

Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters*

Benjamin Nelson

New School for Social Research

A Prefatory Note

The main stress of the present essay is on the importance of variant "structures of consciousness" and the contacts of historically complex societies which have been the cradles and homes of world religions. My chief reason for adopting this emphasis is that it seems to provide exceptionally apt ways of relating to the questions we are obliged to ask ourselves in the comparative study of both civilizational complexes and intercivilizational encounters.

The present draft allows much to remain implicit which will need to be made explicit at a later date. Thus, little detail is offered here on many of the so-called "real (in the sense of material) factors" influencing the shapings of cultural patterns, civilizational complexes and the impacts and outcomes of intercivilizational encounters. Cultural as well as social facts of great importance in these connections are treated lightly; e.g., the forms of language and script, the degree of formalization of the classificatory systems.

The first and last sections of the paper reflect some of the results of case studies which I and others have conducted in this area. Evidence for some of the arguments will be found in other papers of mine—some hitherto published, some now in press. A list of these papers is included in the References which will be found at the end of the essay.

I

Settings and Perspectives

My efforts grow out of a number of deep convictions and commitments: Sociology is at a turning point in respect to the horizons it is obliged to confront and the perspectives and methods it is obliged to adopt in order to make sense of the perplexing and tumultuous sociocultural processes of our time. We dare no longer suppose that these processes can effectively be gotten at by confining ourselves to settings which are local, parochial, or

*The original draft of this paper was subtitled "Structures of Consciousness from the Perspective of the Comparative Historical Sociology of Sociocultural Process." A portion of the statement was presented at a special Seminar on "Civilizations" at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association which met on August 30, 1971, at the Denver Hilton Hotel, Denver, Colorado.

instantial in terms of the level of interaction (for example, small groups); the social-system setting (the family); the geographic setting (the local community); the temporal horizon (the current moment, the present).

We are obliged to see that many of the most important phenomena of processes and productions of our time are occurring everywhere across the world and they are occurring most intensely in those levels and in those settings which have been least systematically studied by sociologists or anthropologists. I refer to the *societal level*, the *civilizational level* and the *intercivilizational settings and encounters*. In truth, these last-mentioned settings have always been of enormous importance and it would be a mistake to suggest that there have been eras when great complex polities have escaped being in the throes of processes at these levels.

To understand and explain the perplexing sociocultural processes of our time it becomes necessary to acknowledge that we are in the throes of no fewer than a half-dozen revolutions which originate in different contexts, express multiple interests, proceed at varied paces and are hardly likely to be contained by any set of societal remedies or interventions. Among these revolutions one might mention:

1. *The Scientific-Technological-Perspectival Revolution* which has been proceeding with ever intensified pace, scope and impact since the beginning of the 20th century. This set of developments embraces the knowledge revolutions in theoretical physics, the formal sciences, the biological, social and behavioral sciences; the revolutions in extra-scientific, artistic and symbolic mappings; the revolutions in transportation, communications, systems of control, productions of new forms and uses of energy.

2. *The Spatio-Temporal Revolution* related to the above and most evidently illustrated in the reshaping of our environment and ecology under the impact of the global technologies of transport communications, atomic energy—all resulting in the precipitous shrinking of a world now forced into anguished conjunctions in the midst of abrasive contacts.

3. *The Rationalization Revolution* involved in the spread across the world of systems of instrumental and functionalized rationalization—multi-national as well as national structures of management and labor organization, business enterprise, political and military operation.

4. *The Socio-Morphological Revolutions* resulting from explosions and implosions of populations and dissonant ethnic subcultures.

5. *The Equal Freedom, Equal Share, "Freedom Now!" Revolutions* carried on in the name of social justice and equal participation: "Freedom Now!" for all strata and groups previously deprived of the same—youth, women, ethnic minorities, racial minorities.

6. *World-Revolutions in the Structures of Consciousness and Conscience* include struggles within all strata and groups across the world in relation to each other over the by-products and issues of modernization, industrialization, rationalization and Westernization.

The extravagant promises and the erratic workings of the touted "cybernetic" political and economic structures yield perplexing results. The simultaneous presence of bounties and deprivations mingle hope and despair in a game appearing to operate according to rigged actuarial tables with unfavorable odds. In these straits, millions are goaded to demand full and immediate fulfillment of their *ultimate* hope for joy, love, peace, plenty. A crucial form of this oppositional trend, recently at peak intensity after intermittent appearances over the past two centuries, assumes the character of a comprehensive antinomianism, better described as *A-nomism*. In this view, the norms of scientific rationality and so-called "objective consciousness" which have been distinctive features of European civilization are identified as the malignant blights that have brought the West to its present disintegration. The cry is general for a new beginning which carries us far beyond—and away from—Solon and Pericles, Abelard and Roger Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, Locke and Jefferson, Max Weber, Freud, Einstein and others.

All six sets of these newer revolutions were foreshadowed in developments of earlier centuries, especially the 19th century; all gained great momentum in the first decades of the present century; all have been proceeding at vastly accelerated paces since the First World War.

The interference effects which flow from one of these to another now immensely exacerbate, complicate and intensify the stresses and strains; all are undergoing change at the very same time.

Surely one of the most critical components in the newest phases of the situation is the incommensurability between our technical means and the political and social divisions of our day. As a result of supersonic transport, space travel and other extraordinary expansion in the scope of action, civilizational structures and complexes which were once in infrequent contact are now in one another's back yard.

There seems little doubt that complex societies are almost always likely to undergo heightened feelings of threat, ecstasy, even vertigo when conclusive contacts occur with other great societal complexes at the level of their respective rationales. Many of the most abrasive aspects of contemporary politics result from the equal inability of all powers to create iron walls which would insulate them against the unwelcome intrusion of alien modes of thought and perception. In centuries past, relations among great powers at this level were relatively rare and ordinarily not fraught with grave perils.

II

First Remarks on Terms and Concepts

These newer developments place us all under many demanding obligations. An obligation which falls with special weight upon scholars is the mandate to forge a language adequate to express the differences and

dimensions central to the establishment of a comparative historical sociology of civilizational complexes and intercivilizational relations. So far our main barrier in this sphere has been our excess readiness to accept ambiguous and inflated versions of commonsense concepts. We ought to constrain ourselves to use our terms precisely so that we can identify their bearings and their components as accurately as possible.

Wherever possible in the following pages I shall use the key terms strictly rather than loosely. Thus I reject the widespread habit of using the word *civilization* to refer to the sociocultural processes of selected great nations. Instead, I prefer to reserve the term "civilizational complex" for a segment of the paradigmatic cultural patterns in the *sphere of the expressive and instrumental productions of societies or societal complexes*. In speaking of complex societies in this way I refer to *political societies*, which contain numerous internal differentiations, including nations, classes, institutions, and varieties of cultural experience.

