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Title:

The clash of civilizations and emergence of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley

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In the name of God

Dedication

The author wishes to dedicate this thesis to his mother, without her love, dedication, and patience, this research would not have been possible.

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Abstract:

The fundamentalism is term which originally used to refer the American protestant Christianity. The concept of fundamentalism can be considered in contrast with Western modernism. Islamic fundamentalism is characterized by "anti-modernity", "anti-civilization" and "anti-West" features, and is generally very prominent its anti-new civilization aspect. The significance of the present study is to understand the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism within the framework of the Huntington's clash of civilization theory. The main question of the research is that in accordance with Huntington's clash of civilization theory what are the contexts of the emergence of Islmic fundamentalism in Fergana valley? The hypothesis that is presented in response to this research is that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley. Thesis is an explanatory research which attempts to explain how the polarization of society between forces of modernism and Islamism caused the emergence of fundamentalism. The format of study is based on a descriptive analysis, and a comprehensive and historical outlook of the specific events and opinions. The research achievement of thesis is that religious fundamentalism is not synonymous with extremism but consistent with traditionalism. The clash of Islamic civilization is not merely with modernity (as one of the waves of Western civilization) but, its contradiction is related to West's expansionist and supremacist nature (Westoxification). The theory of the clash of civilizations can be applied to the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods but it does not have this applicability for post-soviet period, and the modernity and theories related to fundamentalism appear to better explain the confrontations and contexts of Islamic fundamentalism indeed, in this period.

Keywords: Islamic fundamentalism**,** Clash of civilizations**,** Fergana valley**,** Modernism, Radical Islam

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Introduction:

The Fergana valley has played a role both in establishing stability in Central Asia and in becoming the starting point of violent conflict throughout the history of the region. The valley became administrationally and ethnically divided into several parts during the Soviet and post-Soviet era. During the Soviet era, the socialist union republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan administered the region within the Soviet Union, while after the collapse of the Soviet Union; they became independent states and continued to administer the region separately.

Currently, the tension among different ethnic, social, and political groups is high because of overpopulation, the increasing scarcity of water and arable land, and the economic hardships and social differentiation during the political, economic, and social transformation that occurred after the Soviet Union collapsed. The Fergana valley, at the heart of Central Asia, has become one of the most conflict-prone areas in Central Asia. For these reasons, it can be said that Fergana valley has become a region prone for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. The purpose of thesis is also to investigate the contexts of emergence of the Islamic fundamentalism in this valley as a ticking bomb. The contexts that are related to three periods: Tsarist Russia period (1860-1917), Soviet period (1917-1991), and post-Soviet period (1991- 2001).

The hypothesis in this thesis is that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

It is worth mentioning that, the present thesis attempts to analyze the issue of Islamic fundamentalism within the framework of Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations. In this theory, so that will be expanded in second chapter, the confrontation between Islamic civilization and Western civilization is considered, a theory that can be applied to the periods of Tsarist Russia and Soviet, but modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism appear to better explain the subsequent confrontations in post-Soviet period.

In the third chapter, the contexts of the emergence of this phenomenon will be addressed. In Tsarist Russia period, the factors such as Tsarist colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions, suppression peoples, destruction of Islamic beliefs, increasing taxes, Russia large-scale colonial exploitation of oil and coal resources especially cotton, famine and starvation, were the contexts for anti-Russian protests and anti-colonial rebellions in Turkistan (Central Asia) specially, Fergana valley and eventually religious revival. Indeed, in this period of Islamic fundamentalism, has been reaction to modernism a wave of Western civilization.

In Soviet period, factors such as Stalin's extensive and consistent de-Islamization policies, unsuitable economic conditions, the exploitative exploitation policy of natural resources especially cotton, Western civilization waves for example modernization values, Bolsheviks' policy of redrawing or delineation the borders along ethnic or national lines and administrative delineation, Stalin's policy of transforming Muslim nations into modern states to separate Muslims in Central Asia from each other and creating distinct ethnic identities, starvation, severe suppression of Muslims during the Bolshevik regime and confronting Islamic beliefs and symbols in Central Asia (process of secularization), implementation of political-economic reforms during the Gorbachev period under the title Glasnost and Prostorica and subsequently highlighting of Islam's role in society and formation of identit, ethnic diversity, poverty and unemployment, unresolved territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts, provided the contexts for the emergence of fundamentalism and the activities of the Islamic reformist movements and actually the re-Islamization. During this period, Islamic fundamentalism has also been reaction to modernism as one of the waves of Western civilization. So that, it can be said that the confrontation between Islamic civilization and Western civilization and the influence and opposition of its waves, such as secularization and especially modernity vs Islamic civilization and its conservative and traditionalist nature are evident in this period.

Eventually, in post-Soviet period, the factors such as the role of external actors such as Taliban rule over Aghanistan and etc, in strengthening and supporting Islamic tendencies, and also internal factors such as economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning, social anomalies and ruling political corruption in Central Asian republics, drug trade, inequalities, , the prominent role of Islam in determining part of the identity of the region, the development of religious self-awareness, the lack of legal frameworks for political campaigns, the inability of new independent governments to manage crisis of region, the civil war in Tajikistan and the hard-line positions of the leaders of the region specially Uzbekistan's leadership towards the development of Islamic political activities and democratic freedoms also contributed to the emergence and promotion of Islamic fundamentalism.

It should be said that during this period, the confrontation between Islamic civilization and Western civilization is contextualizer to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley, but it is mainly the internal critical conditions that has provided the basis for the emergence of this phenomenon. In other words, in the post-Soviet period, contrary to the previous periods, fundamentalism in the Fergana valley was not a product of a particular religion, such as Islam.

A striking issue about fundamentalism is the causes of propagation of radical Islam (revival of Islam) in Fergana valley. This issue will be considered in the fourth chapter of thesis. Islamic revival refers to the support for an increased influence of Islamic values on the modern world as a response to Western and secular trends. Islamic fundamentalism has is a close relationship with radical Islam.

After the Central Asian republics became independent, Islam was instrumental in identifying of people of the region. Islamic revival in post-Soviet Central Asia can be characterized as moderate, given, first of all, lack of political experience in Islam, and the legacy of the Soviet rule, which had a major secularizing effect on Central Asian societies.

Fears of genuine Islamic threat in the form of fundamentalist or radical movements that are supported by outside forces and resort to violence in achieving their goals are largely ungrounded. In fact, the issue of Islamic radicalism featured far from top in the list of serious problems that newly independent Central Asian states and its leaders faced in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but later in the post-Soviet period, some concerns were raised about Islamic activism and fears were conjured up about the possible threat emanating from Islam's extreme forms coming from abroad. Immediate measures were taken by the Central Asian elites to suppress different forms of Islamic expression, often labeling the ordinary believers 'fundamentalists'. But to what extent these groups were really fundamentalist backed by outside Islamist forces is a controversial issue.

It should be said that, in post-Soviet Central Asia, Islamic revival is a natural process after a long period of suppression and if Islam is to be radicalized, it will still be not because of outside influence but conditioned by the discontent of people within the region, faced with the challenges of unstable economies and the excesses of authoritarian regimes that are increasing their powers across Central Asian republics at present. In other word, in addition to this historical legacy of Islam, this revival process is currently being influenced by internal socio-economic conditions and political situation. Radicalization of Islam, if it ever takes place, will not be because of outside influence, but will be the result of discontent with economic hardships and inability of authorities to build a just society with democratic principles. Therefore, it should be said that effective internal factors in revival of Islam are concerned to political conditions, economic conditions, and religious conditions. The limited oppositional political activism of some Islamic groups is not a threat to the stability in society but is a threat to the position of elites that want to remain in power.

In fact, it can be said that considering Islam as a political ideology which is able to face the malfunctioning of the Soviet and at the same time confront the influence of western civilization propagated Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

In the fourth chapter, is examined the role- playing of modernity and its social changes, and also its role in stimulating and strengthening Islamic fundamentalism with centrality of religion. Modernity has created multiple social and identity crises for traditional societies by creating a transformation in the role of religion in individual and social life. Religious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to these developments. Within the framework of modernity it should be said that, fundamentalism is the product and factor of more comprehensive social changes, not product of a particular religion, such as Islam.

In fact, modernity contributes to strengthen Islamic fundamentalism by containment the role of religion and social changes result from it such as, transforming the economic structures of traditional societies, defining the new roles in the modern society which were not essentially linked to religious values, undermining the pyramid patterns of power in society and religion, cultural pluralism, challenging religious absolutism by developments in science.

It should also mention the loss of the social and cultural links of the traditional community in migrants and the need to replace it with a new identity, which fundamentalism ideology usually provides such an alternative.

In addition, local contexts of strengthening fundamentalism are also noteworthy in this regard. The contexts such as confrontation of the Islamic world with Europeans, impact of colonization as a wage of modernity, being abruptly and disorderly modern changes in islam world, existence of totalitarian governments and the lack of modern and traditional democratic institutions and foundations, the rise of religious beliefs and enthusiasm and tendency toward spirituality and religion and not having a background of widespread religious education among leaders of fundamentalist movements which led to radical and not moderate interpretations of religion.

In general, it can be said that, the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism was based on the revival of Islam as a cultural and political identity in a fundamentalist way.

Chapter I:

Generals of research

Statement of the problem

The fundamentalism, a term used loosely to describe a reaction of (neo) traditional religion (religious thinking) against the pressures of modernity, fundamentalism (it) became a widespread topic of interest in the media and the academy during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Fundamentalism is a worldwide phenomenon, arising in various societies with differing cultural backgrounds and experiences of modernity.

The original understanding of fundamentalism, however, took shape in an American protestant context. For this reason, among others, critics have questioned the viability of fundamentalism as a universal religious category, especially when applied to non-western societies; and comparative studies of fundamentalism have been marked by self-conscious attempts to prove the existence of the phenomenon that they are presumably examining. But about the problem of fundamentalism in Fergana valley, the appeal of Islamic-based political movements in the Fergana valley is owned largely to the fact that people lacked an outlet for secular political expression. People increasingly felt disenfranchised and alienated not only from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes but also from the traditional leaders of civil society. Increasingly, people turned to Islam as means for political expression. Outsiders quickly radicalized this indigenous Islamic revival, particularly in the Fergana valley where Islam retained its hold despite 70 years of soviet rule.

The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed central Asia access to the different interpretations of Islam and to the importation of Muslim education from Turkey-Turkish-style secular schools- as well as the militant madrassas sponsored by Pakistan, the extreme Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia and the Ideology of the Taliban of Afghanistan which corresponded with a rise in Muslim missionary activity in central Asia's southern regions where Muslim traditions are strongly represented. Rising poverty and unemployment in the Fergana valley led to growing of a genuine Political opposition, Central Asia leaders quickly suppressed nascent political movements protesting the deteriorating economic conditions.

Deprived of a genuine Political alternative, opposition found an outlet in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asian leaders are now concerned with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. However, the growing influence of the religion in the Region has been accompanied by the emergence of fundamentalism, which Central Asian governments have sought so suppress using tough measures. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalism has made significance inroads in the Uzbek portions of the Fergana valley with the cities of Namangan, Kasansai and Andijan considered the stronghold of "Wahhabi" activity.

The purpose of this research is to study the contexts the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley in accordance with Huntington's clash of civilizations theory. Actually this research seeks what factors are caused in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley. Factors that differently relate to three significant Periods. The tsarist Russia period (1860-1917), Soviet Period (1917-1991) and the post-Soviet period (1991- 2001). In the tsarist Russia period, the theory of the clash of civilizations can well explain the clashes of the tsarist period, but modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism seem to better explain the subsequent confrontations in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

Research questions

This research will attempt to answer the following questions:

Main Question:

i. In accordance with Huntington's clash of civilizations theory what are the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley?

Secondary Questions:

ii. What have been causes of propagation of radical Islam (Revival of Islam) in Fergana valley?

iii. What has been traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism?

Research hypotheses

Main Hypothesis:

i. The contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

Secondary Hypotheses:

ii. Considering Islam as a political ideology which is able to face the malfunctioning of the Soviet and at the same time confront the influence of western civilization propagated Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

iii. The traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism was based on the revival of Islam as a cultural and political identity in a fundamentalist way.

The significance of the study

By examining the roots of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley, we can understand the Radical Islam and religious revival in central Asia, as well as radical movements and causes of ethnic conflicts and generally the radicalization of Fergana valley in this region. Through this research, we can understand the Islam's response to the rise of modernism. To examine the causes the rise of fundamentalism in region to develop solutions for avoiding the potential problems of the fundamentalism, which are caused by some radical elements can indicate the importance of choosing this subject and research.

Background of study

The books and articles have been devoted to Islamic fundamentalism and radical Islam.

1: Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan: Possibility or Paranoia, by Javad Khansari- Eco College of Insurance, Area Studies Department- September 2011. this thesis analyzed the dynamism of Islamic revival in Uzbekistan through the prism of the imported phenomenon of 'Islamic fundamentalism'. The main question is that whether Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan affected by internal or external factors? The Hypothesis is that It seems that, Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan is affected more by internal factors such as socio-economic problems, political and religious conditions rather than external factors. The thesis demonstrates that Islam in Central Asia is a natural process determined primarily by internal socioeconomic and political conditions and not influenced by outside forces. The aim of this thesis is to explore Islam in Uzbekistan since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The thesis will demonstrate that religion in Central Asia operates as a force reaching beyond its politicization to the social fabric of daily life. it is further argued in the thesis that any manifestation of real Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia has been influenced by outside forces.

2: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Uzbekistan, by M. Bakhrom, Madrakhimov- air Command and Staff College, Air University- April 2002. The research question, which the paper seeks to address, is "What factors are caused in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan"? The research object in this study examines the causes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan in an order to develop solutions for avoiding the potential problems Islamic fundamentalism, which are caused by some radical elements. The core part of the study analyzes common factors, which play vital impact the rise Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan. These factors can be external such as the impact or influence of the Islamic fundamentalism from other Muslim countries.

3: The threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, (With an emphasis on Uzbekistan), by Ms. Dr. Elahe Koolai- University of Tehran, Faculty of law and political science. Winter 1387. The main question is that has ethnic diversity been a serious threat and a major Factor of insecurity in the Central Asian region, especially Uzbekistan? The hypothesis is that Islamic fundamentalism is a major factor in the insecurity and threat against the sovereignty of these countries, especially Uzbekistan. The main topics that this article pays them including: Political, social and cultural characteristics of Central Asian countries- Prove the sub-hypothesis (ethnic diversity)- Examining the historical background of Islam and Islamist fundamentalism in each of the Central Asian republics- Investigating the Islamic fundamentalism factor in Central Asian countries, especially in Uzbekistan, and proving the main hypothesis.

4: Islam, Fundamentalism, and the betrayal of tradition, revised and expanded, essays by western Muslim scholars- world wisdom, Inc. - main objective in these essays has been to apply the principles of traditional Islam to the exigencies of our time. The main topics that this article pays them including: Religious foundations- Historical Dimensions- Political dimensions.

5: The Fergana valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism? by Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov- CA&CC Press®- Sweden 1998- 2014. This study analyses the religious situation in Fergana today, taking account of the internal and external factors influencing the 'fundamentalist boom' in the valley. The focus is on those Islamic groups which rally round the idea of reviving the 'genuine Islam' of the times of the Prophet and his first four 'caliphs'.

6: Islamic Revival in Central Asia: The cases of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, by Saodat Olimova and Farkhod Tolipov- documentos cidob ASIA 26. March 2011. The main question is that whether Islam plays a confrontational or engaging role in post-Soviet Central Asia, and whether there are differences in approaches to Islam in different Central Asian countries. This article presents an overview on the topic of Islam in Central Asia, assuming that it is possible to identify some common trends for the whole area, but also many particularities that depend on their own historical, social and political background, and that will condition the nature of the state's relations with Islam. Denying the hypothesis that the Islamic revival in the 1980's-1990's in Central Asia was a result of external influence of proselytism, and that it simply landed in the region after the downfall of Communist ideology, the book underlines the existence of a deep-rooted local Islam, moderate in nature and alien to political struggle.

7: The Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia, by Martha Brill Olcott- Carnegie Endowment for international Peace- 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. The main topics that this article pays them including: Understanding Radical Islam in Central Asia- The Beginning of Radicalization of "Reformist" Islam in Uzbekistan 1920s-1960s- The Radicalization of "Reformist Islam" – 1970's-mid 1980's- Hindustani and Hanafi "Traditionalism"- Hakimjon qari and the "Young Wahhabis"- Radical Islam in the Late 1980s through early 1990s- Radical Islam in the Mid-1990s- The Late 1990s-2001: Tahir Yuldashev, the IMU and Jihad.

8: Islamic fundamentalist areas in Central Asia, by Ms. Dr. Elahe Koolai- Spring 1384- This article focuses on the roots of the development of Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian region. The paper argues that the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia has been influenced by a set of internal and external factors. Article discusses that Islam in the region has a special Significance, and has been very effective at shaping the new identity of the region. Under the post-9/11 environment, this element has become more influential. Political elites in Central Asia have also estimated political Islam as their most important political rival.

9: The Clash of Civilizations, by Samuel P. Huntington- Foreign affairs- summer 1993. Volume 72 No.3. The hypothesis is that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world.

The difference between this research and others researches:

This research typically is a new work. Other investigations have focused on the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, but this research seeks to address the roots and contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the region of Fergana valley as the heart of central Asia and the center of the its formation. It also intends to explain the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley in the framework of the theory of the clash of civilizations.

Independent variable: The polarization of the societies of Fergana valley between forces of Islamism and modernism

Dependent variable**:** The emergence and propagation of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

Objectives of the study

i. To examine viability of the theory of clash of civilizations in explaining the emerge of fundamentalism in Fergana valley
ii. To provide a better understanding of the causes of the evolution of fundamentalism in Fergana valley
iii. To find out the challenges and opportunities which the Fergana valley is facing in its interaction with the western civilization
iv. To examine the Fergana valley as the heart of central Asia and center of fundamentalism
v. To understand radical Islam and religious revival in Fergana valley

Methodology

My research is an explanatory research which attempts to explain how the polarization of society between forces of modernism and Islamism caused the emergence of fundamentalism. Data have been collected by using library sources, specialized magazines, and internet and information banks.

The format of study is based on a descriptive analysis, and a comprehensive and historical outlook of the specific events and opinions. In carrying out the research, books, articles, journals, newspapers and World Wide Web sources have been used extensively.

Theoretical framework

In this research will be used from theory of Huntington's clash of civilizations. In this theory hypothesis is that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, and Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Samuel Huntington presented the geo-culture perspective based on the civilizational clash on the new international politics after the Cold War. Huntington bases the foundations of realism, proposes the hypothesis that culture and identity are the main source of conflicts, and struggles in the modern system, major conflicts in global politics occur among various states and groups which each of them are placed in a distinct civilization block. Basically Huntington bases on realism, describes the order in the framework of civilizations.

From this perspective, the functional framework of the order consists of states which are defined in the form of civilizational blocking. The cultural, civilizational blockings have replaced political blockings. In the modern system, cultural identity is the main determinant of the friendly ties or hostile relations of a country with others.

Operational definition of terms

The under-listed terms are defined in the context they are used in this study:

Fundamentalism: The word fundamentalism, derived from the Latin word "fundamentum" means the foundation and basis. A term used loosely to describe a reaction of (neo) traditional religion against the pressures of modernity; fundamentalism is a worldwide phenomenon, arising in various societies with differing cultural backgrounds and experiences of modernity. The original understanding of fundamentalism, took shape in an American protestant context. However, fundamentalism in its contemporary usage is related to all major religions in the world.

After the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, the Islamic world generally witnessed an increasing Islamic rise and awakening which gradually the term of fundamentalism was commonplace to this new phenomenon. Fundamentalism has been used in many concepts, and it is not possible to offer a particular subscription. The only common feature of these applications can be called the contrast with western modernity.

Fergana valley: Fergana valley, the area is located on western side of the Uzbek territory. The Fergana valley is known as the place where fundamentalism enjoys the strongest support from local inhabitants**.** The Fergana valley is a vast area where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all meet and ideas spread quickly across these borders. The 'Golden Valley' has come to be regarded as a source of Islamic fundamentalism which could influence the religious situation in the entire region. In central Asia, the Fergana valley is the most densely populated and disaster prone area of the CIS region and it is home to the largest cities of Central Asia as Andijon - the fourth largest in Uzbekistan, and Osh – the second biggest in Kyrgyzstan. The high population density, border disputes and existence of enclaves in Fergana increases vulnerability of the region to greater extent Fergana valley is defined as highly vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters and it is prone to complex emergencies connected with ethnic violence, territorial disputes, water disputes and radicalism. The list of ethnic violence and conflicts in Fergana valley can be quite long.

Clash of civilizations: The clash of civilizations is a theory based on the assumption that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. The clash of civilizations is a hypothesis proposed by the Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. He argued that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures, and that Islamic extremism would become the biggest threat to world peace. This theory believes that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.

The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Radical Islam: Radical Islam is a militant, politically activist ideology whose ultimate goal is to create a worldwide community, or caliphate, of Muslim believer. Determined to achieve this new world order by any means necessary, including violence and mass murder, radical Islam is characterized by its contempt for the beliefs, practices, and symbols of other religious traditions

Modernism: Modernism originates from the secularizing and humanistic tendencies which began with the renaissance and resulted in a scientistic and reductionist understanding of reality. The underlying reality of Islam, as of any religion, is tradition, while that of modern Western civilization is modernism and secularism. Modernism in the Islamic world emerged from the direct influence of these foundational ideas of the modern West.

Shortcomings and obstacles of the subject

Shortcoming of resources, impossibility of field research and statistical data limitation

Chapter II:

Theoretical foundations:

The theory of clash of civilizations

Introduction:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a new era was formed in the international system. In the west, two major theories are presented in order to analyze the post-Cold War world or what is called the new global system: one optimistic and the other pessimistic. The first theory believes in the victory of the west in the Cold War and promises the end of history and the end of the ideological contradictions and the supremacy of western liberal democracy around the world. The second theory which will be discussed, warns about the danger of a notional enemy in the form of confrontation and clash between the two civilizations of Islam and the west. Francis Fukuyama has raised optimistic theory of the end of history and the pessimistic theory of the clash of civilizations has been proposed by Samuel Huntington. In this theory, he posed the question whether conflicts between civilizations would dominate the future of world politics. He gives his answer, showing not only how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but also how an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Samuel Huntington predicts that future confrontations will take place between clashing civilizations rather than between nations. He describes the international system, formerly based on major Soviet, American, and third world power blocs, is in transition to a new system composed of eight civilizations: Western, Japanese, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African.

It should be said that, Samuel Huntington presented the geo-culture perspective based on the civilizational clash on the new international politics after the Cold War. Huntington bases the foundations of realism, proposes the hypothesis that culture and identity are the main source of conflicts and struggles in the modern system. Major conflicts in global politics occur among various states and groups which each of them are placed in a distinct civilization block. Basically Huntington bases on realism, describes the order in the framework of civilizations. From this perspective, the functional framework of the order consists of states which are defined in the form of civilizational blocking. The cultural, civilizational blockings have replaced political blockings. In the modern system, cultural identity is the main determinant of the friendly ties or hostile relations of a country with others.

In fact, with the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers face a daunting task: how to craft a new paradigm capable of revealing the principal sources of conflict and collaboration in a rapidly changing international system. Huntington's model of competing and clashing civilizations seeks to provide an analysis of international conflicts and also a method of predicting future strife.

Huntington believes that culture, not class, ideology, or even nationality, will be dominating source of conflict in the future. The civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future and the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. The trend in each bloc is toward greater civilizational "consciousness."

The major wars of the future will be fought along civilizational "fault lines," like those separating western Croatia and Slovenia from muslim Bosnia and Slavic-Orthodox Serbia, or Muslim Pakistan from Hindu India. Western policy, in the context of the new order, will necessarily be directed toward maintaining world hegemony by destabilizing hostile civilizations especially Islamic civilization militarily and diplomatically, playing them off against each other in the "balance of power" mode, and learning to live with global diversity.

According to the subject of the thesis, one of the research objectives in this chapter is to examine the contexts of the emergence of fundamentalism in the form of the contradiction between western civilization and Islamic civilization within the framework of Huntington's theory.

Another research objective is to achieve the true cause of the contradiction between the two Islamic civilizations and the West within the framework of the theory of the clash of civilizations, and the subsequently emergence of fundamentalist movements and the role-playing of the element of culture, especially religion in 'identification'.

Since the objective of the study is to examine the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley and examining the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism, and in addition to that, the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization are considered that made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley, Huntington's theory can be a suitable framework for the description and causation of the contexts of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley, since it addresses the issue of the clashing civilizations, especially the two Islamic and modern civilizations in the post-Cold War space.

In the following, Huntington's theory of clashes of civilizations will comprehensively be analyzed.

Clash of civilizations?

World politics is entering a new phase in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Civilizations, the highest cultural groupings of people, are differentiated from each other by religion, history, language, and tradition. These divisions are deep and increasing in importance. From Yugoslavia to the Middle East to Central Asia, the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. With alien civilizations, the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary. In the final analysis, however, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other. Huntington[1]'s hypothesis is that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. During the Cold War, the conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which a nation state in the classical European was sense nor each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the west and non-western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 31-32).

The nature of civilizations

In the post-Cold War years, countries are categorized in terms of their culture and civilization, not in terms of their political or economic system or their economic development level.What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include sub-civilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 32-33).

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While civilizations endure, they also evolve. They are dynamic; they rise and fall; they merge and divide; they also disappear and are buried in the sands of time (Quigley, 1946, p. 146). Civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large. They both involve the "values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance (Bozeman, 1975, p.1). Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent (Tiryakian, Summer 1974, 125). Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations, and, as Christopher Dawson said, "the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest (Dawson, p. 128). The West has never generated a major religion. The great religions of the world are all products of non-Western civilizations and, in most cases, antedate Western civilization (Mortimer, 1991, p. 7).

Why civilizations will clash

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, and Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. Why will this be the case? First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, and tradition and, most important, (religion). These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from long-standing local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in (Islam). Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 33-35).

In conflicts between civilizations, the question is “What are you?” That is a given that cannot be changed. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim. Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness; on the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization (Ibid).

Common culture actually is facilitating the expansion of the economic relations. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities overcome ideological differences. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. On the other hand, it can be said that culture and actually religion are the basis of the economic cooperation organization (ECO). It is worth mentioning that, efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values engender countering responses from other civilizations.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 35).

Accordingly, it can be said that among factors of the clash of civilizations, the factor of religion is more prominent and more significant. The resurgence of religion and in other words, Islam, in the form of fundamentalist movements, provides a basis for identity. Western confrontation with non-western civilizations, especially Islamic civilization, can signalize the role of religion in shaping identity.

The fault lines between civilizations

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic States and Russia and cuts through Belarus and Ukraine. The peoples to the north and west of this line are protestant or catholic; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems.

The peoples to the east and south of this line are orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The velvet curtain of culture has replaced the iron curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf war left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West. On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilization (Huntington, summer 1993, p. 36-38).

Wars between clans, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, and nations have been prevalent in every era and in every civilization because they are rooted in the identities of people (Licklider 1995, p.685- Huntington, 1971, p. 12-14). Since religion, however, is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations, fault line wars are almost always between peoples of different religions (Shultz, and Olson, pp.17ff- Greenway, 1992, p. 19).

A "new fault line" is emerging, Pierre Behar commented two years later, "a basically cultural divide between a Europe marked by western Christianity (Roman Catholic or Protestant), on the one hand, and a Europe marked by eastern Christianity and Islamic traditions, on the other (Howard, 1994, p. 102-103- Behar, 1992, p.42- Jakobson, 1995), p. 69- Beloff, 1991, p. 78).

The west versus the rest: Intercivilizational issues

In the emerging world, the relations between states and groups from different civilizations will often be antagonistic. Yet some intercivilization relations are more conflict-prone than others. The confrontation of Western civilization with other civilizations, especially Islamic civilization, arises from the fact that the West is exceptionally at the peak of power in the absence of rival power. In addition, the west also has a huge influence on international political and security institutes. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers[2].

Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures (Triandis, Dec. 25, 1990, p. 41 and 1989, pp. 41-133).

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values (Mahbubani, Summer 1992, pp. 3-13).

2- Almost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of "the world community." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview on "Good Morning America," Dec. 21, 1990, British Prime Minister John Major referred to the actions "the West" was taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected himself and subsequently referred to "the world community." He was, however, right when he erred.

At the micro level, the most violent fault lines are between Islam and its Orthodox, Hindu, African, and Western Christian neighbors. At the macro level, the dominant division is between "the West and the rest," with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the West on the other. The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness. Alone among civilizations the West has had a major and at times devastating impact on every other civilization. The relation between the power and culture of the West and the power and cultures of other civilizations is, as a result, the most pervasive characteristic of the world of civilizations. As the relative power of other civilizations increases, the appeal of Western culture fades and non-Western peoples have increasing confidence in and commitment to their indigenous cultures. The central problem in the relations between the West and the rest is, consequently, the discordance between the West's—particularly America's—efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 189)

The confucian-Islamic connection

In this regard, Huntington believes in a coalition or cooperation between Islamic civilization and Confucianism against western civilization.

The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power. For example, centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 44-46).

A map of the new world

Many important developments after the end of the Cold War were compatible with the civilizational paradigm (clash of civilizations) and could have been predicted from it.

"The clash of civilizations?" is an effort to lay out elements of a post-Cold War paradigm. For reasons outlined in theory, civilizations are the natural successors to the three worlds (West, East and third world) of the Cold War. At the macro level world politics are likely to involve conflicts and shifting power balances of states from different civilizations, and at the micro level the most violent, prolonged and dangerous (because of the possibility of escalation) conflicts are likely to be between states and groups from different civilizations. This civilization paradigm accounts for many important developments in international affairs in recent years, including the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the wars going on in their former territories, the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the world, the struggles within Russia, Turkey and Mexico over their identity, the intensity of the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan, the resistance of Islamic states to Western pressure on Iraq and Libya, the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, China's continuing role as an "outsider" great power, the consolidation of new democratic regimes in some countries and not in others, and the escalating arms race in East Asia (Huntington, November/December 1993, p. 50-51).

