Representing civilization: Solidarism, ornamentalism, and Siam's entry into international society

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European Journal of International Relations 2010 16: 417 originally published online 19 March 2010

DOI: 10.1177/1354066109350050

Article

EJIR

European Journal of
International Relations
16(3) 417–439

DOI: 10.1177/1354066109350050
ejt.sagepub.com
SAGE

Representing civilization: Solidarism, ornamentalism, and Siam's entry into international society

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Abstract
Although norms are important in various schools of international relations theory, there has been relatively little effort to integrate their various uses of the term. Here I seek to bring together the Constructivist use of norms based on individual human agency with the English School's concept of solidarism. This perspective helps make sense of the expansion of international society, a point demonstrated through a study of the apparently anomalous case of Siam, which achieved sovereignty without developing significant military power. Siamese elites were able to gain inclusion in international society by enacting solidarism with European conceptions of 'civilized' behavior and using European conceptions of class to trump preconceptions about race.

Keywords
constructivism, English School, imperialism, Siam, state sovereignty

Norms are an important concept in various schools of international relations, but there tends to be relatively little cross-fertilization between these schools. Following Barry Buzan's suggestion that there is an affinity between the two, I propose such a synthesis between the treatment of norms in the English School and Constructivism. English School theorists tend to treat norms at the structural level: states either cooperate based on norms or they do not, depending on whether they are solidarist or not (or, in Buzan's, 2004 reformulation, on how solidarist they are). By contrast, an important line of empirical Constructivist research traces norms to their individual holders and propagators.

The Constructivist attention to agency and its relation to the concept of solidarism can illuminate a curious anomaly in the English School's approach to the expansion of international society, and the institution of sovereignty more generally. While English School theorists are interested in the way in which culture and shared norms complement

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military force and economics to inform the functioning of international society, their account of the expansion of that society fails to provide any explanation for how norms spread, except as an untheorized consequence of colonialism. For Bull (1977), Bull and Watson (1984), and others, international society expanded outside of Europe as a result of decolonization, when acculturated elites brought the newly independent states into international society. Early English School theorists were accused of sanitizing their account of European expansion by eliding the violence inherent in building empires, with later authors pointing out the essentially coercive nature of this transformation (Keene, 2002). Ironically, therefore, the lack of English School theory on the issue of norm transmission leaves it open to the accusation that its account of the expansion of international society rests implicitly on violence that it seeks to mask. Buzan echoes this theme, asserting that the expansion of international society was a function of the military expansion of the West (Buzan, 2004).

A richer conception of norms and the means by which they are transmitted could rescue the English School from this difficult position. Arguably, a social science theory is most useful when it can show how behavior scales up and down to different levels of explanation, and therefore how macro-structures affect individual behavior and micro-behavior produces macro-structures.[1] An account of norms should be able to show how changes at the micro-level affect the macro-structural level at which English School theory operates. Such an account would make the English School account of norms richer and more grounded.

Gong's work on the standard of 'civilization' points the way toward a more satisfying account of the spread of norms (Gong, 1984). Gong takes seriously the cultural implications of the rhetoric of European powers about the identity between late 19th- and early 20th-century European-dominated international society and 'civilization.' Yet Gong's analysis is highly formalistic, focusing on the crafting of treaties that acknowledged the sovereignty of select non-European states. This does not really explain the spread of norms associated with sovereignty and the complex social behaviors necessary to secure recognition as sovereign. While legal instruments were important because they confirmed sovereign status, they were possible only because of prior work by non-European elites that convinced European-dominated international society to grant that status. Rulers needed to establish their country as 'civilized' before they could begin the process of establishing legal equality. The real story of the spread of norms must have therefore happened prior to Gong's legal analysis.

The structural change entailed in accepting non-European polities into 19th-century international society involved non-Western elites winning acceptance from the people that governed the dominant states in the system, which must be explained at the individual level. Nineteenth-century elites from peripheral areas had to engage European diplomacy successfully on its own terms, and this required representing themselves as civilized persons. The process of socialization, the acquisition of the norms that governed international society, and the representation of those norms back to European elites were necessary to gain recognition as civilized and therefore qualifying for international society, and this happened in individual interactions. Civilization and sovereignty had to be enacted by individuals to acquire structural reality.

As Gong notes, many aspects of this standard were unarticulated, and yet these 'unspoken assumptions' were among the most important elements of 'civilization.' Even if a polity enjoyed a good legal claim to sovereignty, failure to meet these unspoken assumptions could prejudice the attempt to gain recognition from European elites who controlled access to international society. Representing one's country as civilized thus required considerable acculturation to European norms of social behavior. It was costly and difficult to equip individuals to handle this task. The networks of relationships they formed with European elites, however, could provide a slender thread to draw their countries into international society

I focus on the case of Siam, which is an anomaly particularly challenging to accounts based on coercion, because it gained entry into international society without developing significant military forces.[2] It did so by deploying and subverting norms associated with the standard of 'civilization.' The only major engagement with the Siamese case from the perspective of the English School is provided by Gong, who focuses on the negotiation of legal instruments that recognized Siamese independence and eliminated extraterritoriality (Gong, 1984). However, the fact that such negotiations took place does not really provide a satisfactory explanation for why the Siamese were successful, while many other polities that similarly attempted to achieve recognition failed.[3]

As Gerring (2004) observes, case studies such as this are especially useful for building theory by analyzing causal mechanisms that may be difficult to infer from larger cross-unit analyses. Methodologically this is a process-tracing exercise, following a chain of causal events and drawing on diverse sources to validate each (Gerring, 2007; Klotz and Lynch, 2007). Sources used here include European official sources, newspaper accounts, participants' letters, and Siamese archival documents.

I begin by reinterpreting the concept of solidarism and drawing out its relationship to the Constructivist treatment of norm transmission, particularly at the individual level. I then show how the norms associated with the standard of 'civilization' and with British understandings of empire were subverted by Siamese elites to stake their claim to sovereignty, focusing on personal diplomacy by the King of Siam in Europe. I conclude with some observations on the differences and continuities in the pursuit of sovereign recognition in the late 19th century and today.

Solidarism and the individual

The concept of solidarism has been used in varying ways in the English School. Although there is heated debate about the precise definition of the term, the core meaning involves normative convergence by states on issues like self-determination and human rights (see for example Vincent, 1986, and Linklater and Suganami, 2006). A solidarist international society is one in which international law approximates a 'constitution' for international society, and might even permit intervention against non-conforming states. A pluralist international society, by contrast, is one which permits normative diversity and in which there is little propensity to make binding, enforceable rules. However, it is often ambiguous whether solidarism and pluralism empirically describe international society, or are normative models for the way that society ought to be, or both. Thus, a solidarist such as

Vincent laments that international society is not as solidarist as it ought to be (1986: 152) while a normative pluralist like Jackson (2000) is concerned with explicating how empirically pluralist international society has the normative effect of raising states above narrow parochialism. There is no single coherent English School position on the subject.