I want to reserve the word *culture* to refer to those structures of expression and commitment which may be said to embody the most distinctive designs developed within and by the people of these societies. In general, for reasons discussed in detail elsewhere, I place strong stress on those structures of expression and commitment which have been elaborated into symbolic configurations of one sort or another.

I wish to speak of many of the habits and the mores of people as *shared behavior* which need to be differentiated from higher level cultural structures.

To speak once again of the central notion of "civilization", I freely admit to sharing a preference for the style of analysis initiated by Durkheim and Mauss.

By the *civilizations* of peoples I wish to refer to the governing cultural heritages that constitute the accepted milieus of $2+n$ societies, territories, areas which generally enjoy or have enjoyed a certain proximity. These strongly-based acceptances will normally be discovered to constitute configurations of the following elements: identities of language, the highest level of the technology of the group, which I would call the "prime material facilitations and skills" of the group; the central patterns of reciprocities including juridical rules; the fundamental canons governing the decision-matrices in the spheres of opinion and act (Nelson, 1962, 1972:123-27); the taken-for-granted structures of consciousness, comprising cultural world-views, logics, images of experience, self, time, the beginning and the end, the extraterrestrial powers. I have previously described some of the last-mentioned schemas under the headings of dramatic designs, directive systems, systems of spiritual direction, symbolic economies (Nelson, 1965).

III

Highways and Byways in Theory and Research

The time has clearly come to take some bold steps in going beyond the conceptual frames now available for the comparative study of civilization complexes and intercivilizational relations.

Actually, a vast amount of material lies to hand in the writings of comparativists in the study of religion, science and societies. These materials have never been closely sifted and systematically codified. Indeed, in this respect, the views of such investigators as Maine, Durkheim, Mauss, Max Weber, Needham—to speak first only of the pioneers—have never been brought into close contact with one another. The rich literature which has been made available by area specialists in history, anthropology and political science during the present century has not been gathered together. The result has been that the frames of reference needed for such a codification have been lacking.

A. The Pioneers

My point of maximum concentration here will be on the concepts needed to differentiate among the ruling structures of consciousness in relation to the critical matrices of experience and regulative order, or, if one prefers, the systems of social and cultural action and function. If some of the phrases I use seem unduly related to recent popular writings in this field, it is a matter of chance. As every reader knows, the foremost specialists and theoreticians have long been working toward the development of frames of this sort.

The structures I propose can readily be shown to rest upon the fundamental work of the classical sociologists, anthropologists and comparative historians—notably, as already indicated, the work of Maine, Durkheim, Mauss and other members of the Durkheimian school, Weber and a great number of contemporary authors dealing with cultural structures, intercultural relations and international relations.

I begin with some issues which hold center stage today.

B. Needham and Weber

In the last two decades Joseph Needham has placed before the world the most important series of challenges made by any of the major comparative historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science since the days of Max Weber.

Needham and Weber are only two of the men of the present century whose work has revealed the need for and promoted the possibility of a *systematic study of the comparative sociology of civilizational complexes and intercivilizational relations*. Conceptual advances, some of equal weight, have been made by a number of men, chiefly Durkheim, Mauss, and Sir Henry Maine. A wider list would include such names as: A. Bozeman, J.

Huizinga, A. Kroeber, R. Redfield, R. Bellah, C. Geertz, R. Lowenthal and the too-soon departed pathfinders, M. Hodgson, J. Levenson and G. von Gr nebaum.

We have no time to lose in striving to collate—to compare and contrast—the views of Needham and Weber and other contributors in respect to the distinctive characteristics of major civilizational complexes. We must, however, avoid falling into the trap of seeing all of Weber’s and Needham’s arguments and evidences for the differences of patterns of East and West from the polarized points of view they may—mistakenly—seem to represent.

C. Weber

In both of the perspectives central to this paper—the varieties of civilizational complexes and the test cases of intercivilizational encounters—there is no turning away from the findings of foremost historians, archeologists, comparative geographers, anthropologists and so on. Again Max Weber offers the handiest point of departure for the renewal of our discussion. Doubtless realizing the immense complexity of establishing causal change in the cultural sphere, Weber began with the supposition that different societal complexes could be found to have adopted one or another sort of emphasis within the frame of possible orientations to world and religion. By so doing, he assumed the answer instead of working out intermediate steps.

In the main, he did not face several critical questions connected with the developments of phases of the structures of consciousness and conscience, nor did he undertake to test out his hypotheses by examining the opportunities for analysis of intercivilizational contacts. Thus one will look vainly in his pages for a discussion of the immensely revealing Jesuit mission in China in the 16th and 17th centuries (See Needham, 1954, esp. vol. 3; Rowbotham, 1942; Franke, 1967). Similarly his self-denying ordinances prevented him from offering us light on a whole series of revolutionary transformations from the 18th century onward (Franke, 1971; also Croizier, 1970).

Despite Weber’s massive, even incomparable, contributions to the exploration of our themes, it must be admitted that he failed to offer sufficiently discriminated articulations of the theoretical frameworks needed for coping with the challenges presented by his own data. Except in a very few writings to be discussed again below (I refer to the “Author’s Introduction” to his posthumously published *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*, and to his monograph on *The Social and Religious Foundations of Music*) his analysis, especially his analysis of rationalization and rationalism, slips into errors of emphasis of the following sort: Driven by complex scholarly preoccupations and methodological commitments, Weber regularly shied away from open investigations of sociocultural process. His

key concepts, such as rationalization, social action, social relations, were elaborated again and again in a manner strongly savoring of social psychology. In this spirit he failed to give due emphasis to the distinctive power and influence of intertemporal decision-matrices in all the spheres of human action and thought—what I have been calling the operative structures of rationales in respect to the definitions and organizations of all of men's intertwined worlds: their environments, their experiences, their options.

Despite Weber's great sensitivity to the myriad social effects of historically-institutionalized varieties in the orientations of meaning, despite—perhaps because of—his extraordinary sophistication in methodological matters, Weber shied away from dynamic analyses of the processes of change and the implications of these processes in the structures of consciousness. In the same way, Weber all too rarely exploited the chance to follow up the great insights of his later years which are most clearly represented in the "Author's Introduction" and the monograph referred to above.

Again and again Weber assimilates too quickly all the forms of rationality and shaping of rationales to the model of means-ends instrumental rationalization. His overriding desire to establish his theses in respect to the controversies over the spirit of capitalism lead him to give short shrift to many perspectives especially critical for the comparative in-depth historical study of sociocultural process in civilizational perspective.

