far they are adequate to support the author's theory, and therefore how far the theory itself is to be relied upon.

The first impression, I imagine, which the reading of the first few chapters of the book makes upon the mind of anyone to whom this class of literature appeals is that, whatever may be the value of the argument one way or the other, he is in the presence of a highly fascinating problem and one which, as the author is constantly reminding us, is entitled to "hold the imagination." As we read on, the mind is still held under the grasp of the same spell, and although it may find some difficulty in endorsing the argument put forward on behalf of the theory of the entire "subordination of the present to

the future," it nevertheless clings to the idea that the elaborately worked up argument will in some way or other be substantially shown to square with the actual facts of every day life. But as we read further and begin to near the end, the spell begins to vanish, the argument to falter, until in place of the hitherto steadily directed train of thought towards the solution of the problem, we have page after page devoted to the phenomena of trusts, monopolies, and so forth, continued almost to the last, with scarcely a word of explanation or comment—certainly no adequate explanation—as to the apparently adverse bearing that these phenomena have upon the matter in hand; and we close the book with a keen feeling of disappointment that an argument, otherwise presented in so convincing a manner, should at last fail to sustain the ground gained, and that, too, at a point where, if sustained, was more than ever likely to carry conviction. Throughout the greater portion of the book nothing is more admirable than the close reasoning and the dialectic skill with which the argument is pushed forward, combined with the earnest persuasiveness of the writer; but one rises from a study of its pages with a deep sense of its incompleteness; of a want which we instinctively feel could have been supplied, and should have been supplied in order to complete the harmony of the work and give to it its full consummation. Such at least is the general impression made upon the mind of the writer after a careful perusal.

Mr. Kidd's main purpose, if I read him aright, is to show that "the ascendency of the present" is, so to speak, a thing of the past; that it must give way in an ever-increasing degree to the principle involved in "the subordination of the present to the future;" that, in order to comprehend human society and all it implies in terms of the Darwinian theory, it is necessary to show that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process is forever to be regarded as projected into the future; and that the winning peoples will be those amongst whom these principles are most exemplified. Further, that the present day conceptions of the meaning of the evolutionary process have had their "intellectual foundations" removed.

Let us deal with the latter assertion first, for no small amount

of Mr. Kidd's contention is based upon the alleged difference between his interpretation of society and that of all other philosophical teaching up to the present time. But the fundamental difference which he appears thus to regard as existing, is surely more imaginative than real, and in so far as it has any reality is exaggerated. I fail to see what bearing upon the argument such straining of divergent views can have, unless it be to emphasize the nature of the theory, in which case it does so at the expense of the theory itself. Compare for a moment the current theory with Mr. Kidd's. The impression one gets on reading Mill or Herbert Spencer is certainly not that our whole interest is bound up in the present regardless of the future. On the contrary, their conception of society, or a perfect state, is so far removed from the actual condition of affairs at present that its realization is likely to be immeasurably in the future. True their theory of progress may be "towards a fixed state in which a reconciliation between the self-interest of the individual in the present and the interest of society is to be completed." And is there any reason why not? Why should not an ideal state of society, as at present conceived, at a later date become realized? On the contrary, there is every reason to hope that such will be the case. And if so, what becomes of the contention that the individual must always be subordinate to society? This seems to be the point of difference between the two theories. The one assumes that the interests of the individual and of society, hitherto at variance, shall *at last* become one. According to the other, there appears to be no "at last," but an *ad infinitum* sub-serving of the present to the future. It precludes any ultimate state of perfection—any ultimate goal, and implies that there can be no defined purpose in the scheme of nature. With this lack of possible realization, much of the impetus to exertion manifested in all sorts of movements towards human welfare would be taken away, and with it must also go much of the field in which natural selection operates. And in so far as this was the case the premises of the theory would be removed. On the other hand, according to Herbert Spencer and the utilitarians, the very essence of the current theory subsists in

the fact that the realization of the future lies potentially in the present (itself a product of the past), which is but a stepping stone to that ulterior end. Thus in the one case the present is a means to an end; in the other, that end is denied. It is obvious that the ultimate and perfected advantages gained by natural selection cannot be shared *in toto* by the present; but there is always the *latest* acquisition of advantages shared—the *ultimate* advantages "in the making." And only in this qualified sense can the term "ascendency of the present" with any degree of justification be used with reference to the utilitarian theory.

