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# The “Clash of Civilizations” Theory: An Overview from the South

*S. Rajen Singh*★

Pitirim Sorokin observed: “Most of the significant philosophies of history and most of the intelligible interpretations of historical events...have...appeared either in periods of serious crisis, catastrophe, and transitional disintegrations or immediately before or after such periods.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the end of the Cold War has generated, at least, two major issues concerning about, first, who has won the Cold War; and secondly, how to explain the emergence of the post-Cold War world?

The US political leadership was quick to embrace the view that it was Washington which won the Cold War. The US president, George Bush, in his State of the Union message to the Congress on 28 January 1992, proclaimed proudly: “Communism died this year. By the grace of the god, America won the Cold War. We are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has become the leader

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of the world."<sup>2</sup> A section of the American academic community also took the position that US "won" the Cold War over the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> Corollary to the idea of American 'victory' were its causes. Two different perspectives were offered in this regard. One was the US militant containment power over the Soviet Union which played a key role in causing the end of the Cold War by forcing the latter into submission; and the other was the succumbing of the Soviet Union to the inherent political and economic weakness of its own system – a viewpoint George Kennan had envisioned as early as 1947 in his first article in the prestigious *Foreign Affairs* which, many believed, laid down the basic principles for Washington's policy towards Moscow for the next forty years.<sup>4</sup>

The main focus, however, of the end of the Cold War was, and has been, how to designate the emergence of the post-Cold War world? Explanations of the nature of the world that has developed out of the demise of the Cold War paradigm have not only been varied but also contending. It has aptly been pointed out that just as historians have debated the causes of the Cold War for decades, explaining its demise quickly became a growth industry.<sup>5</sup>

As the Cold War was winding down in the late 1980s, intellectual efforts were undertaken, quite naturally, to explain where world politics had been and where it was going. In this regard, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington are perhaps the best-known scholars who, despite of the controversy they generated, have attempted to explain the post-Cold War development of the world. Perhaps, the first controversial formulation was Francis Fukuyama's thesis on the "end of history", declaring that in the struggle between the forces of liberal democracy and totalitarianism the former have won the battle, virtually for

all time. Fukuyama, first advanced his thesis in an article<sup>6</sup>, published about two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union; and later in a book,<sup>7</sup> which was the revised and expanded version of the article. Fukuyama maintained that liberal democracy might embody the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of government," thereby constituting the "end of history." Fukuyama conceives history not as "events" but as a "single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times."<sup>8</sup> He claimed that, contrary to profound pessimistic interpretations of human history prevalent in the West, which assumed that communism was a permanent ideological and political fixture, the liberal democracies, led by the United States, had indeed successfully prevailed against, first authoritarianism (i.e., hereditary monarchy), then fascism, and now communism. Ultimately, the triumph of liberal democracy would produce a world with "much less incentive for war (because liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another), since all nations would reciprocally recognise one another's legitimacy."<sup>9</sup> A central thesis of this argument is that a Hegelian non-materialist account of history rests on the struggle for recognition; and that this struggle would largely dissipate in a world of liberal democracy.<sup>10</sup>

However, Fukuyama's presentation about the victory of liberal democracy has generally been objected to as an attempt to justify the Western, particularly American, political system.<sup>11</sup> Alexander Nacht has observed that, although Fukuyama did not spell out the specific policy implications of his analysis, "if one accepted his basic premise, the United States would be best advised to pursue to spread of democratic ideals...."<sup>12</sup> Yet, John Gray insists

that "no one regime is always and everywhere the best," and therefore Fukuyama's "democratic capitalism" has no prospect of becoming universal. A world consisting only of liberal democratic regimes is not an inevitability; it is a Utopia.<sup>13</sup> The leading contemporary American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who holds the view that "the great strength of democracy is its capacity for self-correction", perceives that "wars will still disturb the tenor of life" and declares: "Democracy has survived the twentieth century by the skin of its teeth. It will not enjoy a free ride through the century to come."<sup>14</sup>

In 1993, four years after Fukuyama's thought-provoking statement, another thesis by Samuel P. Huntington appeared which portrayed a much bleaker picture of the future of global politics. Huntington not only rejected Fukuyama's contention but also stressed the emergence of a conflictual world in the post-Cold War era. Huntington, who was the Director of Security Planning for National Security Council in the Carter administration, submitted his much gloomier case in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. The article, entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?"<sup>15</sup> (which was the product of a research project on "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests" in the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University) appeared in the summer of 1993, and became reputedly the most famous piece published by the editors of *Foreign Affairs* since George Kennan's foundational Cold War essay, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in July 1947. Huntington, like Fukuyama, elaborated and modified his original arguments contained in the article, and published in 1996 his celebrated and yet controversial book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.<sup>16</sup> Professor Huntington is considered as the West's "most eminent

contemporary political scientist" and Henry Kissinger has described Huntington's book as "one of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the Cold War."

The central theme of the book is that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilizational identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War World."<sup>17</sup> Huntington maintains that in the post-Cold War global politics, reconfiguration of peoples and countries as collective entities are taking place. Countries have been groping for groupings, they are finding those groupings with countries of similar culture and the same civilization. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones. "The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples' identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines."<sup>18</sup> Peoples and countries with similar cultures and religions are coming together; peoples and countries with different cultures and religions are growing apart. Political boundaries are being redrawn to conform to these cultural, ethnic, religious and civilisational identities.

Huntington argues that the most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War – free world, communist bloc, and Third World (unaligned nations) - but rather the seven or eight major civilizations of the world. The most important distinctions and the dominating source of conflict among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic but cultural; and the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the "fault lines" between civilizations. He stresses that local politics is the politics of ethnicity, global politics is the politics of civilization, and

the rivalry of the super powers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.<sup>19</sup>

Huntington divides the book into five parts. Broadly speaking, the first part examines the distinction between modernisation and Westernisation and suggests that the processes of modernisation, which are taking place in non-Western civilizations, are producing neither universal civilization nor replicas of Western civilization. In the second part of the book, he examines the shift in the balance of power among civilizations, and concludes that the Western civilization, though remains dominant, is declining and is facing challenges from the Asian civilizations and Islamic civilization. The third part of the book delineates the nature of a civilization-based world order. A major portion of this section portrays the emergence of cooperation among the cultural kins. Huntington argues that in the post-Cold War world "civilization commonality," or what H.D.S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country syndrome", is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalition. In this section Huntington also argues that efforts to make countries in the image of other civilizational traditions fail, and that countries rally around civilizational flags for the most part. The fourth part of the book focuses on the major conflicts between civilizations and the dynamics of "fault line" wars; that is, wars where civilizations meet either within states or within regions. Huntington contends that the West's insistence on universalism is leading to conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islamic and the Sinic civilizations. In the final section of the book, Huntington argues that the survival of the West depends on the US reaffirming its Western identity; and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew

and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Huntington insists that world is civilizationally ordered and avoidance of a global conflict of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.

Here, one may recapitulate some of Huntington's key formulations which constitute his "theory" of the "clash of civilizations." Huntington argues that conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern times. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system, with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes, which eventually led to the creation of nation-states. Beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict thus were between nations rather than princes. According to Huntington, this nineteenth century pattern lasted until the end of the First World War. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, and then Fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. These conflicts, Huntington stresses, between princes, nation-states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization. Huntington goes on to say:

With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centre-piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.<sup>20</sup>

Henry Kissinger has noted that the "international system of the twenty first century...will contain at least six major powers - the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India-as well as a multiplicity of medium sized and smaller countries".<sup>21</sup> The shifting character of international politics from being a Western dominated one to a universal arrangement, because of increasing participation of non-Western states, is widely known and accepted for quite some time now. But, what is typical of Huntington in this regard is his attribution of such a transformation purely from a civilizational perspective. For the Harvard Professor, the world is not at the end of history, destined to be harmonious and peaceful. Nor is it split into two blocs, whether rich or poor, Oriental and Occidental, centre and periphery, North and South, West and non-West. For Huntington, the fundamental divisions in international life go beyond these binary oppositions. Huntington says that, "it is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization," and it is because "cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's associations and antagonisms."<sup>22</sup> To drive this point home, Huntington refers to the "re-alignment" of countries after the Cold War in Europe, Asia and Latin America on cultural lines.<sup>23</sup> "Many important development", Huntington argues, "after the end of the Cold War were compatible with the civilizational paradigm and could have been predicted from it."<sup>24</sup>