Buzan in his recent reinterpretation of English School theory seeks to clarify this debate, suggesting the concepts of solidarism and pluralism are more useful when stripped of their normative content and treated as a sliding scale rather than two absolute categories. Solidarism in this view refers to the convergence in domestic institutions and values across states, and the propensity of states to cooperate on the basis of shared normative projects, whatever those institutions, values, and projects happen to be (Buzan, 2004).

For present purposes I accept Buzan's reinterpretation while arguing that it can be further refined, noting that states may be located at different places on this scale depending on the issue at hand. In other words, they may exhibit different levels of solidarism on different issues. If solidarism refers to the propensity to cooperate on the basis of shared norms rather than a substantive, progressive vision of international society, then states may be more solidarist on some issues than on others. Singapore, for instance, arguably shows a high degree of solidarism on the issue of free trade, but a very low level on the issue of human rights.

If we think of solidarism as issue-based, a pluralist international society might be described as one in which states share a strong commitment to norms of sovereign independence and non-intervention: in other words, it is one in which there is strong solidarism on the issue of pluralist norms of sovereignty. The norms that constitute sovereignty must be shared if the system as a whole is to be defined by them, so the most basic form of solidarism in international society must be the recognition of other polities as sovereign states

Systems that lack such normative consensus would not be pluralist but imperial, because the units would recognize no formal limit to the potential expansion of their power. Rather than respecting the autonomy of other states, the more powerful units will seek to impose suzerainty on peripheral powers. This was in fact the form that most international societies took prior to the peculiar European notion of the juridical equality of sovereign states (Bull, 1977; Wight, 1977).

Europe in the 19th century exhibited very high levels of solidarism on the issue of pluralist sovereignty, even while using this consensus to deny equal status to most non-European polities. The standard of 'civilization' originated as a way to justify subordinating non-European peoples (Keene, 2002). However, creating a standard in which race was implicit but not explicit allowed for the possibility that non-Europeans could adapt to obtain recognition as 'civilized.' The expansion of international society in the 19th century required both the spread of the norms of European international society and European recognition that those norms were also held by other polities where domestic institutions converged with the European standard. This process of recognition involved mutual (if asymmetric) cultural change on both sides of the boundaries of European international society: some non-European polities struggled for sovereign recognition by European states, and European elites were induced to alter their implicit definition of civilization to acknowledge some non-European polities as 'civilized.'

This process of recognition entailed the socialization of non-European polities into the norms of European international society, but solidarism entails more than socialization. Polities could be socialized in many ways, and could be socialized into an imperial system just as well as an international society of sovereign states (Johnston, 1995).[4] Even when socialized into a society of states, they might be more pluralist or solidarist, depending on the dominant conceptions of order in international society and their position within the system. Socialization is a process of learning norms, but solidarism is a distinctive kind of sharing of norms associated with a society of states, which unlike imperial systems have the unique problem of organizing cooperation in the absence of hierarchy.

A key question about solidarism is how the normative agreement between states is enacted. How do states (not to mention scholars) know that they share norms? Solidarism is reciprocal: it involves not just cooperation based on shared norms, but recognizing each other as possessing those norms. How do states come to understand and trust each other's normative commitments? Here Constructivist work at the micro-level is suggestive.

The most successful empirical work on norms in the Constructivist tradition implicitly looks to the individual level of analysis. Although some Constructivist theorists retain the state as the primary level of analysis and treat states as unitary actors (e.g. Wendt, 1999), in practice most empirical Constructivist work on norms emphasizes the agency of individuals and networks of individuals (for instance Evangelista, 1999; Finnemore, 2003; Haas, 1990; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Nadelmann, 1990). Finnemore (1996), in a largely state-centered account of the impact of ideas on national interests, specifically takes the English School to task for its excessive structuralism and lack of attention to agency. If we assume ideas and identities are important to the behavior of states, it is necessary to look to the individual agents who carry and enact them.

Buzan (2004) notes that one of the strengths of the English School is its methodological pluralism, and despite its structuralist tendencies it does sometimes advert to the individual level. This is particularly evident in discussions of diplomacy and its role in binding international society together. Bull, for instance, comments on the existence of a shared diplomatic culture, referring to diplomats as 'the custodians of the idea of international society' (1977: 176). A number of case studies in the English School tradition highlight the importance of particular individuals and elites (for example, Bull and Watson, 1984; Gong, 1984; and Stivachtis, 1998). The problem, however, is that the role of these elites is under-theorized: it is clear *that* they made a difference, but not *how.* This is precisely where the Constructivist work on individual agency can help, by connecting the activities of individuals and social networks with their structural effects.

In social science levels of explanation cannot be easily isolated. A good social science theory should be judged on how it can scale up and down to answer related questions at different levels of analysis. To explain behavior at one level is helpful, but a good theory makes it clear how findings at one level can be specified at other levels of explanation. A theory that scales easily between different levels of explanation is preferable, for instance one that can show how individual behavior produces structural phenomena, or how macro-level structures can be decomposed into individual action. Individual- and

network-level Constructivist work has the potential to significantly improve English School theory by informing its structuralist tendencies at another level, showing how ideas and norms at the individual level can produce structural effects.

Ideas become relevant in international relations, as in other aspects of human behavior, when they are enacted in social practices. For instance a state's recognition of another even as a pluralist rival requires reciprocally enacting the practices that constitute recognition. When leaders refrain from claiming authority over territory controlled by other states, police enforce the law only up to the border, citizens pay taxes to their own rulers and not those of other states, and so on, these behaviors seem natural to us because the norms that inform our behavior make them so. They are enacting sovereignty, and have the effect of structuring the system as a society of sovereign states. In other times and places people have routinely acted differently.[5] It is in this sense that states make the world so that it reflects their shared norms.[6] In particular, we cannot assume the state as an actor when the very question at stake is whether units qualify as states. The practices that enact sovereign recognition must therefore take place at another level, at least in the first instance. I argue that it happens at the level of transnational social networks.

Transnational networks and divided states

In cases where transnational networks influence events decisively, the assumption of the state as the primary unit of analysis becomes problematic because is cannot be assumed to be a unitary actor. Like Haas's environmental scientists and Evangelista's peace activists (Evangelista, 1999; Haas, 1990), the actors that are united may cross borders, while states are internally divided about policy. Such divided states tend to lose their 'actor quality,' and the activities of individuals and networks become decisive for advancing change.