I refer mainly to the following: the changing shapes and workings of the different historical crystallizations of the structures of consciousness within the culture-areas deeply influenced by great world religions; the variabilities in the terms of reference of the opposed cultural logics; the phases in the elaboration and the mechanisms in the workings of the symbolic technologies.¹

Despite these reservations, one cannot be too grateful to Weber for opening up the problems of the rationalization process and the phases in the progress of the Spirit of rationalization. Who knows what Weber might have gone on to do had he lived on after 1920? I like to think that he would have gone forward to give due weight to the problem of the importance for social development of the spreads of universes of discourse, generalizable terms and concepts, formed logics or codes with generalized terms accessible to wider universes of discourse. In the end it was his failure to connect these with the extensions of wider communities, the openings out of new accesses of participation which may have blinded him to wider horizons of the comparative history and sociology of sociocultural process in civilizational perspective.

¹ In this latter sphere, Weber shifts his stress markedly from work to work. He is seen to best advantage in his little-known work on music (Weber, 1958); he is too condensed on arithmetic and algebra in his opening discussion on Hinduism; he misses the critical importance of the neglect of geometry by the Chinese (e.g., Weber, 1958).

D. *Needham*

As odd as this may sound to many fellow admirers of Max Weber, I must plainly say that in my point of view Needham represents an advance over Weber in respect to a clarification of the dimensions of the questions we have just discussed. Indeed, I would argue that Needham goes far in offering answers to the questions of universal import he has been putting to himself and others. The difficulty is that he puts these questions in different ways in different places and so gives the appearance of inconclusiveness both in the forms of the question and in the forms of the answers.

The two main weaknesses in Needham's analysis are: (a.) his very incomplete knowledge of the patterns of development of the West and the levels of development attained from the 12th century forward; (b.) his almost total neglect of the work and insights of the theoretical and empirical advances of sociological forerunners in the study of civilizational complexes.

Notwithstanding these limitations, Needham proves correct on many scores:

1. He senses that the Chinese found it very difficult to get to a notion of a law of nature comparable to that which was rooted in Greek thought. The context-overdetermined stress of the Confucian ethics on the Five Relationships and the aesthetical-magical Taoist images of Yin and Yang tended to preclude the emergence of a general law of nature.
2. Needham correctly perceives the essential importance in the new mathematical physics of structures of abstract rationality that were universalistic in character. His stress on universality represents an advance over Weber's discussion of rationalization which often thwarts itself by over-concentration on the means-ends maximization model of instrumental reason.
3. Needham has a certain perception of the inhibiting effects in China of the magical base of the imperial structure and the Mandarin aristocracy.

Regrettably, Needham is unable to free himself sufficiently from his polemical stains to recognize that the fundamental structures of abstract rationality in the West received very full elaboration well before the time of Galileo in fields other than experimental science. He misses altogether the critical importance of the breakthroughs in the structures of consciousness and the rationales of conscience, opinion and act which occur in the new universities, and the new forensic, associational and political settings starting with the 12th and 13th centuries.

E. *Durkheim and Mauss*

Oddly enough, as important as Weber's works are, we have to turn to Durkheim and Mauss for fuller clues in respect to the shapes of the contents of the civilizational complexes. Durkheim and Mauss were especially sensitive to the extent to which cultural structures of a certain degree of generality could come to serve multiple purposes as vehicles of different

ideas and interests. The neglected "*Note on the Notion of Civilization*" done by these pioneers in 1912 is a model of intensive reexamination of conceptual frames which had hitherto proved a barrier to the development of a proper comparative sociology of civilizational complexes and intercivilizational relations.

Durkheim and Mauss arrived at the very notion of civilization by courageously facing up to the anomalies of the Durkheimian school's foundation theorem. The original insistence on linking every social process to a social body broke down in the course of systematic reflection on the spread of world religions and universal sciences far from their point of origin and original audiences across boundaries of every sort. It took great courage on the part of Durkheim and Mauss to acknowledge that they needed to modify their basic frames by introducing a fresh term to embrace those phenomena which were intersocietal and intercultural; and so they went to work on the analysis of "civilization". They referred to this level of process as the civilizational level and they included within this level languages, religious ideas of a high degree of abstraction, scientific notions, and rules holding between nations (the so-called *ius gentium* or the *ius inter gentes*).

F. Maine

Sir Henry Sumner Maine will one day be recognized as having performed great feats in expanding our powers to relate to the two main varieties of challenges we have emphasized in this paper. The criticisms which have been directed against details of his work are of little account when compared to the extraordinary suggestions of his distinctions among the sorts of complex societies and the possible grounds of the differentiations in their patterns. Here I restrict myself to speaking only of the following distinctions:

1. As everyone must recall, Maine was passionately concerned with explaining the differences in both the patterns and pathways between what he calls *stationery societies* and what he calls *progressive societies*. By "progressive societies" he meant those groups ready to attempt the amelioration of their own plight by deliberative innovation and legislation. In "stationary societies", fear of change results in an extreme reluctance to go beyond settled habit and prescriptive rule. Maine's analysis of traditionalist casuistries of improvement such as "legal fiction" and "equity" allows us to recognize these as very ingenious answers to the problem of changing without seeming to change.

2. At the base of Maine's thought is his awareness of the critical importance throughout history of the extension of the boundaries of the moral and political communities. He fully perceives that the passage to the territorial society represents a very great move in the direction of civilizational complexity. In the language I have applied in my previous studies, we see a passage "From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood." Associational ties reduce the authority of familial control and piety.

Increasingly the unit of which the civil law tends to take account is the individual and not the family.

What may well be the single most important contribution of Maine to the discrimination of complex societal and civilizational structures has been noticed by hardly a handful of historians. Maine paid immense attention to the stages in the development of the directive systems and symbolic designs of great societies. He came to believe that key variations occurred in the following settings, among others: (1.) the original shapes of the directive imperatives; (2.) the extent to which the original judgments were open to review; (3.) the linkages between the strongly-sanctioned imperatives and theological ritual designs; (4.) the influence of the date of the codification of the structure; (5.) the changes effected through passages to abstract universals of philosophy.

On all these scores Maine came to see that it was possible to establish strong differences in the relations of components of sociocultural process in India, Greece, Rome, and the Hebrew nation. In India a long delay in the codification of the directive imperatives led to the total sacralization of bodies of custom, habit, ritual and theology, resulting in a deep inability to modify the structure through supple causuistry or fresh legislation. The immense variety of languages, social groups and prescriptive rituals in India stood in the way of a full ventilation of the principal structures and a full rationalization of intelligence. The moves to neutralization, generalization, universalization, rationalization were checked at every turn.

G. Once again: Weber, Needham, China and the West

Having begun this section with Weber and Needham, I return to their names and work in ending it.