According to Huntington, civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large. A civilization is, he says, "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity peoples have short of that which distinguishes

humans from other species. It is defined by common objective elements, such as language, history, religions, customs, institution, and by the subjective self-identification of people.”<sup>25</sup> Huntington presents eight major civilizations of the world which include Western, Confucian or Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly, African, and insists that while there are, and will be, conflicts within each of these civilizations, the most important conflicts in global politics will occur along the “cultural fault lines” separating these civilizations from one another. Huntington argues that the greatest conflict will be between the West and China<sup>26</sup> and the West and Islam,<sup>27</sup> as Western power goes into decline and China and Islam grow more confident.<sup>28</sup> Huntington even suggests that China and Islam will tend to cooperate against their common rival, the West.<sup>29</sup> Latin America and Africa will tend to bandwagon with the West - the former because it is closer to Western Civilization in a cultural sense; and the latter because it is economically dependent on the West to perhaps a higher degree than any other civilization. Japanese, Hindu, and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations are described as “swing civilizations,” and could go either way.<sup>30</sup>

If civilizations are destined to clash, then, why will this be happened? Huntington suggests the following major reasons for the cause of civilizational conflicts in the world. (i) In the first place, differences among civilizations are not only “real” but are also “basic”. Throughout history civilizations have provided the broadest identifications for people. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The differing worldviews of people about man, nature and God are the product of centuries and they will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental, Huntington

insists, than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.<sup>31</sup> Expectedly, Huntington holds that over the centuries, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. (ii) As the interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing, these are intensifying civilizational consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. According to Huntington, the enhancement of civilization-consciousness of people, due to the interactions among peoples of different civilization, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching back deep into history.<sup>32</sup> (iii) Huntington suggests that the "revival of religion" or the development of religious "fundamentalism" or the "unsecularization of the world" has a role to play in producing civilizational consciousness and conflict. "The growing power of non-Western societies produced by modernisation is generating the revival of non-Western cultures throughout the world".<sup>33</sup> Huntington claims that the processes of modernisation throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. Modernisation process increases the need for cultural identity and promotes the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways: at the societal level, modernisation enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people to have confidence in their culture. At the individual level, it generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken.<sup>34</sup> In much of the world, Huntington believes, cultural identity has moved in to fill this gap created by modernisation, often in the form of movements that are labelled "fundamentalist." Huntington, true to his spirit of civilizational approach, asserts that such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and the Hinduism, as well as in Islam. The

hallmark of such a viewpoint is the "revival of religion" which provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Huntington identifies a trend, which he describes as "a return to the roots phenomenon," occurring among non-Western civilizations. Trends like "Asianisation" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduisation" of India, the failure of "western ideas of socialism and nationalism", and "re-Islamisation" of the Middle East, etc. all constitute return to the roots. Huntington seems to suggest that a trend of de-Westernisation and indigenisation is emerging in the non-Western countries to take on the West and define and shape things in their own terms. In his words, "A West at the peak of its power confronts non-West that increasingly have the desire, the will and resources to shape the world in non-Western ways."<sup>35</sup>

Another reason why civilizational conflict is with us, Huntington argues, is because cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In ideological conflicts, the question was "which side are you on?"; in conflicts between civilizations, the question is "what are you?" In the former, one could choose sides but not in the latter. Cultural differences go deep and cannot be reconciled as easily as material or ideological differences. Fundamental beliefs about who one is cannot be easily jettisoned or renegotiated. Even more than ethnicity, Huntington proclaims, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. But it is more difficult to be half-catholic and half-Muslim.<sup>36</sup>

Huntington also holds the view that there is a link between

contemporary regional economic integration and civilization-consciousness. To him, common culture is facilitating the growth of economic regionalism. As a result, intra-regional trade has grown everywhere. Convinced that the importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future, Huntington argues that, on one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness and, on the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. In an interview, Huntington has observed that significant economic integration has only occurred so far among societies which do share common culture.<sup>37</sup> The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity; inasmuch as integration schemes in Central Asia and Middle East are based on cultural and religious affinities. Huntington insists that Mexico is culturally very different from the United States, and the success of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican and American cultures.<sup>38</sup> Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. Its cultural differences with East Asian countries might inhibit and perhaps even preclude its promoting regional economic integration. Common culture, in Huntington's view, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. He predicts that if cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centred on China; and this bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence.

For Huntington cultural identity is more important than other forms of identity; and, in contemporary world, the importance of cultural identification is dramatically increasing in comparison with other forms of identity. Identity is defined, according to Huntington, in relation to "other", with separate codes to govern those who are "like us" and those who are not.<sup>39</sup> Finally, to Huntington, conflicts are ubiquitous. "It is human to hate," he proclaims.<sup>40</sup>

Huntington observes that the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels - macro and micro. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations (usually "core" states of each civilizations) compete for military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and cultural values.<sup>41</sup> At the macro-level, the dominant division is between the "the West and the rest," with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies, mainly the Chinese, on the one hand, and the West on the other. Huntington indicates that the "dangerous clashes of the future" are likely to arise from the interaction of "Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness".<sup>42</sup> The clash of civilizations is also manifested at the micro-level, where adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle. That is, micro-level variety of "clash of civilizations" occurs at the local level - some times at the regional level between neighbouring countries; and at others, within countries between ethno-religious communities who are parts of various contending civilizations. These local level rivalries are what Huntington calls "fault line" wars. Fault line wars are basically communal hostilities, where the central issue is control over territory and the expulsion or killing of people of other religious backgrounds; in short, ethno-religious cleansing. Huntington

argues, albeit controversially, that fault line conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims.<sup>43</sup>

Huntington holds that the "fault lines" between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. As the Cold War ended, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has re-emerged. According to Huntington, the most significant dividing line in Europe may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more catholic Western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. The peoples to the north and west of this line are protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experience of European history. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe.

Huntington stresses that the conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia, where, according to Henry Kissinger, the great powers of the region "treat one another as strategic rivals."<sup>44</sup> The "historic clash between Muslim and Hindu" in the Indian subcontinent between Pakistan and India, the "ruthless policy" of China towards the Buddhist people of Tibet and the Muslim minority inside China are, Huntington suggests, all the instances of civilizational conflicts. Huntington believes that a "new cold war" has developed in the relationship between Japan and the United States, as Japanese-American relations became increasingly

heated with controversies over a wide range of issues in the 1990s. Yet, Huntington assumes that in the Japanese-American relations, cultural differences exacerbate economic conflicts. Economic issues between the United States and Europe, while may not be any less serious "but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization."<sup>45</sup> To substantiate his argument about the increasing acrimony between the US and Japan, Huntington cites the results of the public opinion surveys conducted in the early years of 1990s, which portrayed one as posing security threat to the other. <sup>46</sup>

The fundamental clash though will be between the West, on one side, and Sinic and Islamic civilizations, on the other, the rise of China is perhaps the greatest factor for conflict. China sees the US in particular as out to subvert and contain it. The US sees China as a rival super power-in-the-making, with stands on various issues which it finds troubling. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the US have surfaced in three major areas, such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation; and, Huntington believes that these differences are unlikely to moderate.

The sustained expansion of China's military power is seen by Huntington as "centrally important" to the development of counter-West military capabilities. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces. As China grows, Huntington foresees a tendency on the part of the entire region to bandwagon with Beijing and increasingly to exclude Western influences. This is not acceptable to the US

which for a century has wanted to preserve a balance of power in East Asia. Huntington visualises that a major war could occur if the United States challenges China's rise as the hegemonic power in Asia.<sup>47</sup> The antagonism between China and the West is also more basic and normative in terms of ethos and values. The Confucian ethos of China and the Western values are inimical to each other. Confucianism's stress on authority, hierarchy, subordination of the individual to the community, among other values, stand opposed to the West's insistence on reason, egalitarianism, and the primacy of individual interests and freedom.

Huntington argues that conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1300 years. Obviously attacking Fukuyama's thesis of "end of history", Huntington asserts that the twentieth-century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.<sup>48</sup> The warfare between Arabs and the West, he asserts, culminated in 1990, when the US sent a massive military force to the Persian Gulf against Iraq, thereby afflicting the feeling of "some Arabs." Huntington also attempts to establish a link between the introduction of democratic elements in "many Arab countries" and the emergence of anti-West Islamic forces, suggesting that the former engenders the latter. As autocratic Arab political systems open, the principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. "In the Arab world," Huntington writes, "in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces." This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

There are some key factors responsible for the increasing conflict between the Western and Islamic civilizations. (i) Population growth in the Islamic countries has generated large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young people who "become recruits to Islamic causes, exert pressure on neighbouring societies, and migrate to the West."<sup>49</sup> (ii) The Islamic resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence in the distinctive character and worth of their civilization and values compared to those of the West. (iii) The efforts of the West to universalise its values and institutions, to maintain its military and economic superiority, and to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim countries generate intense resentment among Muslims. (iv) The collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each perceive the other as the major threat. (v) Finally, increasing contacts between the two civilizations stimulate in each a new sense of its own identity and how it differs from the other. Increasing interaction between the two has also led to a decline in tolerance towards the other.