In the context of colonial expansion the assumption that states are unitary actors is problematic in just this way. The history of colonialism was not a neat one in which European powers simply took advantage of their superior militaries to conquer pre-existing political units. Metropolitan governments often resisted expansion, but were driven forward by local agents they could not control (Burroughs, 1999; Galbraith, 1960; Long, 1995; McIntyre, 1967). European empires suffered from enormous agency loss: their local representatives were often the metropolitan government's only source of information, were difficult to discipline, and frequently had interests at variance with those of their principles. Neither the metropolitan or peripheral polities were unitary actors. 'The man on the spot' typically determined the course of events: merchants, missionaries, military officers, or colonial officials who had much to gain from expanding the empire, even when this involved flouting metropolitan policy. The historian JR Seeley's quip that the British empire was acquired 'in a fit of absence of mind' contains a nugget of truth: metropolitan officials with little idea what was happening in frontier regions had difficulty controlling the expansion of empire (Seeley, 1895: 10). States did not possess strong 'actor quality' in this context.

It is equally difficult to characterize non-European polities in this period as unitary actors. They were frequently internally divided, with central governments wielding limited power over their subordinates. Furthermore, local collaborators were essential for imperial expansion, because empires were not sustainable as pure coercion (Mamdani, 1996;

Robinson, 1972). European colonialism exploited differences between groups in order to induce local collaborators to assist with conquest and colonial rule. Siam was no exception: both the French and British in their own ways sought the defection of local officials from their Siamese suzerains. Thus the character of the kingdom as a unitary actor was at issue in these events: it cannot be assumed.

Siamese elites were able to exploit European — and in particular British — ideas about class, race, and empire described by the historian David Cannadine as 'ornamentalism' (Cannadine, 2001). In doing so they contrasted themselves with the 'others' colonized by the British, most importantly Indian princes and the neighboring Burmese. They did this by depicting Siamese elites as belonging to refined society, a community to which British elites belonged while the lower classes (both British and Siamese) did not.

Cannadine argues that the social structure of the British empire replicated the social stratification found in Britain itself. For British elites, the empire was not about race so much as it was about class. They identified with foreign rulers, often more than they did with their own subjects. The social structure of the empire replicated this class-based view, with exotic royalty such as Indian rajas and South Pacific chiefs considered more fit to consort with European royalty than the lower orders, either local or foreign.

These notions of class and race transcended the borders of the empire, creating an 'aristocratic internationalism' (Malia, 1999). Initially this was a European phenomenon. Because European royalty intermarried and engaged in extensive transnational social intercourse, they felt united across borders against the commoners they ruled. Royalty were kin, and the vulgar classes were by definition outsiders to their particular society.[7]

The circle of aristocratic internationalism could expand outside of Europe under the right circumstances. As Cannadine is careful to point out, the balance between race and class as markers of identity, and therefore of appropriate social practice, was a fine one. A vignette from 1881 captures these tensions nicely. King Kalakaua of Hawaii was visiting England, and was invited to a dinner party along with the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII) and the German crown prince, who was also Edward's brother-in-law. Edward insisted King Kalakaua be given precedence, and when the crown prince objected, replied 'either the brute is a king, or he is a common or garden nigger, and if the latter, what's he doing here?' (Magnus, 1964: 171). Edward won the point, but the fact that he needed to justify his position — and that he did so in such race-saturated terms — suggests the fineness of the balance, and the degree to which either race or class could become the dominant factor in cross-cultural social interaction.

The key to participating in aristocratic internationalism for non-Westerners was engaging with European elites who dominated world society on terms that invoked class-based codes of conduct rather than race. This required a sophisticated understanding of European elite social behavior, which was not easy to obtain in an imperial periphery where most Europeans were soldiers, merchants, or missionaries. Representatives of high rank needed to be trained in proper decorum and European languages. To send officials of low rank, no matter how accomplished, would fail to engage the class prejudices of European elites. To send aristocrats or royalty with little understanding of European languages or elite culture would invite Europeans to interact with them on the basis of race rather than class. Equality in aristocratic internationalism required highly trained people of the highest social rank. The Siamese, almost uniquely, were equipped to supply such representatives.

Siamese aristocratic internationalism

Siamese diplomacy in the late 19th century had a distinctively cosmopolitan dimension: the ambition of Siamese elites — royalty in particular — to be accepted as 'civilized' members of an aristocratic international society. They sought this acceptance not only as representatives of Siam, but as high-status individuals in a transnational society of elites. They admired European culture and sought to engage with it on terms that would reflect their own high status. This is visibly manifest in their choice of dress and in the buildings they erected (Peleggi, 2002), but it is also present in their social and political life as reflected by the people they chose to associate with and how they represented their country to others. This phenomenon was cosmopolitan in the strict sense: it involved interaction across national borders by individuals, not states. Yet it had implications for the structure of international society: acceptance of high-status Siamese individuals as civilized persons by Europeans implied the acceptance of the kingdom they ruled as a member of 'civilized' international society.[8]

Engaging European culture in the context of a world increasingly subject to European imperial control was an act of subversion: it meant representing civilization to those who defined its standards. By doing so, Siamese royalty and aristocrats were able to accomplish what the 'standard of civilization' usually prevented: the inclusion of non-Europeans in international society on equal terms.

This subversion entailed a simultaneous affirmation of that standard of 'civilization,' as defined by Europeans, by enacting social practices familiar to upper-class Europeans. The embrace of European norms had to be sincere, or at least appear so; European elites were extremely sensitive to what they regarded as mere 'aping' of European customs by lower-class natives.

The reward was to be accepted and respected by high-status Europeans, to become high-status members of a cosmopolitan society defined not by race, but by adherence to a set of behaviors that marked high class and status. This process occurred on both domestic and international stages. Domestically, the Siamese elite created a social space for the inclusion of European diplomats and advisors to the Siamese government in Bangkok society. Assistant Legal Advisor Robert Fitzpatrick, for instance, played tennis and whist with Prince Devawongse every Sunday, while his supervisor Emile Jottrand maintained an active social life with members of the royal family (Jottrand and Jottrand, 1996 [1905]; Tips, 1998). These people in turn provided valuable connections to European social networks.

Internationally, Siamese diplomacy studiously adhered to Western norms. However, the Siamese could not afford to be seen as simply aping such customs: to enact solidarism they had to convince European elites that they genuinely believed in them. Furthermore, to gain access to the European social circles that really counted, Siamese representatives of very high social status were required. Commoners would not do: to get access to elites and command respect, aristocracy was required, preferably royalty. Even where royalty were not necessarily in control of government and diplomacy, as in Britain, they remained highly influential arbiters of social life.

King Chulalongkorn's foreign travels were crucial for advancing Siam's diplomatic agenda. While the King had extensive contact with foreigners in Bangkok, his trips

abroad — in particular his first trip to Europe in 1897 — marked his emergence into the royal society of Europe, in parallel to the kingdom's emergence into the international society of states. The King's trips were the culmination of a long process of education that began with tutoring by American and British teachers (Wyatt, 1969), and included experience gained by earlier Siamese missions to Europe and the King's own travels in Asia.

Early Siamese missions to Britain

Although Siam had exchanged ambassadors with France in the 17th century, regular diplomatic contact with Europe began only after the signing in Bangkok of the Bowring treaty of 1855 with Great Britain. Two years later the Siamese replied with a goodwill mission to Great Britain.