In this chapter, it was stated that civilizational identities will be replaced by all other identities, state-nations will be eliminated, every civilization will become a coherent political entity, and different groups will not fight within a civilization. The present theory suggests the hypothesis that the differences between the various civilizations are real and important, civilization-consciousness is increasing, conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors, conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars. The paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest" and central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

A civilizational approach can explains much and orders much of the blooming confusion of the post-Cold War world, which is why it has attracted so much attention and generated so much debate around the world. According to the theory of the clash of civilizations, what matters to people is not economic or ideological or political interests but is religious beliefs, beliefs, and other things that People are known by them and fight for it. Hence, the clash of civilizations is the pivotal phenomenon of global politics that covers the post-Cold War environment, and the civilizational paradigm better than any other framework provides a useful starting point for recognizing the current developments on the global stage.

Considering the capable potential of the theory of the clash of civilizations to explain the confrontation between the civilization of the West and other civilizations, especially Islamic civilization, and the followers of both sides and also signalizing the role of religion (Islam) in opposition to the west to shaping identity, present thesis seeks to investigate the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley in the light of same theory.

Huntington said that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world." Huntington's corollaries to this proposition, in summary form, are these:

1-"For the first time in history, global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational." 2-As the balance of power among civilizations shifts, the relative influence of the West is declining, 3-A world order is emerging that is civilization-based, 4- "Universalist pretensions" are increasingly bringing the West into conflict with other civilizations, especially the Islamic world and China, 5- If the West is to survive, America must reaffirm its Western identity and unite with other Westerners in the face of challenges from other civilizations (Huntington, 1996, p. 20).

The new era in world politics: A multipolar, multicivilizational world

In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the third world outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 2.1). In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations (Map 2.2). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those "imposed" on them by the West (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 72-76).



Map 2.1 – The Cold War World: 1960s



Map 2.2 – The World of Civilizations: Post-1990

In this new space, local politics is actually the politics of ethnicity and global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.

In this new world the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their "kin countries (Greenway's phrase, 3 December 1992, p. 19).

The bloody clashes of civilizations in Bosnia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Kashmir could become bigger wars. In the Yugoslav conflicts, Russia provided diplomatic support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Libya provided funds and arms to the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but because of cultural kinship. The most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 76).

In sum, the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations. Differences and cultural commonalities shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states. The local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations. The predominant patterns of political and economic development differ from civilization to civilization. Power is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multicivilizational and multipolar.

Responses to the west and modernization

The expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization and the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to the Western impact in one or more of three ways: rejecting both modernization and Westernization; embracing both; embracing the first and rejecting the second (Toynbee, 1935, p.61- Esposito, 1992, pp. 53-62- Pipes, 1983, pp. 105-142).

Rejectionism: Japan followed a substantially rejectionist course from its first contacts with the West in 1542 until the mid-nineteenth century. Only limited forms of modernization were permitted, such as the acquisition of firearms, and the import of Western culture, including most notably Christianity, was highly restricted. For several centuries China also attempted to bar any significant modernization or Westernization. Unlike Japan, China's rejectionist policy was in large part rooted in the Chinese image of itself as the Middle kingdom and the firm belief in the superiority of Chinese culture to those of all other peoples. Only the very most extreme fundamentalists," Daniel Pipes writes concerning Islam, "reject modernization as well as Westernization (Pipes, p. 349).

Kemalism: A second possible response to the West is Toynbee's herodianism, to embrace both modernization and Westernization. This response is based on the assumptions that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully westernize in order to successfully modernize. Modernization and Westernization reinforce each other and have to go together (Pfaff, 1978, p. 47). For example, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created a new Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and had launched a massive effort both to westernize it and to modernize it.

Reformism: A third choice is to attempt to combine modernization with the preservation of the central values, practices, and institutions of the society's culture. This choice has understandably been the most popular one among non-Western elites. In Egypt in the 1830s Muhammad Ali "attempted technical modernization without excessive cultural Westernization." This effort failed, however, when the British forced him to abandon most of his modernizing reforms (Al-Amin Mazrui, 1990 pp. 4-5.)



Figure 2.1 – Alternative responses to the impact of the West

Figure 3.1 diagrams these three courses of action. The rejectionist would remain at Point A; the Kemalist would move along the diagonal to Point B; the reformer would move horizontally toward Point C. Obviously each non-Western society has followed its own course, which may differ substantially from these three prototypical paths. Mazrui even argues that Egypt and Africa have moved toward Point D through a "painful process of cultural Westernization without technical modernization." To the extent that any general pattern of modernization and Westernization exists in the responses of non-Western societies to the West, it would appear to be along the curve A-E. Initially, Westernization and modernization are closely linked, with the non-Western society absorbing substantial elements of Western culture and making slow progress toward modernization. As the pace of modernization increases, however, the rate of Westernizationp declines and the indigenous culture goes through a revival. Further modernization then alters the civilizational balance of power between the West and the non-Western society and strengthens commitment to the indigenous culture.

In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and lead to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer. This causal flow is set forth in simple form in (figure 3.2), (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 111).

Figure 2.2 – Modernization and cultural resurgence



Islam and modernization do not clash. Modernization requires no one political ideology or set of institutions: elections, national boundaries, civic associations, and the other hallmarks of Western life are not necessary to economic growth (Pipes, pp. 107, 191).

It can be said that, westernization is a prerequisite by pointing to the conflicts between Islam and modernity. In fact, to find out the contexts of Islamic fundamentalism, the confrontation between Islamic civilization and western civilization is subject to consideration, not the confrontation between Islam and modernity.

Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices. The latter, indeed, may be almost impossible: whatever obstacles non-Western cultures pose to modernization pale before those they pose to Westernization (Braudel, pp. 212-213). Modernization, instead, strengthens historic cultures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less western.

Indigenization: The resurgence of non-western cultures

Indigenization has been the order of the day throughout the non-Western world in the 1980s and 1990s. The resurgence of Islam and "re-Islamization" are the central themes in Muslim societies. In India the prevailing trend is the rejection of Western forms and values and the "Hinduization" of politics and society. In East Asia, governments are promoting 26onfucianism, and political and intellectual leaders speak of the "Asianization" of their countries (Naff, Fall 1985 and Spring 1986, p. 219- Isozaki, Spring 1992, p. 18).

Indigenization is furthered by the democracy paradox: adoption by non-Western societies of Western democratic institutions encourages and gives access to power to nativist and anti-Western political movements. In the 1960s and 1970s Westernized and pro-Western governments in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they are increasingly in danger of being ousted by elections. The democratization conflicts with Westernization, and democracy is inherently a parochializing not a cosmopolitanizing process (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 124).

The result is popular mobilization against Western-educated and Western-oriented elites. Islamic fundamentalist groups have done well in the few elections that have occurred in Muslim countries and would have come to national power in Algeria if the military had not canceled the 1992 election (Sission, 1993, pp. 55-61).

We are witnessing "the end of the progressive era" dominated by Western ideologies and are moving into an era in which multiple and diverse civilizations will interact, compete, coexist, and accommodate each other (Fuller, 1994, p. 95).

This process of indigenization is globally clear broadly in the revivals of religion occurring in so many parts of the world and especially in the cultural resurgence in Asian and Islamic countries generated in large part by their economic and demographic dynamism. Economic and social modernization became global in scope, and at the same time a global revival of religion occurred.

The religious resurgence involved people returning to, reinvigorating, and giving new meaning to the traditional religions of their communities. Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Orthodoxy, all experienced new surges in commitment, relevance, and practice by erstwhile casual believers. In all of them fundamentalist movements arose committed to the militant purification of religious doctrines and institutions and the reshaping of personal, social, and public behavior in accordance with religious tenets. The fundamentalist movements are dramatic and can have significant political impact. The "unsecularization of the world," as George Weigel remarked "is one of the dominant social facts in the late twentieth century (Weigel, Spring 1991, p. 27).

How can this global religious resurgence be explained? The most obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Longstanding sources of identity and systems of authority are disrupted. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 126).

Fundamentalist movements, in particular, are "a way of coping with the experience of chaos, the loss of identity, meaning and secure social structures created by the rapid introduction of modern social and political patterns, secularism, scientific culture and economic development (Radford Ruther, 1992, p. 10- McNeill, in Marty and Appleby 1993, p. 561). More broadly, the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity. The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist, groups (New York Times, 15 January 1993, p. A9- Clement Moore, 1980 pp. 227-228).

In addition to the psychological, emotional, and social traumas of modernization, other stimulants to religious revival included the retreat of the West and the end of the Cold War. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the responses of non-Western civilizations to the West generally moved through a progression of ideologies imported from the West. In the nineteenth century non-Western elites imbibed Western liberal values, and their first expressions of opposition to the West took the form of liberal nationalism. In the twentieth century Russian, Asian, Arab, African, and Latin American elites imported socialist and Marxist ideologies and combined them with nationalism in opposition to Western capitalism and Western imperialism. Religion takes over from ideology, and religious nationalism replaces secular nationalism (Juergensmeyer, 1993).

In general, the revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies. That revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It is a rejection of what has been termed the "Westoxification[3]" of non-Western societies. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that: "We will be modern but we won't be you" (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 129).

Islam and identity: Civilizational consciousness and cohesion

In Central Asia historically, national identities did not exist. "The loyalty was to the tribe, clan, and extended family, not to the state." At the other extreme, people did have "language, religion, culture, and life styles" in common, and "Islam was the strongest uniting force among people, more so than the emir's power" (Onaran, 1994, p. 493- Dragounski, 1995, p. 12). Throughout Islam the small group and the great faith, the tribe and the ummah, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation state has been less significant. As a revolutionary movement, Islamist fundamentalism rejects the nation state in favor of the unity of Islam just as Marxism rejected it in favor of the unity of the international proletariat (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 179). Increasingly, Islamic religious fundamentalism is also gaining dominance in determining Muslim national interests (Obradovic 1994, p. 12-13).

3- The loss of national values and identity and blind imitation of the culture, customs, art and technology of Western countries, so that the Westernized nation suffers from helplessness and servitude, instead of feeling competing.

In fault line wars, each side has incentives not only to emphasize its own civilizational identity but also that of the other side. In its local war, it sees itself not just fighting another local ethnic group but fighting another civilization. The threat is thus magnified and enhanced by the resources of a major civilization, and defeat has consequences not just for itself but for all of its own civilization. Hence the urgent need for its own civilization to rally behind it in the conflict. The local war becomes redefined as a war of religions, a clash of civilizations, fraught with consequences for huge segments of humankind (Hill, 1995), p. 104).

The Islamic Resurgence and the economic dynamism of Asia demonstrate that other civilizations are alive and well and at least potentially threatening to the West. A more dangerous source of a global intercivilizational war is the shifting balance of power among civilizations and their core states. In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.

Anyway, consciousness without cohesion is a source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civilizations. To signalize the role of religion (Islam) in shaping to identity due to contradiction of between Islamic civilization and western civilization needs to consciousness with cohesion.

Islam and the west

A comparable mix of factors has increased the conflict between Islam and the West in the late twentieth century.

First, Muslim population growth has generated large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young people who become recruits to Islamist causes, exert pressure on neighboring societies, and migrate to the West. Second, the Islamic resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence in the distinctive character and worth of their civilization and values compared to those of the West. Third, the West's simultaneous efforts to universalize its values and institutions, to maintain its military and economic superiority, and to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world generate intense resentment among Muslims. Fourth, the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived major threat to the other. Fifth, the increasing contact between and intermingling of Muslims and Westerners stimulate in each a new sense of their own identity and how it differs from that of the other. Interaction and intermingling also exacerbate differences over the rights of the members of one civilization in a country dominated by members of the other civilization. Within both Muslim and Christian societies, tolerance for the other declined sharply in the 1980s and 1990s. Conflicts between the West and Islam thus focus less on territory than on broader intercivilizational issues such as weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamist terrorism, and Western intervention (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 189).

In the 1980s and 1990s the overall trend in Islam has been in an anti-Western direction. In part, this is the natural consequence of the Islamic resurgence and the reaction against the perceived "gharbzadegi" or Westoxification of Muslim societies (McNeill, in Marty and Appleby, p. 569).

Growing Muslim anti-Westernism has been paralleled by expanding Western concern with the "Islamic threat" posed particularly by Muslim extremism. These concerns are shared by both publics and leaders (Reilly, 1995, p. 21- Monde, 1991, p. 12- cited in Blunden 1994, p, 138- Morin, 1993, p. 37- foreign policy association 1994, p. 5).

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power. In fact, the issue of Islamic fundamentalism is the product of the confrontation between the two Western civilizations and the Islamic civilization. The problem for Islam is also is the West, a different civilization whose people is convinced of the universality of their culture and believes that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, and within the framework of the theory of the Huntington Civilizations, it was investigated that the order in the international system in the post-Cold War space is based on the confrontation between civilizations, especially the between Islamic civilization and West civilization. Huntington's hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic but principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. In fact, the clash of civilizations became to dominate global politics and it should be said that the global politics has become multicivilizational and multipolar. During the Cold War, the conflict was summed up between the two superpowers, and had an ideological nature. But after the end of the Cold War, conflict found the civilizational nature, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the west and non-western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. The nation state as a source of identity was weakened and religion as effective and influential factor has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Finally, the fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The factor of religion plays an important role in the contradiction between the two Islamic civilizations and Western civilization. The resurgence of religion and in other words, Islam, in the form of fundamentalist movements, provides a basis for identity. Western confrontation with non-western civilizations, especially Islamic civilization, can signalize the role of religion in Identification. It can be said that civilization-consciousness is typically increasing.

Since the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels, namely at the micro-level and the macro-level, in this research, the macro-level is considered, because, because the contradiction between the two Islamic civilizations and Western civilization and in fact, issue of radical Islam and the conflict with the waves of Western civilization, such as secularization and especially modernity is at stake, and according to macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values. At the macro level, the dominant division is between "the West and the rest," with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the West on the other.

In this new atmosphere, an approach that can explain such an order of the new system with the non-ideological nature is the civilizational approach. Hence, the clash of civilizations is the pivotal phenomenon of global politics that covers the post-Cold War environment, and the civilizational paradigm better than any other framework provides a useful starting point for recognizing the current developments on the global stage.

Considering the potential of the theory of the clash of civilizations to explain the confrontation between the civilization of the West and other civilizations, especially Islamic civilization, and also signalizing the role of religion (Islam) in opposition to the west to identification, present thesis seeks to investigate the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley in the light of same theory.

According to intended subject in thesis, within the framework of this theory, is posited the contradiction of two Islamic civilizations with re-traditional and conservative nature and Western civilization with expansionist waves such as secularization. It is worth mentioning that modernity is also one of the wages of Western civilization, but not consistent with it and requires no one political ideology and the other hallmarks of Western life.

The research achievement of this chapter is that Islam and modernization do not clash because modernity does not have an expansionist nature and does not necessarily mean Westernization. Thus, westernization is a prerequisite by pointing to the conflicts between Islam and modernity. In fact, to find out the contexts of Islamic fundamentalism, the confrontation between conservative Islamic civilization and expansionist western civilization is intended subject, not the confrontation between Islam and modernity as one of the wages of west civilization.

Furthermore, modernization strengthens process of indigenizaton and historic cultures and re-Islamization or Islamic revival indeed and also reduces the relative power of the West. That revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. The revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies. The religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity. The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist groups.

Chapter III:

Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley and contexts for its emergence during the Tsarist Russia period, Soviet period and the post-Soviet period

Introduction:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, fundamentalism (Islamism) has been considered in Central Asia. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the formation of five independent republics in Central Asia, the revival of Islamic tendencies has brought about serious changes in the region. What exacerbates the fundamentalist crisis in Central Asia is the existence of some territorial, boundary and ethnic challenges which the most important of them has been manifested in Fergana valley. The valley has now become one of the centers for activities of fundamentalist groups. Fergana valley is a buffer zone and a connecting point for three countries: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. This valley is one of the most dense of demographic parts of the world.In the history of the valley, it will be determined that the valley has been one of the centers of anti-Tsarist fighters when the communist tsar arrived in Central Asia. So that, In 1875, a great rebellion occurred against tsarist rulers in this region, which was hardly suppressed by the tsarist government and strangulated in the infancy. During the years of the establishment of the communist regime in the Soviet Union, several groups in the Fergana valley came to work against the communist-Leninist system that the repression of them lasted for many years by the communist government. However, Fergana valley can be considered as one of the potential centers of the crisis in the coming years in Central Asia.

Fundamentalism is a word originally and for the first time used to refer to various Protestant movements in the United States. The original understanding of fundamentalism, actually took shape in an American protestant context. However, fundamentalism has been used in different meanings for these meanings; a particular commonality can not be offered. The only common feature of all these applications can be seen in contrast to Western modernism. In the theory of "clash of civilizations", Samuel Huntington considers religion as the main cause of the clash of civilizations and sees Islam in confrontation with Western civilization; as a result, he considers the war between the two civilizations of the Christian West and the Muslim East as inevitable event. From the perspective of the West, Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism is characterized by anti-modernity anti-civilization and anti-Western character and, in general, the aspect of its new anti-civilization is very prominent. About So-called ‘Fergana fundamentalism’, the ‘Golden Valley’ has come to be regarded as a source of Islamic fundamentalism which could influence the religious situation in the entire region. The Fergana valley is one of the most densely populated places in the world. It is also the most volatile region of Central Asia. Not only is the area ethnically and linguistically diverse, it is politically divided, with parts ruled by three different states—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic—whose distant capital cities all relegate Fergana to their respective peripheries.

Therefore, thesis focuses on contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia in particular, Fergana valley as the heart of Central Asia. The research objective in chapter is the study of the contexts of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley in the framework of Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations. Contaxts which differently relate to three significant periods; the tsarist Russia period (1860-1917), Soviet period (1917-1991) and the post-Soviet period (1991- 2001). In fact, in this thesis the contradiction between Western civilization and Islamic civilization are considered as inputs, and Islamic fundamentalism as output. Another research objective is to determine the applicability of the theory of the clash of civilizations in the three periods mentioned. In the tsarist Russia and Soviet periods, the theory of the clash of civilizations can well explain the clashes, but modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism appear to better explain the confrontations and contexts of Islamic fundamentalism, indeed in the post-Soviet period.

1- Introduction to Fergana valley: From an ethnic perspective

Besides its beauty and abundant natural endowments, nothing about the Fergana valley is simple. For one thing, it is not a linear valley defined by rivers, although it roughly corresponds to the basins of the lower Naryn and Kara Darya rivers and their confluence to form the Syr Darya River. Another distinctive feature of the valley is that its name is not really Fergana, or Ferghana (forms that date from Russian colonial rule), but Farghona. However, given that the term Fergana or Ferghana has gained common usage we will use it, while acknowledging that a different name prevails locally. This non-valley with a name imposed from without is divided both linguistically and politically, with parts ruled by three states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic (Starr, 2011, p. 9). In fact, Fergana valley, a fertile region at the heart of Central Asia and actually in the Tian Shan mountain ranges that covers eastern Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, is the most densely populated region in all of Central Asia. It is also host to political unrest and Islamic fundamentalism. Hizb-ut Tahrir, a radical Islamic group that advocates the non-violent overthrow of existing governments in Central Asia and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the region, has strong roots in the valley.

When the countries of Central Asia gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, areas that were once part of a unified economic, social and political system were divided from one another. Boundaries, which were once of little significance impacted ordinary lives and economic process- sometimes in very dramatic ways. The Fergana valley is one such region, unified by common history, culture and social and economic networks, but now divided into three countries- Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Soviet authorities simply divided people of the same religion and related language group into separate administrative units (Ahmedova and leitich, p. 33). Between 1924 and 1928, the Central Asian republics were established to become the first administrative units in the region formed in the basis of ethnic nationality (Akbarzadeh, 1997, 517).

The Fergana has far-reaching implications for the Central Asian region as a whole, as it is an area with tremendous productive capacity, but on the negative side, is the locus of serious tensions with broad ramifications (Rashid, 2002- Weisbrod, 2001, olcott, 1996). Demographically, the Valley comprises only 5 per cent of the landmass of Central Asia while it is home for more than 10 million or close to 20 per cent of the Central Asian population (Eastvold 2003, p. 19). In Kyrgyzstan, the Fergana valley territories hold more than half of the country's population. The Fergana valley contains one-third of the population of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan's Fergana valley territories are very small territorially; the Fergana valley contains 27% of the populaton and five out of the country's ten largest cities. The Fergana valley subsumes two provinces of Kyrgyzstan- Osh and Jalal-Abad- three provinces of Uzbekistan- Andijan, Fergana, Namangan, and Sugd (formerly Leninanad) province in Tajikistan. The Fergana valley population is extremely diverse, not only across the region, but also within each country (Ahmedova and leitich, p. 33-34).

Ethnic composition of the Fergana valley by countries in 1997

Geographical Unit	Uzbeks (%)	Tajiks (%)	Kyrgyz (%)	Russian (%)	Total Pop. (Million)
Uzbekistan	**75.8[1]**	**4.8[1]**	**0.9[1]**	**6.0[1]**	**23.0[2]**
(Uzbekistan part of) the Ferghana Valley	84.2	5.0	3.2	3.0	6.2
Andijan	85.0[1]	1.4	4.2[1]	3.9[1]	2.0
Ferghana	83.6[1]	5.5[1]	2.1[1]	4.9[1]	2.4[2]
Namangan	85.1[1]	8.8[1]	1.1[1]	1.9[1]	1.7[2]
Kyrgyzstan	**14.2**	**0.8**	**60.3**	**15.7**	**4.7[3]**
(Kyrgyzstan part of) the Ferghana Valley	26.7	1.6	73.5	2.7	2.4
Osh[4]	28.0	2.1	63.8	2.4	1.5
Jalalabad[5]	24.5	0.6	67.3	3.3	0.9
Osh city	40.9	0.4	29.1	n.a.	0.2
Tajikistan[6]	**24.8**	**68.4**	**1.3**	**3.2**	**5.9**
(Tajikistan part of) the Ferghana Valley (Leninabad) [6]	31.3	56.9	1.2	6.5	1.8

Sources: The information is from the following sources and supplied by John Schoberlein of the UN Fergana valley Development Project: 1. Informatsionnyi sbornik Uzbekistan 1991-1995, Tashkent. 2. Ozbekiston Republikasi Entsiklopediia (Tashkent, 1997). 3. Kyrgyzstan: National Human Development Report (Bishkek, 1998). 4. Oshskaia Oblast' v tsifrakh 1997: kratkii statisticheskii sbornik (Osh province in figures) (Osh, 1998). 5. Jalal-abad regional strategy. Jalal-abadskii oblastnoi statisticheskii komitet, January 1998. 6. Naselenie Respubliki Tajikistan (Dushanbe, 1997). 7. Regionalnyi statisticheskii sbornik Respubilki Tajikistan za 1991-1996 gg. (Dushanbe, 1996) (Lubin & Rubin 1999, p. 36).

In Central Asia, the Fergana valley, while straddling Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is the most densely populated and disaster prone area of the CIS region and it is home to the largest cities of Central Asia as Andijon - the fourth largest in Uzbekistan, and Osh – the second biggest in Kyrgyzstan. While accommodating a quarter of region's total population in less than 5 % of Central Asian territory and having 1600 people per square mile, Fergana valley is defined by local and western scholars as the most densely populated part of Central Asia. The high population density, border disputes and existence of enclaves in Fergana increases vulnerability of the region to greater extent. Fergana valley is defined as highly vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters and it is prone to complex emergencies connected with ethnic violence, territorial disputes, water disputes and radicalism (Polina, 2014, International Conference "prospects of EU-Central Asian Relations: Security challenges in Central Asia).



Map of Fergana valley, which includes the population density index

Politically, the Fergana valley forms a potentially self-sufficient and coherent unit from the rest of the Central Asian states because of the strong ethnic ties within the area. Many ethnic groups have settled across three countries' territories in the Fergana valley, and ethnic ties remain strong across the borders of the three countries via their intermingled pattern of settlements. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new international borders have divided the richly interwoven cultural mosaic of this agricultural valley into three areas. The new political division has resulted in the cultural, ethnic and economic dislocation of the ethnic groups, which gradually had led to an increase in inter-ethnic and national tensions, as well as to an economic crisis (sault, 2007, p. 9).

Ethnically, the Fergana valley is a highly populated and multilingual region, and is home to more than 80 different ethnicities. The ethnic demography of the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks[4] in the cross-border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the eastern edge of the Fergana valley has been important for wider relations between the two countries. As Bogatyrev has suggested, the ethnic Uzbek minority of Osh and Jalal-abad Oblasts of Kyrgyzstan, especially in its capital cities Osh[5] and Jalal-abad, in the Fergana valley are seen as a threat to Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan as well as a threat to the stability of the region. There is certainly a sense of cross-border ethno-nationalism amongst the Uzbek ethnic group living on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, in Andijan (in Uzbekistan) and in Osh (in Kyrgyzstan). However, fifteen years of independence has suggested that the ethnic Uzbeks' living pattern on the border is a less essential but necessary element for causing instability between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the region, because this element could be politically manipulated by either country. The reason is that Uzbek ethno-nationalism has created an uneasy path for socio-economic cooperation between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders on the eastern edge of the Fergana valley. However, there was a clear message from President Karimov of Uzbekistan soon after the independence of the Republics: the Uzbeks in Osh should look to Bishkek, not Tashkent for governing (Nira 2002).

4- If we look at the ethnic profiles of the cities on the two sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, there is a dramatic difference in their ethnic profiles. For example, the 1991-1995 statistic data of Informatsionnyi sbornik Uzbekistan shows the ethnic Kyrgyz in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan are 4.2 per cent of the city population, while the Uzbeks are 85 per cent. However, the statistic data of Oshskaia Oblast' v tsifrakh in 1997 shows that Uzbek ethnic groups is 40.9 per cent of the population in the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan, while the Kyrgyz are only 29.1 per cent. In appendix 4 the statistical data, which is complied by John Schoberlein of the UN Fergana valley Development Project, shows that the ethnic profiles on the Uzbekistan side of the Valley are 75.8 per cent of Uzbeks, 4.8 per cent of Tajiks and 0.9 per cent of Kyrgyz. The ethnic profiles on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Valley are 73.5 per cent Kyrgyz, 26.7 per cent Uzbeks and 0.8 per cent Tajiks.

5- Osh is approximately 2500 years old and is one of the oldest settled urban areas in Central Asia. As far back as the eighth century, it was renowned as a centre for silk production along the Silk Road and was strategically situated on a key trade route to India. Osh is the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan after Bishkek, the capital city, and is the administrative centre of Osh Oblast as well as the centre for southwestern Kyrgyzstan. The provincial capital city is about 1290 kilometres southwest of Bishkek and only several kilometres from the border of Uzbekistan [Electronic-Encyclopedia 2003, Osh, CIS and Baltic Political Geography, Columbia University Press, viewed 5 June 2004, <http://reference.allrefer.com/encylopedia/Osh.html>.].

2. The Fergana valley: history, context and cross-border issues

In order to study the contexts of the emergence of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley, it is important initially to have a good analysis about the context of the Fergana valley. In fact, Fergana valley is an interesting region because of its many ingredients which can lead to conflict

2.1 History: the decisive divide-and-rule policy

The Fergana valley is situated at the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The region knows some complex borders and many enclaves. Uzbekistan has 60% of the valley's territory, Tajikistan 25% and Kyrgyzstan the remaining 15%. The valley is enclosed by the Kuramin, Chatkal, Fergana, Alai and Turkistan mountains. The official administrative provinces in the valley are Andijan, Fergana and Namangan in Uzbekistan; Batken, Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan; and Sogd in Tajikistan (Slim, 2002). Map 1.1 gives an illustration of this.

Map 3.1: Topography and hydrography of the Fergana valley



Reference: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2005

The borders around the Fergana valley date back to the time of Stalin in the 1920s. He set the borders on the basis of his divide-and-rule strategy. Stalin drew lines like a "one armed alcoholic": the borders intertwined and convoluted. For example, there are several Uzbek enclaves entirely cut off by Kyrgyzstan (Stephens, 2010; Murray, 2010). This divide-and-rule strategy was not without reason; the borders were specifically designed so as not to create prosperous economic, political, cultural and ethnic coherence, especially not in the Fergana valley. The valley was well-known because of its fertile ground and economic prosperity potential.

By drawing lines crossing ethnicities and natural economic units, distrust and hostility amongst ethnic groups would increase so that there would be no chance for consolidation of nationalist movements in the economically high potential valley (Star, 2011). So though it might seem that the three countries are respectively ethnic homes for Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks, the truth is entirely different. An example of an ethnic mixed place is Osh, a city which was originally mainly inhabited by Uzbeks, but has been 'placed' on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a tense situation between the ethnic groups about access to land, water and jobs (Gleason et al, 2007, p. 7; Stephens, 2010; Murray, 2010; Megoran, 2004, p. 733). Some analysts even go a step further by saying that the divide-and-rule policy was not only to prevent an economic prosperous region, but that its main goal was ethnic engineering. The goal of this would be to foster ethnic inter- and intrastate conflicts. The Soviet policy was to intentionally create mono-ethnic regions which left large communities of ethnic minorities in each Central Asian state, leading to ethnic tensions. Ethnic discrimination and territorial claims became part of everyday life, planting the seeds for conflicts (Peimani, 2009, p. 145). Whether or not on purpose, ethnic conflicts did take place in the period around the collapse of the Soviet Union. Towards the end of the 1980s conflicts amongst different ethnic groups emerged in the Fergana valley. The central power of Moscow weakened and Gorbachev introduced his first reforms. The Soviet Union was weakened and not able to control its own territory anymore. In Uzbekistan in 1989 fighting erupted between Turkmen and Uzbeks and in Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and between Kyrgyz and Tajiks (KIC, 2011, p. 9).