A key element of Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilization relates to the development of cooperation among non-Western countries to compete with the West. The most prominent form of this cooperation, Huntington suggests, is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power. The West wants a world order that is based on its values which it claims are universal. As their strength and confidence grow, non-Western societies too want a world order which reflects their values and codes. In particular, as China rises to power, it will want to refashion the world order. As the Islamic resurgence continues, Muslims will want their preferences reflected in the governing codes of world order. However, the two challenger civilizations, while poles apart culturally,

have an interest in combating against Western arrogance and power. Huntington presents the growing multiple ties between China and some of the Muslim countries as part of a quasi Confucian-Islamic alliance. Besides, China's conflicts with the West mean that it will have partnership with other anti-West states, of which Islam furnishes the largest and most influential member. In addition, China's increasing needs for oil are likely to impel it to expand its relations with the major oil-rich Muslim countries.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missiles and other sophisticated weapon systems so as to counter the military power of the West. Such a situation has led, according to Huntington, to the emergence of a "new form of arms competition" between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. Of course, one may well argue about the difficulty of forming an anti-Western coalition between the Sinic and Islamic societies. Sinic and Islamic civilizations differ fundamentally in terms of religion, culture, social structure, tradition, politics, and basic assumptions at the roots of their way of life. But, Huntington wants to clear the matter when he says that Islamic and Sinic societies see the West as their "antagonist" and thus have reason to cooperate with each other against the West, "even as the Allies and Stalin did against Hitler."<sup>50</sup> For Huntington, the links between the two civilizations has already been established; by the early 1990s, a "Confucian-Islamic connection" was in place between China and North Korea, on one hand, and in varying degrees Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria, on the other, to confront the West.<sup>51</sup>

But, Huntington asserts that the central axis of world politics

in the future is likely to be the conflict between the West and the rest, and the responses of non-western civilizations to Western power and values. According to him, the responses of the non-Western states take one or a combination of three forms: to pursue a course of isolation and thus opt out of the participation in West-dominated global system; to join the West and accept its values and institutions; and to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institution; in short, to modernise but not to Westernise.<sup>52</sup>

In his theory of the clash of civilization, Huntington, besides bringing in the civilizational factor in the forefront of global intercourse and diplomacy, also portrays the implications of civilizational framework for the West in general and for the United States in particular. (i) Huntington submits that the emerging politics of culture, the rising power of non-Western civilizations, and the increasing cultural assertiveness of these societies are the new realities. But, the "American elites" have been slow to accept and come to grips with these emerging realities.<sup>53</sup> (ii) Huntington also observes that American foreign policy thinking also suffered from a reluctance to abandon, alter, at times even reconsider policies adopted to meet Cold War needs of the past. Though Huntington recognises that the Cold War legacies should not be lightly cast aside, "neither, however, is it necessarily in the interests of the United States or the West for them to be continued in their Cold War form." The realities of a multi-civilizational world "suggest that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be expanded to include other Western societies," and he also opposes the inviolability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which was a device of the Cold War era."<sup>54</sup> (iii) Huntington strongly argues that

in the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture receives challenges from the non-Western civilizations. Huntington discounts the view of a "universal civilization" or the idea that the Western civilization represents the universal civilization. In his "end of history" thesis, when Francis Fukuyama talked about the 'Western idea' becoming universal, he was referring to the Western-style liberal democratic institutions as becoming universal norms. According to Huntington, however, the very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of non-Western societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Huntington admits that at a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated across the world. If non-Western societies, Huntington argues, are once again to be shaped by Western culture, it will happen only as a result of the "expansion, development, and impact of Western power."<sup>55</sup> But, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in Other civilizations. Huntington maintains that the West differs from Other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions,<sup>56</sup> which include ideas of pluralism, individualism, liberalism, democracy, free market, the separation of Church and state, etc.<sup>57</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has said that such ideas are "European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption."<sup>58</sup> Huntington argues that such Western values often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures and Western efforts to propagate them produce, instead, resentments from these non-Western civilizations. Huntington declares that the principal responsibility of Western leaders is not to attempt to reshape other

civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization, and that responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the United States.<sup>59</sup>

It was widely assumed, since nineteenth century, that as countries throughout the world adopted modern technologies, they would also assimilate the values of the European societies. John Gray, a supporter of Huntington's "no universal civilization" view, holds that such assimilation has not happened in history, and argues that "the late modern world is not treading a road that leads inevitably to a universal civilization. Instead, as ever more countries enter into late modernity, enduring differences between cultures are acquiring a greater practical importance."<sup>60</sup> Convinced with cultural particularism, Huntington is very sceptic about American foreign policy commitments to make liberal values universal. He argues that the values embodied in Western understanding of liberal democracy do not command universal assent. They express the ethical life of a few Western societies. They are not authoritative for all cultures. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy-issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. "Most important," he asserts, "the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations." This is an incisive criticism of Fukuyama's neo-Wilsonian perspective that Western values are universal.

Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington argues that modernisation and westernisation are not one and the same. "Everyone wants to be modern but not everybody wants to be western."<sup>61</sup> In his view, Western civilization is the only

civilization which is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western, and so far, only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Huntington holds that non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the elements of modernization – economic strength, technology, skills, machines and weapons, etc. They will also attempt to reconcile modernism with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence, Huntington argues, the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from the West. "This," Huntington stresses, "will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations."<sup>62</sup>

If global politics is based on civilizational conflict, what can be done to control situations that could escalate and to terminate conflicts short of large scale violence? In other words, what steps be taken to manage civilizational conflicts? In this regard, Huntington recommends that the core states must follow three "rules" - the abstention rule, the mediation rule, and the commonalities rule. The abstention rule requires "core states to abstain from civilization." The mediation rule emphasises that "core states negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations." And commonalities rule says that "people in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilization." Huntington recognises that in a world of civilizational clash, these rules would not be easy to implement, but he sees no other way if there is to be peace and stability in the world.

So far, we have discussed the major propositions of Huntington's theory of the clashing civilizations. Huntington argues that civilizational consciousness is on the rise because cultural ferment generally is on the rise and because cultural identity is more important than other forms of identity. He claims that civilizational loyalties and antagonisms are structuring the basic friendships and enmities in world politics. Is he correct? Kanti Bajpai says that there is evidence to support Huntington, but also enough data to raise doubts.<sup>63</sup>

To complete the scheme of this essay, we may now make a general attempt to provide a critical estimation of Huntington's key positions. (i) Huntington's civilizational framework cannot be considered as a new one. A major criticism of Huntington's civilization theory is that its claim to originality is at best tenuous. He has dealt with the cycle of societies and states through the civilizational prism. The civilization theory is now at least a century and a quarter old. It is widely accepted that the theory was first put out by the Russian Nikolai Danilievsky in 1871 in his work, *Russia and Europe*. In twentieth century, the civilization theory was further popularised mainly by the works of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. M.K. Palat observes that during the Cold War years civilizations were discussed by scholars, but without civilization theory. The theory thus already enjoys a notorious pedigree.<sup>64</sup> (ii) Huntington's contention that cultural identity should be given top priority and that it is increasingly superseding other forms of identity is difficult to accept. According to Huntington, when the world was bipolar what was important was "which side you are on;" but now in the post-Cold War world, what is important is "what are you?" But the questions "who am I?; what do I belong to?" are obviously perennial and classical ones. In

fact, in the Greek philosophy, Socrates laid emphasis on knowing oneself. And in the Eastern philosophies too, particularly in the Hindu and Sufi Islamic traditions, the basic emphasis is on knowing oneself ("one who could know oneself, would know the entire universe"). In Afro-Asian societies, the emphasis has always been on self-identity. Hence what Huntington has submitted cannot be taken as a new discovery. Asghar Ali Engineer argues that since Huntington is a Western scholar, he did not know the Eastern thought intimately enough, and further insists that "for him (Huntington) to lay emphasis on self-identity is a post-Soviet phenomenon."<sup>65</sup> At another level, the issue of giving priority to cultural affinities is to be taken with a pinch of salt, in view of rising global attention for common concerns like environmental issues, universal health problems, natural calamities, etc. There is evidence that a sense of obligation transcending ethnic, national and civilizational bonds is expanding in the world to address to these issues. Admittedly, such a sense of obligation has translated into support for international functional humanitarian institutions including those of the United Nations.<sup>66</sup> It is also manifested in the growth of a global civil society comprising non-governmental organisations which contest the claims of cultural affinity based on cast, language and religion. The global agendas and obligations contest and dilute the claims of ethnic affinities or nationalism restricted to one's fellow nationals.<sup>67</sup> The international community's response to help the Asian countries affected by the Tsunami in December 2004, which killed more than 2 lakhs of people, was a clear example of how the concern for common causes could dilute the barriers of cultural variables. Huntington says, "it is human to hate;" but it is also equally human to help and cooperate.