In this connection let us glance back, as Mr. Kidd does on page 94, to the time of the ancient Greeks. To-day is the future of yesterday—of 23 centuries ago. Has not each successive "ascendency of the present" between then and now marked an upward progress of human society without any direct, conscious or real "subserving" of interests at each stage, and this in spite of an increasing consciousness of the presence of, and obligation to, a moral sense? Comparing the two extremes of this period, is not society now a more enlightened whole—a nearer approach to the idea of the interest of the one being the interest of all—than it was at the commencement of that period? "Subserving" there certainly has been (there can probably be no future without it); but it has been little more than the subserving of the interests of those at the time being existing, and has been synonymous with the struggle of each successive "present" generation to make the best of itself, without any premeditated idea of sacrifice for generations unborn. I do not deny, and no one will deny, that there have been many noble instances of sacrifice, wholly free from the taint of self-interest, undertaken for the sake of those who may come after. I am also free to admit that this spirit of sacrifice, or rather of altruism, is happily an increasing quantity, and is, as I believe, destined to become an important, if not the main factor in the development of the human race. But between admitting all this and subscribing to Mr. Kidd's dictum of the entire "subordination of the present to the future" there is a wide difference.

Yet another thought arises in this connection. Is there any

reason why the "strongest interests of the present" (page 94) should not be compatible with those of the future? Why "duty" and other moral sense conceptions should not be of like interest to both? Why, in short, "duty," etc., should not coincide with desire? For if it is conceivable, and for my part I fail to see why it should not be, that our sense of duty and of obligation to practice the virtues generally should one day, as the result of the gradual evolution of all that is best in the human race, come to be regarded as synonymous with desire—so regarded, in fact, that *to act* would be to practice virtue—then in that case there must come a time when subordination would cease to have any meaning—would in fact become non-existent, and virtue would be "all in all."

One other comment upon Mr. Kidd's premises calls for attention before proceeding to the subject-matter itself. In seeking to base his theory on the principle of natural selection, Mr. Kidd asserts that this principle acts "through the largest numbers," and proceeds to show that the "vast majority" (*i. e.* of the human race) must always be in the future, and that it is therefore in the interest of this "vast majority" that the present is to be exploited.

Without calling in question the truth or otherwise of this view of natural selection, it is only necessary here to question its relevancy to the matter in hand. Is there sufficient reason for the assumption that, in the case of man, the "vast majority" must always be in the future? We have no guarantee whatever that such will be the case. Unless we are prepared to admit an eternal succession of generations in this world, there must come a time when the majority is *not* in the future but in the *present.* Only on the further assumption of a never ending succession of generations can the original assumption of the "vast majority" always being in the future be maintained. So that as much of the theory as is based upon these assumptions must to that extent be invalidated unless otherwise supported by independent evidence. But although Mr. Kidd does seem to regard it as one of the premises of his argument, it does not appear that there is really any necessity to do so. For, taking natural selection for granted, and using

it in its widest sense as including the human intellect as one of its most potent factors, it is evident that if there is such a thing as social evolution at all, natural selection must largely operate, and it is purely gratuitous to assume that in order that it should do so the majority must always be regarded as being in the future.

Passing now to the subject-matter of the book, let us seek to have a clearly defined conception of the argument which the writer puts before us. In brief, it is this: that the controlling meaning to which human consciousness has become related is no longer in the present but in the future. And referring back to the times of ancient civilization he points out that there is an entire absence therein of "the assumption that in the last resort we have a duty, not only to our fellow-creatures, but to principles which transcend all the purposes" for which our own life and that of the State itself exists (p. 190). All ancient schemes of individual ethics and political theory, he points out, related to the idea of the sovereignty of the State, and Aristotle's conception of "virtue" was nothing more than a form of "political activity," or the effort of self-consciousness to realize itself. And in order to show the gradual unfolding of the world process by which we are surrounded, he divides the historical period which he surveys into two epochs. The first presents us with a type of society which exists in virtue of its ability to hold its own against all comers, i. e. a people in whom "military efficiency" has been brought about by a process of "military selection." The second epoch (and one which presumably we ourselves are but on the threshold of) presents us with the same society imbued with an entirely different set of principles and ideals, in that whereas the dominant note of the former was the self-sufficiency of the individual, that of the latter is its insufficiency or contempt of self. Moreover it is only after the first epoch has run its course that there can be any progress in the second or higher stage of social evolution.