The 1857–8 mission was a hybrid of Siamese and European diplomatic practice. Its goal was a traditional South-east Asian one: the reciprocal presentation of gifts to Queen Victoria. This was necessary because receiving gifts without reciprocating would have marked Siam's King Mongkut as a client of Queen Victoria. The Ambassadors dressed in traditional Siamese court garb and carried out the presentation of gifts using Siamese protocol, which included approaching the Queen through a series of elaborate prostrations. Initial press reports of the embassy therefore focused on the exotic. For instance the *Times* of London reported 'their state costume borders closely upon the theatrical pantomimic, only that it is of a richer quality in material than the usual "property" of the supernumeraries in a stage burlesque' (*Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 45*: 33).

However, the ambassadors adapted rapidly. They impressed their hosts with their interest in European culture and science and adopted European social customs. A later report from the *Standard* remarks 'they live precisely after the English fashion, and drink wines and eat of the same food as ourselves, although they never saw an English table before their arrival in this country' (*Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 45*: 82). The chief ambassador was discovered to be related to the King, which immediately raised his status in the estimation of his hosts. In addition, he was able to converse in English, which further raised him from an object of curiosity to a person worthy of respect (*Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 45*: 83, 102). By the occasion of their second audience with Queen Victoria, the Siamese ambassadors had learned a great deal about European court etiquette, and were praised by the *London Gazette* for 'setting an example of deference and good taste which it would be well for the Orientals frequenting our Court to be made to follow' (*Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 45*: 129).

Adapting to European tastes in matters such as dress and diet was not a trivial matter. Gong notes how dress and diet in particular contributed to the creation of a sense that the representatives of a country shared also the many unspoken assumptions that established them as sharing the standard of 'civilization' (Gong, 1984: 21).

In addition, the Siamese absorbed the lesson that the British were impressed by royalty. The tone of the press coverage of the 1857–8 mission changed when reporters learned it was led by a member of the royal family. The Siamese government was careful to put princes at the head of subsequent missions, most importantly the 1880 mission that established permanent Siamese diplomatic representation in London.

Permanent Siamese representation in London

Establishing direct diplomatic ties with European countries was critical for claiming sovereignty in the context of the European dominated international system, and could be an important shield against European colonialism (Strang, 1991). However, it was unusual for non-European countries to be accorded this privilege, precisely because of the protection it conferred. The government of India claimed authority over Britain's relations with most Asian countries, allowing the British government to deal with them without acknowledging their sovereignty. The British could therefore unilaterally change the terms of the relationship. For instance, they redefined the rump Burmese kingdom as a protectorate after the second Anglo-Burmese war (1852–3) without consulting the Burmese. The King of Burma engaged in a flurry of last-ditch attempts to establish treaty relations with other European powers that would provide some claim to sovereignty (Pollak, 1979). The government of India, however, succeeded in preventing the Burmese from dealing directly with either London or Paris.[9] The legal constraints they faced in annexing Upper Burma in 1886 were thereby significantly reduced.

Siam by contrast established permanent direct representation in London in 1880, as part of a general revision of treaties in which the Siamese circumvented the government of India with the connivance of the British consul-general in Bangkok.[10] In 1880 the British government appointed an ambitious professional diplomat named Palgrave to be consul-general at Bangkok. His job was to look after the interests of British subjects in Siam, to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction through the consular court, and to maintain a smooth flow of trade between Siam and British possessions. When he arrived, Anglo-Thai relations were tense because Palgrave's predecessor as consul-general had ordered a British gunboat to Bangkok, threatening war over the execution of his Thai son-in-law.[11]

Palgrave apparently saw an opportunity to wed his own ambitions to the task of smoothing Anglo-Thai relations. He proposed a revision of treaties between Siam and Britain, to include the creation of a permanent Siamese mission in London. This would require the British government to upgrade its mission to Siam, which would almost certainly result in the promotion of the consul-general (Palgrave) to minister. Palgrave made these offers without authorization from the Foreign Office.[12] However, he was able to use the confusion generated by the fall of Disraeli's government to avoid formal reproof until the Siamese Foreign Minister was on his way to London. The British Foreign Office then decided that since the Siamese Foreign Minister, a half-brother of the king, was coming in person, Palgrave's unauthorized dealings could not be disowned.[13]

Permanent Siamese representation in London thus became a *fait accompli*, the product of careerist ambitions, confusion due to a change of government, and Siamese recognition of a good opportunity. The government of India could only issue a feeble complaint after the fact.[14]

King Chulalongkorn's travels

King Chulalongkorn's foreign travels suggest the importance he attached to personal interaction with Europeans: no Siamese monarch had ever left the country except at the head of an army. Chulalongkorn undertook several foreign trips, both to European

colonies in Asia and to Europe. Due to space constraints I will focus here on his 1872 tour of India and his two trips to Europe.

Chulalongkorn's 1872 trip to India prefigured his European trips by demonstrating his familiarity with the standards of 'civilized' society. He and his retinue were at pains to demonstrate that they were comfortable with European customs, could converse fluently in English, and were interested in modern technologies and administrative systems. They sought personal meetings with important political leaders wherever they went. In all these ways, they sought to impress upon their hosts the King's civilized demeanor, and to contrast his behavior with that of the subject Indian rajas.

The official report of Edward Bosc Sladen, who was deputed to accompany Chulalongkorn on his Indian travels, contains a wealth of information about the trip.[15] Sladen was a major figure in the expansion of British Burma, and not shy about advocating a forward policy. However, he accepted Chulalongkorn as the king presented himself: a modernizing monarch genuinely interested in civilizing his people.

From their first meeting Sladen notes the familiarity of the king and his retinue with European customs, approving, for instance, of the Siamese steamers' reply to the salute of British guns, 'in a manner which shewed their acquaintance with the ceremonial observances … of European nations.' Furthermore:

> the King and all the Siamese Officers with him, dressed and otherwise deported themselves very much in the European style. It was easy therefore to provide for their entertainment throughout the tour of India, by means which brought them into more intimate domestic relationship with us, than would otherwise have been possible, had they been in the slightest degree trammeled by native caste prejudices, or the restrictions imposed by an enforced regard for oriental observances.[16]

By achieving this 'intimate domestic relationship' with their hosts, the Siamese delegation was able to demonstrate that they shared those 'unspoken assumptions' that characterized the standard of civilization. In order to achieve this, the Siamese displayed a remarkable disregard for 'oriental observances.' For instance, while visiting the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon they observed the English custom of retaining their shoes. Sladen initially assumed that this was the custom in Siam, but he eventually got the point the Siamese were trying to convey: that they were different from the Burmese.