Undoubtedly the most exciting of all intercivilizational encounters is that which involves the relations of China and the West in the 16th and 17th centuries and China and the West in the 20th century. I will speak now only of the first of these sets of encounters: Clearly Matteo Ricci and those Jesuits who were brought to China came to play a considerable role in the development of Chinese technology and science. It was the need to maintain the sacro-magical system in respect to astronomy, chronomancy and geomancy which allowed Ricci, Verbiest, Schall and others to come to such high positions in the framework of the imperial departments. The Jesuits sought to accommodate themselves in every respect to the Mandarinate and to the Confucian style; so much so that they were prepared to make notable concessions in linking Confucius to Christ and in making room for elements of Catholic ritual. In the end the Jesuits were obliged to leave China because of nativist reaction against the influence they were asserting on the emperors. Moreover, the exceptional liberties the Jesuits took in respect to theological and ritual accommodations occasioned an international contro-

versy which was settled only at the topmost level through a decision of the Papacy and the Papal Congregation on Rites.

From our point of view, one aspect of the contact of the Jesuits and the Chinese cannot be too strongly emphasized. Full breakthrough to generality in the *terms of reference and universalities in the communities of discourse* never occurred during this era of critical contact. The words used by Ricci to describe the motives behind the translation into Chinese of Euclid's *Elements* are helpful in this regard.² Nor should it be assumed that the use of the telescope for the purpose of improving predictions of eclipses in any way involved a basic breakthrough in the structure or generative role of the sciences in respect to the production of knowledge.

The power of the sacro-magical structures is not yet ended in China, but there is substantial evidence that the faith-structures and the rationalized structures of conscience are gaining ground in this era of "Cultural Revolution" and "The Thoughts of Comrade Mao." Older particularisms are giving ground to the newer universalities implicit in the notions of nation, people, and pure and strict science. Few documents on cultural themes are so revealing of how far the Chinese have gone toward universality in their policy of "Westernization with honor" as Chou-en-Lai's statement on language reform. Chou's explanations of the decision for the Latin over the other alphabets (including the Cyrillic!) need to be read by every student of the civilizational politics of the time of transition to the 21st century and the third millennium:

... the Latin alphabet is a set of symbols of international usage, and no country can claim it as its own. We cannot say that Frenchmen use the English alphabet any more than we can say that Englishmen use the French alphabet. We can say only that Frenchmen use the French alphabet and the Englishmen use the English alphabet. Likewise, when we adopt the Latin alphabet, in which we make necessary adjustments to suit the needs of the Chinese language, it becomes the phonetic alphabet of our language and is no longer the alphabet of ancient Latin, still less the alphabet of any foreign country. An alphabet is a means of transcribing pronunciation. We make it serve us just as we make trains, steamships, automobiles, and airplanes serve us. (And, from the point of origin, all these are imported.) It is also like using Arabic numerals for counting and calculating, the Gregorian calendar and the Christian era for

²We read in Ricci's Journal:

It was during this time that the Fathers undertook a work which at first sight might not seem to be wholly in keeping with the purpose of their mission, but once put into practice proved to be quite beneficial. Doctor Ciu Paul had this one idea in mind: since volumes on faith and morals had already been printed, they should now print something on European sciences, as an introduction to further study, in which novelty should vie with proof. And so, this was done, but nothing pleased the Chinese as much as the volume on the *Elements* of Euclid. This perhaps was due to the fact that no people esteem mathematics as highly as the Chinese, despite their method of teaching, in which they propose all kinds of propositions but without demonstrations. The result of such a system is that anyone is free to exercise his wildest imagination relative to mathematics, without offering a definite proof of anything. In Euclid, on the contrary, they recognized something different, namely, propositions presented in order and so definitely proven that even the most obstinate could not deny them.

See in "References" below M. Ricci (1953:476).

recording the year, kilometers for measuring distance, and kilograms for measuring weight. The adoption of the Latin alphabet will, therefore, not harm the patriotism of our people.³

IV

Civilizational Complexes, Intercivilizational Encounters, Structures of Consciousness and Conscience

The comparative historical sociology of civilizational complexes and intercivilizational encounters can only be approached a step at a time. All becomes a jumble if we plunge forward with undue haste to account for the immense variety in the shapes of these complexes. Many long-established clichés readily prove to rest on slender foundations of fact, to conceal as much as they reveal. A number of other cautions will help. We would err if we supposed that the critical civilizational patterns have acted over great distances with constant force. Whenever adaptation occurs it occurs selectively.

The evidences are equally plain on a number of related points. To speak of a single civilizational atmosphere in the history of any large societal environment is to miss the fact that conflict over civilizational ascendancies is endemic in large societies. From our point of view there is no warrant for confining "civilization" to one set of constructs, to one sort of fabric.

Civilization can, indeed, be based on diverse geometries. However, insofar as civilizations come to serve as cultural prerequisites for the relatively enduring organization of different sorts, they will generally be found to involve patterning of related elements. These patternings are found to comprise arrangements of coordinates defining cultural ontologies, epistemologies, and logics; directive systems, dramatic designs, and sociopolitical frameworks; and technologies of different sorts—symbolic as well as material.

³ Chou continues:

One remaining question with which we are all much concerned is the future of Chinese characters. We all agree that as a written record they have made an immortal contribution to history. As to whether or not they will remain permanently unchanged, whether they will change on the basis of their original forms, or whether they will be replaced by a phonetic language—Latin letters or other phonetic scripts—we need not draw a hasty conclusion. Any language is, however, subject to change, as evidenced by the changes of the characters in the past. There will be changes in the future. We can also say that there will be a day when the languages—written and spoken—of the different peoples of the world will gradually become one and the same. The trend in the development of the languages of mankind is that they gradually approach one another until, at long last, there will be no wide difference. This is a good and not a bad anticipation. As to what scheme will be adopted, it is too early to hazard [a guess]. On the question of the future of the Chinese language, there may be various views. We can bring them out for discussion and debate. I shall not dwell upon it any further since it does not fall within the scope of the task of the language reform.

The text is conveniently given in Crozier (ed.) (1970: 128-31)

Types of Structures of Consciousness

I turn now to a series of differentiations in the *structures of consciousness* as they are revealed by close studies of the histories of those great civilizational complexes which have been associated with great world religions. We need to discriminate a series of patterns in the structures of consciousness and the degree of collectivity or individualization in the forms of representation. I make no pretence of offering a complete inventory of these structures or of setting forth an evolutionary sequence which is irreversible. On the latter, I specifically reject the idea of "irreversibility" as being unhistorical. I simply refer to three types which have been historically prominent across the centuries and which can easily be discovered to be useful in defining the shapes of civilizational complexes and the impacts and adaptations which arise whenever there have been conclusive contacts of the major societal complexes.

Consciousness-Type 1 (CT1)

The first pattern of structures of consciousness is characterized by the predominance of collective acceptances of responsibility to make amends for collective wrongs or falls from a state of undividedness. The ruling supposition is that all lapses from unity in both macrocosm and microcosm have to be atoned for by collective acknowledgements of crime and wrong, assumptions of liability, propitiations, sacrifices and commemorations.