The borders became more problematic with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian states. Crossing the border all of a sudden became difficult. Especially Uzbekistan adopted strict border policies. The consequence was that there were many minority ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Uzbeks living in Osh, suddenly became an ethnic minority in Kyrgyzstan without a possibility to visit their relatives across the border. Furthermore, with the independence of the Central Asian states, feelings of nationalism grew which did not improve the relation with ethnic minorities. In a period of transition and democratization elites will try to mobilize ordinary people with feelings of nationalism. Nationalism provides the opportunity to unite elites and masses and to get a strong support base, as was the case when the Central Asian states became independent (Stephens, 2010; Murray, 2010; Deen & Bouyjou, 2006, p. 1; Megoran, 2004, p. 736).

The hardening of the borders had economic consequences for the valley. Suddenly, economic exchange became difficult or not possible anymore and cross-border collective farms had to close down. The ordinary flow across the border of people, goods and services disrupted. Unemployment increased, partly because of the crack down of the network of suppliers and distributors and markets that used to be spread throughout the Soviet Union. The region fell into an increasing dependency on subsistence farming, labour migration and drug trafficking. This situation led to a steep decline in people's living standards. What once was an economic potential valley now became a valley with bad economic conditions (Slim, 2002; ICG, 2010, p. 1). In fact, the artificial designed borders led to ethnic tensions. Together with economic decline and the political transformations this led to increased conflict potential.

2.2 Cross-border issues in the Fergana valley

Fergana valley is a border region, thus there are cross-border issues as in all border regions in the world. The issues discussed are border disputes, Islamic extremism and drug trafficking.

2.2.1 Border disputes

Nowadays there are still territorial and border disputes between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan about the Fergana valley. There are disagreements about each country's share of the valley and there are parts which are still undemarcated. Also separatist movements are present in the valley, caused by the many ethnic minorities. In Khojand, a city in Tajikistan with an Uzbek majority, the Uzbeks threaten to secede from Tajikistan in order to join Uzbekistan. The other way round, Tajikistan inactively claims the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan (Peimani, 2009, p. 16/96). This situation increases the risk on interstate conflict in the valley. Most probably the countries will try and solve the undemarcated border zones through multilateral or bilateral dialogue and concessions. However, when this is not possible an interstate conflict can occur (Slim, 2002).

Because of the disputes about the borders at the national level, people at the local level have disputes about accessible land. Because land is scarce and many spots are undemarcated, everyone tries to access this land. Arable land is needed for farming, especially in the Fergana valley which is one of the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks are competing for the land in different parts of the Fergana valley, especially in the region of Batken in Kyrgyzstan (Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. iii). This is a good example of an 'ethnic conflict' while the cause of the conflict is not because the groups are ethnically distinct. The groups are fighting for access to land, not because of differences in ethnicity.

In addition to land disputes, the disputed borders also cause problems with regards to water. As indicated with red stars in map 1.2, many water disputes are situated at the borders of the Fergana valley. However, the water issues also have further growing consequences for the economic situation. The three countries in the Fergana valley are interdependent on each other for their water sources. In addition to this the water is also used for contrary purposes: where Kyrgyzstan needs water for energy production, Uzbekistan needs the same water for the irrigation of their cotton. As a consequence of this, the agricultural production in Uzbekistan fell by 30% in 2000 (Slim, 2002). Therefore, it can be said that water issues not only contribute to intra-state conflict potential, but also to inter-state conflict potential.

Map 3.2: Water issues in the Fergana valley



Reference: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2005,

Accordingely, border disputes between the three countries of the Fergana valley increases the conflict potential in the region; both intra-state and inter-state conflicts are possible.

2.2.2 Islamic extremism

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Islamic extremism also found its way to the border area of the Fergana valley. Some experts say that radical groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir find more and more support in the countries surrounding the Fergana valley. Both are pan-Islamic groups which want to create an Islamic state in the historical region of Turkistan under the rule of the sharia (Slim, 2002).

About these movements it should be said that the increasing popularity can be ascribed to the fact that there is dissatisfaction amongst the population with their government. As said before, since the collapse of the Soviet Union people increasingly live in poor conditions and their governments do not offer improvements.

when the government feels no responsibility for its citizens, people will have to search for security and social safety nets themselves. Therefore they seek their salvation in religion and Islamic groups. It is said that in Osh this is also the case nowadays. After the violence many Uzbeks joined Islamic groups because they do not have faith in the government of Kyrgyzstan anymore. In order to guarantee their own security, they will have to search for alternatives which are often Islamic groups. However, rumours about growing Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley remain mainly guessing and speculations. This is partly because the groups act mainly in underground networks. Besides, many case studies on Islamic fundamentalism in the valley do not find any proof. People do have their Islamic values and traditions, but not in such a way that it is worrisome (Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. 10). For the time being Islamic extremism as such does not lead to conflict potential in the Fergana valley. This is because Islamic extremism should be more regarded as opposition towards the governments. In a case like IMU who is striving for the overthrow of Karimov it can lead to instability. The increasing popularity finds its roots in disappointment with the government, not in the convincing ideas of the religion as such (Bruijn, 2011, 32). According to the ICG (2001, p. 11): “the [Islamic] insurgency is a reflection of the economic hardships and discontent affecting a part of the population”. People want change, and therefore they search for other ways to achieve this change. So again, the bad economic and political situation in the countries lead to conflict potential, and Islamic groups are taking advantage of this.

2.2.3 Drug trafficking

Drug trafficking belongs to the daily business in parts of the Fergana valley nowadays. Because it is an illegal business, it is difficult to find out to what extent this has an impact on the situation in the Fergana valley, especially since official data are not available and hard to collect. Especially the southern part of the Fergana valley plays a role in drug trafficking. Drugs are transported from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, from which it is brought to Kyrgyzstan via the many Uzbek enclaves and undemarcated zones. From this part of the valley, the drugs are smuggled to Uzbekistan, either directly or via Osh (Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. 11).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic decline in the Fergana valley, the drug business has increased. The informal economy is a good alternative for people who cannot find a job. The criminal business is well visible in the street view nowadays. The money being earned with drugs leads to a culture of consumption in the valley. Young men in Osh are wearing luxury clothes and are driving expensive cars. This also leads to increased feelings of inequality amongst the population. Especially when the business is dominated by a certain ethnic group, the inequalities lead to tensions between ethnicities. The drug trafficking also leads in another way to instability. Intense competition is going on between criminal groups about the ownership of the most important drugs routes (Slim, 2002). In fact, people make a cost and benefit analysis in order to join this criminal business. As people do not have many things to lose, it is often an easy decision for them to participate in drug trafficking.

So drug trafficking leads to increased conflict potential in the region. However, again this is also mainly rooted in the fact that economic conditions are bad. People search for ways to earn money. If employment was high and the region would experience economic prosperity, it is likely that less people will be involved in drug trafficking. The trafficking is also rooted in the political situation; the governments are unwilling or unable to control the situation. A complex network of drug traffickers, criminal groups, corrupt border guards and political elites has been developed in which people in the drugs business are free to move (Bruijn, 2011, 33). In general, border disputes, Islamic extremism and drug trafficking all lead to increased conflict potential in the Fergana valley. However, all the issues are rooted in the bad economic conditions and the weak or authoritarian political situations in the countries.

In summary, it can be said that the history of the Fergana valley has been very decisive for conflict potential in the region. But what has been the contextualization for this potential conflict and actually emergence and formation of Islmic fundamentalism? In other words, why did people turn and recourse to Islam (Revival of Islam) ultimately as means for political expression and deprived of a genuine political alternative, opposition found an outlet in the form of Islamic fundamentalism and that why the growing influence of the religion (Islam) in the region , has been accompanied by the emergence of fundamentalism, indeed?

About Fergana valley, history, context and cross-border issues were investigated, but in following and in third section, the contexts of the emergence and formation of Islamic fundamentalism will be addressed in this Valley during three periods, The tsarist Russia period (1860-1917), Soviet Period (1917-1991) and the post-Soviet period (1991- 2001). In addition to that In the tsarist Russia period, the theory of the clash of civilizations can explain the clashes of the tsarist period, but modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism appear to better explain the subsequent confrontations in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

3- Fergana valley and Islamic fundamentalsim problem

Issue of Islamic revival in general and of Islamic fundamentalism in particular have been increasingly emphasized. Radical Islamic fundamentalism is indeed a serious treats to states and populations, not just for Moslem states, but also for entire the world community.

In strong religion: The rise of fundamentalisms around the world, Almond et al. argue that 'fundamentalist movements form in reaction to, and in defense against, the processes and consequences of secularization and modernization (2003: 93). In general Islamic fundamentalism came into being slowly at the end of the nineteenth century, growing to adulthood in the twentieth. Only in the late 1970s did it become a generally recognized phenomenon in Islamic states (Jansen, 1997, p. 12).

The dynamics of Islamic revival in Central Asia today are determined mostly by internal conditions, rather than by external factors. The thesis will demonstrate that religion in Central Asia operates as a force reaching beyond its politicization to the social fabric of daily life. Fundamentalism in Central Asia has its own characteristics and is not the same as in the Middle East and in the rest of the Muslim world. This thesis in this section seeks what factors are caused in the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

About terminology of this term, I would refer that Islamic fundamentalism as an aggressive revolutionary movement militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist and Nazi movement of the past. All these movements have historically being intolerant of opposing views and groups. All these movements have historically resorted to violence and repression to silence the opposition.

3.1 Islamic fundamentalism: origins

Although the term "fundamentalism" is now identified with Islam, it first appeared in the Christian world. Fundamentalism is in fact an Anglo-Saxon term. Christian (Protestant) fundamentalism which held that the Bible must be accepted and interpreted literally grew up in America at the beginning of the 1920s. Fundamentalism means "a Protestant movement emphasizing Christian life on the fundamentals and teachings of the Bible. "If we use this term for Muslims, the meaning of fundamentalism should be to call for strict observation of Islamic fundamentals and doctrines following the verses of the Qur'an. In this case, all Muslims who abide by Islamic fundamentals are called fundamentalists. When people talk about Islamic fundamentalism, it is often equated with return to medieval backwardness and retrogression. Nowadays, it is looked upon as radicalism, extremism, terrorism, and incompatibility with Western democratic systems. Islamic fundamentalism means the religious and political movement that seeks a return to the golden age of the Prophet Muhammad and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs on the basis of pure Islam. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalists as political activists endeavor to reconstruct the Muslim communities that are intoxicated by Western culture and neo-colonialism. Fundamentalists regard Western countries, especially America and Israel, as their main enemies. In their opinion, Western aggression, long-term colonialism, and Westernization resulted in the decline of the Muslim society and political corruption (Ock Chang, 2005, p. 58).

3.2 The spread of Islamic fundamentalism

The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Central Asia access to the different interpretations of Islam and to the importation of Muslim education from Turkey- Turkish-style secular schools (Leitich and Efegil 2002)- as well as the militant madrasas sponsored by Pakistan, the extreme Wahabbi doctrine of Saudi Arabia and the ideology of the Taliban of Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001) which corresponded with a rise in Muslim missionary activity in Central Asia's southern regions where Muslim traditions are strongly represented.

Rising poverty and unemployment in the Fergana valley led to a growing dissatisfaction and alienation among the population. Feraing the growth f a genuine political opposition, Central Asia leaders quickly suppressed nascent political movements protesting the deteriorating economic conditions. Deprived of a genuine political alternative, opposition found an outlet in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asian leaders are now concerned with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, embodied in Wahhabism- a strict Islamic movement that originated in Saudi Arabia based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd el Wahhab (1704-1792)- throughout the region (Murtazin, 2000, p. 139). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalism has made significant inroads in the Uzbek portions of the Fergana valley with the cities of Namangan, Kasansai, and Andijan considered the stronghold of "Wahhabi" activity (Mirsky, 1992, p. 336).

A new polarization is occuring between traditional and "new" Muslims (usually younger and more radical, and concentrated in the Wahhabi sect), traditional religions (Islam and Russian orthodoxy) and the newcomers (i.e. Protestants, Jehovah's witnesses, Bahais, and others), Christians, Orthodox, and Protestants and even between belivers and non-belivers. Protestants, Orthodox Russians, various Muslims sects as well as othe religious groups have been actively finding converts among Central Asians (Ahmedova and Leitich, p. 38).

4- Contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley

In this section, the purpose of the thesis is to find out the factors that have contributed in the contextualization the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley. The factors that differently relate to three significant Periods. The tsarist Russia period (1860-1917), Soviet Period (1917-1991) and the post-Soviet period (1991- 2001).

In fact, the thesis tries to analyze the contexts of the emergene of this phenomenon through a more transparent window in light of the theoretical framework of the Huntington's clash of civilizations, which will be analyzed in the fifth chapter

4.1 Tsarist Russia: Colonial rule and indigenous responses, 1860–1917

The decline of the territorial empires of Asia coincided with European expansion and accumulation of colonies. The Russians, Central Asia's nearest neighbor, was attracted to this area by lure of reputed riches in cities along the former Silk Road. The move of the Russians to Central Asia was at the same time stimulated by the gains of the British in the Indian subcontinent in the 19th century. This competition appeared to be more urgent after the defeat of Russians in the Crimean War (1854-1856), when Russia set out more concrete plans to capture as much of Central Asia as possible (Gleason, 1997, p. 33). The conquest of Central Asia by the Russian Empire began in the mid-19th century and lasted until the early 20th century, when the Soviets succeeded to the area. After the conquest of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan the following year, The Tsarist Russia began its imperial thrust eastwards and southwards, incorporating one after another new Muslim territories (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 38).

As it gained political and economic power, the Russian Empire showed a clear interest in Central Asia, beginning in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Russia's incursion into the region occurred at a time when the Central Asian khanates themselves were in a state of permanent confrontation with one another. Thus, the emirs of Bukhara undertook military campaigns against the Kokand Khanate in 1840, 1842, 1862, and 1865. As a result, the areas located between the two states (e.g., Ura-Tyube or Istaravshan, Khujand, Nau, Dzhizak) suffered heavily. These constant wars among the khanates drove down living standards and weakened the states themselves, thus facilitating Russia's conquests of Central Asia and of the Fergana valley itself (Starr, 2011, p. 69).

On the eve of the Russian advance in 1860, the densely inhabited oases of Turkistan were divided into the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, and the Emirate of Bukhara, ruled by the khan or emir. The population structure of the three principalities was despotic in nature (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 2) and rulers were running highly oppressive and totalitarian states (Rashid, 1995 p. 86.). As the economy along the old Silk Roads declined, these impoverished khans survived by slave trade and by imposition of heavy taxes on the population (Rashid, 2002, p. 23). The Emirate of Bukhara became a Russian Protectorate in 1868, followed by Khiva in 1873. In 1876 the Khanate of Kokand was annexed (Akiner, 1994, p. 10). General von Kaufman ruled Turkistan from 1867 to 1881 as Governor-General (Keller, 2001, p. 6). The core of his policy toward native subjects was formulated by Catherinean frontier policy, within which all religions deserved to be recognized and tolerated, and not persecuted. Religious tolerance for him, as it was for Catherine II, was a matter of political significance. His policy was conducted in such a way that he was able to combine progressive colonial policies of Catherine II and to break apart the solidarity of the Muslim community (Brower and Lazzerini, 1997, p. 120).

Overall, despite important economic and political changes brought by Tsarist administration in the late 19th early 20th centuries, the regime did not try to change (unlike the Bolsheviks) the traditional social structure of local populations of Central Asia. Although the Tsarist rule wanted to weaken Islam in the region, it attempted to do this by ignoring rather than directly attacking religion (Fierman, 1991, p. 13). In 1865 Russia renamed the conquered Kokand territories as Turkistan and moved the capital to Tashkent, which it placed under the governor-general of Orenburg. Two years later it elevated Tashkent to the status of a separate governorgeneralship and folded into it all the parts of the Kazakh steppes, the Kokand Khanate, and the Emirate of Bukhara that had been conquered since 1847. The Syr Darya province based in Tashkent and the Semireche (Seven Rivers) province based in Vernii. K.P. Kaufman was appointed governorgeneral and vested with independent authority to undertake military campaigns and diplomatic negotiations with the neighboring states (Uzbekskoi, 1968, p. 25). In 1868 Kaufman proposed a deal to the ruler of Kokand, Khudayar Khan, consisting of several provisions: Khudayar Khan would grant Russian merchants the right to visit all cities of the khanate and to establish representatives in each city, equalize taxes for Russian and Muslim merchants, and allow Russian caravans free passage into other areas of Kokand (Kastelskaia, p. 18). By signing this agreement Khudayar Khan became a vassal of the Russian Empire. After settling issues with Khudayar Khan and inflicting military defeats on the neighboring khanates, Kaufman forced Bukhara and Khiva to sign similar treaties in 1868 and 1873 respectively, making them protectorates of the Russian Empire as well (Starr, 2011, p. 71). These military campaigns significantly shrank the territories of the Kokand Khanate and forced its economy into decline. To pay the large indemnity to Russia, Khudayar Khan had to increase taxes, which led to protests both in the periphery and in central districts of the ethnically diverse khanate. Many blamed Khudayar Khan for betraying Kokand's interests and for becoming dependent on Russia. Heavy taxes, especially on cattle, led to revolt in the summer of 1873. The uprising erupted in the villages of Kasan and Nanaia near Namangan and soon consumed the whole Fergana valley, raging unchecked until February 1876 (Uzbekskoi, p. 30).

Various ethnic groups of the Fergana valley participated in the revolt, but it was the Kyrgyz who constituted the military core of Pulat Khan's (Ishak Mulla) rebellion (Starr, 2011, p. 71). This uprising alarmed not only Khudayar Khan but also the Russians, who sent special punitive detachments against the rebels, crushing them by February 1876. Losses among the rebels were enormous (Uzbekskoi, p. 36). Russian forces also suffered heavy losses at Andijan. "The battle was dreadful, unprecedented; lots of Russians were killed, some troops simply fled," wrote General Kuropatkin in his diary (Ibid). Following the suppression of the military revolt, Ishak Mulla (Pulat Khan) and some of his confidants were hanged in Margilan in March, 1876, while his followers were physically punished, jailed, or sent into exile (starr, 2011, p. 71). Russia's military conquest forced upon the peoples of Central Asia a new system of law, politics, and socio-economic relations that from the very beginning redefined Central Asia as a periphery and made it utterly dependent on the Russian center. Imposed on local traditions by force, the new system weakened the region's traditional patterns of life and further undermined national development there (Abdurahimova and Rustamova, 1999, p. 19).

As part of its colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions on Turkistan and other parts of Central Asia that would assure its continued political, military, and economic control of the region. Actively drawing on the experience of other colonial powers, Russia's political elite actively and effectively applied the famous principle of "divide and rule." From the very beginning the colonial administration based in Tashkent worked to sow seeds of distrust and hostility among the conquered peoples, so as to prevent the consolidation of any nationalist movement (starr, 2011, p. 74.). Military governors headed provincial offices and also commanded the troops, wielding dictatorial powers over every aspect of life in the Fergana valley (Ibid., p. 30).

It is no exaggeration to say that the provincial head had a monopoly of power in almost all spheres of social and economic life as he applied the logic and spirit of the tsarist colonial policy locally. The provincial administration was in effect all-powerful, but nonetheless worked tirelessly in the pursuit of its own interests tirelessly to strengthen and expand its authority all the more (Starr, 2011, p. 73). The colonial administration defended its actions as part of an effort to remove the "inconveniencies inherent in the [traditional] administrative system (revizii, 1910, p. 9).The tsarist police were the colonial rulers' most reliable weapons and the guardians of monarchical interests in the Fergana region. In larger cities like Kokand and Novyi Margilan, police chiefs wielded extensive executive powers and could call on the Russian military to reinforce their actions. Tsarist authorities considered prisons as an important tool for controlling movements that threatened the established order. All together, Russian government regarded these assemblies, local heads, police, and the prison system as the backbone of imperial authority in Fergana and the best tools for suppressing rebellion even before it started (Starr, 2011, p. 74).

Initially, people from the old khanate system continued to carry out their duties, but over time these "indigenous administrators" were reduced to a supporting role in the colonial system. Meanwhile, following the usual imperial practice, migrants from Central Russia settled in separate villages in rural areas, and enjoyed a high degree of self-rule under their elders (Tillabaev, 2006, pp. 17–18). Russia's leaders, well aware of Central Asia's military-strategic significance and its abundant resources, intended to establish a firm colonial dominion over the region. They were not content to rely solely on a strong army and administration. In addition, they enlisted Russian immigrants to help create a firm foothold in the region. (Starr, 2011, p. 79). New colonization rules for Turkistan introduced in 1883 allowed for the free resettlement of Slavic peoples (Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians) who were Orthodox Christians. All others needed to obtain special permission from the imperial institutions and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequent "Rules of resettlement" introduced in 1886 and supplemented in 1889 and 1903 explicitly fostered Russian migration into the region's richest agricultural and commercial areas (Gofforov, 2003, p. 29). Despite continual resistance from the indigenous population, colonial administrators utilized these acts to pursue a targeted policy to increase the number of Russian immigrants and use them to exploit as much as possible the natural and human resources of Central Asia (Ibid., p. 30).By 1910 the European population of the Fergana valley, primarily Russian and Ukrainian, constituted slightly more than 2 percent of the total (Gubaeva, 1991, p. 104).During Russia's colonization of Central Asia, the imperial authorities paid close attention to ethnic and political relations within the region. Of course, they took full advantage of the prevailing conflicts between ethnic groups and between political elites (Kastelskaia, p. 33).

Once the governor-generalship of Turkistan was established, the Russian Empire undertook a program of large-scale colonial exploitation in the region. The goals of this effort were to weaken both the settled and nomadic aristocracies, to expropriate land from the indigenous population, to exploit agriculture to the maximum extent possible, and to foster colonization (Kastelkaia, p. 41).

Russians brought industrialization to the region, in order to exploit the newly acquired territories. So, they started to build canals for irrigation, railroads and telegraph lines. The first irrigation canal was started in 1874, and the transportation rail line was built in 1881 (Keller, 2001, p. 8). Cotton had become an important commodity for trade and was exported to Russia also through this railroad, and introduction of its long-staple type in 1880s put the economy of Turkistan on a cash basis, creating conditions for appearance of merchants as highly influential urban class (Ibid., p. 10). Prior to the conquest, food crops were dominant in Central Asia as a whole and in the Fergana valley, with cotton being a secondary product. But Russian traders and investors demanded an increase in cotton production, as this would enable them to reduce their import of expensive raw cotton from abroad. The government, too, supported this because it would improve its balance of payments (Niallo, and Halfin, 1953, p. 106).

The major area for cotton production in all Central Asia and overwhelmingly the source of increased production after the Russian conquest was the Fergana valley.

Russians also exploited the oil and coal resources of the Fergana province, with six oilfields and twenty-eight coalmines operating there by 1913–14. The largest of these coal mines were near the towns of Kizilkie and Sulukta (Musaev, 1999, p. 36). The Russian Empire's approach to colonization and land-use left a deeply negative mark on the social and economic conditions of the indigenous peoples.

Colonization and the prevailing style of colonial rule united local peoples against Russia. A consistent pattern emerged, with each new colonial abuse giving rise to new and more radical modes of resistance. Anti-colonial rebellions broke out in various parts of Turkistan throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. In the Fergana province alone, there were more than 200 anti-colonial protests during the three decades after 1870. In 1885 alone the Andijan, Osh, and Margilan districts witnessed mass protests led by one Dervish Khan. Another rebellion led by the Kyrgyz woman Kurmanjan Datka took place during the same period. Kurmanjan Datka was one of the first Kyrgyz females to use lethal force against the colonial regime (Starr, 2011, p. 75). On June 20, 1899, new uprisings engulfed almost the entire Fergana valley. The gravity of this outbreak forced the Russian government to analyze its causes and implications in order to improve its colonial policy in the region. Russian officials assembled twenty volumes of information on the issue. However, this did not lead them to draw the correct conclusions, with the result that the local population's living standards continued to fall, with the result that discontent mounted further (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 75-46).

The effects of the newly introduced cash crop economy, imposition of heavy taxes, lack of experience with usury and share-cropping, and corruption of the local elite, were disastrous for ordinary peasants. Under such conditions it was natural that protests against the Russian domination emerged, first in 1885 in the form of sporadic rural riots, in the cotton-rich Fergana, and culminating in the anti-Russian Andijan mass revolt in 1898, backed by the Sufi Naqshbandi order. The leader of the Naqshbandi order Dukchi Ishan organized attacks against the Russians in the cities of Andijan, Osh and Margelan. Although the revolt was suppressed and Dukchi himself executed, the Russians were astonished by the fact that such an act could have taken place while they were totally unaware (Ibid., pp. 10-11 and 16-18). Five hundred and fifty people were arrested in connection with the uprising in Andijan, while Madali Dukchi Ishan and all his immediate associates were executed (Starr, 2011, p. 75). Because the revolt was masterminded by a religious leader, this action is usually described as a form of Islamic resistance to Russian domination. In fact, however, this resistance was not a religious war against unbelievers, but was a protest against worsened conditions into which the ordinary masses found themselves as a result of changes imposed from outside (Botoiarova, 2005, 42-43). As a result of Russian colonization, by the beginning of the 20th century the region of Central Asia was transformed into a supplier of raw materials. Industrialization and Russian settlement policies had, however, a devastating effect on local population, such as insufficient food production, economic decline and impoverishment (Quoted in Daniel Brower in "Islam and Ethnicity", p. 132).

The 1916 Revolt, occurring on the eve of the collapse of tsarism, was the pinnacle of the national liberation movement. It was triggered by the imperial decree of June 25, 1916, "On the recruitment of alien males for work behind the lines," which mobilized more than 200,000 men between the ages of nineteen and thirtyone. Most of these involuntary recruits came from the most populous part of the region, the Fergana valley (Khotamov, 2007, pp. 94–95).

The revolt was initiated by Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads, who refused to fight for the Russians in Europe, but quickly swept through the rest of the region (Rashid, 2002 p. 25).This rebellion, however, was put down by Tsarist forces as it was the case with previous revolts. Although it was suppressed quickly, it had left tens of thousands of dead and wounded (Ibid).

The 1916 rebellion was the last response to the Tsarist regime and although it was quickly suppressed, it had awakened a strong anti-Russian feeling among the local populations. Once again, Islam was utilized as a potent anti-colonial instrument. The event of 1916 in no way reflected the Russian attitude toward Islam, but according to some scholars it "undoubtedly aroused Muslim religious fanaticism directed against the Russians" (Wheeler, 1964, p. 188). 0For the Russians the outcome of the rebellion was the realization of the volatility of the situation which demanded reformulation of the main policy line toward Central Asia. The Bolsheviks would rely considerably on this experience, and their approach to region, at least in the beginning, was more or less cautious and accommodating, as compared to that of their Tsarist predecessors (Haghayeghi, 1996, 9-10).

4.1.1 Cultural responses, Jadidism, and religious revival

The Islamic resistance to the Russian occupation in Central Asia had also found its expression in the form of the Jadid movement, which took its name from the Muslim reformers active in Samarkand and Bukhara. Their method of teaching was called usul-i-Jadid (the new method) in contrast to the usul-i-Qadim (the old method) of the maktab and medrese that was prevalent among the Muslims of Russia at the end of the 19th century (Shorish, Summer – Autumn 1994, p. 161).

The father of this movement was a Tatar reformer from Crimea, Ismail Bay Gaspirali (1851-1914), founder of the influential Tatar-language newspaper Tercuman, through which he suggested that all Turks should unite under a common literary language and culture and resist the ossification of Tsarism and mullahs. The goal of this movement was to reform Islam and seek in varying degrees to reconcile the problems associated with exposure to Western modernism with Muslim religion and culture (Rashid, 2002, p. 30). Religious and educational reform was the major undertakings upon which this movement embarked on in Central Asia (d'Encausse, 1988, p. 78).

The Jadid movement sought a new, independent Turkistan, free of both Russian rule and the old conservative, despotic, and corrupt religious establishment. The Jadids, or Young Bukharans as they were also called, saw Turkey as a model for a modern Muslim state. They strived to revive the Turkic languages and develop a modern Turkic culture (Rashid, 1995, p. 88).

The key points of the Jadidist message, as formulated by Gaspirali, included among other things redefinition of education by adopting analytical and critical thinking; incorporation of changes in the attitude of the faithful towards religion with the idea of progress, as opposed to the stagnant worldview which glorified only the past; encouragement of cultural borrowing from non-Islamic civilizations as well as reliance on Russia with the aim of achieving cultural synthesis; strengthening community sense among Muslims, emphasizing not only religious ties but also feeling of common linguistic and ethnic affiliation within Islamic context placing human beings more in logical than divine scheme; and rededicating pious endowments (waqf) to social purposes (in particular education) (Lazzerini, 1992, pp. 161-163).

The eventual vision of the Jadid argument was that the old elites should give way to a new elite – the Jadids, who would lead the people to an enlightened and purified Islamic culture (Khalid, from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022400.shtml).

The local Jadids opposed the "ossification" and ignorance of some members of the Muslim clergy, who misinterpreted sharia norms and distorted the meaning of many of the most important tents of the faith. In all this the Jadids' ideology was substantially shaped by currents of thought flowing into the Fergana valley and the region as a whole from adjacent Muslim countries. But even here they did not simply embrace the alien ideas from abroad. Instead, they allowed the new ideas to pass through the prism of national beliefs and traditions. Indeed, some radical Muslims from abroad already were propagating the notion of a hard-line opposition to the Christian West and a revival of the universal caliphate. However, such ideas did not find widespread sympathy in either the Fergana valley or Turkistan as a whole (Starr, 2011, p. 87-90).

Within this context, the term 'pure Islam' had its own unique interpretation for the Jadids. For them, 'pure' Islam was synonymous with progress and civilization, achieved through knowledge. The idea of modernism advocated by the Jadids brought them into conflict with both the Russians and ulema. For their part, the Russians, who considered the Jadids reactionary and obscurantist, had encouraged the ulema to continue their practice of conservative interpretations of Islam in order to counter the anti-Russian Islamic and nationalist sentiments. Given such conditions, when the Jadids of Central Asia were strongly despised by the Russians, it was therefore natural that the Jadids rendered their support to the Bolsheviks after the October revolution, who adopted, at least initially, more accommodating and reconciliatory approach than their Tsarist predecessors (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 47-49).