This second or higher stage represents the passing of the present under the control of the future, and here we find ourselves in the presence of a "great antinomy" which may be

expressed by saying that on the one hand we have the dominant forces, which have all along been making for the "ascendency of the present," still with us; on the other, a new array of forces, the absolute negation of the ruling principles of the past, tending ever to the projection of the sense of human responsibility beyond the limits of political consciousness, and giving as a result freer play for all human activities than the world has yet witnessed.

We have in the presentation of this antinomy the outline of a problem which has long perplexed, and is probably destined still longer to perplex, the human mind. It is an elaboration of the problem foreshadowed in Mr. Kidd's previous volume "Social Evolution," where it was shown that as soon as the element of rationality was introduced into organic life, it was as if a new and revolutionary factor were placed at the disposal of natural selection. It is the same problem that we see Huxley endeavoring to grapple with when he uses the words Cosmic and Ethic as expressive of the two terms of the antinomy. And it is a problem which we still find ourselves struggling with under various aspects, and it may be in subconscious ways, but always when analyzed found to be related to two fundamental principles—the one, as to how far the promptings of pure self-interest should be allowed to lead us (comprised under the term "Cosmic"), the other, how far these should be combated by the promptings of interest for others (which may be comprised under the term "Ethic"). These two principles, in whatever manner stated, are to all appearance diametrically opposed to each other and utterly irreconcilable; and yet, if we are to accept evolution as the unifying process it is supposed to be, we are constrained to believe that, irreconcilable as they appear to be, there must be, far though it be removed from our view, some fundamental chord which gives harmony to the twofold process more immediately within our ken. It is the search for this harmonizing truth that gives so much significance to the book before us. If evolution is a unifying process whereby opposing tendencies become reconciled, what is the principle common to both which makes for this reconciliation? Herbert Spencer has pointed out that

whenever opinion is sharply divided on any point, reconciliation is to be brought about by emphasizing that ultimate element of truth underlying manifold differences. And a similar process would seem to be applicable in the case before us. Broadly speaking, granting that progress is an end—or more correctly a means to further an end—the Cosmic process makes for the improvement of the physical side of man's nature; the Ethic for the moral side of it, and before the latter can make any appreciable headway it is necessary that the former should at least have attained a certain degree of development. The former is the framework on which the latter operates, and though, when looked at in the abstract they are mutually subversive, yet when viewed more carefully and as a whole, it is wonderful how little in reality they are so. For looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the Cosmic, in point of time, far preceded the Ethic, and may be said to have largely completed its work. The ethical side then dawns upon the scene, and operating side by side with the cosmic, is frequently found in conflict with it. The result of this combination of forces, the one increasing and the latter (having largely done its work) decreasing, is that a feature of progress is introduced, which is different both in degree and in kind from any which so far had preceded it, and one in which physical characteristics are being increasingly subordinated to the ethical. Regarding the matter in this light we have first of all the physical (*i. e.* the cosmic) holding full sway; then the cosmic *plus* the ethical, in which the mollifying effects of the latter act as a brake upon the former, causing it to be slowly brought under its sway; and finally, through the vistas of time, we can conceive of the ethical so completely supplanting its rival as in the end to practically hold full sway. After this eventual triumph of right (for that is what it amounts to) over the physical world, we do no great violence to our imagination to conceive of a third—and that the greatest—factor, after long æons of comparative inactivity, at length coming to maturity and finally entering into full possession; namely, the spiritual factor—not indeed as another rival to the ethical, but as a higher expression of it.

This bald outline of a world process is of course largely conjecture, but it is conjecture which receives a certain support from actual experience. If we compare it with Mr. Kidd's two epochs and his tentative argument therefrom, we shall find a considerable degree of similarity. The first epoch—*i. e.* of military efficiency—is that in which the Cosmic holds its sway. The second represents the dawn of the Ethical, and as it increases in intensity, the gradual subordination also of all the interests of the present to it, together with the rising conviction of the greater importance of the spiritual over temporal interests. And as we have also seen, these phenomena occur in natural sequence, and in such a manner that the succeeding can only take place after the antecedent has reached a certain stage of development. The phenomena in fact represent a true evolution, and while in this bald outline we have only one or two stages in that vast evolution pointed out to us, there yet remains an infinitude of detail to fill in, and in this filling in there is abundant scope for speculation and for rival theories as to the significance and interpretation of passing events in their relation to a well-ordered whole. It is in respect to this interpretation as to the meaning of the forces we see around us that we may find ourselves in conflict with some of the opinions expressed in the book before us.