From a standpoint of comparative sociology of cultures the leading clues have been provided by Max Weber. What I have in effect described is what Weber would call the sacro-magical structure of consciousness. The ruling instances of these sacro-magical forms may be found in all societal and civilizational complexes dominated by prescriptive etiquettes and rituals, all oriented to the total fulfillment of laws believed to be ontological in character and to have their sanction in the cosmic orders, the commands of the ancestors and the primordial traditions that require that they be preserved through literal performances of fixed obligations. A number of variations are possible in the social structural guarantees of these ritual performances. These differences, however, do not fundamentally alter the central supposition that the total society is under total obligation collectively to fulfill the ontological demands and to offer totalistic propitiations, placations or commemorations, if the harmonies of the cosmos are to endure. Weber illustrates the authority of such systems in ancient India, China, and Judaism, and sees the break from those systems as constituting one of the decisive passages in the direction of rationalization. It needs to be perceived that structures of this sort lie below the level of the social religious formations he so powerfully analyzes in his *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*, especially in those segments having to do with India, China and Judaism.

Weber's frames need to be supplemented by reference to the work of Durkheim, Mauss, and Maine, especially the essay by Durkheim and Mauss on *Primitive Classification* and Durkheim's introduction and conclusion to his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. *Consciousness-Type 1*, as we are here describing it, may be spoken of as a structure where, for whatever reason, collective representations prevail and affirm the absolute authority of magical-prescriptive structures which are fulfilled by all groups without notable deviation. Within this structure of consciousness developments may occur in the direction of a wider rationalization, but if these developments are essentially elaborated as reinforcement of the magical-prescriptive systems, they need still to be spoken of as instances of *Consciousness-Type 1*.

From the point of view here adopted, *Consciousness-Type 1* may be ascribed no less to the Chinese than to the Hindus; no less to the Hindus than to the Jews, even after the appearance in China of the Confucian ethic and the Mandarinate, or in Judaism even after the prophets. The central factor is the dominance of a sacro-magical structure which binds the entire community in propitiations, commemorations and expressions of the collective conscience.

Consciousness-Type 2 (CT2)

From my point of view, a decisive breakthrough occurs in the emergence of another structure of consciousness, *Consciousness-Type 2*, in which all are enjoined to enter into meditation, producing a faith-structure of consciousness. The faith-structure requires that all individuals and groups, however differentiated, are under the obligation to engage in continuous purgation and catharsis of evil thoughts and feelings and to discover a way by which they can appropriately conform by being *informed* by the faith-consciousness. The faith-consciousness already implies a kind of *logos* or world soul in which participation is accessible through psychic conformities. The passage to the faith-structure of consciousness is illustrated most clearly in the passage from Judaism to Christianity and has been very powerfully described in the work of Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages in the Christian Church*. Faith-structures of consciousness are already a premonition of a next phase in the development of consciousness, the move toward the rationalization of the contents of faith; that is, the systematic analysis of the contents of and evidences for faith, the appearance of a science called theology. In *Consciousness-Type 2*, where faith-consciousness prevails, the form of participation, whether collective or individual, is existential and is manifested in practice, activities, imitations, exemplifications.

The faith-structures allow for many complex differentiations. One critical differentiation is the appearance of specialist virtuosi in meditation and in the achievement of mystical union whose skills in the attainment of

“essentiality” are believed to provide vicarious expiation for others who have not been able to attain the level of expertise necessary to qualify in their own right. I would observe that here I am departing somewhat from the ways in which Weber talks of the cross-cuttings of his critical types in respect to the modes of orientation to religion and world. The faith-structure of consciousness may, indeed, issue in a new legitimation of the inherited patterns in the sacro-magical prescriptions or they may lead to a radical devaluation of the activities of the world and produce the patterns that Weber ascribes to other-worldly asceticism. They may, indeed, issue in the intermittent treatment of the sacro-magical and even moral values as second-order values.

Faith-structures of consciousness represent a phase of many different religions. The above-mentioned book by Edwin Hatch permits us to see the transition from the prescriptive structures of forensic Judaism to the faith-structures of consciousness resulting from the permeation of Judeo-Christian beliefs by Greek and Roman influences during the Hellenistic and Roman Imperial eras.

The soul's commitment to faith does not guarantee that a unity will be achieved between the moral and the theological. Actually, the faith-structure of consciousness is one which treats the moral order in different ways at different times, sometimes as the direct revelation of the theological, sometimes in a way which is relatively indifferent.

Where faith-structures of consciousness prevailed, one often discovers the presence of groups and sects (claiming to be exempt from natural causality and natural law) which are supposed to be in possession of special revelation to commit acts not ordinarily allowed. Faith-structures of consciousness are manifested strongly in mystical acosmic, mystical millenarian, mystical militaristic sects, and inner-worldly mystical groups. Among these groups marked by faith-structures of consciousness were the Gnostics, the Sufis of Islam, the *Perfecti* among the Cathari, the Families of Love and other groups of enthusiasts who felt themselves possessed by God's grace and power.

Not infrequently faith-structures of consciousness are characterized by a *transmoral consciousness*, a conscience beyond good and evil. Those who are perfect and enjoy direct illumination feel themselves free from the obligation to live in accordance with the ordinary moral or civil law.

The key to the faith-structures of consciousness is that individuals committed to faith feel themselves to be part of the truth, a manifestation of the divine in expression of the universal will or sovereign design. Existence in the faith is truth.

Consciousness-Type 3 (CT3)

Consciousness-Type 3 comes into operation when the collective structures of representation have weakened and large segments of a population

are not agreed as to the contents of the faith, the evidence of the faith and the implications of the structures of faith and action, belief and opinion. The most decisive illustrations of this breakthrough to the "*rationalized structures of consciousness*" are to be found in the 12th and 13th centuries in Europe when the new logic and the new dialectic bring forth a new theology.

The principle architect of this new theology is Abelard, who in a series of extraordinary writings, clearly sets forth the method by which the contents of faith are to be differentiated and sifted so as to produce a logically provable structure of *rationales* which undergird belief in all spheres of opinion and act. The most critical encounter in the transition between *Consciousness 2* and *3* is the conflict of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Abelard.

It may be admitted that the terms of my reference may recall the thought of many writers from whom I would separate myself, the principal one being Auguste Comte. My position clearly implies that a universalistic theology represents a decisive breakthrough, the emergence of a prime science. The distinctions between what I would call the theological, metaphysical, and positive structures of consciousness are in my view distinctions within the *Consciousness 3* rationalized structures of consciousness. The differentiations within *Consciousness 3* are not nearly so difficult to attain as are the passages from *Consciousness 1* to *2* and from *Consciousness 2* to *3*. Indeed, I would contend that the passage from *Consciousness 1* to *2* probably represents the most decisive move in the direction of the functionalization of intelligence, the generalization in the terms of reference, and the universality of the community discourse. It hardly matters that the passage to a faith-structure of consciousness allows the intermittent dominance within communities of faith of men especially skilled in the achievement of states of contemplation and undividedness. The key fact is that so long as the fundamental frames are faith-consciousness, all who have some access to the faith-frames may lay claim to being messengers of the faith, exemplars of the faith, or incarnations of the faith. In such a situation social class and caste may readily be broken through by manifestations of power or charismatic authority in respect to the annunciation.