Many Jadids supported the Bolsheviks during the anti-Russian Basmachi uprising, which began in 1918 in the Fergana valley, believing that the Basmachi were a reactionary force led by mullahs (Rashid, 1995 pp. 88-89). Following the fall of tsarism and the Kerensky Revolution in February 1917, Fergana Jadids continued to fight for socio-economic and political liberty, and for the agenda of the national movement. Thinking that the Bolsheviks supported their goals, they also supported the October Bolshevik Revolution later in 1917. But once the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, they quickly accused Jadid leaders of a reactionary "Pan-Islamism" and "bourgeois nationalism" (Starr, 2011, p. 91)

In summary: in the tsarist Russia period, the factors such as Tsarist colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions, suppression of peoples, destruction of Islamic beliefs, increasing taxes, Russia large-scale colonial exploitation of oil and coal resources especially cotton, famine and starvation, were the contexts for anti-Russian protests and anti-colonial rebellions in Turkistan (Central Asia) specially Fergana valley and eventually religious revival.

4.2 Soviet period:

4.2.1 Soviet rule and the delineation of borders in the Fergana valley, 1917–1930

Initially revolution of February 1917 occurred. In this revolution, after a series of strikes, demonstrations and conflicts, Nicholas II, the last Russian tsar was expelled from the monarchy, and a provisional administration came to power. The provisional government was formed under the supervision of Georgy Lvov and Alexander Kerensky.

In early March 1917, reports about the change of power in Petrograd[6] reached Turkistan. This led to the rapid reconfiguration of the former colonial relations and a transformation of the region's political life. Both the soviets, which drew mainly on the Russian-speaking population, and the Muslim organizations extended their loyalty to the provisional government that Alexander Kerensky had formed in Petrograd (Starr, 2011, p. 94).

The second stage was the October 1917 Revolution. The October revolution, under the control of the Bolshevik party (a radical branch of the Russian social-democratic labor party) led by Vladimir Lenin, seized power from the interim government.

6- Formerly Saint Petersburg.

4.2.1.1 The Turkistan autonomous government

The centralized and semi-military structures of Russia's colonial administration were now gradually losing control over the situation in the valley. Their efforts were increasingly concentrated on the protection of the city of Tashkent and especially its Russian-speaking residents. In the Muslim quarters of cities and especially in the rural areas where the majority of the indigenous population lived, district and rural institutions gained in importance, thanks both to the formal and informal authority vested in them, and to their many informal connections with the local society. Particularly important were the *(kurbashis)*, who served as police chiefs in Muslim urban quarters and were the only figures with legal access to weapons and the right to use force. All this helped split society into numerous antagonistic yet simultaneously compromise-seeking groups and factions (Starr, 2011, p. 95-96).

Deteriorating economic conditions also caused mounting tensions in the Fergana valley. Cotton producers faced the collapse of commodity prices and the disappearance of buyers. The area of land under cotton cultivation shrank by 54.4 percent between 1915 and 1916 (Buttino, 2007, p. 142). Crucial developments in the winter of 1917–18 harshly destabilized conditions throughout the region, and made the Fergana valley the center of Turkistan's political life. Turkistan on November 26, 1917 a fourth extraordinary regional congress of Muslims convened at Kokand, formerly the capital of the Kokand Khanate and still one of the major economic centers of the valley. The congress consisted of some 200 delegates, more than half of whom came from the Fergana valley itself. At the top of the agenda was the issue of Turkistan's independence. A more radical proposal to announce an independence from Russia did not receive a majority of the votes. Finally, the congress elected a provisional government of autonomous Turkistan, initially headed by a Kazakh named Muhammadjan Tynyshpaev, a former member of the Second Russian State Duma (Starr, 211, 96-97).

The Bolsheviks called the self-proclaimed Muslim government the "Kokand Autonomy." It was an attempt by various anti-Bolshevik forces to forge a legitimate authority that could counterbalance the Soviets. Kokand immediately became an important symbol of the anti-Bolshevik opposition However, the Kokand "autonomists" in the end failed to enlist the support of Muslims elsewhere in Turkistan and even in Tashkent. The emir of Bukhara withheld his support. Even the population of the Fergana valley was by and large indifferent to calls by the new government for Turkistani autonomy, unsupported as they were by military and economic power. While leaders of the Turkistan autonomy were nursing their internal antagonism and waiting on developments in Petrograd, where the situation remained uncertain until the constituent assembly was convoked, Russian army soldiers based in Tashkent and the Fergana region took decisive action (Ibid, 97-98). In late January 1918, the fourth congress of Soviets of the Turkistan region outlawed the Kokand autonomous government and ordered the arrest of all its leaders. It confiscated the autonomous government's monetary assets in Tashkent and Kokand banks (Iarmatov, 1980, p. 50).

What began as a confrontation between the Soviets and the "Turkistan autonomy" turned into a general open conflict among diverse forces that spread across the Fergana valley. Now the Turkistan region was left in the hands of those advocating active resistance, with the Fergana valley in particular becoming one of its main centers (Starr, 2011, p. 99).

4.2.1.2 The anti-Soviet war in the Fergana valley

The new Bolshevik government achieved a major success by defeating the Turkistan Autonomy at the start of 1918. But even this demonstrated the Bolsheviks' military power, it did not leave them in full political and military control over the Fergana valley. The Soviet government had stripped Turkistan of autonomy and declared it part of the Russian Socialist Republic, but the region remained in the hands of a variety of factions and local forces that often acted on their own authority and understood the revolutionary goals in their own way. The Soviets also enjoyed the support of railway, mining and oil workers, as well as the small Russian population in the cities of the Fergana valley, above all the city of Skobelev. Also, a considerable number of local Muslims supported the Bolsheviks, which gave the conflict the character of a civil war. Resistance against the Soviet government was no less fragmented. It included groups of the most diverse backgrounds, political interests, and power. Although this resistance was complex and comprised many different streams, it was and is commonly referred to under the single name of *basmachestvo*[7]. This movement emerged less as a political resistance to the Bolshevik regime, although that factor was present, than as a reaction to the breakdown of local authority and the collapse of the area's economy. At first the majority of kurbashis, the local police who led rebel squads in the Fergana valley, were neither politicians nor ideologues. They did not develop a clear political program, but instead stood up for the interests of local communities and clans. Their horizons were defined by their Muslim identity and sense of belonging to an Islamic community, and it was this which served as a significant factor in mobilizing and uniting the resistance (Starr, 211, p. 99).

Scores of resistance fighters operated in Fergana. Among the largest and most famous were the squads of Mullah Ergash in the Kokand district (replacing Ergashbai, who perished in the spring of 1918), Madaminbek (Muhammad-Amin Bek) and Kurshirmat (Sher-Muhammad Bek) in the district of Margilan, Aman-Pahlavon, Kabul, Rahmankul in Namangan county, Hol-Hodja in Osh county, and Ahunjon, Parpi, and Mahkam-Hodja in Andijan district. At one time or another each of these groups numbered several thousand men, with smaller detachments active in many villages. Only nominally subordinated to "large" kurbashi squadrons, they acted mainly on their own authority. The total number of these military alignments in various years ranged from twenty to sixty (Turkistan v nachale, p. 165).

7- "Basmak" from the Turkic, meaning "oppress" or "press". Basmach is a name that had been used since tsarist times to refer to bandits and gangsters in Central Asia.

Other forces opposing the Bolsheviks tried to establish relations with the kurbashis of the Fergana valley. Among them were kurbashis from Djamiatiulamo and Shurosi-islamia, Turkic nationalists from among the Tatar-Bashkirs and Kazakhs, members of the White Guard, Englishmen, and various authority figures from Bukhara and even from Afghanistan. All of them provided organizational and military support to the resistance forces, offering ideological programs and slogans as well. In the summer of 1918 they created a Peasant Army under the leadership of Konstantin Monstrov. By September 1919 Monstrov reached an agreement with Madaminbek to carry out joint operations against the Red Army. In the fall of the same year the rebels temporarily occupied Osh, boldly attacked Old Margilan, and laid siege to Andijan. At this moment it seemed that the united forces of the basmachi and peasant settlers could turn the tide and take full control of the valley. During the same fall they proclaimed the creation of a Provisional Autonomous Government of the Fergana valley (Starr, 211, p. 100-101). However, by this time the military initiative wash passing into the Bolsheviks' hands. Their forces were now much better equipped than formerly, thanks to their ability to run the blockade between central Russia and Turkistan. Active combat units deployed to the Fergana valley, including a Volga Tatar Rifle Brigade, enabled them to conduct a series of large-scale operations against the kurbashis and the Peasant Army. Following up on their successes in the field, the Bolsheviks approached selected kurbashis with proposals to surrender and join the victors. Fighting flared up once again during the summer of 1920, although by now the rebel forces were much weaker and numbered not more than 6,000 fighters in total. Attacks on the kurbashis gained new momentum during the fall. Newly reinforced Red Army regulars, now backed by artillery and even aircraft, defeated the kurbashis in central and eastern Fergana, which left practically the entire valley under the Soviets' control (Ibid, 101-102).

4.2.1.3 Policies of the 1920s

The combination of more active military operations and tactical collaborations with various local factions enabled the Soviet government to establish firm control over the Fergana valley. By abandoning its brutal approach, adopting more flexible tactics, and utilizing reformist and anti-imperial rhetoric, the Bolsheviks managed rather quickly to restore relations with the Central Asian elite. They engaged its members as intermediaries with the Muslim community, as partners in the process of reform and modernization, and as assistants in the imposition of new systems of governance and control. While each side pursued its own interests, they both wanted an end to hostilities and the restoration of stability (Starr, 2011, p. 103). An important Soviet initiative in the Fergana valley was the establishment of "clerical administrations" (mahkama-i-shariat) in the major cities and then in the villages as well. The task of these bodies was to control the activities of the mosques (Arapov, 2006, p. 321). The Bolsheviks aimed to create groups and forces through which they could exercise control over the region, pursue reforms, and weaken unreliable and potentially dangerous forces. Their approach combined administrative changes, attempts to reform water-management, financial subsidies, and efforts to "emancipate" women (Ibid, p. 104).

The first attempt at land and water reform in the Fergana valley was undertaken in 1921 in the Kanibadam district of Kokand, the Jalalabad district of Andijan, and in some areas of Osh County (Kunakova, 1962, pp. 57–58). A still larger-scale land and water reform was attempted in 1925–26. The goal was to transfer land from non-working households to farmers and paupers (Ibid., pp. 150–51). These economic reforms were not sweeping and did not fundamentally change conditions within society, the status of its major groups, or system of governance. However, they served a critical function of creating loyal factions and classes within the population, advancing new leaders, and reallocating resources and power—all to the benefit of the Soviet government (Starr, 2011, p. 104-105).

4.2.1.4 The process of administrative and national delineation

An important dimension of the Bolsheviks' policy of strengthening their position in the non-Russian areas of the former Russian empire was to redraw or re-delineate national and administrative borders. This was seen as an essential step toward efficient control and modernization in the region. As early as 1920, following Ryskulov's promulgation of the plan to create a "Turkic Republic," Moscow began discussing the possibility of dividing Turkistan along ethnic or national lines (Starr, 2011, p. 105). Vladimir Lenin himself set out the procedure for doing so:

1- Authorize the creation of maps (ethnographic and other ones) of Turkistan showing its division into Uzbekia, Kyrgyzia[8], and Turkmenia. 2- Then determine the possibility of merging or dividing these three areas (Lenin, 1981, vol. 41, p. 436).

In 1922 the government developed a general plan for the administrative division of the Republic of Turkistan. That same year a group of Soviet and Communist Party activists from the Semireche (Seven Rivers) and Syr Darya provinces declared that the Kara-Kyrgyz, or "Black" Kyrgyz, should enjoy the rights of a separate people. A new project thus emerged, with the goal of creating a separate administrative unit for these people, the "Mountainous Province." Following stormy discussions, however, this plan was dropped (Ozhukeeva, 1993).

The idea of redrawing the borders along ethnic or national lines did not originate in Central Asia, but had been brought to the region from without, namely Moscow. It first appeared on the agenda at the end of 1923. This time it was decided to incorporate into the discussion the "Bukhara Republic" and the "Khorezm Republic," along with the "Turkistan Republic[9] (Starr, 2011, p. 106).

8- Between 1920 and 1925 the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic existed, which was subsequently renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic or Kazakhstan

9- Initially, it was planned to rearrange and then preserve the Khorezm republic, but it was decided in the course of discussions to divide it into national territories as well.

In the spring of 1924 the central government managed to persuade local elites of the need to pursue these reforms. Then, on June 12, 1924, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party adopted a resolution "On the National Delineation of the Central Asian Republics." The original plan for delineating the borders sought to merge most of Central Asia into a single powerful Republic of Uzbekistan that would become a "union republic" of the USSR as a whole (Starr, 2011, p. 106). In essence, the delineation process turned on the balancing of contradictory alliances between the Bolsheviks and the diverse elites of Central Asia (Ozhukeeva, p. 22).

In October 1924, the highest authorities in Moscow decided in favor of the plan to create new national republics and regions in Central Asia. At the close of that year, representatives of Kara-Kyrgyzia moved from Tashkent to Pishpek (later Frunze, now Bishkek), which became the capital of the newly formed region[10] .Throughout the winter and summer of 1925, new governing structures and institutions were being created and elections held to fill administrative positions. In May 1925 the Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous region was renamed Kyrgyzia. Because the delineation occurred within the boundaries of Uzbekistan and did not concern relations between the republics, all of the conflicts and disputes regarding the administrative boundaries of the Khujand district failed to gain a hearing at the national political level. Thus, they remained merely an internal affair of the republic. The "Tajik issue" already had surfaced in the course of delineation in 1924. It was originally intended to create a Tajik autonomous region within Uzbekistan that would include areas of the former eastern Bukhara and some settlements and cities of the former Samarkand province of the Turkistan republic. This resulted in the creation of a Tajik autonomous region that also included a Badakhshan autonomous region in the Pamirs. However, once the delineation of 1924 was announced, conflicts between the Uzbeks and Tajiks began to intensify (Starr, 2011. P.108-113). In 1929 a commission on the territorial delineation of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan began its work (Masov, 1991, pp. 115–35). The territorial delineation left most of the plains areas of the valley under the control of Uzbekistan.

In general, the population responded calmly to the delineation of borders. Being transferred to another administrative unit did not produce immediate changes in people's everyday lives, nor did it seriously affect their interests. Because borders were open and local institutions weak, the revised boundary lines had little or no immediate effect on familiar economic practices, personal relations, or transport routes. As a result of the new delineation of borders, the Fergana valley was parceled out among three national-administrative entities. As a consequence, it disappeared from the political map as an independent economic and cultural whole, turning instead into a peripheral zone connecting the three union republics among which it had been divided (Ibid).

10-The issue of creating such a center in Jalalabad, which was connected to Tashkent by a railway, was discussed for some time

4.2.2 The Fergana valley under Stalin, 1929–1953

The so-called Stalin years were a pivotal period in the development of Soviet Central Asia in general and the Fergana valley in particular. This was a time when the USSR gained international recognition and when, by the second half of the 1920s, the internal struggle against the basmachi in Central Asia concluded.

Gradual and evolutionary development of the Soviet government and its adaptation to local conditions changed radically at the end of the 1920s, when Bolshevik doctrine abandoned the goal of spreading the "world revolution" and embraced instead the idea of "socialism in one country." Henceforth, a total political and economic centralization reigned in Central Asia. What was called a system of "command and administrative control" prevailed everywhere, and especially in the cotton production in the Fergana valley. The goal was to free the USSR of all dependence on cotton from abroad, especially from the United States. The chosen means to achieve this was to collectivize the ownership of land and to introduce extreme centralization in its management. To fight the inevitable inefficiency and abuses to which this system gave rise, the government resorted increasingly to terror and coercion .In the Fergana valley, the aim of this entire system of soviets instituted by the Communist Party was the complete destruction of the class of independent farmers and of private agriculture, to be replaced by gigantic collective farms that would produce cotton (Starr, 2011, p. 121-122)

Collectivization in the Fergana valley continued from 1927 until 1933. By the end of 1932, some 81 percent of farming households in the valley had been collectivized, and they accounted for 79 percent of all production (oblasti, p. 40)

During the Stalin era Central Asia failed to become a unified economic region. Moscow viewed it as a source of raw materials for the more developed European areas of the USSR. Railways were designed not to promote regional development, but to deliver raw materials in the most direct manner from Central Asia to industrial centers in the Russian Federation. The priority Moscow assigned to the core Russian areas of the USSR assured that the periphery would remain backward and with a weak sense of unity. The Stalin era left Central Asia as a poorly developed, agrarian, and subsidized region dependent on Russia for whatever economic well-being it enjoyed. This is all the more true of the Fergana valley, as a periphery of a periphery (Starr, 2011, p. 123-124).

Russian colonization brought ideas of modernization to the Fergana valley by the end of the nineteenth century. In spite of war, revolution, and civil war, these ideas spread to all social classes and to even the most remote corners of the Fergana valley over the following decades (Ibid p. 124).

4.2.2.1 Soviet religious policy

Before the establishment of the Soviet rule in Central Asia, the Islamic proclivity among Muslims of the nomadic tradition – Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Turkmen – was much weaker as compared to the historically sedentarized communities of Uzbeks and Tajiks (Akiner, 1994 , p. 20). The overwhelming majority of Central Asian Muslim population (with the exception of a numerically small Isma'ili in Pamir Mountains) was adherents of Sunni tradition of the Hanafi School, noted for its moderate form of expression of faith and liberal orientation. The founder of Hanafi School – Abu Hanifeh ibn Zuta (699-767) – advocated a more tolerant use of analogy (qyias), public consensus (ijma), and personal opinion (ra'y) in administration and interpretation of Islamic principles (Haghayeghi, p. 251). Without any doubt, Islam was an integral part of the cultural identity of Central Asians. It was hardly possible to find a native Central Asian who would not identify himself as Muslim (Gleason, 1997, p. 170).

Under the specific conditions of Central Asia Islam was redefined as a form of cultural defense and represented a symbolic link with the world of their forefathers.Native people of Central Asia, whose genetic heritage was linked to its land for centuries, would almost without exception identify themselves as Muslims. According to them, Islam was both tradition and also heritage, and therefore a way of life rather than a set of laws (Ibid).

When the Soviet rule was established in Central Asia in 1918, the new regime had to have a more consistent and solid policy for Islam, which was probably the most important identity for the Central Asian people. The approach of the Bolshevik leaders towards religious issues, as in other issues, rested basically upon the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Theoretical approach of Leninism to religion was based on Marxist anti-religious framework, which emphasized religion's exploitative function. For both Lenin and Marx, the fight against religion was synonymous with the class struggle against capitalism and exploitation in Russia (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 52). Before they could attack Islam directly, the Bolsheviks needed to win support from millions of non-Russians in the former Tsarist Empire to strengthen their position in newly gained territories. For them, it was quite inexpedient to reject Islam when their power had not yet been consolidated, because for the majority of Central Asians Islam was the main indicator of identity (Keller, 2001, p. 48).

Deriving from the Marxist belief that religion was an obstacle to modernization and social development, a campaign was launched against all religious institutions, including Muslim ones (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 54). When Stalin came to power, the Soviet attempt to undermine all religions, including Islam, was further intensified. The number of mosques and prayer-houses was sharply reduced from 26,279 to 1,312 by 1942. 14,000 mosques and religious schools were closed in Central Asia. The clergy also became a target of persecution as their numbers drastically fell from 45,339 to 8,872 for the whole of the Soviet Union (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 23).

This was accompanied by the action called hujum (the assault) on women to liberate them from veil, polygamy, bridal payment and other traditional practices. In late 1920s, in order to destroy the power of Islam completely as a social and political force, the party replaced the Arabic and Persian script by a new Latin alphabet for Turkic-speaking people of the USSR (Keller, 2001 p. xv). As for Stalin, the elimination of 'outward' attributes of Islam was important, three of the five pillars of Islam – the payment of the zakat (alms), the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, and the observation of the fast of Ramadan – were outlawed (Akiner, 1994, p. 176).Thus, the campaign against Islam greatly intensified during the first Five Year Plan (1927-1933), when crude propaganda and violence were widely used to fight religion and 'emancipate' women from veils and many traditional family roles (Fierman, 1991, p. 27). As a part of this renewed anti-religious campaign, Stalin set out the cleansing of the Communist Party from the residues of the so-called nationalist deviationists. Stalin's nationality policy and his anti-religious campaign were closely connected to each other. In 1932, Central Asian elites began to be consumed by his purges, which culminated in the 1937-38 trials. There were many executions of prominent Muslim Communist leaders during these two years (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 26). The clergy, too, were accused of and severely punished for collaboration with national deviationists, sabotaging the collectivization campaign and practicing the ritual of circumcision (Ibid). This high level of anti-Islamic propaganda was maintained throughout the rest of the period until the World War II.

The Soviet government attempted to control all aspects of Muslims' social and political life. Communist ideology declared religion to be the opium of the people and subjected it to large-scale attacks. The atheistic Soviet system's first target was the more intellectual form of Islam, with its powerful financial base and array of educational institutions. The Soviets also sought to undermine the influence of "popular" Islam, which had always existed on the communal level and linked the culture and folklore of people in the Fergana valley with their religious identity. The organs of state security were particularly active in the struggle against religion, destroying all influential clerics and getting the survivors under their control. Mosques and madrassas were turned into warehouses and commercial buildings. Sharia courts were abolished in 1927 (Starr, 2011, p. 125).

Meanwhile, the Soviet government used the loyal and certified mullahs of "official Islam" to create acceptable substitutes for both the intellectual and the popular forms of the faith. The Bolsheviks' use of co-opted "red mullahs" dated back to their struggle against the basmachi in the 1920s. Official Islam, which emerged during the height of World War II in 1942, was under firm communist control. Its main body was the Central Asian Clerical Administration of Muslims (SADUM) headed by a mufti. However, such religious figures and their institutions did not play a significant role in the lives of the Hanafi Sunni Muslims of the Fergana valley. Among those who cared, the majority of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz preferred official Islam to popular Islam supported by unofficial mullahs and ishans at the community level. This "unofficial" or "popular" Islam lacked intellectual depth and operated under the sights of the state security services, which feared the damage it potentially could do to the Soviet government. (Ibid, 125-1256)

4.2.2.2 Dilemmas of the "indigenization" policy and problems of leadership

The Soviet government tried to demonstrate that its policies had nothing in common with the tsarist policies that had oppressed the non-Russian peoples. With this goal in mind, Soviet officials pursued a policy of *korenizatsiia* or indigenization. This was an early Soviet notion that supported members of the titular nationalities of recently formed republics and "national minorities." Its objective was to enlist the support of non-Russian peoples and thereby internationalize the communist movement. A goal of the indigenization policy was to develop competent "national cadres" loyal to the Soviet government. The weakness of the indigenization policy began to show immediately. The figure of the rais, loyal to his superiors and unrelenting toward his villagers, came to be the ideal archetype for all party and soviet-level leaders in the Fergana valley and Central Asia. Their lack of education prevented rais from rising in the industrial world. This created a fissure in the economy of the Fergana valley, with agriculture and industry developing along parallel but non-intersecting lines. Locally born and speaking local dialects, rais were not familiar with Marxism-Leninism and had only the vaguest notions on how best to promote communism, but did not interfere with internal community affairs. Industry, by contrast, was firmly in the hands of urbanized Russians and not indigenous people. The government dreamed of a merging of city and countryside and of Russian and Kyrgyz, Tajik, or Uzbek; however, no such merging occurred (Starr, 2011, p. 126-128).

The Soviet government worked hard to train young professionals from the local nationalities. By 1930 almost half of the 5,000 workers at cotton mills in the Uzbek sector of the valley were local ethnics (Rahimov, 1984, p. 42).

But considering the overwhelming predominance of local peoples in the population of the province, this did not suffice. Moreover, most key leadership positions in industry were filled by Russians and other Slavs, with local workers concentrated in the most low-paying jobs (Starr, 2011, p. 128).

Soon the Bolsheviks began damping down the indigenization policy out of fear that the multi-national Soviet empire might collapse if it did not have enough people sharing a single language and culture. Indigenization began in the mid-1920s but had faded away by the 1930s, replaced by the time-tested tsarist policy of Russification (Ibid).

4.2.2.3 Russification and the manipulation of language policy

Russification, the policy of imposing Russian culture on non-Russian peoples, provoked protests from most of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Russians were appointed to key administrative and political positions, and the Russian language became essential for business, Communist Party affairs, industry, science, and engineering. Soon bilingualism prevailed in Central Asia; not the former TurkoTajik bilingualism of the Fergana valley, but Russian-Kyrgyz, Russian-Tajik, and Russian-Uzbek bilingualism. To be sure, most people became familiar with Russian culture without being forced to do so. But within some strata of society Russification engendered Russophobia, taking the form of passive protests and a quiet withdrawal into "parallel" Islam. The government's 1927-1940 policy of manipulating language had the further objective of breaking down Muslim unity and isolating Central Asia from the larger Islamic world. In 1927 the Soviet government abolished what it considered the archaic and inadequate Arabic-based scripts and decreed that the Latin alphabet be adopted instead. By this step the government separated the region from the Muslim world and bound it instead within its own orbit. Latinization broke Islam's monopoly over the publishing industry and pedagogy and compromised the status of both the Arabic and Persian languages, setting against them the younger and predominantly Turkic "popular" languages. At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government undertook a large-scale campaign to promote the Cyrillic alphabet and Russian language. It presented this to the outside world as a campaign to "abolish illiteracy," in other words, to introduce culture into a world of absolute illiteracy and a culturally virgin land. Simultaneously, the Soviets destroyed madrassas across the Fergana valley and also many mosques, some dating to the Middle Ages (Starr, 2011, p. 128-129).

The price paid for modernization and the introduction of Soviet mass education was the irretrievable loss of culture, subsequent cultural deprivation, and the plunging of whole populations into backwardness. Epistemologically and psychologically this policy was rooted in Islamophobia and a Russian form of "Orientalism," that is in the imperial belief that the Russian people were somehow "chosen" to civilize the more "backward" peoples. Within a decade Russian had been established as a symbol of dominance, while all indigenous languages were downgraded and Islam stripped of its scientific, literary, and educational bases. But it was not destroyed, as the Bolsheviks wished (Ibid, p. 130).

4.2.2.4 The formation of identity

People of the Fergana valley embraced the Soviet identity and separate nationalities that had been imposed on them, but these did not replace their older loyalties to family, class, and territory. Their Fergana valley identity preserved its major features but shrank to a very local community-based on family clans and a jointly preserved history. When Fergana valley residents moved to the capitals, their devotion to family and clan, and their territorial community, actually intensified. Soviet urban culture proved impotent against the more enduring, natural, and emotionally rich indigenous attachments (Starr, 2011, p. 133).

Overall, Soviet-style modernization did not attain its goal. Soviet rules did not supersede existing norms. Economic development did not lead to the emergence of national economies. In the Fergana valley, traditions of harmonious coexistence among ethnic group faded, while Soviet "nation building" disrupted historical memory and social continuities. Yet indigenous identity, grounded on a common culture, mentality, and emotional ties, somehow survived across the valley (Ibid).

4.2.2.5 Repression

The period between 1929 and 1953 marks a tragedy in the history of Central Asia. Under the totalitarian system that crystallized at that time, all power rested with the Communist Party and all non-governmental entities and informal assemblies, including mosques, madrassas, maktabs, and gaps (male interest forums) were violently suppressed. Chaikhanas (teahouses) were turned into communist propaganda centers. Religion was criminalized and believers persecuted. During these years all parts of the Fergana valley experienced state terror and the merciless destruction of whole classes of people. The Party, fearing external enemies, violently suppressed the slightest manifestation of dissent within the country (Starr, 2011, p. 134).

In the Fergana valley, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, many tolerated and even supported these acts of repression. Local leaders tried to save themselves by showing vigilance in hounding down "enemies of the people." Citizens informed on neighbors or colleagues in order to save their own families. Nonetheless, all sections of the population were subject to repression. Party and Soviet leaders and anyone else suspected of ties with such obvious "public enemies" as bais, khans, emirs, basmachi, bourgeois nationalists, and pan-Turkists suffered particularly (Ibid).

In the fall of 1937, the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Boshevik), Andrei Andreev, personally "purged" Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Even though most Uzbek and Tajik Party leaders already had been jailed, the government now organized local "troikas" consisting of a prosecutor, the head of the secret police, and the local chief of police, to consider tens, if not hundreds of, cases a day. From 1937 to 1939 such troikas in Uzbekistan tried 37,000 people and sentenced 6,920 of them to death (Repressia, 1937–1938, p. 8).

As a result of these purges, residents of the Fergana valley naturally became highly fearful and distrustful of the state and government. Many perceived that Stalinist society rested on lies and intimidation. But in assessing the Stalin period, it is important not to whitewash the situation. Stalin's paranoia was not solely responsible for totalitarianism. National and Party leaders were also involved, as was the public at large. Without all their support the Stalinist regime could never have taken root, let alone survived as long as it did (Starr, 2011, p. 135).

Between 1929 and 1953, residents of the Fergana valley endured three periods of starvation: in 1932–33 caused by collectivization; the wartime famine of 1941–45; and the post-war famine of 1946–47. Not only did the horrors of collectivization and Stalin's Great Terror claim tens of thousands of lives, but the repressions continued unabated until the mid-1950s (Ibid, p. 137).