> The above deviation in their form of worship gave rise, in the Burman mind, to an idea that their Siamese co-religionists in adopting European manners and customs, had become imbued to some extent also with a European Anti-Ritualistic element, to the prejudice perhaps of sound orthodox Buddhism.[17]

Since it is the custom of Thais to remove their shoes in a temple, this episode was clearly meant to demonstrate to the English that the Siamese were more like them than the Burmese.[18]

In India, Chulalongkorn and company were model guests, showing a lively interest in everything. They constantly displayed their facility in the English language and comfort with European dress and customs, facts remarked upon in the Indian press.[19]

The apogee of domestic intimacy was the British Viceroy Lord Mayo's entertainment of King Chulalongkorn in his home, 'en famille.' The Viceroy was assassinated shortly after, and Chulalongkorn confessed to Sladen that 'one of the great advantages which would … have undoubtedly been brought about, as a result of his own visit to India, had been ruthlessly snatched away…. As there was no immediate prospect of entering again into personal friendship and familiarity with another viceroy.' Chulalongkorn recognized personal friendship with the Viceroy as being an important product of his trip. Further demonstrating their familiarity with European customs, the King and his suite adopted mourning dress for the rest of their trip.

In India, as in British Burma, Chulalongkorn took pains to distinguish himself from the natives. Entertained lavishly by Indian princes, Sladen records that:

> The King of Siam was highly gratified but at the same time chiefly amused, by these signal manifestations of decaying orientalism. Having for some years past with his Court, set aside in great measure, or as far as it was possible, with the safety of his Dynasty, a slavish obsequience to the customs of his forefathers, and having adopted in their stead, a limited correspondence, with the manners and customs of European civilization, he could not help viewing with something akin to pity and ridicule, the conservatism of native dependent states which aped to preserve the magnificence of bye-gone days without regarding the progress of western civilization.[20]

Chulalongkorn's 1872 trip to India thus began the work of representing Siam as 'civilized,' by representing its monarch as a progressive figure comfortable with European customs. This task was performed through such symbolic acts as wearing European clothes and rejecting 'oriental customs,' enabling Chulalongkorn to enter social networks that would otherwise have been barred to him. In so doing he enacted the social practices that defined European civilized behavior, meeting those 'unspoken assumptions' so important to securing a claim to the standard of 'civilization.'

It is worth comparing Chulalongkorn's 1872 trip to India to the mission sent by Burma's King Mindon to Europe in the same year. Mindon seems to have understood perfectly what was at stake. His letter to the Queen refers to them both as 'independent sovereigns,' for instance.[21] Yet despite understanding the political issues, he and his ambassadors overlooked important symbolic and social ones. The ambassadors were commoners, not royalty. The symbolic marks of civilization that Chulalongkorn was so careful to present were absent. The chief ambassador, the Kinwun Mingyi, although universally liked, did not speak English.[22] The ambassadors and their suite went everywhere dressed in their customary clothing, rather than European fashions.[23] While they mixed extensively with middle-class Londoners and chambers of commerce all over Great Britain, their contact with royalty and the elite of English society was quite limited.[24] In this respect it bore a resemblance to the early days of the Siamese mission of 1857–8, but without the rapid adaptation of the Siamese.

The Burmese mission failed to establish itself as representing a 'civilized' and progressive monarch. Instead, they represented the spectacle of the exotic orient.[25] While they were credited with aspiring to bring aspects of British civilization back home, their British escort doubted their ability to do so.[26] They failed to create trust and 'intimacy,' or to build social networks with European elites who would later make decisions affecting

the independence of the kingdom. They remained outside the 'unspoken assumptions' that marked the standard of civilization.[27]

The 1896 Declaration and King Chulalongkorn's 1897 trip to Europe

While representing Siam as civilized in Europe, the central Thai elites who dominated the Kingdom were also reforming the traditional Siamese polity to make it more like a European state. Gong describes how internal legal reforms contributed to the perception of Siam as civilized (Gong, 1984; see also Loos, 2006). At least as important were administrative reforms that ensured the central government's writ ran in the provinces (Englehart, 2001; Tej, 1977). Diplomacy alone was not enough to represent Siam as civilized: it had to appear as a modern, European-style state capable of exercising the legal functions of sovereignty throughout its territory.[28]

However, internal reform was not sufficient by itself. Leaders in many polities attempted such reforms, but few succeeded in joining international society. In Burma King Mindon (r. 1853–78) desperately tried to modernize the government and military of his kingdom after the second Anglo-Burmese war of 1852. He imported European weapons and purchased steamships. He hired foreign advisors, had his children educated in English and French, sent students abroad to study, reformed his administration along Western lines, built model factories, and sought to open diplomatic relations with a number of European powers (Myo Myint, 1987; Pollak, 1979).

Mindon never succeeded in his attempts to secure recognition from other European powers as a sovereign state, however, or in convincing the British government to deal with him directly, rather than through India. As we have seen, the quality of Mindon's diplomacy handicapped these efforts.

Prior to King Chulalongkorn's 1897 trip to Europe, European powers continued to conduct diplomacy concerning Siam without Siamese representation. Most importantly, in 1896 France and Britain signed a joint declaration resolving a number of outstanding issues related to imperial expansion. This included an agreement that neither would unilaterally annex the Chaophraya river valley, the core of the Siamese kingdom. In retrospect this has been read as a guarantee of Siamese independence.[29] The 1896 Declaration has been the basis of a Realist reading of Siamese independence that presents the major alternative to the explanation offered here. In that argument Britain and France jointly guaranteed Siamese independence as a buffer zone between their colonies in India and Indochina.

One problem with this argument is that India and Indochina already shared a common border between Burma and Laos in 1896. The Upper Mekong region was important to British and French ambitions to set up overland trade routes with China, which heretofore had been in the hands of Yunanese traders (Chiranan, 1989; Thant Myint-U, 2001). Both spent considerable resources exploring routes between the South-east Asian peninsula and South China.[30] An Anglo-French commission was created in 1894 to explore the idea of creating a buffer state on the Upper Mekong, but discussions broke down without result. In other words, where a buffer state would have mattered most, the idea was not pursued.

Furthermore, the language of the 1896 agreement was so confusing that many in both Siam and Europe thought it divided Siam into spheres of influence. The Declaration could easily have been employed to justify annexing portions of Siam, rather than the

reverse. Indeed, Some Siamese officials interpreted the 1896 Declaration as an attempt to partition Siam.[31] The French and British parliaments both saw the document as a partition of Siam outside the Chaophraya river valley (Jeshurun, 1977: 227), and some French nationalists even interpreted the agreement as creating an Anglo-French condominium in the Chaophraya river valley. A French official in 1902 similarly claimed that the agreement assigned the French and British spheres of influence in the country (Jeshurun, 1970: 125–6). The Declaration only concerned the central part of the Kingdom, and in some ways actually liberated the colonial powers to interfere in outlying areas. Both France and Britain annexed areas claimed by Siam after the Declaration was signed.