The differentiations which have developed within *Consciousness 3* were already implicit in this pattern from the very outset. No sooner is a rationalized theology under development than we have separations of the parts of the analysis with the help of Aristotle, Plato and others. There is immediate opportunity to distinguish between moral philosophy and natural philosophy. The terms of discourse are absolutely general and increasingly available to higher degree through formalization into abstract languages which are technical, artificial in the strict sense, and open to mathematical formulation at one or another level of abstraction. Moreover, the forms of proof appropriate for these different spheres are readily discriminated. The

passages to formal sciences, theoretical sciences, and experimental sciences, are much easier than have hitherto been alleged.

I call attention here to only one of the many inferences which may be derived from the immediately preceding discussion. Those who wish to engage systematically in the comparative study of civilizational complexes must always attend closely to the fundamental focus of differentiations *within as well as among* the structures of consciousness. Idiomatic mixes and balances of elements of all the respective structures above may be certain to appear on close inspection of the civilizational cover and the workings of large historically-embedded societies. Scholarly studies in this field have to be as deeply concerned with stratigraphy as are archeology and geo-history.

It is only by adopting these wider points of view that we can escape falling into traps which await the unwary. Thus, for example, due attention to cultural stratigraphy helps us to make sense of the widespread recurrences in our own day of aspects of sacro-magical structures of consciousness mistakenly believed to be extinct. By the same token we avoid too quickly identifying as a Western society one whose seeming differentiations within the rationalized sector only serve to call attention to the insignificance of rationalized intelligence or universalistic intent at the focal point of the society's logics and its agencies of decision and function. Comparative historians and sociologists are familiar with many highly bureaucratized societies unable to break through traditionalism at critical levels with respect to the structures of consciousness, despite public commitments to Westernization.

V

The Balances of Intercivilizational Ascendencies—Some Historical Illustrations

Without saying so in so many words, Max Weber clearly identified Greek rationalism and Roman rationalism as twin pillars of the development of Western civilization. He would almost certainly have agreed that Greek rationalism may be said to represent the highest classical development of the logics of opinion, inquiry and demonstration; and similarly Roman rationalism, the highest classical development of the logics of organization, of action and of administration. We dare not stop here to ask why Weber did not deal more directly and at greater length with these recurring thrusts and interweaving influences (Nelson, 1949, 2nd ed. 1969).

From the point of view adopted in this essay, it is necessary to note that different eras and movements in the history of the West have been marked by different emphases on one or another of the crystallized structures of classical rationalism. (I say nothing at the moment about the analogous issues of the degree to which these variations in the ascendancy of one or another expression of given structures of consciousness prevail in one or

another Eastern society.) Surely so far as Europe is concerned it may be said that where Greek rationalism has been predominant it has often been the case that the critical decisions as to action and function have had to appear to meet the tests of theoretical science and philosophy. Where Roman rationalism has been prominent a strong tendency has regularly asserted itself to declare or derive the ontologies from the requirements or imperatives of *praxis* or the logics of control. Our own time has offered myriad illustrations of the hegemony of the instrumentalized logics of rationalized control (Nelson, 1949, 2nd ed. 1969:166-68).

Classical Greece, especially Athens, offers the paradigmatic case of a society and culture in which we see the most conclusive passage from the tribal society to the polis, from the family to the public institutions, from particularism to universalism in spheres of science and philosophy. Nowhere so greatly as among the Hellenes did there occur a movement to the achievement of principal structures of the highest degree of universality. It is therefore no wonder that Western civilization rests upon a Greek foundation: Plato and Aristotle, Euclid and Archimedes, Ptolemy and Hero of Alexandria. And it rests as we have just seen, upon a Roman foundation—Roman law and administration.

The subsequent development of civilizational complexes and intercivilizational contacts proves to be a study of the relative viability of integration of the classical inheritance. This is the meaning of the processes of translation and adaptation of Greek metaphysics, Greek dialectic and Greek science. If we are to understand the differences in the degree of adaptation of the Greek inheritance we have to understand the measure to which the Muslims, medieval Hebrews, and medieval Christians—and for that matter, the early modern Chinese and Japanese—allowed their own structures to be permeated by the underlying universality of Greek logic and dialectic.

A great blunder is often made here by scholars of narrowly construed behaviorist-positivist outlook, that is, those who identify the progress of knowledge with “positive progress” within *positive sciences*. From the *civilizational* point of view adopted in this essay it is not nearly so important whether in any given science a given people did or did not actually make an advance upon the Greeks in respect to one or another discipline—for example, chemistry, optics or mathematics. The fundamental issue is whether there did occur a comprehensive breakthrough in the moralities of thought and in the logics of decision which open out the possibility of creative advance in the direction of wider universalities of discourse and participation in the confirmation of improved *rationales*.

An Axial Shift—the 12th and 13th Centuries

The great break in the balances of intercivilizational ascendancies comes in the 12th and 13th centuries. It is the era in which we have the Crusades marked by highly abrasive contacts at every level—military, political,

cultural and theological. In these conflicts we have encounters of Western Christianity and Islam, Western Christianity and Byzantine Christianity, Western Christianity and the Mongols, Western Christianity and China, Western Christianity and Africa, Western Christianity and the Jews.

I will confine myself here to speaking only of selected aspects of these contacts. My main stress will be on the complexes and contacts of Western Christendom, the Muslims and the Jews.

For reasons we do not yet fully understand, the 12th and 13th centuries saw an extraordinary resurgence of Western power on the battlefield, in commerce, in science, in theology, natural philosophy and mathematics. Translators and scholars did extensive work in recapturing the Greek heritage through the medium of Arab and Hebrew texts. The great advances made by Arabs came to be incorporated into Western science. This is especially true in the fields of optics, algebra and medicine. Also involved in this diffusion of culture were the more critical components of the Chinese and Hindu inheritance. From the Chinese there came the compass, forms of sailing and the approach to printing with the use of paper. From the Hindus came the so-called Hindu-Arabic numeral system which reached the West in 1202 through the translation of the so-called *Book of the Abacus* by Leonardo Fibonacci of Pisa.

The most critical borrowings came from the Muslims. It was they who placed at the disposal of this period much of Aristotle and Plato that had been lost, together with critical commentaries by Averroes and others.