4.2.3 Fergana valley under Khrushchev and Brezhnev

When Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1954, a period of relative liberalization between 1955 and 1958 would emerge as a part of his de-Stalinization campaign, which aimed to eliminate some of the harsh policies. (Rashid, p. 39. P. 39). Again, such liberalization did not mean that anti-religious propaganda subsided. It simply differed from Stalin's harsh treatment of religion, under which Islam was severely repressed and clergy executed. According to Khrushchev, propaganda should be directed against religious ideology and not against the clergy. At the same time, Soviet leadership was concerned with the degree of religious revival that occurred during the war and feared that it may get out of control, and subsequently challenges the Communist ideology (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 30). After 1958 and until his fall in 1964 Khrushchev adopted the hard-line approach, as can bee seen from the nature of decrees issued after 1958. In October 1958 a resolution on enhancing atheistic work among the population and in November – 'On terminating pilgrimage to so-called 'holy places'' were issued (Ro'I, 2000, p. 43). In 1962 a proposal to bring the practice of religious rites under criminal liability was approved and in 1964 the activity aimed at replacing religious rites with secular ones was started (Ibid., p. 47). Although initially his attitude toward religion was relatively moderate, "Khrushchev's building of communism could clearly not tolerate any compromise with religion as one of the most 'reactionary' and 'backward' holdovers from capitalism (Ibid, p. 41).

With Khrushchev's displacement in 1964, the anti-religious campaign assumed a less hostile character. Thus, when Brezhnev came to power, the Soviet leadership considerably loosened its firm hold on religious activity. It did not, however, mean that anti-religious propaganda was completely terminated. Under Brezhnev the leadership did not show any particular concern with religious issues, but propaganda continued in the form of regular party and government resolutions, that was a part of general ideological work. Little was done to change the nature of anti-religious propaganda. For example, the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution changed the nature of anti-religious propaganda only slightly, by replacing the phrase 'freedom of antireligious propaganda' with 'freedom of atheistic propaganda (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 35). Under Brezhnev the 'progressive' nature of Islam was emphasized and religion was praised as part of the anti-colonial ideology. Subsequently, compatibility of Islam with Marxism was further recognized (Ibid). The change in the religious policy also derived from the Communist Party's interpretation that Soviet society had evolved into a stage of 'mature socialism'. According to the concept of 'mature socialism', Soviet socialist society was no longer vulnerable to any form of anti-Communist ideology, including religion. To this end, it was recognized that Islam was totally integrated within the Soviet system and therefore, no longer posed a threat to the Communist regime (Yemelianova, 2002, p. 130).

After the Islamic revolution broke out in Iran in 1979, the relatively stable relations between the Soviet authorities and Islam were somewhat undermined. In response to the events in Iran, the Soviets decided to strengthen security and law-enforcement in Central Asian republics. This was mainly because of their proximity to Iran, which would supposedly destabilize the entire region by potential foreign ideological subversion. Therefore, security forces were stationed and KGB presence was substantially increased both within the republics and along the borders with Iran and Afghanistan. In addition to that, propaganda activity was resumed across Central Asia and a number of articles appeared in the press criticizing both Islam and ineffectiveness of atheistic education and propaganda (Haghayeghi, 1996, pp. 36-37).

At the same time, however, the revolutionary movement itself was characterized as anti-imperialist and it therefore was welcomed as progressive (Ibid, p. 35). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had further strained the relations between Soviet regime and the Islamic republics of the USSR. In spite of the fact that Spiritual Directorates officially supported Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, in practice the majority of Muslims responded negatively to it (Yemelianova, 2002, p.p. 131). The Soviet Afghan war on Central Asia rekindled Islamic sentiments among its populations. The Soviet authorities were quick to respond by tightening their control over religious activity and a number of resolutions were passed in 1981 and 1983 that called for reinvigoration of atheistic propaganda aimed at the Islamic community of the Soviet Union (Ibid, p. 132). In spite of the fact that Soviet atheistic propaganda was not reduced under Brezhnev, the regime tolerated widespread observance of many practices generally associated with Islam. During this time local party officials could be the members of the CPSU and at the same time participate in religious ceremonies. They could even support construction of local mosques and 'tea-houses' that served religious purposes (Fierman, 1991, p. 27). Moreover, the collaboration between official and unofficial Islam increased after Stalin and continued well into the Gorbachev era (Ro'I, 2000, p. 719).

This ambiguous and contradictory policy continued until the era of Gorbachev. In general, the Soviet official religious policy between 1917 and the 1980s has an ambiguous and contradictory nature. During this time Islam was, by turns, severely repressed, cautiously compromised, repressed again, and finally, reluctantly recognized. Yet much of the traditional Islamic culture of Central Asia managed to survive through unofficial activity, forced by the regime to go underground. This was 'popular' or 'parallel' Islam which was kept alive by unofficial practitioners. It remained a crucial component of culture and the basic way of life of many Central Asians.

4.2.4 The Fergana valley during Perestroika, 1985–1991

The era of perestroika, which began with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, directly affected the political and economic institutions of the country and, even more so, the thinking of the average Soviet citizen. Perestroika was preceded by such critically important developments as the USSR's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the brief rule of Yuri Andropov in 1983. All these events were to have an important impact on the Fergana valley. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shocked many people with the sudden realization that profound changes were already under way, if not in the USSR itself then in its immediate region. The Central Asian republics felt this most acutely, because Afghanistan was their immediate neighbor. It was at this time that religious networks were reactivated, especially in the Fergana valley. In fact, the process of re-Islamization was launched precisely at that time (Starr, 2011, p. 187). On certain levels the perestroika years were a political "golden age" for the Fergana valley. The first phase of the perestroika period (1985–88) saw the rise of Fergana valley regional political elites in all three countries. Conflicts in the Fergana valley were directly responsible for the fall of political leaders in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which once again demonstrates the significance of the Fergana valley in the political life of the countries that make up this region (Ibid, p. 178-179). The period of Gorbachev (1985-1991) which is directly associated with the period of democratic transformation of the Soviet society under the policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), aimed at restructuring the stagnant society left from Brezhnev period. The major target of Gorbachev's reforms was economy. Neither Central Asia nor Islam ranked high on his agenda at the beginning of his tenure. In fact, he was the only Soviet leader who did not have a well-defined antireligious agenda, similar to that of his predecessors (Haghayeghi, 1996, pp. 54 and 48).

From the outset he was mainly concerned with economic issues, putting the religious question aside. However, he did not abandon a general line of anti-religious policy, adopted by his predecessors. Gorbachev's first direct reference to religion came in 1986, when he repeated Brezhnev's view, which focused on indirect scientific propaganda rather than direct attacks on religion: *The Party will use all forms of ideological influence for the wider propagation of a scientific understanding of the world, for the overcoming of religious prejudices without permitting any violation of believers' feelings* (Ibid, p. 54).

As the social and economic crises intensified in the USSR during the 1970 and 1980s, the first efforts were mounted to address issues of corruption and false reporting in the cotton industry, especially in the Fergana valley (Starr, 2011, p. 181). A massive anti-corruption campaign was mounted across Central Asia in order to reestablish a tighter control. The so-called 'cotton scandal[11]' was the cause of increased concern of central powers in Central Asia (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 52).

11-'Cotton scandal' (began in 1983) was a criminal case brought against a number of high-ranking officials in Uzbekistan, who were involved in falsification of cotton production quotas through an elaborate system of bribe-taking and padding reports, that revealed embezzlement of large sums of money from the central budget. It is notable for involvement in it of such top-level persons as Uzbekistan's Communist Party first secretary Rashidov, Brezhnev's son-in-law Churbanov, as well as a number of other officials.

In the process of this investigation Islam was identified as a major cause of Central Asia's 'backwardness' and wide-spread corruption. When Gorbachev was in Tashkent in November 1986, he delivered a public speech in which he openly denounced the errors committed by local authorities and expressed concern over the religious situation in the region, urging for "uncompromising battle against all religious phenomena" (Ibid., p. 55). It was decided that in order to deal with corruption, the authorities should deal first of all with religion. Therefore, Gorbachev called for an urgent re-intensification of the antireligious campaign and more strict enforcement of religious legislation (Ibid).

Dissatisfied by the level of corruption in Central Asia, Gorbachev openly criticized Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and embarked on further tightening of control. He saw sources of corruption in region's culture and religion and thought that imported cadres could improve the situation. The first move in this direction was the replacement of Dinmuhammed Kunaev – the first secretary of Kazakh Communist Party and a native Kazakh – with a native Russian, Gennady Kolbin (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 5).

In Kazakhstan, the replacement of Kunaev led to the first sizeable outburst of ethnic violence in Central Asia in December 1986, when young Kazakhs staged a series of protests against the appointment of a non-Kazakh to the post (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 136).

When glasnost and reformist intentions were challenged by strong anti-reformist tendencies from below, he chose to include the religious matter into his agenda with change of policy towards religion. This change was motivated by Gorbachev's realization that reforms in the economic sphere would be hard to implement unless they were accompanied by reforms in the ideological structure (Ibid, p. 62) .

With perestroika and glasnost, Islam (and other religions) was given a freedom for the first time since it was curbed by Lenin's religious campaign of 1920s (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 60). The first signs of religious activism in Central Asia were seen in late 1980s. In 1988, in Uzbekistan (Central Asia's most religious republic), religious activists joined demonstrations staged in Tashkent by Uzbek students, who demanded the restoration of Uzbek language and culture (Critchlow 1991, p. 176).

One of the most striking outcomes of the Gorbachev period was the formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Initially, the party was conceived as a movement that would embrace all the Muslims of the Soviet Union (Hunter, 2001). Another event that was associated with the increase of Muslim activism at this period of time was the conflict in Fergana valley between Meshketian Turkic minority and local Uzbeks. In June 1989 a conflict flared up between the two groups, resulting in mass violence and massacres that led to death of more than a 100 people. The Meshketians[12] became an object of local hatred of Uzbeks, who killed them and destroyed many of their homes and much of their property (Critchlow, 1991, p. 178).

12- The Meshketian Turks were among the peoples, who had been deported from their homelands in the Caucasus during World War II by Stalin on the grounds of alleged disloyalty.

An estimated 14, 500 Meshketian Turks were expelled from the Fergana valley (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 193). Although both attackers and the victims were Muslims, it was believed that it was caused largely by religious motives (Critchlow, 1991, p. p. 178). The rise of Islamic activism in Central Asia sent alarming signals to European parts of the USSR. In media there appeared articles which expressed fears of further ethnic unrest and distrust of Islam. Concerns were raised that the Muslim border regions were vulnerable in terms of foreign religious threat. Especially in the aftermath of Iranian revolution there were increased fears of Islamic fundamentalism (Ibid., p. 179). Gorbachev's period was crucial in transforming almost every aspect of Soviet citizen's life, including religion. Perestroika offered religious freedom to Central Asian republics among other things. With Gorbachev's changed policy on religion there was an impetus for enhancing the role of Islam in society in late 1980s. Islam was welcomed and promoted as a guardian of social mores of Central Asian society. By the end of Soviet era there was a widespread consensus, that Islam's role in society should be greater, but there was not any concept as to how Islamic norms should be understood and observed in on-going conditions. As such, for the overwhelming majority of the population, Islam was still primarily interpreted in terms of tradition, culture or symbol (Akiner, 2003, p. 99).

4.2.4.1 Territorial and water dispute during the Perestroika era

During the curfew on the eve of the Tajik civil war, the first secretary of the communist party of Tajikistan, Mahkamov, held a press conference on a conflict involving three Tajik villages of the Isfara district of the Tajik Republic and some Kyrgyz villages in the Batken district of Kyrgyzia. The conflict, in which several people died and dozens were hospitalized with gunshot wounds, erupted over access to land and water. It started when a collective farm board in the Isfara district responded to a request from the Kyrgyz side of the border by transferring 144 hectares of land to a kolkhoz in the Batken district. Meanwhile a village on the Tajik side had asked for 100 hectares adjacent to its lands, but on the Kyrgyz side. All this should have been simply resolved, as the border never had been clearly defined during the entire Soviet period. When no solution appeared, the Tajik village shut off water flowing in the Matchoi irrigation canal across the border to Kyrgyzstan (Starr, 2011, p. 193).

The press conference noted that back in 1958 an agreement had been reached on the border, which the Kyrgyz government ratified but not the Tajik Supreme Soviet. Because of this, the 1958 delineation was now considered illegitimate (Leninabadskaia Pravda, July 19, 1989). Once the curfew was lifted, the Tajiks cleaned the Matchoi canal and resumed the delivery of water to the Lenin state farm on the Batken side of the border. Meanwhile, the leaders of the two republics set up a commission to find a permanent solution to the problem and to assure easy crossing of borders in disputed areas (Leninabadskaia Pravda, July 20, 1989). The Tajiks concluded that the only legitimate map dated not to 1958 but to 1927, and that this left 24,000 hectares of pastureland that now had to be divided between the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides. The two presidents were to have settled this in a meeting in May 1991, but the Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev failed to appear, leaving the issue still unresolved (Leninabadskaia Pravda, May 22, 1991).

4.2.4.2 The "Osh events": Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict

In May 1990, the economic collapse in Kyrgyzstan reached its nadir, and general political uncertainty prevailed at both the local and national levels. The waning of the Soviet supra-national ideology left people scrambling to protect their rights by affirming their national identities. With neither the imperial center nor national elites able to protect their rights, citizens turned to spontaneous protests to defend themselves. In June 1990, inter-ethnic strife between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks exploded in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province. The sources of this strife were not dissimilar to those we have explored in the case of the "Fergana events" between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in June 1989, and in the case of the confrontation between Tajiks from Isfara and Kyrgyz from Batken in July of that year. In Kyrgyzstan's sector of the Fergana valley, many impoverished rural Kyrgyz youths lacked farming skills and, discontented, migrated to the cities in search of jobs and housing. Unable to afford apartments in Osh, they squatted on municipal land on its outskirts, area being used mainly by Uzbek cotton farmers (Starr, 2011, p. 194). Meanwhile, within Osh city an informal Uzbek cultural association, Adolat (Justice), began calling for the protection of the Uzbek language and Uzbek traditions. Concurrently, the Kyrgyz formed their own national association, Osh Aimagy (Residents of Osh), to defend the national interests of the Kyrgyz living in the Fergana valley its program called for the granting of land to Kyrgyz to construct houses, and also for the protection of human rights. Adolat leaders leaned toward ethnic separatism, while their counterparts from Osh Aimagy proved unable to engage in dialogue and compromise In May 1990, Uzbeks from the Fergana valley city of Jalalabad appealed to the waning Soviet leadership in Moscow to grant autonomy to Uzbeks throughout the south of Kyrgyzstan[13].

They argued that the indigenous population of Osh province was in fact Uzbek, and that the 560,000 Uzbeks there constituted half the population of Osh province. Given this, it was unacceptable to them that Kyrgyz had been declared the official language of the new Kyrgyz Republic and Russian the language of inter-ethnic communication, with no place for Uzbek. All the records of Osh now had to be translated into Kyrgyz. Many Uzbek secondary-school graduates chose to pursue their university studies outside the Kyrgyz Republic. This gradually shifted the ethnic balance in the Osh region in favor of the Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz were favored in every sphere, leaving the Uzbeks feeling themselves to be an alien ethnic group within Kyrgyzia (Starr, 2011, p. 195).

13- (www.nlobooks.ru/rus/magazines/nlo/196/328/378/)

Their petition concluded with a plea to create an "Osh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the framework of the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic (Razakov, 1993, pp. 104–80). This statement was issued on March 2, 1990, and by May the situation was slipping out of the government's control. After a series of mass protests by Kyrgyz organized by Osh Aimagy on May 27 in the "Lenin" kolkhoz, a rally of 5,000 people took place near Osh. Following long discussions, it was decided to allocate the collective farm's cotton land for housing construction. The Uzbeks who farmed those lands were furious, and retaliated with a large rally of their own. This ended with the issuance of many new demands, including the designation of Uzbek as a state language in the Republic[14]. On June 4 more than 12,000 Uzbeks assembled at one end of a field at the Lenin kolkhoz, with 1,500 Kyrgyz on the opposite end. Most of those killed in the ensuing battle were Kyrgyz, but on the following days the situation was reversed. In all, some 600 people were killed, the majority of them Uzbeks, with unofficial estimates of the total as high as 1,500. Thousands of Uzbeks from the Uzbek sector of the valley were marching toward Osh when a strict curfew sent them home. Only the involvement of the army and the pleadings of religious and traditional leaders prevented the outburst from spreading across the entire Fergana valley (Starr, 2011, p. 195).

In summery, in the Soviet period, the factors such as Stalin's extensive and consistent de-Islamization policies, unsuitable economic conditions, the exploitative exploitation policy of natural resources especially cotton, Western civilization waves for example Modernization Values, Bolsheviks' policy of redrawing or delineation the borders along ethnic or national lines and administrative delineation, Stalin's policy of transforming Muslim nations into modern states to separate Muslims in Central Asia from each other and creating distinct ethnic identities, starvation, severe suppression of Muslims During the Bolshevik regime and confronting Islamic beliefs and symbols in Central Asia (process of secularization),implementation of political-economic reforms during the Gorbachev period under the title Glasnost and Prostorica and subsequently highlighting of Islam's role in society and formation of identity, ethnic diversity, poverty and unemployment, unresolved territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts, provided the contexts for the emergence of fundamentalism and the activities of the Islamic reformist movements and actually the re-Islamization.

14- (www.nlobooks.ru/rus/magazines/nlo/196/328/378)

4.3 Post-Soviet period: the Fergana valley after 1991:

4.3.1 The issue of identity

The unexpected breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 fragmented the Fergana valley territorially, with Uzbekistan holding about 60 percent of it, Tajikistan 25 percent, and Kyrgyzstan 15 percent. The unfortunate conflicts that occurred during the first post-independence decades arose in part because the Soviet borders left the new states with both enclaves and "exclaves," where the territory of one state is surrounded by another state and does not have a shared border with its own state. Another source of conflict is the difficulty of fixing cultural borders in the Fergana valley, especially between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ethnic indicators there are ambiguous, with many people speaking both Turkic and Tajik-Persian languages. This reality impedes the prospect of building nation-states whose territorial borders coincide with cultural boundaries. It also underscores the fact that all the region's social-political processes inevitably are linked to identity (Starr, 2011, p. 278- 279). Caught in a new crisis of identity, the political and cultural elites of all three countries scour the cultural heritages of their peoples in search of workable models for the present. This process has distinct features in the three countries, reflecting the differing process of state-building in each (Metz, 1973, p. 473). Valuable insights on cultural process in the post-Soviet Fergana valley can be gleaned from a study of the causes of conflicts that have occurred there. During the Soviet period most conflicts were inter-ethnic and prompted by such practical issues as water and territory. In the post-Soviet era most conflicts had become ideological, mainly concerning religion (Starr, 2011, p. 280).

4.3.2 Fergana valley: Between national identity and Islamic alternative

After 1991, the independence of the three countries and the establishment of borders and customs posts increased the mutual isolation of the three zones of the Fergana valley. This is particularly true in the western sector of the valley—between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Further east, relationships between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek parts of the valley also became less intense, but not to the same extent as in the west. With respect to religion, the new state divisions and borders clearly aggravated the situation by not allowing the populace to address and solve the various challenges they face together (Starr, 2011, p. 298-297).

The emergence of Islam as a significant factor in the political life of Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was in no sense a surprise, even where religion had declined to the status of a cultural artifact. Meanwhile, the opening of the external borders and the nominal return of Central Asia to the lap of Islamic civilization led to increased public interest in Islam and to its politicization. At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR Central Asian countries benefited from major investments made by the Muslim world, mainly from the Gulf States. However, the response came not from Muslim governments but from religious-political parties, most of which were committed to radical Islamist ideologies. Initially the new authorities in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere endeavored to show their commitment to Islamic tradition as a part of national culture. Later they came to treat the Islamic resurgence with more caution, seeking to submit Muslim organizations and movements to state control. Even though these measures were by no means successful, the question remains as to what extent re-Islamization can actually be achieved (Ibid, p. 339-340).

Today, a process of re-Islamization is taking place in all the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, and particularly in northern Tajikistan, most of which belongs geographically to the Fergana valley. Governments of the region have preferred to speak of this in more politically correct terms as a revival of Islamic values and the Islamic heritage. After the liberalization of religious life that started in the mid-1990s, religion began to emerge from under the onslaught of Soviet official atheism. It turned out that Islam not only had not lost its place in the worldview of the Tajik people, but was reviving with a new vigor that enabled it to encompass all areas of life, including the political. Divided among three countries, it is no surprise that the Fergana valley recently should have become the object of influence and pressures from beyond its borders. These arise from the intense competition for influence in the region, and result in efforts by outside groups to impose by various means their own religious, political, and ideological agendas. Inevitably, this has led to mounting tensions. Local conditions also contribute significantly to the increase in tensions. Specifically, prevalent social and economic hardships, ethnic diversity, and unresolved territorial disputes all give rise to destructive passions. The fact that there exists a high level of religious consciousness among the general population also becomes to some degree a factor of alienation and even conflict; individuals and communities seeking solutions to their problems are readily subjected to the ideological influence of radical and extremist religious and political groups. The goal of such extremist groups is to replace the public's traditional notions of Islam with radical approaches that call for the overthrow of secular governments and the establishment of a modern version of a theocratic state. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Renaissance became an influential political movement, the IRPT (Starr, 2011, pp. 351- 353).

Yet neither the majority of the Tajik population nor all Muslim leaders support the formation of religious parties, believing that this politicizes religion and therefore harms it, and will lead to internal conflicts. This negative attitude only increased during the Tajik civil war of the 1990s, when the population divided into two camps comprised of believers and non-believers (Vechernii, September 24–30, 2007). New Islamic forces in opposition to the government are particularly active in the Fergana valley. They have few links, if any, to the IRPT. One of these newly imported movements is Salafism[15] (Starr, 2011, p. 355). Another Islamist political party imported into Tajikistan is the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, better known in the local form of the name, Hizb ut-Tahrir. The first units of the party appeared in Andijan, Tashkent, and Fergana city in the 1990s, and in a short time it significantly expanded its influence within Uzbekistan and then across the region (Ibid,p. 356). Yet another active extremist organization in the Tajik part of the Fergana valley is Bayat (the *oath*). The main goal of supporters of this group in the Sughd region is to resist the incursions into the area of all non-traditional religions and sects (Daydzhest-press, 13 November, 1997). According to a source at the office of the ministry of security, the Bayat organization has close ties with, and is financed by, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan/Turkistan (Starr, 2011, 359). Islamic Movement of of Uzbekistan (IMU) also was the biggest threat to the Uzbek government. IMU activities in Tajikistan continued in 2006.

The appearance of Islamic extremist movements and parties in Tajikistan has forced society there to reflect on the preservation of national unity and stability in the country once again (Bukhari-zade, December 23, 2008) This suggests that religion, in its traditionally balanced form, far from representing a threat to national integrity, can be a force for consolidating society and protecting national and state interests (Starr, 2011, p. 360)

4.3.3 Fergana valley: Stimulating forces

After the emergence and expansion of political Islam waves following the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Central Asia, though was governed by communism, but witnessed the oututbreak of developments in influencing this flow. The end of the bipolar system and the Cold War provided more favorable context these conditions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the communist modernization programs improved the conditions for fundamentalist activity. The surviving leaders of the communist era, who, in the light of new developments, sought to preserve their authority in the name of the leaders of national found political Islam as their most important competitor. Following the long-term, but failed, efforts of Soviet leaders to separate the people of Central Asia from their Islamic identity it soon became clear that Islam still constitutes part of the region's identity (Olcott, 1992, pp. 74-04).

15- Salafiya, from the Arabic salafi (be original), is a fundamentalist religious-ethical line within Sunnism, created in the fourteenth century and based on the works of Ibn Taymiyyah. It hailed the era of the Medina communities (622–630) as the "golden age" of Islam. The most prominent Salafi preacher is Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Currently, Saudi Arabia is considered the center of Salafism

American and Russian concerns about the development of Iran's spiritual influence in the region led to magnifying the danger and "Islamic threat" in the region. The presence of millions of Sunnis in Central Asia and a small number of Shiite Muslims has been well presenting the real force of the "Islamic threat" from the Islamic Republic of Iran after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Packer, 1377, p. 38). The Tajik civil war which was often attributed to the activities of Islamic political parties and caused the people of region to fear the Islamic republic of Iran and repeating this bitter and bloody experience in other republics was exploited by the surviving leaders of the communist era. In the constitutions adopted by all the republics of the region, was emphasized the secular identity of the new political systems (Kolaei, Spring 2005, p. 215). This point should not be neglected, for the leaders of the new independent states in Central Asia; Islam played a significant role in strengthening their identities. (Packer, 1998, pp. 88-68).

The Importance of political Islam and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism relates to various estimates of the role and influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Central Asia in the post-collapse conditions of the communist development model in the region. For the Muslims of Central Asia, following this great development, two development models were introduced: non-religious development model and religious development model, the first model, Turkey and the second model, the Islamic republic of Iran were evaluated. In a situation where Moscow's leaders sought to isolate the concept of security in Central Asia from their internal security considerations, the United States also strongly opposed the expansion of the Islamic Republic of Iran's influence in the region. The Turkish government was estimated appropriate tool to pursue the objective of confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran and the spread of political Islam as well as promotion of non-religious development pattern. This evaluation was fully consistent with Turkey's objectives and plans for expanding its influence in Central Asia (Kolaei, 1997, pp. 64-162). It is noteworthy that the enormous cost of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is also very effective and penetrating evaluated to strengthening Islamic desires in Central Asia. From the early years of the independence of these republics, the Saudi government has spent a lot of resources on promoting its desirable religious thoughts. Given the acute economic problems, the financial assistance of this country to the republics of the region could have a lot of attraction. Anyway, unlike Turkey, which tried to use ethnic and linguistic leverage to influence the region, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries used oil dollars to reinforce their confirmed Islamic Beliefs (Patricia arlej, in: Rubenstein, 1995, pp. 196-97). In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran also estimated the development of Islamic orientations in the region as desirable. Iran's influence in Tajikistan and Tehran's support for opponents of the Dushanbe government, along with the effective support of the Rabbani government in Afghanistan, affected the trend of internal developments of this republic (Odom and Dujarvic, 1995, pp. 99-195). The presence of the red army in Afghanistan and the all-out support of the Soviet Union from its dependent government in Kabul, in the framework of the Cold War stereotypes, pushed the United States to support Islamist forces. In this regard religious schools in Pakistan have been considered with the widespread support of the Saudi Arabi and and Arab Gulf States (Kolaie, 1997, pp. 102-103).

Pakistani political forces also expanded their activities in these schools. Since September 1996 the Taliban (Pakistani religious school graduates and scholastics), with the assistance of the Pakistan Army intelligence agency (ISI) and the full support of the United States, expanded their efforts to dominate Afghanistan. The US government clarified its support In the stabilization of Taliban's power. The Taliban expanded its activities and embarked on widespread military action, promising to establish security in Afghanistan, which was an essential prerequisite for Pakistan's access to Central Asia (Mojdeh, 2003, pp. 3-32). For the US government, the stabilization of the military-political situation in Afghanistan to realization the Afghan-Pakistani transit route in order to deprive Iran of its natural interest was important to lead to its support for the Taliban's deployment (Mojdeh, 2005, pp. 47-146).

The Taliban's fundamentalist victory in Afghanistan has had a direct impact on the security and political developments in Central Asia. Central Asian fundamentalists gained more energy with the victory of their counterparts in Afghanistan. The economic difficulties, social anomalies and political corruption ruling the republics were provided the context for the activities of these serious political rivals of the elite of the region (Kolaie, 2002, p. 101).

The stabilization of the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan provided good conditions for the creation of training units for the Islamic militia in Central Asia, in particular the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Potential Uzbekistan has a significant capacity for expanding Islamic fundamentalist tendencies, which various evidences appeared about in the Fergana area in the cities of Andijan and Namangan (Cornell and Spector, 2000, p.891).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning and massive subsidies of Moscow accompanied by threatening dimensions. The inability of new independent states to manage regional crises intensified the worry of spreading religious feelings. Several attempts to undermine the traditional construction of power in the region seriously threatened the leaders of the Central Asian republics (kolaei, 2005, p. 218). The civil war in Tajikistan caused the elite ruling Central Asia to point to it, to block the process of political developments in the region and prevent the spread of democratic freedoms (Kolaei, 1997, pp. 261-46). The Uzbek leadership, who was deeply concerned about the spread of fundamentalism in the country, played an effective role in the fight against Dushanbe's administration opposition. In turn, these efforts have added to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalist tendencies.The experience of the Tajik civil war paved the way for the political elites to confront the development of the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. In all the republics of the region, non-religious constitutions have been passed which has banned the political activity of religious forces and Islamists (Abdul Karim, 2000, p. 106). Central Asian fundamentalist forces have been accused of interfering in smuggling affairs and Transportation of drugs to meet their financial needs. Given the inequalities and dire economic situation of the republics in the Fergana valley, there was activity in the narcotics trade to meet the financial needs of from people.

After the declaration of the war on terror by US President George W. Bush, (Gretsky, 1995, pp.31-61), the space has become more desirable to exacerbate the suppression of Islamists in Central Asia by ruling elites. Leaders from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which the Fergana valley is located in their countries, arrested hundreds of Muslim activists. According to some estimates, about 10% of the people have been fans of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Around this advocacy they have sought to meet their diverse needs in protest to the various political-economic difficulties. The lack of secular political forces has increased the capacity of these efforts (Kolaei, 2005, p. 220).

Rapid population growth and difficult economic conditions, political corruption, drug trafficking, inequalities and huge economic problems simultaneously contributed to the expansion of fundamentalism in Central Asia along the development of religious awareness. The relationship between the fundamentalists of the region and the Taliban in Afghanistan has strengthened this trend. Lack of legal framework for political struggles has also contributed to strengthening these trends. Although religious thoughts have been suppressed in Central Asia as in other parts of the Soviet Union for decades, but the depth and influence of religious beliefs has led to its continuity and sustainability (Ibid, p. 221).

In summery, the post-Soviet Period, the factors such as the role of external actors like Taliban rule over Afghanistan and etc, in strengthening and supporting Islamic tendencies, economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning, social anomalies and ruling political corruption in Central Asian republics, drug trade, inequalities, , the prominent role of Islam in determining part of the identity of the region, the development of religious self-awareness, the lack of legal frameworks for political campaigns, the inability of new independent governments to manage crisis of region, the civil war in Tajikistan and the hard-liner positions of the leaders of the region specially Uzbekistan's leadership towards the development of Islamic political activities and democratic freedoms, also contributed to the emergence and promotion of Islamic fundamentalism.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, it was discovered that Fergana valley, according to its history and background, is a suitable context for the emergence of intra-ethnic and intra-border conflicts. A context or, in other words, a process that evolved during the tsarist Russia, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods and provided the conditions for the emergence of the fundamentalist phenomenon in religious clothing. In these three periods, factors were investigated, which were contextualizer emergence of fundamentalism. In fact, these factors and contexts generally, were analyzed in the framework of the theory of the clash of civilizations.