The 1896 Declaration simply recognized that Siam's sensitive location between British India and French Indochina meant that both empires had legitimate interests there. Far from guaranteeing Siam's sovereignty, it only required the agreement of the other party before any territory or concessions could be obtained. When Britain and France did in fact decide to guarantee Siamese sovereignty in 1904, it required an additional, separate agreement to do so. The major advantage of the 1896 Declaration to the Siamese was that they could now play the French and British against each other, since each now had a veto over aggression by the other. In practice this meant courting the British in order to check the more aggressive French, something that simplified Siamese diplomacy but was very far from a guarantee of sovereignty, especially given the weak control metropolitan governments had over their agents in the region. In this context, King Chulalongkorn embarked on his first trip to Europe in 1897.

Chulalongkorn's 1897 trip marked his real emergence into international society, because for the first time it permitted him to interact directly with European royalty. The trip enabled Chulalongkorn to generate positive publicity for the kingdom, to represent Siam in Europe as a 'civilized' country with a progressive monarch.

At another level it was an important emotional experience for Chulalongkorn, who valued the personal bonds he forged with his regal counterparts elsewhere. His visit to Russia was particularly important in this respect. According to Chulalongkorn's published letters, the Czar received him 'like a brother' and they were constantly together; he ate alone only once. Chulalongkorn writes that the Empress was near tears when he left, and he missed Russia terribly after his departure (Chulalongkorn, 1962: 266–71). This quasi-familial relationship with the Russian royal family became the benchmark Chulalongkorn used to evaluate all his subsequent contacts with European royalty. The Czar wrote Chulalongkorn letters of introduction to the kings of Sweden and Denmark and the Queen of England, as well as pressuring the French government to meet with him despite a minor diplomatic flap.

Britain, Siam's most important trading partner and most significant colonial threat, was Chulalongkorn's most important stop on his 1897 tour. His visit was preceded by advance work by the Siamese legation. The legation's English secretary, Frederick Verney, gave a talk at a special meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce, emphasizing Chulalongkorn's fine character and his progressive reforms, as well as the fact that he had sent brothers and sons to be educated at the finest schools in Europe — 'and most of them in England.'[32] Verney courted the popular press as well, providing information and photographs for a positive article on the Siamese royal family in the *Illustrated London News.*[33]

The education of Siamese royalty in England was particularly emphasized during the king's visit. Reporting on his tour of Harrow, where the crown prince was enrolled, the *Times* wrote that 'surely no greater tribute of admiration for the institutions of this country could be paid by an Oriental Monarch than to have his children and near kindred brought up under the discipline and amid the traditions … of a great English public school.'[34] The *Times* praised the King's own education and personal qualities: he spoke 'in resonant tones and in excellent English'; at Kew he 'showed himself to be no mean botanist'; at Westminster Abbey and the Tower of London he demonstrated that he was 'by no means unread in the annals of this Country.'[35] Even allowing for Victorian grandiloquence, the repeated use of double negatives is significant, suggesting that one might expect the King of Siam to be a mean botanist and unread in the annals of England. Reports and illustrations in the popular press showed Chulalongkorn in European dress deporting himself in a gentlemanly manner.[36] The adulation was reinforced by reports of Chulalongkorn's social intercourse with the Queen and high nobility of the country, putting him on the same plane as other European royalty.[37]

Chulalongkorn was able to play this role effectively because of his real affection for and identification with English culture. Upon his arrival in Britain for the first time in 1897, he wrote a remarkable letter home, playing on symbols of Buddhist ordination and the Muslim Haj: 'today was the day I received ordination as a Hajji, as all believers in the Koran must in another country unlike this crystal one. I was ordained with the Duke of Cambridge as my preceptor … at Buckingham temple in the town of Kapilavasti.'[38]

Yet despite the political and social success of his 1897 trip, Chulalongkorn was personally disappointed by his reception from the Queen. Like many visitors to the Queen in this period, he was forced to make a laborious trip to Osborne for a brief audience.[39] Although his royal status gave him access to government elites, other members of the royal family, and the aristocracy, he seems to have felt that his royal dignity had been only brusquely acknowledged by the Queen.

Despite his high enthusiasm upon arrival and his glowing treatment in the press, Chulalongkorn was thus disappointed by his trip. Only two letters from England appear in his published account. The first is the 'Haj' letter above; the second, written shortly before his departure, complains of ill health and homesickness, and carps about his official reception, which 'was counted good for England, but looked poor compared with other countries' (Chulalongkorn, 1962: 320). Despite the success of the trip in promoting a popular image of Siam as a cultured and 'civilized' country led by a progressive monarch, Chulalongkorn was disappointed in his quest for personal recognition and respect from the Queen, especially compared with his reception in Russia.

His subsequent visit to France — a country far more hostile to Siam than the UK — reversed these terms. Chulalongkorn was delighted to meet a stylish reception and to enjoy extensive interaction with the President of the Republic. While recognizing this was largely due to the intervention of the Czar, and sensing that French professions of friendship might not be wholly sincere, Chulalongkorn still wrote glowingly of his stay in Paris, noting the country was 'incomparably beautiful' (Chulalongkorn, 1962: 334–9).

Chulalongkorn's 1897 trip to Europe was a success in Siam as well. It enabled him to represent himself at home as the epitome of a cosmopolitan leader, accepted abroad as

worthy of intercourse with European elites at the core of the states system. A canny judge of symbolism, Chulalongkorn came away with ideas for representing this social equality at home, for instance by remodeling his own palaces based on those he saw in Europe (Chulalongkorn, 1962: 272; Peleggi, 2002). Chulalongkorn's letters from his European trips were published in book form. He reported extensively on his intercourse with important Europeans in these letters, which often degenerate into guest lists. Chulalongkorn constantly emphasizes his social equality with European royalty.

The 1897 trip was thus a political success for Chulalongkorn, both internationally and domestically. It seems to have been the source of personal satisfaction as well. The major sour note was what he regarded as a poor reception in the country that mattered most: Great Britain. He did not secure the 'domestic intimacy' that he sought from British royalty. This failing was to be remedied in 1907, however, on Chulalongkorn's second trip to Europe.

Chulalongkorn's 1907 trip to Europe was a more private affair, shorter and less concerned with affairs of state. On a personal level, his letters suggest he felt more confident about his status in European eyes. Pomp seemed to matter less, but he still cherished personal contact with European royalty.

The most serious diplomatic aspect of the 1907 trip was the ratification of a Franco-Siamese treaty by which the French surrendered extraterritorial rights over their native subjects resident in Siam. This was an enormously important step toward Siam's admission as a full member of international society. Yet Chulalongkorn has little to say about the treaty in his letters. Instead, he mostly recounts sightseeing and his active social life in Paris, merely noting that the French government seemed more sincerely friendly than it had in 1897 (Chulalongkorn, 1923: 419).