Criticism can also be levelled against Huntington's definition of civilization. The proposition or predication by which he defines a civilization is religion. Civilizations, however, cannot be strait-jacketed into singular religious identities. They are backed by social mores, technological, economic, cultural and creative capacities which transcend religious affiliations and theocratic identities.<sup>68</sup> Criticising Huntington's definition of civilization as based on "narrow perception" the noted scholar-diplomat, J.N. Dixit, stressed that all the major religions of the world do not in themselves encompass the entire civilizational identity of a people who claim affiliation to one religion or the other.<sup>69</sup> Huntington divides the map of the world pointing out the cultural "fault lines." But culture is a pretty difficult thing to confine into boundaries. It blows across lands, and one cannot compartmentalise culture and draw a boundary or line of limitation across continents. Huntington seems to be following a mechanical approach to a thing as abstract as culture; and does neither explain nor concede any cross-cultural ventilation. Indeed, in many cases there are no clear boundaries between civilizations. In several parts of Asia "civilizations" intermingle with one another. D. Banerjee, a leading Indian strategic analyst, observes that dividing of "fault lines" between civilizations is blurred in many cases, including India and South East Asia. He writes: "We find it difficult to locate a Hindu civilization.... There is instead a larger Indian civilization that transcends religion," and further insists that in South East Asia there is "a much closer intermingling of "civilizations" which does not again allow the identification of "fault lines."<sup>70</sup>

In his "clash" thesis, Huntington jumbles up religion and culture, fudges the difference between them, and ends up using one for the other and both for each other. But, it is

difficult to say that, all the time culture and religion are one and same. Let us take the example of Islam. Do a Russian Muslim, and an Indonesian Muslim, and a Chinese Muslim, and an African Muslim, share the same concept of Islamic culture? Religion, yes. Neetesh Misra writes that, "the Islam of South East Asia with major Hindu and Buddhist influences, is similar in religion – not in culture – to the Middle Eastern Islam, and does in no way relate to the revivalist assertive Islam that Samuel P. Huntington refers to. Neither does the Russian. Nor the Chinese. Nor the African."<sup>71</sup> So, within the one big monolith of a religion, there might be openings for other religions to seep through. One religion might consist of more than one cultural strains. The question does not end there. How will Huntington classify the Whites of South Africa, with a typical Western contempt for the Blacks and yet an inherent sense of South African culture? How will he classify the millions of Blacks in the US that live in its suburbs, its shanty towns; and their poverty?

Huntington's argument is that the "fault lines" between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflicts in global politics, and that ideology and power equations are no longer relevant. Donald J. Puchala asserts that, though Huntington's contentions and predictions are worthy of serious discussion, however, the intellectual level at which the discussion about clashing civilizations is being engaged is both "theoretically unsophisticated and historically uninformed."<sup>72</sup> J.N. Dixit observes that Huntington's argument is not only "factually wrong" but "intellectually misrepresented." Huntington seems to have underplayed the role of nations and of nationalism in history. And, obviously, we are not about to see the end of the nation and the beginning of the "one world", or large national groupings

totally subsuming state sovereignty. Now, as in the past, wars are commonly waged between (and within) nationalities and ethnicities, not between different civilizations. Whether or not they are waged by the agents of sovereign states, the old, familiar logic of territories and alliances often impels members of the same "civilization" into enmity and members of different "civilizations" into making common cause. In the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Iran threw in its lot with Christian Armenia, not with Islamic Azerbaijan. The Iran-Iraq war and the genocidal conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi occurred within what Huntington understands as single civilizations. When the Russian army invaded Chechnya, in large measure to prevent its secession, the nearby Muslim-majority Azerbaijan sided with Moscow and not with Chechen rebels who are Muslim. Azerbaijan did so for reasons of its own economic and military dependence on Russia and also because it is facing secessionist problem in Nagorno-Karabakh. Conflict and cooperation in global politics has largely been determined by states' national interests and strategic perceptions. It has been observed that neither economic rivalries nor military conflicts can be understood when viewed through the distorting lens of civilizational conflict.<sup>73</sup> Shibashis Chatterjee has observed that Huntington labours a great deal on civilization fault lines and the conflict they induce, without explaining why such conflicts were not regular power conflicts, fought over hard material interest.<sup>74</sup>

Whereas Huntington has proposed for the non-relevance of the Cold War classification of the world into East and West, he has not been able to liberate himself from being influenced by the Cold War under-currents. "The peoples of the West," Huntington has warned, "must hang together, or most assuredly they will hang separately." This clarion call

presupposes that Western civilization- "the peoples of the West" - can be identified easily and un-problematically. Yet the old and familiar polarities of East and West never had a fixed or simple meaning. During the Cold War, "the East" meant the Soviet bloc; in the Cold War's immediate aftermath, in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, it came to refer to an older division between Eastern and Western Christianity; and now it is being invoked, by Huntington and others, to capture America's relation with China and sections of the Arab world. John Gray argues: "When Huntington refers to 'Western civilization,' he does not invoke an extended family of cultural traditions that has endured for centuries or millennia. He invokes a construction of the Cold War, with few points of leverage on the World that is taking shape around us."<sup>75</sup>

Huntington suggests that civilizations are power blocs. Now, even if civilizations may be said to exist as large cultural universes, that does not make of them power groupings in international politics. M.K. Palat says that the "weakest point" of civilisation theory is the confusion of civilization with a power bloc.<sup>76</sup> Obviously, an Islamic civilization may indeed be discerned, but not an Islamic power conglomerate in the manner of the West or China. If Islam has ever acted as a single political entity in history, M.K. Palat observes, it was only during the first few centuries of Arab expansion; but thereafter the numerous Turkic dynasties in India, Central Asia, and Ottoman Empire, the sundry Arab states stretching from West Asia to Spain, or the states of Iran and of South East Asia, never acted in concert. MK. Palat further says: "Only to the imagination of the Christian West, inflamed by crusading propaganda, did Islam seem a single political force."<sup>77</sup> That paranoia of medieval times has been resurrected in this century as an instrument of Western

intervention in West Asia. Huntington's work is witness to such obsessions.

A major part of Huntington's "clash" thesis is the proposition that the West, particularly the United States, is in conflict with China and with Islamic civilisation. Such conflict is caused due primarily to the West's insistence that its values should be regarded as universal by the non-Western civilizations. Asserting Western civilization as the dominant one in the world, Huntington, in an interview, says: "People in that civilization, particularly in the United States, want to promote Western values of capitalism, democracy and human rights in other societies. It is quite natural for people in other societies to react against these Western intrusions."<sup>78</sup> Non-Western civilizations see the West's conception of universalism as a mask and as hypocritical. Over and above the West's insistence, the fault seems to lie with the non-Western societies-their cultural ferment and resentment directed primarily against the West. Broadly, Huntington suggests that China and the Sinic civilization and Islamic civilization are pitched against the West because of their resurgence and because of a basic difference in values.

Huntington has emphasised the issues of weapon proliferation, trade, and human rights as the main reasons which caused tensions in the Sino-US relations. This is partly true. But what is interesting is the fact that the two countries, at the same time, have shown an increasing interest in coming closer and establishing mutually beneficial cooperation in different fields at different levels. The bumpy path of rapprochement and of exploring cooperation between China and the US could be said to have started since the first half of 1970s when US presidents Nixon and Ford paid the breakthrough visits to China in February 1972 and December 1975 respectively. Since then, two countries have forged close

strategic relations notwithstanding serious differences on a host of issues. The visit of the Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, to the US in 1997 yielded a consensus over a "strategic partnership" oriented toward the 21st century; thereby laying fresh ground for further cementing the ties between the two countries. American president Bill Clinton's trip to China in 1998 gave a definite impetus to the proposed strategic partnership. It resulted in a bilateral commitment to a joint promotion of peace and security and reduction of tensions in Asia-Pacific region and the world at large, etc. Major concrete results of the trip included Clinton's declaration of a "three no's" Taiwan policy (no Taiwan independence, no two Chinas, no Taiwan entry into any international organisations for which statehood is required), a bilateral decision to de-target nuclear missiles, the pact on the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the signing of contracts worth 3.12 billion dollars. In September 1998, Chinese and US defence ministers held discussions on carrying out the agreement reached between the two heads of states on military exchanges and cooperation. When the Chinese prime minister, Zhu Rongji visited the US in April 1999, the first visit to US by a Chinese premier in 15 year, he made it clear in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) that Washington had nothing to fear from Beijing either economically or military.<sup>79</sup>

Besides strengthening bilateral relations with the United States, China has also started supporting and cooperating with the Western-led arms control regimes, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Beijing played a key role in brokering the nuclear deal with North Korea and continues to exercise a restraining influence on

Pyongyang. It is a key player in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the security forum of ASEAN. On the economic front, China is already part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) which brings together Pacific Asia and its Western trading partners in the larger Pacific region. China and ASEAN have identified several areas for their mutual cooperation. In 2001, the two sides agreed to create a free-trade area (FTA) within 10 years, forming a trillion-dollar market which they hope will propel their economies to new heights. The two sides aim to create the FTA by 2015. In November 1999 China and the United States signed market access agreement which paved the way for Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. The formation of Shanghai Cooperation Council in June 2001 provides another opportunity to China to expand cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian republics in areas of energy, security and meeting the threats of global terrorism.