In Tsarist Russia period, these contextualizer factors such as tsarist colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions, suppression peoples, destruction of Islamic beliefs, increasing taxes, Russia large-scale colonial exploitation of oil and coal resources especially cotton, famine and starvation, which were actually the contexts for anti-Russian protests and anti-colonial rebellions in Turkistan (Central Asia) specially Fergana valley and eventually religious revival. In this period, on the one hand, we are witnessing the internal critical conditions as a result of changes imposed from outside in the region, and the waves of Western civilization, such as colonialism, undermine the region's traditional patterns of life, industrialization and modernity on the other hand.

In soviet period, the contextualizer factors included cases such as Stalin's extensive and consistent de-Islamization policies, unsuitable economic conditions, the exploitative exploitation policy of natural resources especially cotton, Western civilization waves for example Modernization Values, The Bolsheviks' policy of redrawing or delineation the borders along ethnic or national lines and administrative delineation, Stalin's policy of transforming Muslim nations into modern states to separate Muslims in Central Asia from each other and creating distinct ethnic identities, starvation, severe suppression of Muslims During the Bolshevik regime and confronting Islamic beliefs and symbols in Central Asia (process of secularization), implementation of political-economic reforms during the Gorbachev period under the title Glasnost and Prostorica and subsequently highlighting of Islam's role in society and formation of identit, ethnic diversity, poverty and unemployment, unresolved territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts, which provided the contexts for the emergence of fundamentalism and the activities of the Islamic reformist movements and actually the re-Islamization.

In this period, the waves of Western civilization such as colonialism, modernism, secularism and confronting Islamic beliefs, is also evident. Among the colonoal policies in period, were delineation of borders in order to political and military control over the Fergana valley and also imposition of new systems of governance and control by Bolsheviks in order to strengthening position, and as well as, policy of centralization by Stalin. In fact, Russian colonization brought ideas of modernization to the Fergana valley by the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, in this period we are witnessing confronting Islam religion was an obstacle to modernization and social development. The indigenization policy as born of cultural modernization was to develop competent "national cadres" loyal to the Soviet government which in turn, strenghtened cultural resurgence especially revival of Islam and "re-Islamization. The period of Gorbachev (1985-1991) which is directly associated with the period of democratic transformation of the Soviet society under the policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), enhanced the role of Islam in society and identification. With perestroika and glasnost, Islam (and other religions) was given a freedom for the first time since it was curbed by Lenin's religious campaign of 1920s. In fact, in these two periods 'fundamentalist' movements form in reaction to, and in defense against, the processes and consequences of West civilization wages. Nevertheless, internal critical conditions such as repression, poverty and unemployment and so on also contributed in intensification and emergence of Islamic fundamentalism.

Eventually, in post-soviet period, the contextualizer factors included cases such as the role of external actors such as Taliban rule over Aghanistan and etc, in strengthening and supporting Islamic tendencies, and internal factors, such as economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning, social anomalies and ruling political corruption in Central Asian republics, drug trade, inequalities, , the prominent role of Islam in determining part of the identity of the region, the development of religious self-awareness, the lack of legal frameworks for political campaigns, the inability of new independent governments to manage crisis of region, the civil war in Tajikistan and the hard-line positions of the leaders of the region specially Uzbekistan's leadership towards the development of Islamic political activities and democratic freedoms which also contributed to the emergence and promotion of Islamic fundamentalism.

In this period, religious fundamentalism is merely not long a reaction to the waves of Western civilization, but mainly internal situation were effective in formation and evolving this phenomenon. In this period, the Islamic religion assumed significant role identification despite the many years of repression in previous periods. After the liberalization of religious life that started in the mid-1990s, religion began to emerge from under the onslaught of Soviet official atheism. Following the long-term, but failed, efforts of Soviet leaders to separate the people of Central Asia from their Islamic identity it soon became clear that Islam still constitutes part of the region's identity. In this period, we are witnessin ruling political corruption in Central Asian republics, the lack of legal frameworks for political campaigns, the inability of new independent governments to manage crisis of region, and the hard-line positions of the leaders of the region specially Uzbekistan's leadership towards the development of Islamic political activities and democratic freedoms despite existence of economic difficulties and difficult social situation. The fact that there exists a high level of religious consciousness among the general population also becomes to some degree a factor of alienation and even conflict; individuals and communities seeking solutions to their problems are readily subjected to the ideological influence of radical and extremist religious and political groups.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the communist modernization programs improved the conditions for fundamentalist activity. Divided among three countries, it is no surprise that the Fergana valley recently should have become the object of influence and pressures from beyond its borders. These arise from the intense competition for influence in the region, and result in efforts by outside groups to impose by various means their own religious, political, and ideological agendas. Inevitably, this has led to mounting tensions. However, local conditions also contribute significantly to the increase in tensions. The external stimulating forces included Iran's spiritual influence in the region, Turkey's influence as a desired model of west to containment of Iran, Saudi Arabia's influence to strengthening Islamic desires in Central Asia, Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the competition between the two American and Russian superpowers, Pakistan's role in strengthening political forces such as the Taliban, all of these cases contribuded in the strengthening and evolution of Islamic fundamentalism.

In addition, the civil war in Tajikistan also caused the elite ruling Central Asia to point to it, to block the process of political developments in the region and prevent the spread of democratic freedoms. In fact, despite the difficult economic conditions, civil society was deprived from a outlet for political expression. The experience of the Tajik civil war paved the way for the political elites to confront the development of the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. In all the republics of the region, non-religious constitutions have been passed which has banned the political activity of religious forces and Islamists. September events led Central Asian leaders to become more determined than suppress fundamentalist currents and the space has become more desirable to exacerbate the suppression.

In general, it can be said that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley. The research achievement in this chapter is that, the theory of the clash of civilizations can be applied to the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods but it does not have the this applicability for post-soviet period, and modernity and theories related to fundamentalism appear to better explain the confrontations and contexts of Islamic fundamentalism indeed, in this period

Chapter IV

Understanding the propagation of radical Islam in Fergana valley and Traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism

Introduction:

The history of the development of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is a gradual process and phenomenon. Despite the variety of historical and cultural legacy in Central Asian countries, all these countries are subject to the process of "re-Islamisation." The use of popular terms such as "Islamic renaissance", "re-Islamization", "revivalism", "secondary Islamisation", and the spread of the term "fundamentalism" has been a matter of debate among researchers. Animated discussions also persist as to whether the revival of Islam in Central Asia was a result of the independent spiritual, social and political development of the region, or a phenomenon imposed from outside. In fact, radical Islam in Central Asia has its own specific characteristics, but in order to understand its distinctiveness it should be analyzed by looking at both external and internal factors. The issue of Islamic revival in general and of Islamic fundamentalism in particular have been increasingly emphasized and singled out from among a range of problems, faced by Central Asia in the transition period.

To understand the nature of the radical Islam in Fergana valley we first need to study the role and place of Islam in the social, political and spiritual life of societies in the region. First of all, and despite the severe atheistic pressure, Islam and Islamic thought gained weight in Central Asia during the Soviet period. The tradition and succession were never discontinued. Islam existed as a way of life and as an identification of the indigenous population of Central Asia.

In fact, a fresh awakening of Islam came in the early 1980s as the communist ideology suffered an obvious crisis in Uzbekistan, especially in Fergana. The safest and most natural form, under the Soviet regime, was the revival of Islamic rites on an everyday basis. Naturally the local authorities and communists saw this as a threat to the state 'mono-ideology'. Interest in religion soared throughout the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev years. Glasnost led to a quest for moral and spiritual values that were now seen to have been corroded by Communism. In addition, disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 with it's the atheistic style of ruling resulted increased number of believers to Islam. The soviet experience with Islam was sufficient to produce the preconditions necessary for an Islamic revival in Central Asia. Islamic fundamentalism has a close relationship with radical Islam and its organizations. Radical Islamic movement had developed by the early 1990s, because there were ideological needs of people in response to the extensive social problems and the spiritual needs of people. Radical Islamic ideology and its organizations were well accepted and politically active in the Fergana valley, because they had more supporters among the young people.

It is worth mentioning that, the revival of Islam or Islamization in Central Asia normally refers to 'the recovery of Islamic communities' in these new states, which refers to going back to their old religious practices and traditions, which were practiced before the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917. The return to old practices and beliefs may entail a certain level of conservative attitudes towards modernity, but this should not be considered as Islamic extremism but rather it is *traditionalism*, especially in the case of Islamic culture and its revival in Central Asia.

The underlying reality of Islam, as of any religion, is tradition, while that of modern Western civilization is modernism and secularism. Modernism in the Islamic world emerged from the direct influence of these foundational ideas of the modern West, often wed to the political and military power of colonialism. Fundamentalism or literalist reformism implies a rejection of traditional Islamic scholarship and especially its intellectual and spiritual traditions. The groups denoted by the term often have a puritanical emphasis and an agenda for Islamic revival on a social and political level but with little interest in the spiritual and intellectual aspects of Islam. Islam's traditional understanding of itself as a message of salvation, stands in stark contrast to an anthropocentric, rationalistic, and materialistic framework which relegates the sacred to the private sphere—the very framework that determines much of modern Western civilization. Indeed, traditional values are placed against modern values. Traditional Muslims have responded to the same challenges from modern thought that resulted in the emergence of the modernist and fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world. Western military adventures and the promotion of secular values will only fan more fundamentalisms in the Muslim world.

The research objective in this chapter will be to examine the causes of propagation of radical Islam in Fergana valley, as well as, traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism. In other words, objective is to understand Islamic radicalization in the valley, and the reaction of traditional Islam to the waves of Western civilization, especially modernity. Before turning to examine the causes of propagation of radical Islam in Fergana, a brief excursion into the roots and causes of Islamic radicalism is necessary.

1. Understanding the propagation of radical Islam in Fergana valley

1.1 The roots and causes of Islamic radicalism

Existing literature on the topic can be divided into a number of categories__ economic, political, ideological, behavioral, instrumental, security, and agency-based__ each of which has roots in long-standing theoretical approaches in the social sciences (Naumkin, 2003, p.5).

Economic approaches stress the importance of socio-economic conditions as the cause of Islamic militancy. The general assumption is that poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, and other grievances give birth to extremism. These economic explanations can be further subdivided into static and dynamic models. The static approach, which emphasizes conditions at a particular moment, is unconvincing for a number of reasons. First, it cannot explain why radicalism is on the rise and is able to mobilize supporters in some countries but not others where economic conditions are equally dire. Second, it cannot explain why extremism, including Islamic radicalism, appears in societies that are relatively developed socio-economically. Moreover, statistical analyses confirm that a low standard of living has no direct or significant effect on the rise of Islamic extremism. Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the wealthiest countries in the Middle East, but the Saudis are nevertheless among the strongest supporters of Islamic radicalism. On the end of the spectrum, Mauritania is one of the poorest Muslim countries on earth, but it does not appear to be prone to religious extremism (Ibid).

In an effort to address these shortcomings, some scholars have offered a more convincing approach based on economic factors. The emphasis here is on relative economic deprivation. A significant decline in living standards, it is argued, often engenders extremism. While this economic explanation seems more appealing, it does not seem to explain the rise of Islamic militancy over the past several decades. For example, Uzbekistan has become a hotbed for the most ferocious Islamic movements in Central Asia despite the fact that its decline in living standards has been less than that of other Central Asian countries in the post-Soviet period. An alternative hypothesis stresses not economic but *political* deprivation. Frustration and discontent arise from a lack of participation, oppressive regimes, widespread corruption, and the pressure of patronage networks. However, this approach is also not convincing because there are many authoritarian regimes that do not ignite Islamic militancy, as in Turkmenistan. (Ibid, p. 6).

The *ideological* explanation, which has become particularly popular in the West after September 11, argues that Islam as a religion, or more precisely some schools of thought within Islam that are usually called fundamentalist, contain ideas that profess intolerance and hatred of non-Muslims as well as of Muslims who supposedly violate authentic Islams norms. Also termed Salafism (from the Arabic word salaf, which means ancestors), the ideology is inspired by the legacy of the first Islamic state founded by the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate heirs. Violence, it is held, is necessary to return the Islamic world to this idealized era. In particular, the Salafi concept of takfir, which represents the core of the Salafist program, legitimizes violence against self-identified Muslims (including some heads of Muslim states) who are supposedly violating the norms of authentic Islam and are therefore infidels (kafirs or kufr) (Muflikhunov, 2003, p. 123).

Some scholars, however, do not view Salafism as responsible for militancy. John Esposito, for example, has argued: Islamic modernists and movements like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Pakistans Jamaat-i-Islami worked to combine religious reform and political mobilization (Esposito, 2002, p. 49).

While it may be fruitless to try to convince people who are determined to take the lives of their enemies and die in the process that their commitment is not justified by Islamic teachings, it is true that there is nothing in Islam that justifies suicide attacks in the name of God. As Bernard Lewis has noted, suicide attacks are prohibited by a number of passages from the traditions of the Prophet, such as Whoever kills himself in any way will be tormented in that way in Hell and Whoever kills himself in any way in this world will be tormented with it on the day of the resurrection (Lewis, 2003, pp. 153154). The key elements here are the motivations underlying suicide attacks and the driving force that justifies them in the minds of those who carry them out.

Behavioral and *psychological* explanations attempt to explain these motivations. Behavioral explanations view Islamic extremism as a specific type of behavior based on exclusion and intolerance of outsiders. However, as Ernest Gellner has observed in reference to similar claims about ethnic violence, such motivations are common to all human groups, and cannot serve to define either tribe or nation (Gellner, 1983, p. 99).

Nor are the motivations unique to confessional groups. Boundaries drawn by the Salafis between us (true Muslims) and them (bad Muslims, or infidels) are clearly of a psychological nature, but this observation is unable to explain when, why, or how those boundaries are drawn (Naumkin, 2003, p.8).

Psychological explanations hold that people behave emotionally rather than rationally. Emotions, for example, are said to have overwhelmed the rational concerns of the Afghans when they welcomed the obscurantist Taliban after they seized power in Afghanistan. The Afghan people supposedly saw the Taliban as pious Muslims and sincere defenders of public order and social justice, in contrast to the corrupt mujahedeen who came to power in Kabul after the collapse of the pro-Soviet government. Nevertheless, behavioral approaches usually overestimate the autonomy of motives, emotions, and impulses, and they underestimate the structural causes of puritanical and violent streams in Islam. They also fail to interpret militancy and extremism in the obvious absence of autonomous impulses in many cases, which is why an adequate understanding of violence is required (Ibid, p. 8).

Functionalist approaches explanations view Islam as a tool for pursuing political goals. A parallel can be drawn here between interpretations of religious and ethnic violence. As Randall Galvert has argued: Under the right conditions, ethnic violence can be perpetrated through the efforts of political leaders striving cynically to gain or hold office. And under the right conditions, ethnic conflict can be suppressed or eliminated by the action of politicians seeking to maintain democracy, peace, and economic development (Galvert, 2002, p. 59).

A special line of argument in this category stresses the linkage between religion and ethnicity. Islamic radicalism, it is asserted, is merely an expression of ethnic strife. In the view of Gellner and others, nationalism emerged as a reaction to industrialization and the uprooting of people from their local communities because kinship and religion were no longer capable of organizing people (Gellner, op. cit).

Security explanations emphasize the feeling of vulnerability and insecurity that generates social resentment in Islamic societies that are faced with technological and cultural penetration by secular and transnational Western civilization, Westernization, and modernization. The demonstration effect due to the growth of the mass media intensifies feelings of insecurity and inferiority. The clash of civilizations thesis (a formulation coined by Samuel Huntington is a variety of this approach[16] (Naumkin, 2003, p. 10).

Rejection of Western culture, or at least some of its components, is common to many Islamic societies, and the desire to protect the authenticity of Islamic culture, order, and way of life may be conducive to extremist thinking and behavior. But some scholars, notably Olivier Roy, have noted that many members of extremist Islamic groups and terrorist networks are well integrated into Western societies, received their education at Western universities, and were re-Islamized in the West. This observation undermines security-oriented explanations. However, it also fails to explain those cases where extremists were not in direct contact with the West. *Agency*-based approaches emphasize the role of individual political actors in the emergence of Islamic militancy. Political actors can be divided into ideologues, teachers (guides), organizers, field commanders, financiers, and diplomats (recruiters of external support). These roles are, however, often combined in one person, who at one moment may be primarily an organizer but at another is a commander. In general, political actors of all types have played an important role in mobilizing religious militancy throughout the Islamic world. Some observers have minimized the role of human agents in Central Asia, arguing that a lack of theoretical knowledge, political experience, and organizational expertise have made agency less important. Many emphasize instead *institutional* factors. For them, human agents do not act independently of their social environment. Institutions matter most, they argue, because they support collectively shared systems of meanings that shape agents activities (Ibid, pp. 10-11).

In fact, none of the approaches in this incomplete list provides a full and adequate explanation of Islamic radicalism in general or in Central Asia in particular. A combination of approaches, or compromises among different explanations, might be more productive. I would like to address the question of violence as culture; an approach that has received little attention in the literature on Islamist militancy but that I think has particular explanatory power.

16- The clash of civilizations thesis can also be viewed as a *culturalist* argument. However, a deep feeling of insecurity is the overwhelming factor that is adduced to explain the supposed clash of civilizations, and therefore author prefer to categorize it as security oriented.

1.2 Causes of propagation of radical Islam (revival of Islam) in Fergana valley

Islamic revival refers to the support for an increased influence of Islamic values on the modern world as a response to Western and secular trends. Accordingly, a return to Islam in its purest form is seen as the solution for the ills of Islamic societies and modern society as a whole.

In Central Asia Islamic fundamentalism has a close relationship with radical Islam and its organisations. Radical Islamic movement had developed by the early 1990s, because there were ideological needs of people in response to the extensive social problems and the spiritual needs of people (Eastvold 2003, p. 22).

1.2.1. The emergence of political Islam:

The introduction of glasnost saw a loosening of the state's control and monopoly on political expression in Central Asia. Opposition groups soon began forming. The period following independence saw the emergence of opposition groups, ostensibly secular, to challenge the states monopoly on power[17]. Faced with a myriad of domestic social and economic problems as well as weakened centralized government control coupled with public, expection, Central Asian leaders quickly consolidated power while silencing domestic dissent through political repression and censorship. Opposition political parties were banned, the state controlled media outlets and public discussion and debate was outlawed (Ahmedova and Leitich, p. 36).

In addition, Central Asian governments quickly adopted policies limiting Islamic political activity fearing the importation of radical Islam and its allied social and political activities. The emerging Islamic parties[18] that have sought to insert religious ideas into political life were subject to constant harassment and while also declared illegal. Prior to beign banned, the Islamic Renaissance party (IRP) had a mass appeal in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The party now continues its efforts underground and its most active segment is the Uzbek population in the Fergana valley (Ibid, 36-37).

The appeal of Islamic-based political movements in the Fergana valley is owed largely to the fact that people lacked an outlet for secular political expression. People increasingly felt disenfranchised and alienated not only from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes but also from the traditional leader of civil society. Increasingly, people turned to Islam as a means for political expression. Outsiders quickly radicalized this indigenous Islamic revival, particularly in the Fergana valley where Islam retained its hold despite 70 years of Soviet rule (Rashid, op. 55).

17- In the late 1980s and early 1990 secular organizations and movements such as Birlik in Uzbekistan, Rastokhez, in Tajikistan and Asaba in Kyrgyzstan appeared on the political scene but were quickly dealt with by the government authorities. Leaders were either jailed or fled to exile in Moscow.

18- The first Islamic political party to emerge during Soviet times was the Islamic Renaissance party (IRP) founded during the 1970s and is considered a precursor to the Islamist opposition parties that have emerged in each of the Central Asian republics following independence.

During the Soviet era, Islam was suppressed as mosques were closed. Muslim intellectuals were either arrested or imprisoned and madrasahs were outlawed, yet Islam survived mainly in its ritual and traditional forms in rural areas. The soviet system prevented Islam from becoming modernized; most progressive Muslim leaders were either imprisoned or killed (juergensmeyer, 1993, p. 112). Central Asia become isolated from the rest of the Muslim world's progressive thought (Malashenko, 1998, p. 53).

As part of their consolidation of power the Bolsheviks eliminated any formal and public role for religion. Shari'at law was banned as a basis of jurisprudence in the early 1920's, all the madrasa were eliminated, and only a handful of mosques were allowed to remain open. Literally thousands of mosques were destroyed or worse yet used for some kind of sacrilegious purpose. The majority of believers, though, remained in Central Asia and during the late 1920's and throughout the 1930's untold tens of thousands went through the machinery of Stalin's purge. For all intents and purposes, Islam effectively disappeared, although the possibility of religious continuity was insured through the survival of a handful of people with religious education and the internal disposition to be spiritual leaders. Despite the best efforts of Stalin's terror machine and Soviet anti-religious propagandists illegal -- hujra -- schools continued to survive throughout the Soviet period, in Tashkent and in even larger numbers in the Fergana valley (Olcott, 2007, p. 8-13).

In contrast, the emerging Muslim leaders in the Central Asian states of today have shown a marked rigidity in ignoring the social and psychological needs of many Russified or westernized Kyrgyz and Uzbeks- particularly, women. Raised in an atmosphere of Soviet equality between the sexes, women in the post-Soviet Central Asia now encounter pre- Soviet norms of family family. At the same time, diverse cultural associations with Muslim orientation have drawn new members from across the social spectrum, including women, (league of Muslim women, Association Fatima, and movement Rifakh- cultivate ethno- cultural distinctiveness of Muslims and the patriarchal values of traditional Islamic society) (Ahmedova and Leitich, p. 37).

1.2.2. Islamic revival in post-soviet: The role of external and internal factors

One major event decided the fate of the Soviet Union, opening the way to independence for all 15 republics that constituted the former Soviet Union, including the Central Asian ones: the abortive coup that had been staged by the conservative strand of CPSU on August 1991 in Moscow against Gorbachev's reforms. Although the coup failed, it inevitably entailed the dissolution of the Union. As a result, Central Asian republics became independent subsequent to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by the presidents of Russia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine in December 1991 in Minsk. This second event officially abolished the USSR. Few days later Central Asian republics joined the commonwealth as independent states (Olcott, 1992, p. 32).

By the time the Soviet Union dissolved, there was a growing interest in Islam among Central Asian populations. During the first years of independence there was much controversy over what role Islam was to play in the process of construction of new political and social order. Initially, there was much enthusiasm on the part of the elites to support Islamic revival, because Islamic card would help them gain support of masses in consolidating their powers as well as fill the ideological vacuum created by the demise of Marxism-Leninism (Akiner, 2003, p. 101).

They did not, however, depart from the techniques of co-option, by which Islam was to be kept under control. Central Asian authorities (all of them products of Soviet upbringing and education and all of them former heads), had become more and more antagonistic towards forms of Islamic expression that were on the rise in the region soon after independence. Lack of experience, education and expertise in dealing with religious issues prompted these elites to use old Soviet era mechanisms of control over religious activity, often retaining Communist Party's traditional hostility towards Islam. But apart from concerns of the elites, this increased interest in Islam did not immediately translate into the growing political threat, capable of challenging stability within these new countries. There is no doubt that Islam is deeply ingrained in Central Asian ethnicity and culture. However, it is important, firstly, not to underestimate the effects of the Soviet legacy that weakened Islam; and secondly, specific features inherent to Central Asia among the nomadic and sedentary populations (Botoiarova, 2005, pp. 96-97).

By looking at the region's immediate past that is associated with legacies of the former Soviet Union, it is obvious that personal understanding of Islamic doctrine in Central Asia is much limited or distorted because religious teaching and practice were forbidden or co-opted by the political regime. Although the Soviet regime did not cause Islam to entirely disappear, it eventually caused total de-Islamization. As such, expression of Muslim piety was repressed, formal religious education was abolished, and the ulema was persecuted (Central Asia: Islam and the State, 2003, p. 2).

The closed borders isolated Soviet Muslims form the mainstream political expressions of Islam that were taking place in the broader Muslim world just across the border. As such, Islam in Central Asia became a totally local phenomenon and tended to be defined primarily in traditional and cultural terms. Certainly, today, Islam remains one of the strongest sources of identity, but being a Muslim for Central Asians means adherence to customs and traditions that developed in the course of many centuries there, but not the Islam that was and still is being observed in other parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East. In Central Asian context, being a Muslim does not necessarily mean to lead a Muslim way of life (attending mosque, fasting, performing pilgrimage, etc) (Botaiaova, 2005, p. 97).

The diversity of Islam in Central Asia's various parts is an important aspect of a more distant history that predated the establishment of the Soviet rule. This diversity, however, is instrumental in defining contemporary Islam today in the region. As was mentioned earlier in this study, the degree of loyalty to Islam is strongest in the mentality of historically sedentary societies and lacks depth and substance among historically nomadic tribes. As such, historically sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks (who are the dominant ethnic groups famous for religious activity throughout the Islamic history in Central Asia, such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand) are the groups where Islam took an early and strong hold, touching almost every aspect of their life. Nomadic Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Turkmen are relative late-comers to Islam. Their Islamization took place much later as non-Islamic tribes existed as late as 19th century (Kulchik, 1996, p. 5). Consequently religious fanaticism, that is present in some parts of the south, is not characteristic of nomads, located in the north (Akiner, 1993, p. 38-39).

The effects of this historical distinction can still be strongly felt today. Soon after the Central Asian republics became independent, Islam was instrumental in identifying the course of events among the sedentary Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Tajikistan, Islamic factor was manipulated to be the dominant tool in the struggle for power, resulting in the bloody civil war with major human losses. In Uzbekistan, fears that the situation in Tajikistan would easily spill over and challenge the authorities resulted in the establishment of an extremely authoritarian regime by the Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Another important observation is that proclivity to Islam throughout Central Asia is closely related to the presence of region's numerically largest Uzbek population (Haghayeghi, 1996, pp.77-78). This traditional division into sedentary and nomadic communities, however, has little relevance to the issue of Islamic fundamentalism in contemporary Central Asia. It does not mean that historically sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks have a strong potential for the rise of fundamentalist movements similar to those that evolved in the course of several last decades in the Middle East. It is rather an indication to the fact that nomadic societies were even less religious than sedentary ones and not vice-versa, and that in the process of Islamic revival this is still apparent (Botaiarova, 2005, p. 99).

In general, Islamic revival in post-Soviet Central Asia can be characterized as moderate, given, first of all, lack of political experience in Islam, and the legacy of the Soviet rule, which had a major secularizing effect on Central Asian societies. Fears of genuine Islamic threat in the form of fundamentalist or radical movements that are supported by outside forces and resort to violence in achieving their goals are largely ungrounded. In fact, the issue of Islamic radicalism featured far from top in the list of serious problems that newly independent Central Asian states and its leaders faced in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Freedman, 1997, p. 217). Establishment of close diplomatic ties with Muslim states neighboring Central Asia during the first years of independence was not the expression of Central Asia's commitment to Islam or its willingness to grant Islam the upper hold in decision-making, but was rather conditioned by economic and geographic aspects of such relations (Olcott, 1996, p. 31).

Later in the post-Soviet period, some concerns were raised about Islamic activism and fears were conjured up about the possible threat emanating from Islam's extreme forms coming from abroad. Immediate measures were taken by the Central Asian elites to suppress different forms of Islamic expression, often labeling the ordinary believers 'fundamentalists'. But to what extent these groups were really fundamentalist backed by outside Islamist forces is a controversial issue. In this context, it is necessary to point out that in post-Soviet Central Asia, Islamic revival is a natural process after a long period of suppression. But because the region was isolated from the broader Islamic world for a long period of time and developed on its own, it had to absorb customs and traditions of local communities and adapt to circumstances imposed from above. As a result, Islam in Central Asia took its moderate shape, free from fanaticism or political ambitions. Therefore, there is no breeding ground for genuine politicization of the faith, even if there are efforts by outside forces to import more radical form of Islam to Central Asia. However, if Islam is to be radicalized, it will still be not because of outside influence but conditioned by the discontent of people within the region, faced with the challenges of unstable economies and the excesses of authoritarian regimes that are increasing their powers across Central Asian republics at present (Akiner,1993, p. 69).

Islamic revival that is now taking place in Central Asia is a natural process, determined first of all by indigenous culture and tradition of Islam, which developed in isolation from its trends in broader Muslim world and preserved its specificity, being primarily a way of life and having a stronger hold in tradition of historically sedentary communities and being weaker in historically nomadic societies (although moderate in both). In addition to this historical legacy of Islam, this revival process is currently being influenced by internal socio-economic conditions and political situation. Given the specific nature of Islam practiced in Central Asia throughout its history, there is no scope for influence from external Islam, including its dangerous forms. Although there is some activism in political Islam in the region, it is not influenced by outside forces of religious extremism or radicalism, but it is an expression of discontent with current economic decline and authoritarian regimes. There is much speculation, primarily by the elites, that population of Central Asia is exposed to the negative influence of Islam from abroad that poses a dangerous threat to the stability in the region. This speculation led to labeling moderate groups as 'fundamentalist' or 'Wahhabi' in order to justify harsh measures taken against them. Overall, at present there is no threat to the stability of the region emanating from outside influence of Islam on indigenous population. With regard to Islam, "one has to take into account the very different historical root that Islam took in Central Asia to determine whether current events can actually be called a politicization of Islam (Steinberger, 2003, p. 223).

The limited oppositional political activism of some Islamic groups is not a threat to the stability in society but is a threat to the position of elites that want to remain in power. The liberal orientation of the dominant (Sunni) Islamic doctrine and prevailing doctrinal diversity at the republican level are critical elements in shaping the criteria for Islamic adherence in Central Asia that contributed to a moderate Islamic revival, thus limiting the activities of fundamentalist Islam to a few isolated cases of influence (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 80).