Although he had no official business to conduct in Great Britain, Chulalongkorn was a great deal more satisfied with his reception there than he had been in 1897. King Edward hosted 3 days of non-stop entertainment for him, ranging from informal meals with the family and other royalty to a massive garden-party (Chulalongkorn, 1923: 435–6). Chulalongkorn's enthusiasm shows in his lengthy letters, full of detailed guest lists, descriptions of dress, scenery, houses, and everything else that caught his eye. His taste for pomp seems more moderate, though; he appreciated the informal dinners with other royalty and comments on their comfort and hominess (Chulalongkorn, 1923: 442–3).

As much as Chulalongkorn's account of his visit to England is more elaborate in 1907, the newspaper accounts were more muted. The *Times* reported that 'His Majesty's visit to this country will be a purely private one, devoid of political significance and undertaken solely for pleasure.' Chulalongkorn thereafter appeared in its pages only in the daily court circular, with one additional article on his receiving an honorary degree at Cambridge.[40] The *Illustrated London News* published a portrait of Chulalongkorn in military uniform in the center of its 'Our Note Book' page on the week of his arrival, with the title 'Our Eastern Royal Visitor,' but without any accompanying article.[41] His only other appearance in its pages was in the context of reporting on the garden party at Windsor, and he is shown on the cover escorting the Queen of England, in the company of King Edward and Mark Twain.[42]

This inversion between the politically successful 1897 trip to Britain, with which Chulalongkorn was dissatisfied, and the politically unimportant trip of 1907, about which he enthuses, can only be explained by his response to the differing social contexts.

It is clearly the social reception rather than the political effects of these trips that color his response to each. Because the second trip was more effective at building networks in cosmopolitan high society, the King treated it as a greater success.

In his travels, King Chulalongkorn enacted civilized social intercourse with European elites. He did this less by demonstrating familiarity with European international law — although his visits carefully followed diplomatic protocol — than by displaying an enthusiastic acceptance of European social interaction in the most exclusive circles. He succeeded in representing Siam as civilized in the heart of European civilization, through the deportment of its monarch.

Like Japan, Siam continued to be treated as a kind of junior partner in international society, with European countries maintaining some aspects of extraterritoriality until well into the 20th century. However, there was a qualitative difference between the status of an independent, but not quite equal, state, and the colonial regimes that ruled all of Siam's neighbors. Sovereignty has always and everywhere varied in its practical application, and sovereign states have never been truly equal (Krasner, 1999, 2001). The primary point is that the Siamese claim to 'civilization' was secured by these personal interactions, shifting the kingdom from the category of potential colony to recognized member of international society.

Conclusion

Siamese elites simultaneously affirmed and subverted the European-defined standard of 'civilization.' Chulalongkorn in particular affirmed it in the sense that he adopted it wholeheartedly, relishing the latest European fashions and celebrating his mastery of the English language. This affirmation made possible his acceptance into high society as more than a curiosity. He subverted it in the sense that, by adopting behavior and dress that Europeans recognized as 'civilized,' he was able to represent himself and Siam as 'civilized' as well, and therefore deserving of civil treatment according to European mores and the standards of international law. The standard of 'civilization' had been invented to mark the features that made Europe superior; the Siamese subverted this original intent by expanding the reach of 'civilization' and extending the scope of international society.

Siam's entry into international society is thus the triumph of a kind of solidarism. Siamese diplomacy employed the class prejudice of European elites to overcome their racial prejudice. In this way elites were tied together, and those outside elite circles — including many British 'men on the spot' who would have preferred to see Siam a British colony — were excluded. This exclusion of the lower classes permitted the Siamese to enact class-based solidarity with British elites.

This might be contrasted with Japan, which entered international society in this period, but took a more pluralist path. Although Japanese elites also accepted European diplomatic practice and built European-style domestic state institutions, they emphasized military development as the basis of their claim to sovereign recognition.[43] Japan was thus socialized as a pluralist member of international society, one that subscribed to *realpolitik* rather than the cosmopolitanism of the Siamese.[44]

International society has expanded and changed radically since the late 19th century. Hereditary monarchy has declined, and diplomacy is now conducted primarily by

bureaucrats and international lawyers. Is the story of Siam's inclusion in international society still relevant? There are at least two reasons to think so.

First, something like a modern-day standard of civilization is invoked to justify modification of the norm of sovereignty, based on how states treat their citizens. Donnelly, for instance, has explicitly argued for human rights as a new standard of civilization (Donnelly, 1998). Some arguments for humanitarian intervention also suggest that states which cannot protect the lives and property of their citizens ought to have their sovereignty modified or even 'de-certified' (Herbst, 1996/7; Krasner, 2005; Mueller, 2004).

Second, there are still polities seeking recognition as sovereign states, and the standards by which recognition is obtained are far from clear. Kosovo has received recognition by the most important states in the international system, despite the fact that it is probably not viable as a state without substantial international aid, and cannot provide security for all its citizens without the benefit of international peacekeepers to check ethnic violence. At the same time, the international community continues to deny claims of sovereignty by Somaliland, despite the fact that it already performs most of the functions of a state, including protecting its citizens and its borders. Instead the international community requires Somaliland to remain legally part of Somalia, despite the fact that the rest of the country is a chaotic mess in which the ostensible government, propped up by foreign powers, cannot govern in even the most minimal sense.[45]

These examples differ in a way that suggests 'unspoken assumptions' of some kind still inform the recognition of sovereign states and inclusion in international society. Academics and lawyers make arguments for stripping or reducing the sovereignty of failing states because of their inability to care for their citizens. Yet a territory probably incapable and possibly unwilling to protect the security of (some of) its citizens is recognized as sovereign. On the other hand, a territory that has clearly demonstrated its ability to protect and serve citizens in what is otherwise the most clearly failing state in the world is denied its claim to sovereignty.

Whatever rules govern the granting and modification of sovereignty today are clearly not identical with the explicitly articulated arguments. There is still at work some unseen core of 'unspoken assumptions' that govern the recognition of sovereignty, shaping the structure of international society. To investigate the institution of sovereignty still requires enquiry into the norms and ideas of the individuals and social networks that enact it in international society.

Notes

The author wishes to thank Melissa K. Miller, Michael Montesano, Christian Reus-Smit, and William Wohlforth for their helpful comments.

1. An argument most famously made by Anthony Giddens (1984).
2. A Realist might argue that socialization is not relevant, because countries such as Japan and the Ottoman Empire entered the international system by mustering sufficient military force to deter imperial ventures. This argument is problematic, because Japan and the Ottoman Empire also engaged in serious attempts to adapt to Western norms and present themselves as civilized. However, the Siamese case removes the issue of military force altogether, since it developed minimal military forces and engaged in no serious hostilities with European powers.