The importance of China to the US global security strategy has been clearly reflected in the Washington's official documents. *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, a White House document, says: "A stable, open, prosperous People's Republic of China that assumes its responsibilities for building a more peaceful world is clearly and profoundly in our (US) interests. The prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China's role as a responsible member of the international community."<sup>80</sup> The document further observes that, the US policy toward China is "both principled and pragmatic; expanding our areas of cooperation while dealing forthrightly with our differences," and adds that seeking to isolate China is "unworkable" and "dangerous".<sup>81</sup> Again, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002," says: "The United

States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China."<sup>82</sup> Indeed, the rise of China as a major power presents both challenges and opportunities in the regional security strategy of the United States. Washington has acknowledged that testing security in the Asia-Pacific region would not be possible without a constructive role played by China. China, on its part, has stressed that the undergoing profound changes of the world "require the discard of the Cold War mentality and the development of a new security concept and a new international political, economic and security order responsive to the needs of our time. The core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation."<sup>83</sup> It is quite indicative that the United States cannot overlook Chinese importance in its global security strategy, particularly in Asia-Pacific region, and China expects the United States not to behave with the old Cold War perspective on global politics. No doubt, differences are bound to crop up in the course of their interaction for obvious reasons but they do not constitute the over-riding aspects of their bilateral relations which have been characterised by the presence of a mixture of elements of confrontations and compromises. When the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, said that "we will treat China as she merits... China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way,"<sup>84</sup> he was probably pointing to the foreign policy choice of the US which will in no case allow Washington to be identified as China's enemy. Speaking at the Asia Security Conference in Singapore in June 2005, the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, emphasised that China posed no threat to Washington and insisted that "no nation threatens China" either.<sup>85</sup> It would be incorrect to present,

as Huntington suggests, the Sino-US relations to be always in a state of dagger's-drawn which precludes the scope for mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries.

Huntington's formulation that the Sinic societies are increasingly being drawn to each other is also questionable. Contrary to Huntington's expectation, Taiwan and Singapore, the other major Sinic countries in Asia, are not towing the Chinese line. If any thing, both remain staunch security allies of the US. Mainly due to security considerations coupled with economic and political affinities, the South East Asian countries have since the end of Second World War been allies of the West, not China.<sup>86</sup>

Huntington's other contention about China that it is growing in strength and confidence so much so that it can challenge the West is only partly true. There is no doubt that China's strategic capabilities have grown and are a matter of concern to US and its strategic partners in Asia. However, at the same time, China views itself as a developing power with big power potential – a position it seeks to reach over the next fifty years.<sup>87</sup> But, can a resurgent China be able to pose a "threat" to the West or for that matter, to the South East and East Asian region? Two clear schools of thought have emerged over the course of the 1990s about the validity of a "China threat" in the 21st century. (a) Those who favour the engagement of China argue that through a process of embracing market economics and integration with the regional and global inter-dependent political economy, any incentive for China to undertake military adventurism will be constrained by the need for China to ensure continued economic interaction with the outside world. It is further argued that the potential economic consequences of Chinese aggression outweigh the potential strategic or military gains

of such aggression and it is hoped this will moderate China's behaviour.<sup>88</sup> (b) The alternative school of thought focuses on China's military modernisation, and its declared territorial ambitions in the region. President Jiang Zemin had regarded a modern military as the "basic guarantor of state security and modernisation."<sup>89</sup> Through China's acquisition of power projection capabilities and high technology weapons, China becomes increasingly capable of using military force to achieve regional goals such as the control of the South China Sea and the retaking of Taiwan. Beyond these two clear goals however, China does not seem to become a militarily dominant power in East Asia for many decades.<sup>90</sup>

According to Malcolm R. Davis, it is not in China's interest to use military force against regional states if that course were to ultimately cost China a great deal of economic pain and diplomatic isolation. One key reason why China was constrained from launching direct military attacks on Taiwan during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis was a combination of a forward US military presence and the risk that a direct China-US military clash over Taiwan would have unimaginable long-term political and economic consequences. Malcolm R. Davis further observes: "Beijing clearly felt that continued economic development and engagement with the West was too important to risk going beyond a show of military force."<sup>91</sup>

The question of China's capability (or incapability) to take on the West (and its allies) also needs to be examined in the context of its domestic economic and political vulnerabilities and the preparedness of its military technology. China has many weaknesses on these counts and, apparently, the Chinese are well aware of them. Although, Beijing receives one of the highest foreign direct investment in the world (third position in the world) and maintains annually a growth

rate of 11 per cent or so, its per capita income of 620 dollars remains at Third World levels. Yes, the Chinese economic reform is one of the most successful ones in the world in the recent past, and the merits of the Beijing's economic transformations have largely been acclaimed in various quarters. Amartya Sen in his first D.T. Lakdawak Memorial Lecture, revealed how in the pre-reform period, Chinese leadership paid special attention to universal literacy, widespread health-care and nutritional adequacy, and land reforms. All these efforts at "social changes", to use Sen's language, prepared individuals to respond to opportunities when they were made available since the beginning of the economic reforms. "The force of China's market economy rests on the solid foundations of social changes that had occurred earlier," says Sen.<sup>92</sup> Now, what is feared is whether the Chinese leaders will be able to defend the gains of these "social changes" from being influenced and tarnished by the forces of market orientation. The emergence of a "socialist market economy" in China since 1992 has nothing to do with socialism; what Chinese are "trying," argues William Hinton, is "a shortcut to capitalism."<sup>93</sup> It has been asserted that "market reforms" have fundamentally subverted Chinese socialism and led the country down a slippery slope toward an increasingly capitalist, foreign-dominated development path. In fact, the current economic development of China has been seen in some circle as a form of "undeclared capitalism".<sup>95</sup> The vulnerability of the Communist Party of China in the wake of economic reforms has been felt in some quarters. Prabhat Patnaik argues that "the maintenance of the discipline and the purity" of the CPC "is bound to become increasingly difficult in a context where private enterprise and profit-making are being encouraged." <sup>96</sup> Prabhat Patnaik further observes:

There is an element of idealism in believing that the

Communist Party can forever be immune to impulses emanating from civil society and remain as the guarantor of the socialist tradition. The crystallisation of a powerful new bourgeoisie in the latter, the corruption that would be inevitably associated with such crystallisation, are all bound to impinge on the Party itself, fragmenting it and fracturing it in a manner that threatens the continuity of the socialist tradition itself.<sup>97</sup>

The Chinese political authority, which is spearheading the reform process, may become vulnerable from another dimension too. The reported "internal power struggle" within the Chinese hierarchy apart, which erupts from time to time, the other forces which may give a threat to the existing Chinese political set-up include that of the pro-democracy movement whose future strength and dynamics, though uncertain, cannot easily be wished away. But unfortunately, Huntington, it seems, has not given enough attention to the nature and direction of the Chinese economic transformation which formed an important foundation for Chinese resurgence and modernity. Some of the critics of Huntington have observed that he simplifies his perception of China by grading it under "Confucianism" whereas what is happening in China is a new experiment in "socialist market economy", with all its Western orientations.<sup>98</sup>

China also remains vulnerable in terms of its military capability. No doubt, the Chinese armed forces are undergoing modernisation, but the country still lacks what is known as a real "power projection" capability. Indigenously developed aircraft carriers are not likely to appear until 2020 and the PLA remains deficient in amphibious lift capabilities. Most of its naval surface combatants lack effective area air defence system, making

the PLA's destroyers and frigates highly vulnerable to attack once they deploy beyond the range of kind base air cover.<sup>99</sup> The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has a largely obsolete strategic strike capability. Acquisition of 72 Sukhoi Su-30 MK Flankers fighter from Russia, under an agreement signed in June 1999, may give China an additional long-range strike capability but only if such aircraft can utilize the support of air to air re-fuelling (AAR) aircraft and air-borne early warning (AEW) aircraft - two important capabilities currently lacking from PLAAF force structure. The army itself is still largely organised around the task of defeating a "massive invasion" of China from the former Soviet Union. According to Malcolm R. Davis, without effective strategic airlift capability, or a substantial improvement in amphibious lift, "the PLA looks set to remain a force effective only on the Eurasian mainland for the immediate future".<sup>100</sup>