Radicalization of Islam, if it ever takes place, will not be because of outside influence, but will be the result of discontent with economic hardships and inability of authorities to build a just society with democratic principles. Therefore, it should be said that effective internal factors in revival of Islam are concerned to political conditions, economic conditions, and religious conditions.

In following, thesis will analyze the parameters of external factors that shaped Islamic consciousness.

1.2.2.1. External factors:

In here, the aim of thesis is to show that external factors are not the primary drive in the process of Islamic revival in Central Asia.

The scope of relations between Central Asian states and international community is established with the primary focus on economic cooperation and is not limited to only Muslim states. Although the emergence of the region into the international scene attracted attention of several Middle Eastern countries, it had little or no impact on the process of Islamic revival in Central Asia. In order to clarify these points, relationship of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia will be analyzed (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 102).

1.2.2.1.1. Iran:

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the explicit concern in the West regarding the five Central Asian republics was their presumed susceptibility to external influence of Islamic fundamentalism. In particular, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with which Central Asia has a long border and shares common historical, linguistic and religious ties, was of a big concern. This fear of imported fundamentalism was invoked primarily by Western stereotype to view all Islamic fundamentalists as being manipulated by Iran (Hooglund, 1994, pp. 114 and 115).

A closer look at the process of building relations between Iran and the newly independent Central Asian republics, however, reveals that this process is conditioned primarily by economic rather than politico-religious aspects. Despite its Islamic rhetoric, Iran has taken most cautious and pragmatic steps. Iranian involvement on ideological questions in the region remained low-key. For example, Iran did not exploit the unraveling of the USSR to export its revolution to Central Asia. Instead Iranian policies emphasized the development of economic and cultural relations with Central Asian states (Jonson, 1998, p. 38). Fears of incipient fundamentalist threat to Central Asia are, therefore, an exaggeration, given general anti-Western orientation of Islamic fundamentalist ideology. In fact, “Iran’s view on its role in Central Asia is not the promotion of Islamic activism but the promotion of mutually beneficial economic activities” (Hooglund, 1994, p. 117).

Thus, it is unlikely that Iran, seen as an external factor, may have any significant, not to mention negative, influence to the process of Islamic revival in Central Asian republics.

The causes for pragmatism of Iranian foreign policy are rooted in Iran's domestic political and economic policies that underwent considerable transformation since late 1980s (Ehteshami, 1997, pp. 91-92).

The prevalence of economic aspect over ideological one in Iran's foreign policy is evident. The dissolution of the Soviet Union offered Tehran an unexpected opportunity to exercise its ideological influence in the decades-long closed region of Central Asia. But in its relations with these new republics, Iran preferred to avoid spreading Islamic Revolution to the region. This non-interference into the ideological realm of Central Asia was motivated by two things. First, Iranians were quite aware of how different Muslims of Central Asia were[19]. The tendency of secular, ex-communist leaders of the region to view any Islamic activity with suspicion was already a formidable obstacle in relations between the two regions, The promotion of Shi'a version of Islam among the predominantly Sunni Central Asia would only exacerbate their assigned task (Rashid, 2002, p. 220).

Second, Iran was preoccupied with not spoiling long-term good relations with Moscow, established during the Soviet times. For Iran, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, was viewed first of all as a potential supplier of advanced weaponry which Iran needed. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia continued supplying Iran with modern weaponry, including submarines in 1992 and 1993, and it further promised the supply of a nuclear reactor (Freedman, pp. 226-227).

Therefore Iran tried to formulate its relations with Central Asia without alienating Moscow. One of Russia's main concerns, as well as of Central Asian governments' themselves, regarding Iran was "the export of its Islamic revolution or any close and transparent allegiance with the Islamist movements of Central Asia (Ehteshami, 1997, p. 95). In this respect, Iran's own strategic aim to curb the growth of Sunni Islamic radicalism, whether manifested in the Taliban in Afghanistan, the IMU in Uzbekistan, or Sunni extremists in Pakistan, converged with Russia's concerns(Rashid, 2002, p. 220).

19- In his article "Iran and Central Asia" Eric Hooglund argues that the term 'Muslim Central Asia" is inaccurate given the fact that 70 years of Soviet rule transformed Central Asian countries into secular, even militant atheistic societies and that none of current Central Asian governments base their legitimacy on Islam. He further suggests that depicting Central Asia as Muslim is a Western stereotype to view Iranian Islamic fundamentalism as a major threat to the stability of Central Asia. Iranians seem to be fully aware of the negative consequences of such stereotypes for Iran's foreign policy perspectives in the post-Cold War period. With pragmatism being dominant in their decisionmaking since late 1980s, Iranians preferred to stay ideologically relatively impartial to the region bordering it to the north, thus implying that it is the US which speculates the issue of Iranian-inspired Islamic fundamentalism in order to establish its influence in the region. See pp. 114-115 and 124.

A particular concern for the purpose of this study is Iran's response to the situation on post-Soviet Tajikistan, with which Iran shares the closest linguistic, cultural and historic ties. With the Tajik civil war unleashed by mutually hostile pro-communist government and Islamic oppositional groups, Iran was supposedly supporting the Islamic anti-governmental forces during the war. In the West Iran was suspected of being interested in supporting the nascent Islamic movements which were in turn labeled 'fundamentalist'. However, turbulence in Tajikistan did not cause Iran to depart from its official line. Contrary to speculations that Iran might provide support to Tajikistan's Islamic opposition, it adopted a non-interventionist position by stating that it had no intentions to be involved in the internal affairs of Tajikistan (Freedman, 1997, p. 227).

Iran has dissolved any doubts on exporting its revolution, when it has assumed an important role as peace-making negotiator of the Tajik conflict together with Russia, beginning from 1994 (Jonson, 1998, p. 38). Another factor that contributed to Iran's preference to act in economic, rather than ideological realm in the post-Cold War period was Iran's own economic problems, rooted in its weakened oil markets and its continuing dependence on oil revenues. This in turn encouraged the Iranian government to take steps toward modernization of its industrial base through attempts to liberalize its economy and reduce the state control over economic activity (Hosseini, pp. 168-86). Therefore, it was recognized that moderation of its foreign relation and a closer integration into the international economic system was a necessary step in achieving economic success (Ehteshami, 1997, p. 92). This and several other factors including Iran's increased regional isolation from Arab Gulf states (caused by mostly U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region and its policy of 'dual containment') helped Iran to direct its attention northwards (Ibid., p. 93).

For similar reasons mentioned above, Iran was also an enthusiastic proponent of inclusion of Central Asia into economic cooperation organization, which was emerging as an important regional organ (Ibid, p. 96). economic cooperation organization (ECO) is the oldest inter-governmental regional organization established in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of sustainable socio-economic development of the member states (Pahlevan, 1998, p. 87). In 1992, the organization was expanded to include some of the Central Asian states. At the end of 1992, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan entered ECO as full members, and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan as observers (Naumkin, 1994, p. 211).

Therefore, it is hardly possible that Muslim states bordering Central Asia will have any significant impact on the process of Islamic revival taking place inside the region. In fact, as the example with ECO shows, relations of Central Asian republics with Muslim states bear purely economic connotations.

1.2.2.1.2. Turkey:

When the Soviet Union dissolved, Turkey saw the opportunity of expanding its influence over Central Asia, where the majority of population was of common Turkic stock and Turkic language was widely spoken among them. When the Soviet Union dissolved, Turkey saw the opportunity of expanding its influence over Central Asia, where the majority of population was of common Turkic stock and Turkic language was widely spoken among them. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian states and to establish diplomatic relations with them (Winrow, 1997, p. 109).

In doing so, leaders in Turkey saw the linguistic ties as an important component for Turkey's involvement in the region. At the same time, Turkey was encouraged by the West in the presumed competition with Iran for influence in Central Asia, since officials in the West were anxious to prevent the possible expansion of Iranian influence in the region, especially the spread of Islamic Revolution (Winrow, 1995, p. 13).

This rivalry, however, did not materialize for a number of interrelated reasons mentioned above, primarily because Iran showed no interest in such a competition projected by the West. More than that, the fact that both countries jointly cooperated with Central Asian states through ECO, testifies for the inconsistency of the theory that Iran and Turkey were locked in rivalry for the influence in Central Asia (Critchlow, 1994, p. 238).

Although fear of Iranian-inspired 'fundamentalism' might be overestimated, it was still vital for Central Asian leaders, leading them to look at Turkey for a model of secular Islamic state (Ibid).

Turkey, on its part, has developed a feeling of Turkic solidarity and declared that Central Asia was the land of their forefathers and that their culture and history originated there (Winrow, 1997, p. 109). Closer ties were established between the republics and Turkey during a number of official visits and agreements on cooperation in a variety of spheres were signed (Smolansky, p. 293).

Unlike Iran, Turkey felt more comfortable to broaden its relations with Central Asia to include the cultural and religious spheres. The spread of Fethullah Gülen's movement throughout Central Asia is of a particular concern in this regard (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 112). Fethullah Gülen is the leader of semi-legal Nurcu sect with its origins in Turkey, but became very active in Central Asia in 1990s. Nurcu is a religious group that preaches Islam and 'modernity', and it is an important component of understanding contemporary Islam. In Central Asia their mission is to help people to rediscover their Islamic identity after being exposed to a long-term Soviet domination. To fulfill its mission it strongly relies on modernized education (Balci, 2003, p. 160).

During the first years of independence it was easier for fethullhaci to spread their ideology. They saw the atmosphere, in which Islam was welcomed in order to indicate the break with the Soviet past and some of Islamic values were integrated into the new national identity, as an advantage to conduct their missionary activity openly. For example, the instructors at schools run by Fethullah Gülen taught the pupils namaz and recommended that girl wear headscarves (Ibid, p. 157).

Later, the community encountered difficulties in propagating its idea, due to the tendency of authorities to regard religion with suspicion. In Uzbekistan, for example, the first sign of deteriorating Uzbek-Turkish relations appeared when Turkey supported Uzbek opposition leader Muhammad Salih after his party Erk was banned in Uzbekistan, providing him a political asylum. A chain of Fethullah Gülen schools were closed in Uzbekistan as a consequence. Uzbek authorities accused Fethullah Gülen of supporting oppositional activities (Rashid, 2002, p. 222).

1.2.2.1.3. Afghanistan:

Since the period of independence, the only external factor contributing to the growth of instability in the region was Afghanistan, where Taliban arouse as a dominant militant force with its ambitions to control the whole territory of Afghanistan (Rashid, 2002, p. 209).

The Taliban movement grew in Qandahar in 1994, when religious students, led by Mullah Omar, set to eliminate crime in that region of Afghanistan. They received military support from Pakistan and gained influence across much of Afghanistan as a movement appealing to establish law and order. The movement consisted of Pashtuns (Afghanistan's largest ethnic group), members of the former Khalk faction (a dissident element of old communist party), and fighters from a variety of Arab and other Muslim countries who had joined Osama bin Laden or identified with his anti U.S. Jihad (Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis, 2001, p. 3, footnote 3).

In Central Asia two countries (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) were actively supporting the enemies of Taliban, the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the anti-Taliban political coalition known as the United Front, as well as their military ally, the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was a coalition of military forces loyal to the United Front and controlled the small part of territory in the northern Afghanistan. It was composed of about 15, 000 ethnic Uzbek and ethnic Tajik rebels, united by their opposition to Taliban (Ibid, footnote 4).

The Uzbeks are the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. About one million ethnic Uzbeks live in the area adjacent to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has a relatively small border with Afghanistan, but is connected to Afghanistan by the Termez Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar highway (Kamal, 1999, p. 172). Uzbeks in Uzbekistan had reportedly been supporting general Dostum through supplying fuel and military means to help him counter the Taliban offensive (Ibid, p. 173).

In terms of foreign policy, the Taliban showed little intention of spreading their version of Islam abroad, stating that it was only for internal consumption (Ewans, 2002, p. 195).

With bin Laden, joined by thousands of militants from all over the Arab and other Muslim countries, the perspective of global Islamic radicalism was adopted by Taliban, and its expansionist visions toward Central Asian republics became a part of their military agenda (Rashid, 2002, p. 211).

In Uzbekistan, where in the period since independence a relatively secure military infrastructure was maintained in comparison to Central Asia's other republics; fears of direct Taliban offensive on its territory were less pronounced. However, some observers suggested that there were practically no chances for Taliban-led or Taliban-inspired invasion of Central Asia and that there was no direct threat to the territorial integrity of Uzbekistan or Karimov regime (Everett-Heath, 2003, p. 191).

The major concerns were that in case of Taliban victory in Afghanistan, a large number of ethnic Uzbek refugees would rush toward Uzbek border, bringing in their waves heavily armed and disobedient paramilitaries (Ibid, p. 192).

This would also cause the increased flow of drugs, as well as the spread of ideological influence among certain groups in Uzbekistan susceptible to Islamic rhetoric (Hyman, pp. 110-111), especially among those who are disenchanted with economic difficulties (Everett-Heath, 2003, pp. 192-193) .In circles close to President Karimov's office there was a view that contrary to Moscow promoted idea, there was no direct threat from Taliban and that Uzbekistan was capable to repulse Taliban-led offensive if it takes place (Hyman, 1998, p. 110). But, when faced with the real possibility of a hostile Islamic regime in Afghanistan (after the seizure by Taliban of Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif), the Karimov government chose to align firmly with Moscow (Ibid, p. 111).

After Kabul was captured by Taliban in the autumn of 1996, Russia and several Central Asian republics, above all Uzbekistan, negotiated on a joint effort in preserving the common borders of the CIS. Taliban was determined as 'a dangerous source of military, political, criminal and economic turbulence' representing a 'direct threat to their national interest and security' (Ewans, 2002, p. 195).

Among these problems the most important one seen by the government of Uzbekistan was the spread of ideological influence of militant Islam in Uzbekistan, with its potential challenge to topple Karimov regime. In this context, the role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is important. after the Tashkent bombings and incursions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by radical Islamist militia, the IMU was blamed to be the organizer of those terrorist acts. In this context, the IMU in alliance with Taliban should be viewed not as the international terrorist organization of global significance, but simply as a regional radical force that challenges the regime (Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis, 2001, p. 5).

1.2.2.1.4. Saudi Arabia:

Wealthy Arab states are geographically situated far from Central Asia. Therefore their influence regarding the newly independent states is determined not only by geographical position, but also by a limited choice of investments available to them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Saudi Arabia too had not refrained from exerting its influence in newly-formed and still evolving Central Asian states. This involvement, however, pursued goals that had almost nothing to so with Central Asian states themselves. First of all, Saudi Arabian involvement was stimulated by Iran's foreign policy goals. As was mentioned above, even though for Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union offered a fertile ground for spreading its revolutionary ideas in Central Asia, Iran had limited its engagement in the area to purely economic realm. For Iran, its role and presence in the Gulf remained a priority in pursuing its foreign policy goals. Saudi Arabia, on its part, by greater involvement in Central Asia, and especially in the areas where Iran was active, was pursuing its own goal of distracting Iran from the Gulf region (Piacentini, 1994. p. 43).

The Saudi government eased the conditions of pilgrimage to Mecca for Central Asian Muslims and provided for a continuous flow of religious literature into the republics. The Saudis have been organizing Islamic schools, constructing mosques and distributing Qurans in these republics (Ibid, p. 42). Seen in this light, Saudi Arabia was interested in spreading its Wahhabi version of Islam on the one hand and the establishment of economic contacts on the other (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 120).

Despite its willingness to spread Saudi Wahhabism and certain actions undertaken in this direction, it appears difficult for Saudi Wahhabism to impose itself on Central Asia. The major obstacle is the nature of Central Asian Islam itself, which is incompatible with the strict Wahhabite doctrine. Although Saudi Wahhabism belongs to Sunni trend, unlike Iranian Shi'a version, Central Asian Islam preaches more liberal Sunni Hanafite, whereas Saudi Wahhabism belongs to a rigorous Hanbalite version. Home to the reformist Islamic traditions (manifested in Jadidism, as well as some of Sufism's most popular brotherhoods, known for their veneration of saints and holy places), Central Asia doesn't look favorably at more radical ideas of Wahhabism and its 'purifying' doctrine (Rayyeds, 1994, p. 227).

In promoting Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia was most active in those Central Asian states, where the position of Islam was the strongest. For example, in Tajikistan Saudis helped bring and disseminate Quran in large numbers, organized courses teaching Islam in Arabic and invested heavily in the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) (Zviagelskaya, 1994, p. 153).

In Uzbekistan they were particularly active in the Fergana valley, but after the disruptive activities of fundamentalist groups in Saudi Arabia, President Karimov expelled tens of Saudi imams from Uzbekistan in 1992 (Ibid). Saudi activity in other parts of Central Asia was based on economic activity.

Overall, the Saudi involvement in Central Asia was stimulated by Iranian presence in the Gulf region and its engagement in Central Asia was characterized by spreading its Wahhabite version of Islam, primarily in Tajikistan. For commercial considerations Saudi Arabia was active in oil-reach Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Because Saudi Wahhabism is unlikely to take a firm root in Central Asia due to doctrinal incompatibility with Central Asian Islam, Wahhabism in Central Asian understanding is something quite different form its Saudi counterpart (Botoiarova, 2005, pp. 121-122).

1.2.2.1.5. September 11 attacks:

The attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 followed by the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan have intensified the scrutiny of Islamist movements across Central Asia The people of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are considered to be more religious than the populations in other republics of Central Asia. But all five Central Asian states generally support secular governance. At the same time, very often, the region's nondemocratic leadership has chosen repression as an instrument of dealing with religion and civil society as a whole. This is particularly true of Uzbekistan, where authoritarianism has been used in order to justify crack-down on any opposition to the government, including religious groups without making any distinction between moderates, radicals or extremists. Uzbekistan was also among the first and most enthusiastic countries to welcome the U.S. military presence in Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular. By allowing the United Stated to gain access to Uzbek airbases, President Karimov considered American involvement a unique opportunity both to silence international criticism of his government's pressure on economic reforms and human rights, and to gain international support to eliminate the IMU, which, according to Uzbek official line was behind the Tashkent bombings in 1999 (Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis, 2001, p. 4).

Within the country there has emerged a great deal of concern about this international anti-terrorist campaign, and it has pointed out that the campaign would enable President Karimov to intensively crack-down on legitimate opposition and religious groups (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 123).

Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is known for its most liberal attitude toward religious expression of its citizens across Central Asia. But after Islamists incursions on its territory in 1999 and 2000, Kyrgyzstan, too, strengthened its stance towards Islamism. The country joined the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign and allowed the establishment of U.S. military airbases on its territory. Although in Kyrgyzstan attitudes toward the West are in general not antagonistic (especially among the ruling elites), on popular level the reactions to the U.S. presence differed (Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia?, 2003, p. 21).

In general, the popular attitudes of Central Asians toward the West are not negative as it is the case in other parts of the Islamic world. But after the United States has established its military presence in Central Asia, many people in the region started to believe that Western countries and organizations support corrupt, repressive regimes and are hypocritical about genuine democratic values. After they have established military bases in Central Asia, the Americans themselves appear to realize that by rushing into the region militarily, but doing nothing to eliminate the genuine sources for instability, rooted in economic and political conditions, they may create additional problems in their foreign policy running instead of resolving the existing ones (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 123).

2. Traditional Islam vs rise of modernism

Modernity has created multiple social and identity crises for traditional societies by creating a transformation in the role of religion in individual and social life. Religious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to these developments. Also, subsidiary and local factors also have different effects both in the severity and weakness of this reaction as well as how its emergence and outbreak (Hooshangi, 1389, p. 183).

The theory of confronting modernity as one of the main factor of the emergence and development of fundamentalism must be regarded the product of those research that consider fundamentalism as the product and factor of more comprehensive social changes, rather than seeing it as a product of a particular religion, such as Islam. So that, if occurring in any other non-Muslim society, would produce similar consequences. In this regard, in particular, Abdullah Ahmad al-Naim argued that the fundamentalism is not the inevitable product of particular Islamic religious resources, but this phenomenon is an indigenous response to profound social, political and economic crises in Islamic societies (Anna'im, 2003, pp.25-26). From the viewpoint of these scholars, modernity creates structural changes in society that lead to the collapse of tradition. Civilization, ethnic and religious pluralism, and nation-state building are some of the most important of these changes (Haar, 2003, p. 5).

The goal of thesis in this section is to examine the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism and in fact, before examining some of the role-playing of modernity as the main factor in expanding fundamentalism and evaluating other local factors in this case.

2.1. Modernity: containment the role of religion and social changes resulting from it:

Researchers in sociology of religion (Bruce, 2008, pp. 1-10) often believe that the essence of fundamentalism movement is a kind of protest against the modernization process and its wide social, cultural, political and economic effects on societies that at least one of the most important sources of theoretical and practical inspiration of systems and social, political, and economic relations and even the family of these societies is "religion". Fundamentalism is one of a variety of protest reactions against modernity, which has a religious character. Therefore, it is expected that because religion is only one of the factors influencing and shaping values, causes and social systems in pre-modern times and other factors (such as agricultural-based economic system, political power relations, etc.) have also been involved in the formation of what is called traditional society, so fundamentalism must be a religious reaction to the theoretical and practical consequences of modernity, which specifically has challenged religious beliefs and practices. As the motivations of the fundamentalists have not necessarily and purely been defending the pure religion, and the numerous social, economic, and political factors have caused them to refer to that part of the tradition that has the greatest theorizing power (ie, religion) as the representative of the tradition and trying to restore it as the backbone of traditional life that is now threatened by modernity.

But, what are the changes that modernity creates in societies that such radical reactions are triggered?

Modernity has divided traditional integrated and coherent life into many different areas, by transforming the economic structures of traditional societies that each area had its own unique value system, which did not necessarily relate to religious values. New roles defined in the modern society were not essentially linked to religious values. On the other hand, the pyramid patterns of power in society and religion were also weakened in parallel to each other. In the political sphere of the formation of democratic institutions and in the sphere of religion, the expansion of the movement of Protestantism, which claimed a kind of democracy and pluralism in religious knowledge, essentially undermined the key place of religion in traditional society (Munson 2006, pp. 255-271).

On the other hand, developments in science had a tangible epistemological consequence that denied the existence of absolute truths in knowledge. The diffusion of such an understanding from scientific knowledge to religious knowledge- athough without the same logical conditions in two epistemic areas that justify this generalization- in the long run challenges religious absolutism (Hooshangi, 1389, p.186).

The other influences of modernity, which provided the way for secularization and the abandonment of religion more than before, was cultural pluralism. Previousely, The religious pluralism that resulted from religious reform was mentioned. But large migrations from cities and villages in search of work and the formation of state-nations also spurred this cultural pluralism. Formation of state-nations would have to be controlled by one nation, ethnicity, and new geographic areas which required more familiarity and communication and, in fact, an understanding of the reality of cultural pluralism (Ibid, p. 186-187). It should also mention the loss of the social and cultural links of the traditional community in migrants and the need to replace it with a new identity, which fundamentalism ideology usually provides such an alternative. Because fundamentalists usually emphasize the universal, trans-cultural and general nature of religion and this is an appropriate choice for those who have lost their ethnic, cultural, and geographical identities by migration .(Roy, 2007, pp. vii-xiii).

2.2. Local factors related to strengthening fundamentalism

2.2.1 Modernization and the confrontation of the Islamic world with Europeans

2.2.1.1 Modernization process in action:

In each realistic study of the Islamic world, one must pay attention to its, geographical, religious, cultural, ethnic and political diversity. Oyghur Muslims in China today are less Muslim from the Wahhabis of the peninsula; As the Sufis of the Egyptian methods are as Muslim as the Hoxha of London. One of the problems of research on the grounds of fundamentalism and Salafism is the excessive attention to stereotypes (mostly Hejaz, Egypt, Iran and Turkey) and the neglect of Muslim relatives outside this area (Gregorian, 2003).

For example, the type of fate-belivers activity of Indian Muslim which its admirable example is followers of the “Propaganda of the congregation” is also a kind of reaction to colonialism, modernity and its consequences (Tibi, 2008, pp.1-37).

The wide range of cultural, ritual, political and social variations has affected the intensity and extent of fundamentalist reactions as well as its form and qualitative features. For example, cultural-ethnic factors are certainly involved in the tendency of the Pashtun tribes to Taliban Salafi Islam in Afghanistan and lack of interest in it among Egyptian or Iranian Muslims (Commins, 2006).

While the modern changes in Europe have been gradual, homogeneous and progressive, in the Islamic world this has been abruptly disorderly and unbalanced; In England, for example, the change in the political system from the feudal monarchy to parliamentary democracy took about 200 years from the execution of Charles I in 1649, until Russell's reform law in 1832; However, in some parts of the Muslim world, the latest technical products, or even the theory, arrive at a short distance from its prevalence in the West and it is clear that this creates sharp reactions and it is obvious that whatever the speed of the changes is greater, violence at the reaction of traditional society also increases. On the other hand, due to the fact that some of these intellectual and technological imports from the West to the Islamic world were either imposed or not necessary, after a while the community has rejected this import (Hooshangi, 1389, p. 190).

2.2.1.2 Colonization as the born of modernity:

One of the most important causes of the fundamentalist phenomenon in the Muslim world has been the confrontation with of Europeans and its consequences. Some scholars, of course, have referred to the more general factor of humiliation, and have investigated confrontation with European superior power below it (Greenburg, 2005, p.36).

In the eighteenth century, despite the evolution of Europe in scientific, cultural dimensions and structures of power , the Muslim world is still not politically and militarily subdued by Europe, but gradually, with the decline of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of same century and the beginning of the development of Europe and the era of colonialism, signs of weakness were revealed in the Muslim world, and Muslims became aware of their unpleasant situation in comparison to the Europeans. The 19th century the lands of the Ottoman Empire due to its weakness, gradually became independent or colonized by European countries (Demant, 2006, p.20).

Muslims' self- conscienceness of such a situation and its comparison with the days of exaltation and the growth of Islamic civilization in the past made some see the solution to repeat this glorious of the past in grabbing the authentic and pure teachings of Islam and considere the reason for the humility and weakness of the Ummah distance from these teachings (Hooshangi, 1389, pp. 190-192).

2.2.2. The lack of democracy, the contextualizer of fundamentalism:

One of the important contexts in the formation of harsh Salafi movements in the Muslim world, especially in recent decades, has been the existence of totalitarian governments and the lack of modern and traditional democratic institutions and foundations. The dictatorship of Kamal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Khan in Iran, Ayub Khan in Pakistan, Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and Sokarno in Indonesia are examples of dictatorships that has increased the attractiveness of radical and fundamentalist ways (Hooshangi, 1389, p. 195).

One of the reasons behind the relative interest to fundamentalists in some Islamic countries is their remoteness from practical scene of policy-making and the daily executive affairs of the country, which has caused them to both have a clean and fascinating record due to of their unsigned spells and also because of their radical and idealistic criticisms, can find supporters among dissidents in the policies of the ruling states. On the one hand, as they do not succeed in establishing a state (mainly due to despotism and the atmosphere of oppression), they keep this innocent and attractive face (Ahmad, 1991, p. 408). Interestingly, the reason for some fundamentalists' support (Ahmad, 1991, p. 500, like the modudi) for democracy is that they believe that in a democratic system, however, Islamists will be victorious.

2.2.3. The rise of religious beliefs:

Other local contexts of strengthening fundamentalism the general tendency toward spirituality in some societies after a series of events can be considered. This enthusiasm for religion and spirituality took place in a background in which somewhat the secular and materialist levels of modern culture had created it. However, indigenous and regional factors were also involved. For example, in Egypt there were such conditions in the late 70's. Significant events occurred in the in the late 70's that followed the spread of Islamist waves in Egyptian society. Perhaps the most important of these events was the failure the Arabs (and in fact, the Nasseri Pan-Arabism) of the Zionist regime during the six-day war of June 1967 (Hooshangi, 1389, pp. 202-203).

2.2.4. Social class and member's education:

One of the common features of the leaders and supporters of Salafi and fundamentalist Islam is the not having a background of widespread religious education in the seminaries. Leaders of fundamentalist movements are usually those whose main vocation is not to study religion, and their religious teachings are the result of individual and personal studies and far from the tradition of master-apprentice in traditional learning institutions. This pattern is also repeated among followers. There are so many evidences of such a problem: from Hassan al-Banna and seyyed Qutb in Egypt to Mududi, founder of the Islamic congregation in Pakistan; . For example, in the subcontinent, not the Islamic congregation, which claims to be the combination of modernity and tradition, and not the "propaganda of the congregation", which is more traditional, none have a reliable relationship with the traditional scholars and are considered secular groups (Ahmad, 1991, p. 459).

Modudy knew the traditional Islamic schools as ancient and dead, and never studied them, and his Islamic knowledge was the product of his own efforts and studies (Ibid, p. 465). In fact, the lack of religious education among fundamentalists will push them towards radical and not moderate interpretations of religion. In general, it can be said that, the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism was based on the revival of Islam as a cultural and political identity in a fundamentalist way, which in final section this hypothesis will be illustrated in the form of an example.

2.3. Traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism

The goal of thesis in this section to provide an example of the manner in which traditional Muslims have responded to the same challenges from modern thought that resulted in the emergence of the modernist and fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world.

Recent events have brought to the forefront long-held views in the West of a confrontation and opposition of world-views between Islam and the West. Mainstream analyses in the West, whether in academia or the media, have posited a clash between forward-looking Western civilization and a backward and stagnant Islam, represented by the exploits of so-called "fundamentalist" Muslims. Such analyses stop at only the most superficial aspect of the problem and do not penetrate to the roots of either modern Western civilization or Islam, nor of the various political and social reformist and revivalist movements labeled "fundamentalist." here will we examine alternatives presented by the Islamic intellectual tradition. A very different understanding of the reality of the conflict between the West and Islam emerges when one examines the philosophical principles and presuppositions that lie behind each civilization and that determine the more contingent and external aspects of that civilization. From one perspective, the underlying reality of Islam, as of any religion, is tradition, while that of modern Western civilization—as opposed to its medieval Christian heritage—is modernism and secularism (Lumbard, 2009, p. 79).