It was this new body of writings, constituting the new logic and the *Libri naturales*,⁴ which were to be the point of departure for the great searching of the Western spirit. The immense changes which follow in the wake of the new logic have already been referred to in connection with the development of the rationalized structures of consciousness in the spheres of opinion and action identified with Abelard and his successors. From the year 1210 to the year 1325 there occurred a complete overhauling of the structures of legitimation and theoretical *rationales* of Christian theology and natural philosophy. Natural theology was a half-way house; it contained the promise of natural science. The distance between Adelard and Abelard in the 12th century and Galileo in the 17th is not so great as one may suppose. Bernard of Clairvaux, Walter of St. Victor, the Cistercians and the Victorines sought

⁴This dispute had many very fateful implications which have been studied by scholars in specialized works. Here I would only observe that one eventual outcome was to promote the notion that there were two Books both attesting God's Power and Will, one the *Book of Revelation* and the other what came to be called the *Book of Nature* or the *Book of Creatures*. During the 15th century this idea gained new momentum and eventuated as the notion that the Book of Nature being written on numbers is a "universal manuscript" which is accessible to all (who know numbers) to investigate and understand and is uniform in its meaning, whereas the Book of Revelation requires interpretation by special-interest elites (theologians) who rarely seem to agree on the meaning of any passage. I am now at work on an essay which will trace the interesting and important turns in the history of the relations between the interpretations placed on the two Books (Nelson, 1973c).

desperately to restrain the progress of Aristotle's natural philosophy. In 1210, at a synod of Paris under the direction of Robert de Curzon (the extraordinary Cardinal Legate of Pope Innocent III) Aristotle's *Libri naturales* were declared to be illegitimate material for study until corrected. In 1255 Dominican students were summoned to familiarize themselves with Aristotle's natural philosophy. In 1277 Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris condemned 219 propositions of which a good number were believed to be derived from the commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the same year, propositions developed in the schools were placed under condemnation by Robert Kilwardby, the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Despite this, despite the censures intended against Thomas and the censures against William of Occam, the scholastic theologians moved ahead claiming the liberty of philosophizing, the right to entertain as speculatively probable any and all propositions which were not utterly known to be theologically false.

In the year 1325 Thomas Aquinas became a saint, the Angelic doctor of the church, a required master for all Dominicans and for many others. This story is a shorthand of the extraordinary advances in legitimization of borrowed *rationales*.

Therefore, no mystery is attached to the fact that despite the very evident superiority of the Muslims and Hebrews in the special sciences in the period from the 9th through the 12th centuries, it was in the end the West which broke through the controlling power of the faith-structures of consciousness and moved toward universalities in the terms of reference and the communities of discourse.

In Islam the *ulama* prevailed: the highly developed sciences never had the power to overcome the ruling forensic theological frames. The Islamic structure was powerfully undergirded by the ritual-prescriptive and faith-structures of consciousness, and between the two structures it was extremely difficult for the terms of reference to acquire generality and the communities of discourse to acquire the universality necessary for the passage to the wider functionalization of intelligence and the wider forma'ization of language. The great struggle in Islam occurred in the course of the battle over the *kalam*. The *ulama* never achieved the degree of rationalization which was achieved in Romano-Canonical jurisprudence; the various schools of Muslim law continued to be based upon *hadith* and tradition.

It must also be noted that a very considerable set of moves occurred within the framework of the Hebrew community across the entire world. Special sciences, especially medicine, did undergo development. Moreover, as in the case of Maimonides and then later Crescas, their work illustrated a passage toward theologies deeply philosophical in character. However, the dominant tradition is the *halachic* tradition which maintains the prescriptive structures and the juridical frameworks of the Mishnah and the Talmud. The result is that there was no escaping the immense power of traditionalists in

defining the structures of experience and the terms of discourse for any investigation. Wherever Judaism remains conservative or orthodox, the same essential realities prevail and the breakthrough to *Consciousness 3* is restricted. In Israel today, the appearance of a full breakthrough rests upon a certain separation of spheres which is predicated upon *ad hoc* understandings.

The clue to the differences among Muslim, Jewish and Western Christian adaptation of the Greek heritage may be found precisely here. Muslim and Jewish structures were stubbornly communalistic, resting upon the articulation of the Holy Law in every aspect of existence. The enormous authority of the *ulama* in Islam and the *halacha* in the medieval Hebrew community stood in the way of full rationalization of both of those structures.

It was only in Christianity, where the breakthrough to natural theology had occurred early, where the accelerated passage to universalistic structures came with the new logic and the new science of the 12th and 13th centuries, that the way was prepared for the distinctive patternings of Western civilization, the accelerated thrust toward modernization, rationalization and universalization.

VI

A Look Back—A Look Ahead

The history of intercivilizational relations over the past two millenia has repeatedly involved encounters of complex associational polities marked by advanced bureaucratic structures with nations in earlier phases of communalistic identity. From the time of Alexander the Great, there has been a series of struggles between complex structures claiming universalistic missions and community-societies committed to the preservation of communalistic identities and ritual magic or faith-structures of consciousness. The patterns of response which have developed in the wake of these conflicts have been very similar since the days of Alexander the Great. For the most part, universalistic notions have spread from an imperial center to various peripheries in all the societies involved.

New mediatorial elites, sometimes freshly constituted as a new aristocracy, have participated in syncretistic religions and the elaboration of patterns congruent with the rationalized consciousness and the universalist *rationales* of the bureaucratic society. In all such countries there have arisen "prophetic" groups which have sought to preserve rooted solidarities, pieties and identities in movements of *recollectivizations* of consciousness. The struggles of the Jews against their Hellenistic and Roman rulers from 168 B.C. to 135 A. D.—from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes to the Destruction of the Temple and the Bar-Kochba Revolt—are outstanding illustrations of this.

So long as the *oikumene* is able to maintain itself with a reasonable measure of stability there is a preservation of the forms of rationalized consciousness which are characteristic of civilizational complexes of the West.

The demise of the Late Roman Empire manifested itself in the spread of competing mystery religions and the new forms of apathy and indifference. The prevailing structures of consciousness which evolved from the breakup of the empire were mainly faith-structures, the intensity of the conflicts among the competing theological movements testifying to a great deal more than political factionalism or, indeed, even to economic hardship. They testify to conflicts in the structures of consciousness being etched out of the welter of new experience.

Revolutions and Rationales

All countries of the world, since at least the French Revolution, have been and are the scenes of bitter struggles over the relative values of rooted collective consciousness and schemes of rationalized intelligence. Throughout the 19th century, the struggle over the structures of consciousness took a variety of forms within individual nations. Strong pressures to modernization and Westernization marked the history of lands such as Russia, Japan and India. But these pressures were matched by recurring demands for rejection of Westernization. Slavophilism, Japanese nationalism, Pan-Islamism, and latterly, African nativism, have been the results of religious and ethnic as well as political and economic interests.

Today we are again at a turning point in the successive civil wars and revolutions of the cultures of conscience and consciousness. This time it is the Western rationalized consciousness which is on trial in all countries of the world. The frightful events of our century have convinced great numbers that the civilizations reared on the so-called "myth of the *objective consciousness*" are beyond repair.