China not only lacks in power projection capabilities needed to deploy military force at any great distance from China but also the key elements of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) capabilities that would allow China to wage information-led warfare against a range of adversaries. Information-led warfare is what Alvin Toffler termed as "wave theory of conflict", according to which conflicts in the future, in order to achieve precision and accuracy, will be carried out through the widespread use of computers, microchips, and stealth technologies; and interestingly enough, the United States used the RMA-type capabilities "effectively" during its military operations against Iraq and Serbia. Although Huntington's contention that the Chinese civilisation presents a threat/challenge to the West has been criticised and rejected by the Chinese themselves. In fact, besides Huntington, the concept of "China threat" to the West after the end of Cold War has also been projected in

some circle.<sup>101</sup> China's experts have argued that Huntington's formulation, like other variants of "China threat" theory, has the "aim of containing China's development."<sup>102</sup> Deng Xiaoping pointed out two reasons why China's development has caused such a panic. One is the fear that China will pursue hegemonism after it grows strong, and the other is the fear that China will compete with the West when it gets stronger.<sup>103</sup> But China's experts have urged that such fears, though understandable, cannot justify the hostilities extended to China. Wang Zhongren says: "The assumption that only Western countries have the right to development is exactly an expression of self-centred nationalism, a remnant of colonialism and the logic of hegemonism."<sup>104</sup>

In his clashing civilizations, Huntington similarly proposes that one of the greatest conflicts will be between the West and Islam. He says that "the Islamic world is increasingly hostile toward the West." He claims that, besides China, Islamic world is gaining in strength and confidence, and will stick together and pitch against the West. Arguably, one may say safely that the Muslim countries, due to the religious factors, have some commonalities; but it will be quite erroneous to submit that there are no differences or divisions within the Islamic world. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a "civil war" has been going on within the Islamic civilisation between moderates and extremists.<sup>105</sup> The relations between Iran and Afghanistan are not in good shape. Iran and Pakistan are on friendly terms, but on some key issues such as Afghanistan and Central Asia, there are differences between the two. Iraq's relations with the Gulf States and Iran have not been friendly and we are yet to see a clear change of the situation in this regard in the post-Saddam era. At one stage, Egypt was condemned by almost all the Muslim states for its "selfish" policy towards the Middle East

problem. Apart from differences and divisions, another problem faced by the Islamic world is the absence of leadership. As Huntington himself notes, there is no "core" power in the Islamic civilization; there is no great power among the Muslim countries, and little prospect of one. It is a contradiction: If there is no "core," who will organise the Islamic civilization? The Islamic countries do not have an economic power-house amongst them; nor do they have a great military organisation at their disposal. Even the much-vaunted oil power of the Muslim world is rather limited. Any major attempt to withhold oil supplies is implausible and such attempt may invite counter-measures, including sanctions.

Huntington's contention that the Islamic world is pitched against the West is also questionable. Instead of sticking up together against the West, many Muslim countries actually line up with the United States. Egypt, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Central Asian states, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia look to the United States for aid, investment, technology, trade, and above all, for security. As Akbar S. Ahmed says: "The Muslim world seems to be torn between those who would shake heaven and earth to get a green card and become Americans and those who would shake heaven and earth to destroy or damage Americans. For both groups, the United States is the most important, most visible, and most powerful representation of all that is good or bad in Western civilization."<sup>106</sup>

Another important part of Huntington's observation of the Islamic world is that according to him, in the so-called "fault line wars," Muslims are most often involved. He talks about the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia with its "bloody borders." Huntington argues that Islam's emphasis on military virtues and its tradition of

war is one reason it is involved in fault line violence. Huntington contrasts Islamic to Christian societies to show that the former is more militaristic. Such views, according to Kanti Bajpai, seem to be quite myopic.<sup>107</sup> In history, Christian societies have had records of warfare and conquest which exceeded that of Islamic. One can recall the thirteen or so Crusades that lasted from 1095 to 1444 A.D.; inter-Christian warfare in Europe; colonial wars and conquests; the two world wars (which were wars within Western civilization and which Huntington also seems to admit), and the military power of the present-day "Christian civilisation" which includes nuclear, chemical and biological – all these add up to a history and tradition of militarism which leaves Islam far behind.<sup>108</sup> Huntington's claim of Islam's indigestibility as a key reason for its propensity towards violence is also not acceptable. Huntington, of course, maintains that Muslims and non-Muslim groups engage in mutual intolerance, but it is Islam, according to Huntington, which is more to blame. In his view, other religious groups have less trouble living with each other than Muslim. But, is Islam as indigestible as Huntington suggests? Obviously taking an opportunity to discard Huntington's claims, Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, in his speech at the 27th General Conference of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) held in January 1994, observed: "If we look at the conduct of Muslims in the societies which they established all over the world, we find out that their history, especially at times of prosperity, was a model of co-existence, harmony, tolerance and rejection of segregation, discrimination and intolerance."<sup>109</sup> In reality, what is striking historically, Kanti Bajpai argues, about Islam is its acceptability, its digestibility. The spread of Islam over many hundreds of years is, in the popular imagination of non-Muslims, attributed to forced conversion, but this, as

Kanti Bajpai stresses, is improbable.<sup>110</sup> Most converts came to Islam peacefully, in a variety of ways. Some were attracted to its spiritual and social tenets. Some converted in the wake of conquest, in order to find political, social or economic favour with the new rulers and their courts. Some converted when their leaders were won over to the faith. Islam was digestible for another reason – its science, technology, and arts enriched other civilizations.<sup>111</sup>

According to Mohammed Yunus, one of the major reasons for the “resurgence of Islam” throughout the world is to be found in the link between the fall of the Marxist ideology and the necessity of filling up the vacuum created by such a fall. Mohammed Yunus argues that after the fall of the Marxist shibboleth along with the eclipse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the perennial search for the perfect society or Utopia seems to be turning, more than even before in the twentieth century, toward renewed reliance on revealed truth among believers in religion, and this development is described by some as religious revival.<sup>112</sup> He goes on to add: “The disappearance of the Soviet element from Marxist phenomena seems to have accentuated the activism of Islamic fundamentalism in many regions.”<sup>113</sup> According to Ahmed Rashid “the growing popularity of militant Islam in Central Asia is primarily due to repressiveness of the Central Asian regimes,” which have emerged after the dismantling of the socialist project.<sup>114</sup> It has even been emphasised that “religious revivalism” or “fundamentalism” is not occurring only in Islamic society “but taking place globally in Judaism and Christianity, in Hindu and in Buddhist societies.”<sup>115</sup> It seems that the origin of “fault line conflicts” between the Muslim and non-Muslim societies cannot be due to factors which are necessarily Muslim-specific. A key root for such “conflicts” could be due to the biased representations of Islam

through the ages by Western imperial forms of knowledge, representations that have framed Islam in ways which promote conflict. According to Edward W. Said, Western knowledge and its discursive practices propagated a "reading" of Islam which spread invidious mages of its traditions and peoples.<sup>116</sup> The eruption of local conflicts should also be traced to the Western imperialist designed unleashed in the developing countries for the promotion and protection of their colonial and hegemonic interests. Though Huntington recognises the role of Western imperialism in the "subjection of Muslim societies," he has not given adequate treatment to the issue as much as he gives in his portrayal of the "Muslim faults" for the rise of "fault line conflicts."