We need not follow Mr. Kidd in his examination of history in support of his argument. We are concerned rather with the application and interpretation of the facts than with the facts themselves. What we have now to consider is the predominant feature of the new process which the argument at this stage discloses to our view. The simple condition required for this process is that "the controlling meaning to which human consciousness has become related is no longer in the present." And the result of this is "a free conflict of forces" such as has never been before. It makes for "the emancipation of the future,"—a future in which every obstacle to this free conflict, every absolutism, every tyranny, everything in fact that stands in the way of the free rivalry of all forces, shall be completely swept aside—in a word, a future in which the right of universal opportunity shall reign supreme. And

be it remembered, the interest of the individual and of the present is to be continually subordinated to the larger interest of the future and the universal—nay, further, it is only by virtue of this subordination that the emancipation of the future will be brought about.

When the full significance of this setting free of hitherto restrained forces has been allowed to sink into the mind the problem becomes more engrossing. Assuming for the moment this free conflict of forces to be actually taking place, what should we expect to find? Rivalry and competition of every sort raging more fiercely than ever, and tending by that very fact to curtail the freedom which rendered such competition possible. And in the midst of it all the higher ideals of self-denial and subordination to the future would appear to be thrust altogether into the background. Where in such a world-conflict would there be any place for those ethical forces of which we hoped so much? We are again face to face with the great antinomy. Side by side with this strenuous life of rivalry, seemingly making for temporal welfare only, are we to suppose that there can exist a sense of disinterestedness in the present so active that it altogether transcends any interest therein? Mr. Kidd, I imagine, would unreservedly answer in the affirmative. He would transfer the controlling factor entirely from the present to the future, making as the motive of all our actions something far beyond us, and ignoring altogether interests here and now. While admitting a large measure of truth in this, we cannot go quite so far, for, as pointed out previously, it would imply that our best hopes and efforts can never be realized in this world, and this would be fatal to those hopes and efforts themselves. Moreover we know perfectly well, whatever may be said to the contrary, that as a matter of every day experience our interest in the present is a very real one, much too real in many cases. Nevertheless when we have said everything that can be said on the other side, there is a large measure of truth in Mr. Kidd's contention, and where we differ from him it will, I think, be found to be more in degree than in kind. I might interject the remark here that Mr. Kidd's expression "emancipation of the future" is not

altogether a happy one, for while in one sense conveying the meaning he wishes it to do, in another I think it possibly goes beyond his wishes.

In the sense of the free play of all forces eventually taking place the expression is of course to the point. But if every successive present is to be subordinated to the future, there can hardly in that sense be any real emancipation of the future at all. For the future instead of being emancipated will ever in turn come under the thraldom of its successor in point of time.

After all, "present" and "future" (and "past" also) are relative terms, and simply express the relationship of the observer to the point of time he is considering. And with respect to the controlling principle being in the future, it must, from the nature of the case, always be so more or less. The thing aimed at is always "future" to the endeavor made to achieve it. Realization and endeavor to realize are seldom simultaneous. They are of the nature of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent.

But to return to our subject. We have abundant evidence of interest which is centred in the present. What evidence is there of the transference of this interest from the present to the future?—not, be it observed, evidence of a passive *disinterestedness,* but of an active interest prompted by a sense of human responsibility projected beyond the present. Omitting for the moment any reference to our own day, if we glance back over the history of the human race, one significant fact stands out as the main feature of all the great movements that have from time to time marked the progress of the world. That fact is *the demand for justice*—the demand of the oppressed to escape from the thraldom, in whatever form, of the oppressor, and the gradual recognition, on the part of those who have the power, of the existence of certain rights in those who have it not. Crude and imperfect as this conception of justice was at first, it nevertheless has been accountable for the rising sense of moral obligation which has continued to expand until it finds its outward expression in many of the noblest features of our present day life. And it involves a con-

ception of responsibility to something not altogether in the present—though that has its part—but to something higher. It is therefore an abstract idea, containing some recognition of right and wrong as moral qualities.