3. A similar issue is raised by Strang's (1991) observation that countries that succeeded in negotiating treaties with European powers were less likely to be colonized. What permitted some countries to conclude such agreements while others failed?
4. Thus, for instance, Siam prior to the 19th century observed the norms of the Chinese imperial system, and imposed its own suzerain authority in Cambodia, Laos, and the Shan States.
5. In pre-modern Siam, for instance, authority was non-territorial, and commoners were often subject to the authority of rulers in different towns, political units overlapped, and people sometimes paid tribute to more than one king (Englehart, 2001; Thongchai, 1994).
6. These shared norms may not, however, necessarily require cooperative behavior (Wendt, 1999).
7. This particular social dimension to the development of European international society has not been explored by the English School, but it seems a promising avenue to explain the historically peculiar European notion of juridical equality among sovereign powers.
8. This had domestic political ramifications as well: the Western political model of the state strengthened the Siamese monarchy, and adopting elements of Western culture became a means of advancing social status in Bangkok society (Englehart, 2001; Peleggi, 2002).
9. Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) FO 881/5162 Confidential Print — Correspondence Respecting the Relations Between France and Burmah 1878–1885, December 1885. See also Mukerjee (1988).
10. Siam had already signed one treaty directly with the British government, the above-mentioned Bowring treaty, initiated by a British Governor of Hong Kong largely on his own authority.
11. See PRO FO 69/70 Knox to Salisbury #12, Bangkok 6 April 1879, PRO FO 69/72 Surawongse to Salisbury, Bangkok 24 February 1879 and enclosure.
12. A Foreign Office telegram to Palgrave reads 'I must remind you that you are acting entirely without instructions. We have no intention of raising our Agency in Siam to the rank of Mission, and are not certain that establishment of a permanent Siamese Mission in London would be of advantage.' PRO FO 69/73, telegram Foreign Office to Palgrave, 18 May 1880. An undated internal Foreign Office note complains that Palgrave was exceeding his instructions, and comments 'he appears determined, if possible, to get himself made Minister.' PRO FO 69/73 Cockerell to Pauncefote, no date.
13. A minute reproving Palgrave's actions was cancelled because of a dispatch from Palgrave claiming that he had received verbal instructions from Salisbury and his private secretary shortly before Salisbury left office. PRO FO 69/73 Palgrave to Granville Confidential #49 of 1880, Bangkok. Salisbury's secretary denied this, however. PRO FO 69/73 Currie to Foreign Office, no date. Palgrave continued to defend the proposal on the grounds that his new treaty favored British interests, and that its failure would encourage the interference of 'a neighbouring power of well-known restlessness,' that is, France. In London the Siamese Foreign Minister, who was also responsible for customs collections, also exceeded his instructions by negotiating an increase in the customs duties profitable to himself. See PRO FO 69/74 Palgrave to Granville #64 Confidential, Bangkok 19 July 1880.
14. India Office Records (hereafter IOR) L/P&S/7/27 Part 2 Government of India Foreign Department/Political to Secretary of State for India, Fort William 14 March 1881.
15. British Library, India Office Records (hereafter IOR) Mss Eur E290/14, 20 August 1885.
16. ibid.
17. ibid.

18. Perhaps to make amends, Chulalongkorn also made a substantial donation toward the restoration of the pagoda.
19. See for instance the undated article from the *Bombay Gazette* in IOR Mss Eur E290/12.
20. IOR Mss Eur E290/12.
21. The Queen's reply also refers to 'interchanges of good feeling between sovereign states.' IOR Mss Eur C595.
22. In fact, the members of a non-diplomatic mission sent in 1871, apparently to test the waters for the 1872 diplomatic mission, appear to have possessed greater facility in English. However, their 'picturesque and handsome costumes' still 'excited much interest.' *Times* (London), 5 April 1871: 9.
23. See their portraits in the *Illustrated London News*, 20 July 1872: 60.
24. See IOR Mss Eur C595.
25. So much so that an Irish paper employed them as interlocutors with the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in a *Persian Letters*-style satire, designed to imply that the English treatment of the Irish was as barbaric as the rule of an oriental despot. IOR C595.
26. IOR L/P&S/18/B5, McMahon to Kaye, London 30 January 1873.
27. The first Japanese embassy to the West (to the USA in 1860) falls somewhere between these two extremes. The embassy itself resembled the Burmese 1872 mission to Britain, with the ambassadors wearing traditional Japanese dress and attracting attention as curiosities. However, many junior members of the embassy had an interest in Western cultures, languages, institutions, and technologies and became prominent reformers on their return (Miyoshi, 1979).
28. Thongchai (2000) has noted how promoting 'civilization' among the Thai people became an important goal for Thai intellectuals and educators in this period as well.
29. Jeshurun (1977) provides the most developed articulation of this argument.
30. After French explorers demonstrated that water routes up the Mekong and Red River were not practical (Osborne, 1975) attention shifted to a rail line (Jeshurun, 1977). Both possibilities have been recently revived by the Chinese government.
31. Thai National Archives (hereafter TNA) K 13.2/30, K 13.2/31.
32. *Times* (London) 22 July 1897: 14.
33. *Illustrated London News*, 24 July 1897: 131.
34. *Times* (London) 2 August 1897: 9.
35. Ibid. and *Times* (London) 3 August 1897: 4.
36. See for instance the *Illustrated London News*, 7 August 1897, cover and 171; 14 August 1897: 205 and 215; and 25 September 1897: 424. The 'Our Note Book' column in the 14 August issue: 204, says 'The King of Siam, I am persuaded, is a very good fellow, and the wicked stories that are told of his "goings on" at home must be taken with more than a pinch of salt.' This deflection of common prejudices was precisely what Chulalongkorn needed to overcome to achieve both his social and political goals.
37. The official program for Chulalongkorn's stay at Buckingham Palace and visit to the Queen at Osborne can be found in PRO LC5/258.
38. Chulalongkorn (1962: 319). Kapilavasti is where the Gautama Buddha was born.
39. The Queen was elderly and not very mobile by 1897, and had also just completed the celebration of her Diamond Jubilee. Although King Chulalongkorn's schedule could have permitted him to be present for the Jubilee, he chose to allow the Crown Prince to represent him — perhaps wanting to distinguish himself from the many native Indian rulers who were present. *Illustrated London News*, 24 July 1897.

40. The *Times* (London) 19 June 1907: 10; 22 June 1907: 11; 24 June 1907: 10; and 26 June 1907: 4.
41. *Illustrated London News*, 22 June 1907: 943.
42. *Illustrated London News*, 29 June 1907: cover.
43. In part this may be due to Japan's domestic politics, with a figurehead emperor and the real power exercised by a military elite.
44. As Johnston (2008) argues, we need to explain the socialization of states into *realpolitik* as well as into more cooperative behaviors, as task which is however beyond the scope of this article. To reframe the point using Stivachtis's (1998) terminology for the Greek case, the Siamese followed a 'logic of culture' while the Japanese followed a 'logic of anarchy.'
45. Note that in both cases the population has been subject to brutal, systematic violence by the former rulers of their erstwhile states, so the experience of suffering at the hands of a majority group does not explain the difference.

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