Huntington talks of a linkage between modernisation and civilizational consciousness, stressing that modernisation leads to cultural and civilizational upsurge. According to Huntington, the processes of modernisation produce anomie and alienation for the individuals who are dislocated and cultural identity comes in to fill the gap created by modernisation. This is quite a complex and controversial formulation. If modernisation increases civilizational consciousness, then, according to Huntingdon's paradigm, one should expect those who modernised first (apart from the West), such as Latin Americans and East Asian, to have experienced a civilizational upsurge before the late comers. This will remain difficult to ascertain. Latin America and especially East Asia underwent profound changes in the 1960s and 1970s, but, as Kanti Bajpai pointed out, cultural and civilizational concerns were strikingly absent.<sup>117</sup>

The validity of Huntington's presentation of Western civilization as a monolithic entity is also doubtful. From Huntington's perspective, one should expect the United

States and Europeans to line up consistently with each other. Of course they do so on many issues, but there are also differences amongst the allies. The Report of an Independent Task Force, prepared under the co-chairmanship of Henry Kissinger and sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, has admitted the existence of differences within the Atlantic alliance,<sup>118</sup> and says that the US and its European allies "have disagreed sharply in recent years" on various international issues.<sup>119</sup> The US defence secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld's characterisation of France, Germany and other nations of Europe opposed to US war on Iraq as the "old Europe" has not gone in good taste in these countries. Differences have developed between the US and the European Union (EU) on the issue of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. Washington, which long ago embraced secular Turkey, considered as the world's most successful Muslim democracy, against "Soviet expansionism" during the Cold War, has been pushing hard with the support of Britain on behalf of Turkey for its membership of the EU. This move has been vehemently opposed by France. The debate over Turkey's membership of the EU has so far focused on how the EU will cope with allowing in a largely Muslim country. Huntington has also picked up this point and for him it was a shot in the arm as it would vindicate the validity of his clashing civilizational model. But much of that analysis has missed the point: one of the biggest barriers to Turkey's entry to EU is not that it is a Muslim country, but that it is poor.<sup>120</sup> Given that the EU is an economic union before anything else, the economic arguments for and against Turkish entry may be much more relevant than its adherence to Islam. For all the talk of a "clash of civilizations," what is being overlooked is a clash of economic interests, between a lower-middle income economy, and the wealthy industrial nations of Western Europe. Turkey's national income per head is 2,790

dollars, which is only a tenth of the United Kingdom's national income. Turkey's economy remains heavily devoted to agriculture, which is not a dominant feature to the economies of Western European countries. While agriculture is responsible for just 3 per cent of Poland's economic output (a recent entrant to EU), in Turkey, agriculture makes up for 13 per cent.

Huntington suggests that as South America is close to Western civilization culturally, it will tend to bandwagon with the West. But this viewpoint has lost much of its weight in view of the emergence of the South American Community of Nations in December 2004, bringing 12 South American countries together to create a political and economic bloc that would give them a stronger voice in dealing with the US, Europe and Asia. During the Fifth World Social Forum meet in January 2005, the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez blasted US imperialism. "The imperialist forces are starting to strike against the people of Latin America and the world," Hugo Chavez said and denounced the US for conducting foreign policy with "bombs and for attempting to dominate the global economy."<sup>121</sup> The formation of the South American Community of Nations and the left-ward political turn in much of South America signify not only the invalidity of Huntington's "bandwagon" orientation but also betrays the usual nature of conflicts of states in global politics which has long been characterised by the clash of national interests, rather than of civilizational values. It were Chile and Mexico, both close economic partners of US, who voted in the UN Security Council against US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Over the years France has shown a number of indications of its willingness to go beyond and behave independently from the framework of the Western alliance system, particularly

on security issues. It is now almost apparent that the European Union wants to have some form of a security mechanism of its own, notwithstanding the existence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) where the US reigns supreme. The move for a separate security system for the European countries indicates not only the desire on the part of the Europeans to manage the affairs of European security independently by themselves but also to provide a considerable degree of check to Washington's "dominance" on European security issues. It is no secret that the US is not unsuspicious of German's power and influence in the Western world. The first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Lionel Ismay, said in 1957 that the US needed NATO in order to "keep the Americans in, Germans down and the Russians out" in Europe. The issue of closer defence cooperation in Europe has divided the EU members. Britain wants NATO, with its strong leadership from the US, to remain the pillar of European defence while Germany, France and Belgium support closer military ties among EU members. The idea of forming a European defence force has rankled the US, which suspects that the force will be a rival to NATO. The US and the EU have also been engaging in a "trade war" on a number of issues involving banana, beef, genetically-modified crops, steel, agricultural subsidies, etc. In fact, the conflict between the US and EU mainly on agricultural subsidies and tariffs on steel imports has hijacked the summit meetings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the last few years. Trade sanctions have been imposed by each other, complaints and counter-complaints have been lodged with the WTO by the two sides, and on the issue of banning genetic crops by the EU which the US opposed, the WTO is now facing the biggest case in its history, one that could spark a damaging trade war between the US and Europe and split the international community. The EU has not been happy with the notorious

Helms-Burton Act of the US which allows Washington to impose sanctions over European trade with Cuba, Libya, and Iran, the "rogue states" (in the US parlance) allegedly engaged in the "export of terrorism" and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Though the US and the EU achieved an agreement in May 1998 to iron out the dispute on the issue, the details had not been worked out. The US and Canada have been harbouring major differences on trade in wheat, apples, wine, rice, etc, and over fishing rights. Over the years, there has also developed a conflict between the EU and Canada, on one side, and the US, on the other, on the issue of what has been variously described as American "cultural invasion" or "colonisation" in Europe and Canada. The EU and Canada have vehemently opposed the export of too much American culture through movies, television series, etc., into their regions. In Europe, the EU has urged member nations to devote 51 per cent of their air time to European programming. The American argument of freedom of information has been countered by the Canadian argument of national identity and heritage. Many European leaders have expressed fear of European culture being "colonised" by the US in the future.

Apparently, due to differences in the politico-strategic, economic and cultural fabrics, the "monolithic" character of Huntington's "Western civilization" seemed to be facing incremental limitations which breed doubts enough to question the universality of the term "Western civilization". As John Gray says: "Huntington's vision tells us more about contemporary American anxieties than it does about the late modern world. Huntington's watchword, 'Western civilization', is a familiar refrain in curricular debates in American universities. It has few points of contact with the world beyond American shores, in which 'Western'

supremacy, and indeed the very idea of 'the West', are becoming anachronism."<sup>122</sup>

Besides the points we have enumerated so far, Huntington's clashing civilization remains objectionable on a number of other counts too. His theory obviously tries to invoke the old debate about the incompatibility between the Western and Eastern values. Huntingdon unequivocally proceeds with the not-so-unusual Western wisdom when he stresses the primacy of the principles of individualism, rationalism, secularism, the rule of law, etc., in the Western societies. The Oriental societies, Huntington seems to suggest, are not only unable to comprehend these principles, they also carry a different set of principles based on traditionalism, communitarianism, sacred authority, etc. However, the secular versus sacred, or reason versus tradition, debate is a complex and passionate one.<sup>123</sup> It would be difficult to deny the contributions of Western scholarship in the construction of the entire edifice of the school of irrationalism which is largely considered as an attribution of Eastern tradition and philosophy. It would be erroneous to advance the view that the Western societies have been completely free from authoritarian regimes if the existence of dictatorial Spain and Portugal, the existence of Fascist Italy and Germany were historically correct. If colonialism is to be considered as a form of dictatorship, then, the claim of the West as the apostle of democracy can be questioned. In fact, some critics of Huntington, refuting the claim of the Harvard Professor, even pointed out that democracy in the West is of very recent origin. If the existence of "sects" is considered as a hallmark of irrationalism or traditionalism, how will one explain the existence of various sects in the West? If their existence is justified from the angle of freedom of expression or any other democratic contraptions, why not one applies the same yardsticks in the case of the "Oriental" countries?

However, unfortunately, the problem with Huntington is that he has seemingly proposed a compartmentalised approach – one for the West and one for the rest – in his appreciation of life and society, of man and matter; and the non-Western societies, particularly the Islamic, became victims of his judgement. It appears that any challenge to the West is a threat and Huntington terms it a "clash." What is not Western is a threat. But, the validity of making a distinction as between the West and non-West or Occident and Orient is highly untenable, and in fact, many analysts have rejected it. In his work, *Orientalism*, Edward W. Said wrote about the manner in which the West has, throughout history, in literature as well as in colonial administrative documents, "created" an entity known as "the Orient" as an alternative opposite to itself. The East was the "other," an irrational, amoral and abnormal opposite to the rational, virtuous and normal West. "Orientalism," says Said, is ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them"). Huntington's treatment of Western cultural edifice as something sacrosanct, as embodiment of all "virtues" is difficult to accept in its entirety. Edward W. Said, in his another study *Culture and Imperialism*, provides an extensive account of the roots of imperialism in Western culture.<sup>124</sup>

Huntington says of the existence of two pictures of Western power. The first is of overwhelming, triumphant, almost total Western dominance. He observes: "Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan...."<sup>125</sup> The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that

will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

Secondly, the power of the Western domination is declining, and he maintains that the principal responsibility of the West, in the post-Cold War period, is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of the Western civilization, for which he insists the United States to take that responsibility. Will the United States take the responsibility of promoting and protecting the West? Is the US following a foreign policy pattern as defined by Huntington's paradigm of clashing civilizations? Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a leading American academic who worked in the Carter and Clinton administrations terms the "clash of civilizations" theory as a "great mistake"<sup>126</sup> According to Augustus Richard Norton, "The idea that the West is destined to clash with Islam, has found little support in the American foreign policymaking establishment."<sup>127</sup> An authoritative document prepared by the White House in October 1998, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, states that the "US policies in the Middle East and South West Asia are not anti-Muslim – an allegation made by some opponents of our efforts to help bring lasting peace and stability to the region," and further declares that "Islam is the fastest-growing religious faith in the United States."<sup>128</sup> Huntington's clashing civilizations also received high-level official repudiation. In an important speech to the Jordanian parliament in 1994, president Bill Clinton strenuously repudiated the clash of civilizations thesis, noting that "there are those who insist that... there are impassable religious and other obstacles to harmony; that our beliefs and our cultures must somehow inevitably clash... America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide."<sup>129</sup>