Taking the Reformation as an instance of one of these world movements, Mr. Kidd shows that it was an endeavor to project the sense of individual responsibility *beyond* the principle of authority conceived of as resident in the organized church; it was in fact a rebellion striking at the root of that principle of authority (p. 302). The church, founding its policy on the idea of the greater importance of spiritual over temporal welfare, formed itself into an absolutism the aims of which were considered to outweigh every other consideration. Against this absolutism the forces of the Reformation were directed. It was the outward expression of the sense of injustice existing in men's minds at their enforced subjection to Rome, and their determination to free themselves from it. It was no expression of disapproval of the principle itself upon which the church based its policy, *i. e.* that of the greater importance of spiritual over temporal welfare. This principle the reformers acknowledged as much as the church. It was the wielding of it as a political weapon that they objected to. So long as the church confined itself to advocating its principles without seeking to *enforce* them upon unwilling subjects—without, that is, infringing the equal right of those subjects to accept or reject them as they thought fit—so long could no exception be taken to its policy. But the moment it so far infringed the liberty of others as finally to persecute those who refused to obey it, then it was that the equally high principle of freedom of thought and action found expression in the determination to throw off the yoke which was seeking to keep them in submission. It was the clashing of two principles, each, it may be, right in itself, but wrong, and indeed mutually destructive, when used in the form of compulsion. And here we come in sight of another principle of the utmost importance, and we are indebted to Mr. Kidd's pointed reference to it, for it is one which cannot be too strongly driven home. It is the principle of *tolerance* held as an ultimate conviction of

the religious consciousness, the only condition necessary, as Mr. Kidd points out, for the emancipation of the future. Toleration as *per se* a religious act does not receive anything like the acknowledgment it should do either from the pulpit or the platform. It is too much hidden under the shallow sophistry which seeks to show that toleration and strength of conviction cannot go together, whereas a moment's reflection should convince us that even in the same individual we frequently have evidence of it; for it is no uncommon experience to find oneself holding at one time of life a certain conviction and at another a conviction directly opposed to it. And yet we are obliged to tolerate our own inconsistency. If in one's own person such is the case, how much more reason is there for the exercise of tolerance as between ourselves and others? Yet as showing the persistency of the spirit of intolerance and how hardly it dies, no sooner do we see the Reformation carried through and the rule of the church thrown off, than we again find the victors enforcing the governmental ideas of their opponents—using as it were, the very weapon they had struck from their hands. Persecution with its attendant evils is rife as before, and in Cromwell's time we still find the ascendency in the State—and alliance with it—of a system of religious doctrine believed to be right (p. 319). But as time goes on we see the latent spirit of toleration again and again asserting itself. Tracing its progress we see its effects in the gradual dissociation of religious consciousness from the authority of the State. We see the authority transferred from King to Parliament, and finally emancipation from the control of Parliament itself. True, in England the process has not yet reached this stage, but in America, where definite expression has been given to this principle of toleration by embodiment in an Article of the Constitution, we see it in full force, and it is cited by Mr. Kidd as evidence of a conviction of responsibility transcending the content of any interest within the limits of political consciousness (p. 326).

We must remark here that the argument deduced from the dissociation of the religious consciousness from alliance with the State (as being the outward historical expression of the projec-

tion of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process beyond the bounds of political consciousness) is not altogether conclusive. It might be due to indifference, or even to decline of the religious concept, rather than to an increase of it. And the fact that in this country (England) association with the State is still maintained detracts to some extent from the argument. True, in America indifference does not appear to be the cause, for there complete dissociation is said to be accompanied by intensity of belief. But in any case the argument stands in need of further evidence on its positive side.

In chapter X ("The Modern World-conflict") we have the argument carried a stage further, and it is sought to show that the principle of projected efficiency is the most effective cause of progress that has hitherto prevailed. "All systems of social order must go down before those within which the future has been emancipated in the freest and most efficient conflict of forces in the present" (p. 346). It must be borne in mind that an essential feature of such social order is the disintegration of "absolutisms," for if the forces which have been set free only use their freedom to combine in defeating freedom itself, in no true sense of the term can the free conflict of forces be said to exist. This would be the negation of the principles upon which such system of social order was based. It is necessary to bear this in mind, for if it is the principle of liberty that has transferred the ruling power from the King to the people, it is idle to assert that this principle is still held sacred if the power vested in the people is used as a weapon of tyranny in a similar manner as it was used by the monarch or by the church in times gone by. A right regard for the spirit of toleration, and consequently of liberty, is equally obligatory whether the power be vested in monarch or people, and any violation or abuse of the principle, no matter in what domain of thought or action, is equally reprehensible, and should be the object of strong denunciation wherever it occurs. As we shall see presently, it is essential to keep this point clearly before us; for it is abuse of the true spirit of liberty, so dearly bought, that is largely accountable for the very evils it is the function

of that principle to remove. It is therefore more than ever incumbent upon a nation priding itself upon its love of liberty, that it should, as one of its very first essentials, have a clearly defined conception, both as a community and as individuals composing that community, of the true significance of liberty, its self-imposed obligations, and the right and proper use to be made of it.