So far as Europe is concerned, Italian Fascism and German Nazism marked the mass inception of a critical reversal in the itinerary of Western civilization. The fearsome views and acts associated with the Fascists and Nazis were expressly declared to have the purpose of preserving the purity of the collective racial and national unconscious from contamination by allegedly soulless deracinated *Westernized* intelligence.

The "cultural revolutions" which are occurring everywhere across the world today are marked by intensive thrusts of collective process. Vast efforts are in progress to forge new collective identities and new forms of collective experience and expression. These collective forms are now seen most clearly in youth movements, but they are to be found wherever separatist groups pursue the right to collective identity.

These movements in a collectivist direction suggest that the distinctly Western efforts to develop the individual personality and the individual

conscience may have reached their zenith. Thrusts in the directions of personhood and rationality have been dominant elements in Western civilization from the 11th century. Respect for developed structures of *rationales* in relation to what I have called both the *moralties* and *logics of thought and action* have been steadily declining in the present century. It now appears that these thrusts may have reached their zenith in the years between 1890 and 1920.

From a current perspective, it seems that the half-century since 1920 has been one of especially intense passages towards collective conscience and collective consciousness. Those who call us to the collective reappropriation of redeeming symbols through the collective unconscious may indeed prove to be more popular prophets than the defenders of rationality. The tides are now turning strongly against the very idea of *rationale*, and, indeed, every image of *nomos* and *nomism*. On every side we are seeing efforts to achieve new forms of corporate embodiment, new fusions of identity, and new patterns of non-contractual consensus.

The shifts we have witnessed and are now experiencing in the spheres of collective sensibilities and in the structures, *rationales* and streams of conscience and consciousness are no less critical for the future of culture and civilization than the changes in the economic and political spheres which have followed in the wake of heightened industrialization.

Some Closing Predictions

There is a high probability that the latest forms of the objective structures of consciousness and conscience now being deplored by the Western critics of civilization will move forward in the Orient. Wherever external forms are accompanied by historic residues—for example, of Greek thought, Roman law, medieval theology, Renaissance humanism, 17th century science and political philosophy, and so on—we may expect them to undergo the sorts of restrictions and compartmentalization which have already been manifesting themselves in the Far East. Recent developments in Japan offer an important paradigm of this process, and I believe that India will undergo similar phases. And the experience of China is likely to be the same.

It may safely be predicted that Marxism will play a strategic part in these processes during the next phases. The reason is, as I have hinted elsewhere, that Marxism appears to offer an immensely potent and adaptable mechanism for encouraging modernity and Western rationalized modes, while preserving flexible frames for the pragmatic maintenance of certain collective, non-reflective patterns. Precisely because it has proved its ability to perform this feat in a number of lands in West and East alike, Marxism promises to be the most critical form in which a Western *national* form of socialism apparently free from the blemishes of German National Socialism or Italian National Socialism will spread across the globe.

Marxist structures in variant forms are proving compatible with storm and stress phases of breakthroughs in India, China and Japan, just as they were in Russia. Under the mantle of Marxism in the variants that are arising, there can occur the adoption and adaptation of Western science and technology. This is true despite the restraints which are inspired by different cadres from time to time; however painful they prove to many in the interim, the retardations prove momentary and transient. In the same vein, there can also occur the adoption and adaptations of certain philosophies of the West and even certain logics and structures of the West, but not exactly what I have been calling "moralities and logics of action." Wherever Marxism takes hold, we see the expansion of populist collectivism and new balances of social elements, workers, students, and political party candidates—balances which will always appear to be heading toward an open future rather than to a maintenance of undesirable privileges and prerogatives of the past.

As this statement draws to a close, I will admit to a private doubt that many "developing" countries will not find it possible or desirable to preserve older or create newer civilizational cultural structures. I do not mainly refer in this connection to advanced facilitations or high science. I refer, rather, to the patterns of reciprocities, mutual answerabilities, and relations of trust; above all, I refer to the *rationales* and canons of opinion and act; respect for and protection of rights and interests of persons, including their *abstract* rights and interests. As I see matters, the new nations are unlikely to have structures defending the juridical rights of individuals, whoever they may be, against the powers of government, or to allow for the development of structures that will flourish without impairment in neutralized places; nor will it be possible for there to be neutralized cultural institutions which will carry on their own functions within this totalistic environment. Constitutions, congregations, churches, universities, independent judiciaries are losing their attractions for embattled people.⁵

Given the dynamic totalism of the newer societies which are in the making, we dare not expect the full or even partial institutionalization of those structures which seem to me to be integral to inherited notions of civilization. It seems highly unlikely that the remaining years of the present century will witness an encouragement of other prerequisites of civilization, above all, widely dispersed rights to join together voluntarily for mutual benefit in cultural and associational purposes; freedom of conscience and consciousness; acknowledgment of answerability to universal rationales.

⁵I allow myself to draw freely here from some paragraphs of an earlier essay (Nelson, 1972).

REFERENCES

References below are arranged in three sections:

Section (A) confines itself to mentioning the names of the renowned authors who have made major contributions to the studies of Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Relations.

Section (B) offers fuller citations of authors and writings central to the understanding of the present paper.

Section (C) lists a number of papers by the present author which may prove helpful in tracing out lines of thought and details of the foregoing arguments.

(A.)

The major contributors include: Burckhardt, Spengler, H. Adams, Toynbee, Whitehead, Kroeber, Redfield, Sorokin, H. Frankfort, A. Bozemann, E. Barker, C. Dawson, M. Eliade, L. Mumford, L. White, Jr., and others.

Readers eager to study civilizational structures in depth are advised to consult specialized monographs written by contemporary experts with full command of the languages, literatures and histories of different areas and eras.

Among these authors I would make special mention here of such names as E. Balasz, R. Bellah, W. Eberhard, J. K. Fairbank, C. Geertz, M. Granet, H. Nakamura, J. Needham, E. O. Reischauer, A. K. Wright for *China, Japan and East Asia*; A. Chaudhuri, B. Cohn, L. Dumont, M. Singer, L. and S. Rudolph, N. Srinivas for *India*; Sir H.A.R. Gibb, R. Levy, W.C. Smith, W.R. Smith for *Islam and Islamic lands*; E.E. Evans-Pritchard, D. Forde, M. Gluckman, J. Mbiti, V. W. Turner for *Africa and African Culture*.

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Many of the best essays will be found in the edited collections and anthologies; cf., e.g., works edited by G. Barraclough, A. Crombie, M. Claggett, G. Post and R. L. Reynolds, and S. N. Eisenstadt.

A wider discussion and a longer list of annotated references will be found in two additional publications by the current writer and collaborators which are going through the press: Nelson and Kavolis (1973c), Nelson and Nielson (1973d).

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