Yet, the suggestion of Huntington on the implication of his clashing civilizations on US foreign policy is that foreign policy should not aim to make liberal ideas and values universal. Because Huntington is convinced that one of the fundamental causes for conflict between the West and the non-West is the attempts on the part of the former to promote liberal values on the latter. Interestingly, the American foreign policy tradition is rooted in the doctrine of what became to be known as "American exceptionalism" – the belief that the nation stood for something new under the sun, that its values were applicable universally, and that its destiny was to lead the world from the old to a "new order of the ages". Henry Kissinger observes that the United States consistently adopted a "self-appointed mission of global reform."<sup>130</sup> Kissinger notes that the "idealism of Woodrow Wilson... has spurred America's faith that history can be overcome and if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America's moral prescriptions."<sup>131</sup> But in the post-Cold War world what has happened to the promotion of America's liberal values? Has America abandoned its ideal of the promotion of values which it considered universal? Henry Kissinger has said that Washington "rejected the concept of the balance of power, convinced that it was either able to stand apart from the quarrels of other nations or that it could bring about universal peace by insisting on the implementation of its own values of democracy and self-determination."<sup>132</sup> It seems that in terms of declared principles and objectives, the US is pursuing ideals which Washington assumes have universal bearing. At the Joint Session of the US Congress on 14 September 1990, president George Bush said: "Out of these troubled times our objective – a new world order can emerge a new era free from threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the

world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.”<sup>133</sup> On 29 January 1991, in his speech at the joint session of the US Congress, the US president repeated his call of a new world order, “where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.”<sup>134</sup> But, foreign policies are not made of commitments only. They need to be measured with the results of their application. As Henry Kissinger said “...any foreign policy must ultimately be judged by its operational results.”<sup>135</sup> If the US employs its “position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” to its unilateral advantage, then, the call for “a new world order” may not produce the desired results. Walter Lippmann once wrote, “In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance.”<sup>136</sup> The end of the Cold War has produced what Charles Krauthammer termed the “unipolar moment”,<sup>137</sup> referring to the pre-eminence of US power. The “unipolar” picture of the post-Cold War world will certainly have a number of limitations. But it will be erroneous to conceive of a world without the United States. Brzezinski said that America’s commitment to international affairs on a global scale has been decided by history. It cannot be undone, and the only remaining relevant question is what its form and goals will be.”<sup>138</sup> Emphasising the role of the US in the post-Cold War world, president George Bush, in his speech on 29 January 1991 to the US Congress had said, “today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and requires sacrifices.”<sup>139</sup> The fundamental issue, however, is to examine in what way has the United States assumed itself leadership to take care of the world. If its pre-eminences meant for its unilateral

interests and national aggrandizement there lies "the fault line" between commitments and goals in foreign policy. If this is going to be the road-map on which the US is taking the rest of the world along, it is not, then, unnatural that the American values will have to meet resistance. Though Huntington has said that "a more broad-based, active, and formal anti-American coalition has yet to emerge."<sup>140</sup> Paul Kennedy has said that "the history of the rise and fall of the great powers has in no way come to a full stop."<sup>141</sup>

## Endnotes

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6. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *National Interest*, summer 1989.
7. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History And The Last Man* (London: Penguin Books, 1992). For a more recent statement of Fukuyama's views, see his *The End of Order* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1997)
8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 20.

11. Anil Rajimwale, "Marx, Fukuyama and 'End of History'", *Mainstream*, vol. 32, no. 15, 26 February 1994, p. 12.
12. Alexander Nacht, "US Foreign Policy Strategies", *Washington Quarterly*, summer 1995, p. 198.
13. John Gray, "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present", *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 1, January 1998, p. 150
14. Author Schlesinger, Jr., "Has Democracy a Future?", *Foreign Affairs*, September- October 1997, pp. 11-12.
15. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, summer 1993.
16. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1997)
17. *Ibid.*, p.20.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
19. *Ibid.*, pp.21, 28.
20. Huntington, n. 15, p.23.
21. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), pp.23-24.
22. Huntington, n.16, p.125.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-135.
24. *Ibid.*, p.37. These "important developments" include: the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the wars going on in their former territories; the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the world; the struggle within Russia, Turkey, and Mexico over their identity; the intensity of the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan; the resistance of Islamic states to Western pressure on Iraq and Libya; the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them; China's continuing role as an "outsider" great power; the consolidation of new democratic regimes in some countries

and not in others; and the developing arms competition in East Asia. Ibid., pp.37-38.

25. Ibid.,p.43.
26. Ibid., pp.218-238.
27. Ibid., pp. 209-218.
28. Ibid., pp. 81-84,91-95,109-121, passim.
29. Ibid., pp. 185, 238-240.
30. Ibid., pp. 241-245.
31. Huntington, n. 15, p.25
32. Ibid., p. 26.
33. Huntington, n.16, pp. 91-92.
34. Huntington, n. 15,p.26. See also Huntington, n. 16, pp. 76,129.
35. Huntington, n. 15, p.26.
36. Ibid., p. 27. See also Huntington, n. 16, p. 130.
37. Interview with Huntington, "The New World and the Western Decline," *Times of India*, 26 May 1994. See also Huntington, n. 16, pp. 130-35.
38. In a recent study Huntington says: "Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream US culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves... and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream." For details, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? America's Great Debate*, (New York: Free Press, 2004)
39. Huntington, n. 16, pp. 128-129.
40. Ibid., p. 130.
41. The issues in these conflicts are the classic ones of international politics. For the list of issues, see Huntington, n. 16, p.208.
42. Ibid., p. 183.

43. Ibid., p. 208.
44. Henry Kissinger, "America at the Apex", *National Interest*, summer 2001, p. 14
45. Huntington, n. 15, p.34.
46. Huntington, n. 16, p. 222.
47. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
48. Ibid., p.209.
49. Ibid., p.211.
50. Ibid., p. 185.
51. Ibid.
52. Huntington, n. 15, p.41.
53. Huntington, n. 16, p.309.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 310.
56. Ibid., p. 311.
57. But, a distinctive feature of Western culture, which is broadly known as capitalist consumerism, a by-product of capitalist civilization, does not find a mention in Huntington's analytical framework. Daniel Bell, an eminent US scholar, admitted that Americans were united only by hedonism, a life-style based on pleasure-seeking and gross consumerism. He says: "The cultural, if not moral, justification of capitalism has become hedonism." Daniel Bell, *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 21-22.
58. Cited in Huntington, n. 16, p. 311.
59. Ibid.
60. John Gray, n. 13, p.150.
61. Interview with Huntington, n. 37. Huntington argues that the fact that peoples across continents are embracing American

- food, clothing, pop music, movies and consumer goods does not mean that they are accepting American culture or that the American culture is becoming the universal culture of the world; nor does it signify the spread of Westernisation. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal", *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 1996.
- 62. Huntington, n. 15.
- 63. Kanti Bajpai, "Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Reconsidered," *International Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2, April-June, 1999, p. 173.
- 64. Madhavan K. Palat, "Book review on The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", *India International Centre Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1, Spring 1998, p. 161.
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- 66. Kanti Bajpai, n. 63, p. 178.
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- 69. Ibid.
- 70. D. Banerjee, "Emerging International Order: Conflict or Cooperation," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 14, no. 9, December 1993, pp. 1142-43. See also D. Banerjee, "International Strategic Situation," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 15, no. 1, April 1994, p. 77
- 71. Neelesh Misra, "Clash of Civilizations," *Mainstream*, vol. 32, no. 10, 22 January 1994, p. 34.
- 72. Donald J. Puchala, *Theory and History in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 119.
- 73. John Gray, n. 13, p. 159.

74. Shibashis Chatterjee, "Global Images: 'Realism' Contra 'Culture'?", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24 December 2005, p. 5502
75. John Gray, n. 13, pp. 157-58.
76. Madhavan K. Palat, n. 64, p. 161.
77. Ibid., p. 162.
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84. Colin Powell, "Outlines of US Foreign Policy," *Encounter*, vol. 4, no. 1, January-February 2001, pp. 55-56.
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91. Ibid.
92. Amartya Sen, *Beyond Liberalisations: Social Opportunity and Human Capability* (London: London School of Economics, 1994). See also, Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity* (New Delhi: Oxford, 1997), Chapters 2 and 4.
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