Proceeding with his idea of projected efficiency, Mr. Kidd sees in the system of party government the first large expression of the new principle—the subconscious admission that however intense our conviction we are not the ultimate repositories of truth. In his view the system of party government represents a conception of responsibility to principles projected beyond the limit of political consciousness (p. 354). There can be no purely intellectual sanction for the "submission of the individual to a world-process in which he has absolutely no interest." A purely "intellectual" demand for freedom is the theory of the interest of the individual in the present. Here we find ourselves at issue again with Mr. Kidd because of the want of definition in the use of the terms "present" and "future" as pointed out earlier on. It cannot be held that because of the individual's submission to a process, the realization of which may not be entirely in the actual present, he therefore has *no* interest in that process. The fact that he does not realize to the full the benefits his submission may bring, or that those benefits may to a large extent fall to the share of others, is not to say that he has absolutely no interest in them. Quite the reverse. For not only does he actually participate in the general welfare his submission brings about, but he derives a certain satisfaction from the consciousness that his act of submission not only has already brought, but will increasingly bring gratification to an ever widening circle of his fellow-creatures. He helps to work out his own salvation and in doing so contributes to that of those to come. The subordinating of his own interests to those of his fellow men or to future generations may in varying degrees be altruistic or it may simply be a sub-conscious submission; but in any case he nevertheless to some extent "*has* his reward." Thus

viewed his submission can hardly be said to be without intellectual sanction, nor the current theory to have had its "intellectual foundations removed." But this is not to deny there may be other sanctions besides the intellectual. Mr. Kidd's contention would seem to land us on the horns of a dilemma. If, as is his purpose to show, the current theory (that the "ascendency of the present" is the end towards which social and political development moves) has had its intellectual foundations removed, and yet there is no intellectual sanction for the submission of the individual to the future, where, we ask, does the intellect come in at all? We are ready to admit, and gladly admit, that much of the modern conception of democracy is due to the operation of a principle—the most radical of any that has hitherto operated in the world—which acknowledges and emphasizes the existence of a sense of responsibility to each other, to an extent which has never been acknowledged before. But we cannot agree that this principle has "no relation to any theory of the State bounded by the limits of political consciousness." For, as we have just shown, although its relation to the State is not, and is not in any sense claimed to be, final or absolute, yet that it has a real and intimate relation therewith cannot admit of any doubt. We are reminded that this conception of "political tolerance" (as also of "intellectual" tolerance) is "only held as an ultimate conviction of religious consciousness." This may well be without being driven to resort to the "no interest in the present" theory.

An especially interesting reference is made (p. 364) to the question of free trade, and in the light of events which have taken place since the publication of this work, it is well to note their significance, as affording a striking commentary upon the argument here pursued. Mr. Kidd criticises, in fact denies free trade as an affair of State interest. Rather, he says—and this is the point to notice—it is due to the same "sense of responsibility in men's minds outweighing the claims of all political interests." Now compare this with, and judge it by what is taking place at the present time. Ask Mr. Chamberlain the motive of his policy and what will be his

reply? Assuredly that he is advocating it in the interest of the Empire. That is to say, in the interest of the "State bounded by political consciousness." If asked, "is it not due to a sense of responsibility to a principle projected beyond political consciousness?" "No," he will reply. "I admit that the principle of free trade is right in the abstract, but the immediate welfare of the Empire is the first consideration, and I am convinced that that can be best brought about by waiving for the time being the principle we have so long acted upon." Such, I imagine, would be the lines of his reply. The motive is simply the *political welfare* of the State, regardless of any loyalty to an acknowledged principle. It does not alter the case to say that his policy is in the *future* interest of the Empire, for it is only "future" in the sense we have already referred to. The change is intended to be made *as soon as consent can be obtained for it,* and is therefore essentially of "present" concern. And so it would appear that in this particular case at any rate, the argument does not hold good.

A page or two further on we have Mr. Kidd's opinion that a movement toward equality of *economic* opportunity is following that of political opportunity (p. 370)—an opinion in which we readily concur. But, quoting Sidgwick, he says it has become "an ethical postulate that the distribution of wealth in a well-ordered state should aim at realizing political justice." Quite so. And so would Herbert Spencer and the utilitarians say. But does this "realizing" not strike at the fundamental idea of "projection beyond political consciousness?" It is still the expression of a desire, and a hope to "realize" what is considered to be an ideal State. And if "realizable" the "projection" must some time or other cease. It can only be said to be "projected" in so far as it is not realized.

Space forbids us to follow closely Mr. Kidd as he develops his argument in the next few pages, but any survey of the book would be very incomplete without pointed reference to those characteristic products of uncontrolled competition, known as combinations, trusts, monopolies, etc. It is the phenomena of these trusts which I venture to say we shall

find the greatest difficulty in reconciling with Mr. Kidd's theory of projected efficiency. Let us remind ourselves that the ideal towards which we are moving is one of free rivalry of all forces in which the best organizations, etc., shall have the right of universal opportunity—an ideal resting ultimately on the principle of tolerance held as an ultimate conviction of religious consciousness. Let us first of all note a few of the more salient features of these trusts, as pointed out by Mr. Kidd (p. 420 *et seq.*), and observe their bearing upon the argument. Note their power. They are stronger to control legislative action than the say of the people; stronger in their influence than the most rigorous absolutisms of the ancient world. They possess a sinister influence over the distribution, or rather perhaps we should say over the concentration, of wealth, so that the capital of a private citizen is tending to equal the annual revenue of Great Britain or the United States. The ill-effect of this is not compensated by subsequent philanthropy; it bespeaks an unhealthy social state, and is demoralizing. There is, too, a wide difference between the "collective" or "business" conscience of these combines and the conscience of the "individual." Honesty is not a characteristic feature with them. They afford "great prizes for the most unscrupulous" (p. 428).

Such in brief being the leading features of these organizations, what are we to say of their significance in the midst of our western civilization? Are they the outcome of a sense of responsibility to a principle outweighing the claims of all political interest? Do they point to a sense of obligation to each other transcending all the objects for which they exist? Is there here any expression of the principle of "tolerance held as a conviction of religious consciousness?" Can it indeed be said in their behalf that there is any real regard for conscience at all, much less for that particular direction of it which requires submission in the interest of generations yet unborn? To ask such questions is to answer them. For we know too well that the guiding motive of these trusts is self-aggrandizement; their object the accumulation of wealth with little or no regard for any ulterior principle. Their aim is

purely one of material satisfaction here and now. They make for absolutisms of the worst type, with more and more "present" regarding and less and less "future" regarding qualities about them. In short they are the very embodiment of what we have come to regard as the "ascendency of the present," and in this light indeed Mr. Kidd himself also regards them.

How then are we to establish the principle of projected efficiency in the face of such formidable evidence to the contrary as this? That is the question. There may perhaps be some glimmer of hope in the remonstrance shown on the part of those outside these monopolies, in the growing feeling of antagonism towards them born of a higher regard for justice and freedom, but as yet this is insignificant in comparison with their powerful influence. This concrete example, in fact, of the ascendency of the present which Mr. Kidd has given such prominence to, appears to me to clash so sharply with the principle of projected efficiency as to well nigh eclipse it altogether; and in order to restore the force of the main argument we require to find some equally powerful evidence of, or movement in favor of, the principle implied in the "subordination of the future." Where is it to be found?

Incidentally in connection with this question of trusts it is interesting to recall President Roosevelt's remarks in his presidential address two years ago. "More important," he is reported to have said, "than any legislation is the general growth of a feeling of responsibility and forbearance among capitalists and wage-workers alike." And further, "the right of freedom and the responsibility for the exercise of that right cannot be denied." If these words or the principle underlying them were acted out by all concerned in these huge organizations what different factors in our western civilization they would become.

So far then as we have traveled in our survey of "The Principles of Western Civilization" we still find the "ascendency of the present" largely dominating. Let us see whether Mr. Kidd succeeds in showing that it is giving way before a higher principle. The point we have reached is still that of self-interest in uncontrolled competition for private gain. We have

seen all principles and considerations eliminated but those which contribute to success (p. 438).

Mr. Kidd, in one of his many and apparently unsympathetic references to the Manchester School, points to it as advocating the removal of all barriers to trade, and providing for the uncontrolled competition of forces (p. 435). This school stands for the policy of non-intervention, and as Mr. Kidd sees in it no evidence of his theory of projected efficiency he does not adduce it in support of his argument. But it in effect brings about the same free play of forces as does his own theory, and it is difficult to see why he should not claim it on his side instead of ruling if off as something quite apart. If it is not positive support of it, may not its very passivity mark the rising into consciousness of a principle at least akin to the one he presses upon our notice? If not in this and similar movements, where are we to find evidence of it at all? For as yet (p. 452)—and we are well through the book—"all is related to the ascendency of the present." The regulation of conditions of employment, the question of a living wage, etc. are indeed instanced in support of it. Also the fact that the exploitation of less developed peoples has "at times revolted the general conscience at home." These no doubt are evidence of what we may call a broad humanitarian spirit; but they do not fulfill the requirement of the argument in respect of full subordination to a principle entirely transcending any interest in the present. And in the case of the exploitation of less developed peoples, we certainly cannot be said to have rid ourselves altogether of the motive of self-interest.

Socialism, again, whether it be the outcome of the same humanitarian spirit, or simply a policy prompted by self-interest, cannot be advanced in support of the argument inasmuch as it seeks to suspend all competition and the free play of forces. Yet it represents phenomena in the midst of our civilization which must be reckoned with in any speculation as to the laws underlying the evolution of society. And if it cannot be brought under this theory, then, unless it can be satisfactorily accounted for in other ways, it must considerably detract from the value of it.

What then, we are driven to ask, does represent the principle of projected efficiency at the present day? Where is its counterpart in actual life? Of all the great movements quoted—both those in the past and those under our own observation—do any of them bring sufficient weight in its favor? However near they approach to satisfying the theory in full—and many of them do approximate to it—they all stop short at the point which requires the submission of the individual to a process in which he has absolutely no interest and which is altogether outside the bounds of political consciousness. Of an increasing consciousness of ethical, and indeed of religious ideals, and of a deepening sense of responsibility towards them, there is happily some evidence; but for an example of any movement that "adjusts the current interests of the world to a meaning which infinitely transcends them" we look in vain. Yet, according to Mr. Kidd, the "winning people" must have this characteristic. Rivalry, he says, will take place between a few great, clearly defined systems of social order, and the factor of success will be the degree of efficiency with which the principle of subordination of the present to a larger future has obtained expression (p. 466).

The *one condition* in which the present can thus ultimately pass under the control of the future, is that brought about by the conscious conversion to a sense of responsibility transcending the claims of all present interests, of the only power which can be effectual in the matter—namely, the State—through the consciousness of society. The general will "by its own determinative act" must effect this. But again we ask where is the evidence of it?

In the concluding pages of the book evidence of the "ascendency of the present" is once more brought to our notice; and the "now universal tendency in modern industry to monopoly ownership" is pointed out as one instance. But if this "universal tendency" exists as a fact, how are we to reconcile it with that other assumed fact that the present is being (and consciously) subordinated to the future? If the former is making headway with such bounds, what of the latter, the existence of which we have such difficulty in finding evidence

of? And with this riddle we are still confronted on closing the book.

Reflecting upon the book as a whole we readily admit its merit as a highly valuable contribution to the study of social philosophy, and welcome it as one well calculated to stimulate thought in a much-needed direction. Mr. Kidd's idea of projected efficiency is extremely fascinating; it is presented in such a manner as to assuredly "hold the imagination." One could have wished, however, that the book had maintained with equal effectiveness to the end the force of the argument so ably advanced earlier on. It ends by showing that "the ascendency of the present," so far from giving place to an era in which the spirit of "subordination to the future" is to be the dominant note, remains as powerful an element in our Western civilization as ever it was in the civilizations that have passed away. The theory presented, acceptable as it is in many respects, is undoubtedly exacting; and the weighty facts brought out in the latter part of the book are apt to leave the impression of an irreconcilability which is not readily removed. But the fact that such evidence has not deterred the presentation of the theory enhances, rather than detracts from, the value of it. It is not by the entire annihilation or elimination from our national life of a healthy and legitimate interest in the present that the course of social evolution will be advanced—any more than true religion is advanced by asceticism—but rather by seeking to arrive at the correct mean of regard to be paid to things temporal and things spiritual respectively—by taking as it were a right perspective of human destiny. Only when we awake to the full "consciousness of the nature of the majestic process of cosmic ethics" can we grasp the true significance of the drama unfolding before us, and see clearly the part we are destined to play in it. It is this ethical side of the problem which we could have wished Mr. Kidd had further developed. As it is the balance of the argument preponderates on the side of the Cosmic. Let us hope that in his next volume he will make good this deficiency.

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