From this perspective, traditional Islam refers to both the Qur´ånic revelation and the prophetic Sunna[20] in themselves, as well as the subsequent life and activity of the Islamic community, whether it be in law, philosophy, art, mysticism, politics, or social life, which can be seen as a historical commentary upon, and continuity of, the original Revelation. As for modernism, it refers to a world-view, with a whole body of ideas and their resultant institutions, that emerged in Europe as a result of the renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the enlightenment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which revolted against religion in all the various areas of life and replaced it with humanism, rationalism, and secularism. As a result of these ideas, the Western world transformed itself from the deeply Christian civilization of the Middle Ages to the largely secular humanistic civilization it has become in modern times (Lindblom, 1983- Lings, 1980).

20- The Sunna refers to the Way of the Prophet, which comprises both his words and his deeds, and which has been taken as the perfect model for the life of the Muslims since the beginning of Islam.

Modernism in the Islamic world emerged from the direct influence of these foundational ideas of the modern West, often wed to the political and military power of colonialism. Fundamentalism, or literalist reformism (Lawrence, 1989) , although it serves as an umbrella term comprising many different movements with different beliefs and aims, generally implies a rejection of traditional Islamic scholarship and especially its intellectual and spiritual traditions; it calls for a return to the Qur´ån and the Æadìth (the sayings of the Prophet MuÆammad), interpreting these primary sources of Islam in a purely literalist and exclusivist manner, often in opposition to the traditional understanding and interpretation of these sacred texts (Lumbard, 2009, p. 80).

The groups denoted by the term often have a puritanical emphasis and an agenda for Islamic revival on a social and political level but with little interest in the spiritual and intellectual aspects of Islam. Neither fundamentalism nor modernism is integral to Islamic civilization; both are reactions to the modern secular Western world, which has dominated the Islamic world for the last two centuries, first politically and militarily through colonialism, and later ideologically and culturally (Nasr, 1975).

The neglect in the West of the voice of traditional Islam prevents us from seeing the whole tapestry of Islamic civilization. It has led to reducing Islam to a misleading dichotomy of "fundamentalist" and modernistic currents, which are followed by only a relatively small number of Muslims. Islam's traditional understanding of itself as a message of salvation that affirms the primacy of God, and seeks to awaken men and women to their true spiritual nature and make possible the actualization of their God-given possibilities, stands in stark contrast to an anthropocentric, rationalistic, and materialistic framework which relegates the sacred to the private sphere—the very framework that determines much of modern Western civilization. The modern world lacks a sense of transcendence and limits reality to its most outward and material aspect, while Islam is a religion based on the Transcendence of God; a religion which, like all religions, asks men and women to transcend their lower selves. The issue of Islam's incompatibility with modernism is ignored by both Westerners and modernized Muslims who have become estranged from their own spiritual and intellectual heritage (Lumbard, 2009, pp. 80-81).

2.3.1 The rise of modernism in Muslim India

The Indian Muslims encountered Europeans for the first time when Vasco da Gama sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, ironically with the help of Muslim navigators, and reached India in 1497. The age of exploration had begun and with it the continual encroachment of European powers into foreign lands. By the first decade of the seventeenth century, the British East India Company was already established and had jurisdiction over its own citizens in India. The Company gradually expanded, and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Mughal Empire at the death of the last great Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, it was able to expand its power rapidly. In 1757, it acquired large portions of Indian Territory and its jurisdiction covered a number of Indian provinces. By 1790, Governor-General Cornwallis had enough power of jurisdiction to abolish Islamic law and replace it with the newly created Anglo-Muhammadan law. Under Wellesley (1798-1805), British imperialism became a vital force in the political life of the Subcontinent and by 1803; the British had entered the capital of the Mughal Empire itself, Delhi. Thereafter, the Mughal emperor was to become only a puppet of the British so long as the Mughal Empire survived. These developments on the political front clearly demonstrate that the Muslims had ceased to be the rulers of India and had been replaced by the British, who now ruled over them. It was in light of this situation that the son of the great religious scholar, theologian, and Sufi Shåh Walì Allåh (1703-1762), Shåh Abd al-Azìz (1746-1824), the greatest religious authority of his day, issued his famous *fatwå* (religious verdict), stating that India had still been *dår al-islåm* (the abode of Islam), under the rule of the Marathas, the chief Hindu adversaries of the Muslims in the turbulent period after Aurangzeb's death, but that under the British, it had become *dår al-harb* (the abode of conflict). In this pronouncement can be seen a keen presentiment of the notion that the British were not common enemies like the Marathas, but represented something far more ruinous for the Muslims. Shåh þAbd al-Azìz understood that the Hindu and Sikh enemies might kill and plunder the Muslims but left Islam alone, while the British aimed to destroy Islam itself, which they demonstrated by replacing the injunctions of the sharìþa (Islamic law) with British law. Here then was the first awareness among Indian Muslims of the struggle between tradition and modernity, although it was primarily on a political level. Shåh þAbd al-Azìz's concerns were not unfounded, for the British next discouraged the use of Persian, the lingua franca of Muslim India and the language in which the majority of Muslim religious literature was composed, thus undermining the whole heritage of Islam in India. By 1835, Persian had been abolished as the language of public instruction and replaced by English. This transition marked another important stage in what was to become the struggle between tradition and modernity in Muslim India. Consequently, it was in this period that the religious scholars (oulamå´), seeing the forced decline of Persian, began to cultivate Urdu as a language for the preservation of religion (Lumbard, 2009, pp. 82-83).

The aims of British domination were primarily political and economic. Therefore, despite the enforcement of Anglo-Muhammadan law and the English language upon the Muslim populace, the threat to the Islamic tradition at a truly intellectual, and not merely political, level was not to come directly from them. It came at the hands of a number of Muslim thinkers themselves influenced by the British and their notions of progress and civilization, rationalism and naturalism. Herein began the true battle between the Islamic tradition in India and the modernity spawned by the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, the French Revolution, and other modern developments in Europe, which was inherited by the nineteenth-century Britain that ruled over India. Historically, this struggle began in the aftermath of the Uprising of 1857, largely led by Muslims, in which they were thoroughly defeated and subsequently treated very harshly by the British, bearing the brunt of British hostility and suppression. This defeat and oppression shook the Islamic community of India and left them in a state of crisis. Being subdued and ruled by the enemy, the Muslims had three options: join the enemy, continue to oppose him, or carry on as before. The traditional þulamå´ and the Sufis were to adopt this third option and concentrated on preserving and transmitting traditional Islamic teachings. The second option, due to the strength of the enemy, was not seriously adopted until the beginning of the Independence Movement in the second quarter of the twentieth century, and was then adopted generally by groups of a reformist stance, although many among the þulamå´ also partook in it. The first position that of adopting the ways of the British was the one taken by the proponents of Westernization and modernism, who were to find their voice in Sayyid AÆmad Khån, the most important modernist of Muslim India. The primary forerunner of Sayyid AÆmad Khån was Karamat þAlì Jawnpurì (d. 1873), the first important ideological modernist produced by Muslim India (Ibid, p. 84).

2.3.2. The response to modernism

All traditional schools, as well as the Ahl-i-hadìth, perhaps the most important fundamentalist group in India at this time, were completely opposed to modernism and the errors that it promulgated, especially among the educated classes. But some were more vocal and responsive than others. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the followers of traditional Islam were roughly divided into three groups: those associated with AÆmad Reza Shåh (1856-1921) and the school of Bareilly, those associated with the school of Deoband, and the rest of the traditional population, including those associated with older schools like those of Farangì Mahall and Khayrabåd. Out of these, the last remained the most unaffected by modernism and were therefore the least responsive, continuing to teach Islam according to the traditional methods and choosing to focus on the internal dimensions of the religion. This was largely the attitude of almost all traditionalists, some of whom, however, took a more active stance towards the new ideas affecting the understanding of Islam both in the intelligentsia and the populace around them. The school of Bareilly founded by Ahmad Reza Shåh, a charismatic ålim and shaykh of the Qådiriyya Sufi order, adherents of which are known as Barelvìs, fought to preserve Sufism as it was traditionally and popularly practiced in India, from attacks by both modernists and reformers as well as from other Sufi schools like the Deobandìs, who sought to replace popular Sufism with a more sober, law-bound, and intellectual Sufism. The response of the school of Bareilly to modernism was one of hostility and rejection both from a theological and, especially, a juristic standpoint (Lumbard, 2009, pp. 92-93).

The school of Deoband is the best known of the aforementioned schools, and has become one of the major institutions of learning in the Sunnì world. The school of Deoband is often characterized as reformist, which usually implies puritanical ideas and a break from tradition, but this characterization is not accurate. The Deobandìs no doubt have certain characteristics that they share with reformist groups, such as opposition to various popular practices of Sufism and an emphasis on the revival of Islam, but in all essential matters of doctrine and practice, they remain completely orthodox and traditional[21] (Rashid, 2000).

Conclusion:

In this chapter it was examined that, Central Asia Islamic fundamentalism has a close relationship with radical Islam and its organisations.Islamic revival refers to the support for an increased influence of Islamic values on the modern world as a response to Western and secular trends. The evolution of the process of Islamic radicalism is related to the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but its evolved form or in other words its (manifestation) returns to the post-collapse period. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam was restricted in the identitification of the people of the region; however, after the collapsse of the Soviet Union, there was a growing interest in Islam among Central Asian populations. During the first years of independence there was much controversy over what role Islam was to play in the process of construction of new political and social order. Initially, there was much enthusiasm on the part of the elites to support Islamic revival, because Islamic card would help them gain support of masses in consolidating their powers as well as fill the ideological vacuum created by the demise of Marxism-Leninism.

Central Asian authorities had become more and more antagonistic towards forms of Islamic expression that were on the rise in the region soon after independence. Lack of experience, education and expertise in dealing with religious issues prompted these elites to use old Soviet era mechanisms of control over religious activity, often retaining Communist Party's traditional hostility towards Islam. The Central Asian governments quickly adopted policies limiting Islamic political activity fearing the importation of radical Islam and its allied social and political activities. The appeal of Islamic-based political movements in the Fergana valley is owed largely to the fact that people lacked an outlet for secular political expression.

People felt disenfranchised and alienated not only from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes but also from the traditional leader of civil society. In fact, people turned to Islam as a alternative and outlet for political expression. The outsider forces quickly radicalized this indigenous Isamic revival.

21- In the last twenty years, a gradual politicization of many Deobandì schools in Pakistan has taken place, which has resulted in a form of Deobandism which is akin to a militant Wahhåbism and is quite removed from the traditional Sufi piety of the founders of Deoband.

Gorbachev's reforms loosening of the state's control on political expression in Central Asia. Space was provided for the activities of Islamic groups and movements. Despite the best efforts of Stalin's terror machine and Soviet anti-religious propagandists, illegal schools and centers continued to survive throughout the Soviet period. The role of Islam did not disappear completely. There is no doubt that Islam is deeply ingrained in Central Asian ethnicity and culture. However, effects of the Soviet legacy weakened Islam. Although the Soviet regime did not cause Islam to entirely disappear, it eventually caused total de-Islamization. Today, Islam remains one of the strongest sources of identity. Islamic revival in post-Soviet Central Asia can be characterized as moderate, given, first of all, lack of political experience in Islam, and the legacy of the Soviet rule, which had a major secularizing effect on Central Asian societies. In fact, secularization as on of the wages of west civilization during Soviet Union, was limiting the role of religion, especially Islam.

In is worthe mentioning that, the issue of Islamic radicalism featured far from top in the list of serious problems that newly independent Central Asian states and its leaders faced in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but later in the post-Soviet period, some concerns were raised about revival of Islam and fears were conjured up about the possible threat emanating from Islam's extreme forms coming from abroad. Immediate measures were taken by the Central Asian elites to suppress different forms of Islamic expression, often labeling the ordinary believers 'fundamentalists'.

However, during this chapter it became clear that outside forces had fewer roles in provoking Islamic radicalism than in the political-economic and social conditions existing in the republics situated in Fergana valley. It should be said that, Islamic revival was a natural and gradual process after a long period of suppression. The internal problems and difficulties of societies paved the way for reviving the limited role of Islam (Islamic Rradicalsim) during the years of Soviet rule for identification. Since the region was isolated from the broader Islamic world for a long period of time and developed on its own, it had to absorb customs and traditions of local communities and adapt to circumstances imposed from above.

As a result, Islam in Central Asia took its moderate shape, free from fanaticism or political ambitions. Therefore, there is no breeding ground for genuine politicization of the faith, even if there are efforts by outside forces to import more radical form of Islam to Central Asia. However, if Islam is to be radicalized, it will still be not because of outside influence but conditioned by the discontent with economic hardships and inability of authorities to build a just society with democratic principles and the excesses of authoritarian regimes to increasing their powers across Central Asian republics.

Islamic revival that is now taking place in Central Asia is a natural process. In addition to historical legacy of Islam, this revival process is currently being influenced by internal socio-economic conditions and political situation. In other words, process of revival of Islam is related to expression of discontent with current economic decline and authoritarian regimes and the role of outside forces is less influential. Confrontation with so-called fundamentalist groups is considered good justification and in other word pretex for covering up harsh measures taken against them. After the September 11 events, this trend was facilitated. It can be said that revival of Islam, is not a threat to the stability in society but is a threat to the position of elites that want to remain in power. It should be said that effective internal factors in revival of Islam are concerned to political, socio-economic, and religious conditions.

In general, it can be said that, considering Islam as a political ideology which is able to face the malfunctioning of the Soviet and at the same time confront the influence of western civilization propagated Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

The research achievement in this section of chapter is that, Islamic radicalization or revival of Islam in Fergana valley, is a driving and stimulating thought and force to role of religion (Islam) as outlet for political expression and emancipate from the domestic critical situation due to the inefficiencies of autocratic and authoritarian regimes to solve crises and as well, as get rid of the feeling of deprivation and alienation.

In this section of the thesis, it became clear that modernity confronts traditional societies with multiple social and identity crises. These crises are mainly the production of the transformation of the role of religion in individual and social life. Thus, religious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to these developments.

The theory of confronting modernity as one of the main factor of the emergence and development of fundamentalism must be regarded the product of those research that consider fundamentalism as the product and factor of more comprehensive social changes, rather than seeing it as a product of a particular religion, such as Islam. Modernity creates structural changes such as civilization, ethnic and religious pluralism, and nation-state building in society that lead to the collapse of tradition. Fundamentalism has a religious character and is actually one of a variety of protest reactions against modernization process, and its social, cultural, political and economic effects which specifically has challenged religious beliefs and practices. Modernity by creating changes societies that such radical reactions are

In fact Modernity has triggered radical responses by creating massive changes in traditional societies, the changes such as: Dividing the coherent and integrated structure of traditional societies into different areas which did not necessarily relate to religious values, defining new roles in society, undermine pyramid patterns of power, undermining the key place of religion in traditional society by religious pluralism and abandonment of region by cultural pluralism, challenging religious absolutism by developments in science.

In fact, modernity brings a variety of processes against traditional Islamic societies: relativism, secularization, democratiztion, pluralism.

Indeed, modernity, as a wave of Western civilization, attempts to reduce the role of the religion in unifying the structure of traditional societies by creating structural transformations. It is noteworthy that modifications of modernity are reinforced by other factors. For example phenomenon of migration and the formation of state-nations also spurred this cultural pluralism. It can be said that, when the structure and the cultural and social cohesion of traditional societies are questioned by the changes of modernity, is revealed the need for a new identity which fundamentalism ideology usually provides such an alternative. The loss of the social and cultural links of the traditional community in migrants mainly reveals intended need for identity.

Meanwhile, in this section it was determined that, local factors also contribute to strengthening fundamentalism. Factors such as: being abruptly, disorderly and unbalanced of modern changes in Islamic world, colonization and confrontation of the Islamic world with Europeans, totalitarian governments and the lack of modern and traditional democratic institutions and foundations, tendency and enthusiasm for religion and spirituality, and the lack of religious education among fundamentalists. As previously mentioned in this section, cultural, ritual, political and social variations has affected the intensity and extent of fundamentalist reactions as well as its form and qualitative features. Generally, thsese factors mainly promote and contextualize of fundamentalism. To illustrate the response of traditional Islam to modernity, issue of the rise of modernism in Muslim India was investigated at the end of the chapter and consequently, it can be said that traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism was based on the revival of Islam as a cultural and political identity in a fundamentalist way.

The research achievement in this section of chapter is that, modernity is considerd as one of the contextualizer factor of the emergence and development of fundamentalism and in fact, is a suitable platform for explaining and analyzing the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism in the post-Soviet era.

Chapter V

Analysis of the relationship of the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization and subsequent emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley

Introduction:

The clash between the West and Islam will be vital to the course of world events over the coming decades. Islam is, in fact, the only civilization that ever put the survival of the West in doubt -- and more than once! What is interesting is how this conflict flows not simply from the differences between the two civilizations, but more importantly from their similarities. the relations between Muslims and peoples of other civilizations -- Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist, Jewish -- have been generally antagonistic; most of these relations have been violent at some point in the past; many have been violent in the 1990s.

Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbors. Muslims make up about one-fifth of the world's population but in the 1990s they have been far more involved in intergroup violence than the people of any other civilizations. Several reasons have been offered as to why there is so much violence associated with Islamic nations. One common suggestion is that the violence is a result of Western imperialism. Current political divisions among the countries are artificial European creations. Moreover, there is still lingering resentment among Muslims for what their religion and their lands had to endure under colonial rule.

What was highlighted in relation to the cause of Islamic fundamentalism in the preceding chapters were two categories of identity and, in fact, religion. In fact, use of the civilization approach to the issue of fundamentalism was the desired framework.

Approaches to identity based on the idea of “modernization,” or on the belief that the way to peaceful co-existence of nations is possible only if nations choose the path chosen by the West, were criticized for their ethnocentric bias. If the whole world suddenly became the West, there would be no clashes of civilizations, as prophesied by Huntington, nor inter-state conflicts emanating from within the state, as asserted by inside/out theorists such as G.M. Tamás.

For the modernists, in order to get out of disorder and conflict, nations must subdue their national identities for the sake of a global liberal identity, which is a guarantee of peace. On the other hand, if some nations are inherently too weak to do so (i.e. embark on a path of “modernization” and subdue their national identities for the sake of a change to the right, liberal-type identity), such nations are doomed to live in misery and conflict.

Given the main subject of the thesis, namely, the contexts of emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley, according to its review in the framework of the theory of the clash of civilizations, the contradiction between the two Islamic civilizations and the West were considered. In fact, research objective in this chapter of the thesis, is the analysis of same contradiction between the western civilization and the Islamic civilization and its relationship with emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley. In this regard, our analytical axis is the Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations which was fueled by the idea of "civilizational identity", the formation of which, asserted Huntington, inevitably leads to major conflict. The debate, however, remains focused on territorial lines: should we talk about a bigger "box" or a smaller one, i.e., should we talk about nation-state identity or civilizational identity.

1. Emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley as production of contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization

In the third chapter of the thesis, we analyzed the contexts of the emergence of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley, within the confrontation between Islamic and Western civilization which were divided into three periods of Tsarist Russia, Soviet period, and post-Soviet period.

1.1. In the Tsarist Russia period, the contextualizer factors such as Tsarist colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions, suppression peoples, destruction of Islamic beliefs, increasing taxes, Russia large-scale colonial exploitation of oil and coal resources especially cotton, famine and starvation, were the contexts for anti-Russian protests and anti-colonial rebellions in Turkistan (Central Asia) specially Fergana valley and eventually religious revival.

The goal of Russian Tsarist rule was to weaken Islam and its role in identification the people of the region.

It is no exaggeration to say that the provincial head had a monopoly of power in almost all spheres of social and economic life as he applied the logic and spirit of the Tsarist colonial policy locally (Starr, 2011, p. 73). Although the Tsarist rule wanted to weaken Islam in the region, it attempted to do this by ignoring rather than directly attacking religion (Fierman, 1991, p. 13).

The ideas of modernism and industrialization as a wave of Western civilization by Tsarist Russia were implemented to overcome the resources of Fergana valley, especially cotton.

Russians brought industrialization to the region, in order to exploit the newly acquired territories (Keller, 2001, p. 8). The major area for cotton production in all Central Asia and overwhelmingly the source of increased production after the Russian conquest was the Fergana valley.

Russians also exploited the oil and coal resources of the Fergana province, with six oilfields and twenty-eight coalmines operating there by 1913–14. The largest of these coal mines were near the towns of Kizilkie and Sulukta (Musaev, 1999, p. 36). As a result of Russian colonization, by the beginning of the 20th century the region of Central Asia was transformed into a supplier of raw materials. Industrialization and Russian settlement policies had, however, a devastating effect on local population, such as insufficient food production, economic decline and impoverishment (Quoted in Daniel Brower in "Islam and Ethnicity", p. 132).

As part of its colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions on Turkistan and other parts of Central Asia that would assure its continued political, military, and economic control of the region. Actively drawing on the experience of other colonial powers, Russia's political elite actively and effectively applied the famous principle of "divide and rule" (Starr, 2011, p. 74.). These policies of colonization and the prevailing style of colonial rule united local peoples against Russia. Because the revolt was masterminded by a religious leader, this action is usually described as a form of Islamic resistance to Russian domination.

In fact, however, this resistance was not a religious war against unbelievers, but was a protest against worsened conditions into which the ordinary masses found themselves as a result of changes imposed from outside (Botoiarova, 2005, 42-43).

In gerneral, it can be said that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization is highlighted in this period mean from the mid nineteenth century, which in turn provided a context for religious revival in Fergana valley, indeed. Sub-local factors arising from Russia's colonial policy, such as increasing taxes, famine and starvation and suppression peoples are also factors contributing to this confrontation and revivalism. In fact, the theory of Huntington's civilization clash is applicable in this period.

In the final section, the feasibility of applying the theory of clash of civilizations to the emergence of fundamentalism in this period and in the following two periods will be examined.

1.2. In the Soviet period, the factors such as Stalin's extensive and consistent de-Islamization policies, unsuitable economic conditions, the exploitative exploitation policy of natural resources especially cotton, Western civilization waves for example modernization values, the Bolsheviks' policy of redrawing or delineation the borders along ethnic or national lines and administrative delineation, Stalin's policy of transforming Muslim nations into modern states to separate Muslims in Central Asia from each other and creating distinct ethnic identities, starvation, severe suppression of Muslims during the Bolshevik regime and confronting Islamic beliefs and symbols in Central Asia (process of secularization), implementation of political-economic reforms during the Gorbachev period under the title Glasnost and Prostorica and subsequently highlighting of Islam's role in society and formation of identity, ethnic diversity, poverty and unemployment, unresolved territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts provided the context for the activities of the Islamic reformist movements and actually the re-Islamization.

In contrast to the Tsarist Russia period, resistance against the Soviet government was no less fragmented. In this period, the resistance against Tsarist Russians replaced resistance against the Bolshevik regime and their successors.

They engaged its members as intermediaries with the Muslim community, as partners in the process of reform and modernization, and as assistants in the imposition of new systems of governance and control. While each side pursued its own interests, they both wanted an end to hostilities and the restoration of stability (Starr, 3011, p. 103). The Bolsheviks aimed to create groups and forces through which they could exercise control over the region, pursue reforms, and weaken unreliable and potentially dangerous forces (Ibid, p. 114).

An important dimension of the Bolsheviks' policy of strengthening their position in the non-Russian areas of the former Russian empire was to redraw or re-delineate national and administrative borders. This was seen as an essential step toward efficient control and modernization in the region (Ibid, p. 105).

Being transferred to another administrative unit did not produce immediate changes in people's everyday lives, nor did it seriously affect their interests. As a result of the new delineation of borders, the Fergana valley was parceled out among three national-administrative entities. As a consequence, it disappeared from the political map as an independent economic and cultural whole, turning instead into a peripheral zone connecting the three union republics among which it had been divided (Masov, 1991, pp. 115–35).

Policy of redrawing or delineation the borders along ethnic or national lines, contributed to the intensification of ethnic conflicts in particualr, between the Uzbeks and Tajiks.

During the Stalinist period, since the idea of "socialism in one country" in country was raised, a total political and economic centralization reigned in Central Asia. What was called a system of "command and administrative control" prevailed everywhere, and especially in the cotton production in the Fergana valley.

Collectivization in the Fergana valley continued from 1927 until 1933. By the end of 1932, some 81 percent of farming households in the valley had been collectivized, and they accounted for 79 percent of all production (oblasti, p. 40).

During the Stalin era Central Asia failed to become a unified economic region. Moscow considered it as a source of raw materials for the more developed European areas of the USSR.

The Stalin era left Central Asia as a poorly developed, agrarian, and subsidized region dependent on Russia for whatever economic well-being it enjoyed. This is all the more true of the Fergana valley, as a periphery of a periphery (Starr, 2011, p. 123-124).

Russian colonization brought ideas of modernization to the Fergana valley by the end of the nineteenth century. In spite of war, revolution, and civil war, these ideas spread to all social classes and to even the most remote corners of the Fergana valley over the following decades.

Without any doubt, Islam was an integral part of the cultural identity of Central Asians. It was hardly possible to find a native Central Asian who would not identify himself as Muslim (Gleason,1997, p. 170).

When the Soviet rule was established in Central Asia in 1918, the new regime had to have a more consistent and solid policy for Islam, which was probably the most important identity for the Central Asian people (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 52).

Of course, the Bolshevik politics were not radical to Islam in order to strengthen their position and support for non-Russians, but later, after consolidating their position, they adopted a policy of confronting Islamic beliefs and symbols in Central Asia (process of secularization).

When Stalin came to power, the Soviet attempt to undermine all religions, including Islam, was further intensified (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 23). In late 1920s, in order to destroy the power of Islam completely as a social and political force, the party replaced the Arabic and Persian script by a new Latin alphabet for Turkic-speaking people of the USSR (Keller, 2001 p. xv).

The Soviets also sought to undermine the influence of "popular" Islam, which had always existed on the communal level and linked the culture and folklore of people in the Fergana valley with their religious identity. The Soviet government attempted to control all aspects of Muslims' social and political life.

Russification, the policy of imposing Russian culture on non-Russian peoples, provoked protests from most of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Soon bilingualism prevailed in Central Asia; not the former TurkoTajik bilingualism of the Fergana valley, but Russian-Kyrgyz, Russian-Tajik, and Russian-Uzbek bilingualism (Starr, 2011, p. 128-129).

The government's 1927-1940 policy of manipulating language had the further objective of breaking down Muslim unity and isolating Central Asia from the larger Islamic world. The price paid for modernization and the introduction of Soviet mass education was the irretrievable loss of culture, subsequent cultural deprivation, and the plunging of whole populations into backwardness.

Despite the restrictive Soviet policies, indigenous identity, grounded on a common culture, mentality, and emotional ties, somehow survived across the valley. Under the totalitarian system all power rested with the communist Party and all non-governmental entities and informal assemblies, including mosques, madrassas, maktabs, and gaps (male interest forums) were violently suppressed. In fact, Stalinist society rested on lies and intimidation.

Religion was criminalized and believers persecuted. During these years all parts of the Fergana valley experienced state terror and the merciless destruction of whole classes of people (Starr, 2011, p. 134).

In addition, residents of the Fergana valley endured three periods of starvation: in 1932–33 caused by collectivization; the wartime famine of 1941–45; and the post-war famine of 1946–47. In subsequent periods, less attention was paid to religion, but enmity did not disappear.

It did not, however, mean that anti-religious propaganda was completely terminated. Under Brezhnev the leadership did not show any particular concern with religious issues, but propaganda continued in the form of regular party and government resolutions, that was a part of general ideological work. Little was done to change the nature of anti-religious propaganda (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 35).

After the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran in 1979, the relatively stable relations between the Soviet authorities and Islam were somewhat undermined. In response to the events in Iran, the Soviets decided to strengthen security and law-enforcement in Central Asian republics. This was mainly because of their proximity to Iran, which would supposedly destabilize the entire region by potential foreign ideological subversion. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also had further strained the relations between Soviet regime and the Islamic republics of the USSR.

In general, the Soviet official religious policy between 1917 and the 1980s has an ambiguous and contradictory nature. During this time Islam was, by turns, severely repressed, cautiously compromised, repressed again, and finally, reluctantly recognized. Yet much of the traditional Islamic culture of Central Asia managed to survive through unofficial activity, forced by the regime to go underground. Despite all the limitations that Islam faced, it remained a crucial component of culture and the basic way of life of many Central Asians.

The era of perestroika, which began with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, directly affected the political and economic institutions of the country and, even more so, the thinking of the average Soviet citizen.

The period of Gorbachev (1985-1991) which is directly associated with the period of democratic transformation of the Soviet society under the policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness), aimed at restructuring the stagnant society left from Brezhnev period. The major target of Gorbachev's reforms was economy. Neither Central Asia nor Islam ranked high on his agenda at the beginning of his tenure. In fact, he was the only Soviet leader who did not have a well-defined antireligious agenda, similar to that of his predecessors. However, he did not abandon a general line of anti-religious policy, adopted by his predecessors (Haghayeghi, 1996, pp. 54 and 48). In this period, Islam was identified as a major cause of Central Asia's 'backwardness' and wide-spread corruption. Thus, it was decided that in order to deal with corruption, the authorities should deal first of all with religion.

With perestroika and glasnost, Islam (and other religions) was given a freedom for the first time since it was curbed by Lenin's religious campaign of 1920s (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 60). The first signs of religious activism in Central Asia were seen in late 1980s. In 1988, in Uzbekistan (Central Asia's most religious republic), religious activists joined demonstrations staged in Tashkent by Uzbek students, who demanded the restoration of Uzbek language and culture (Critchlow 1991, p. 176). In this period, Islam played an important role in identifying people of region. In fact, Gorbachev's reforms led to the opening up of political space for revivalist groups of religion and culture.

One of the most striking outcomes of the Gorbachev period was the formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) (Hunter, 2001). Gorbachev's period was crucial in transforming almost every aspect of Soviet citizen's life, including religion. Perestroika offered religious freedom to Central Asian republics among other things. With Gorbachev's changed policy on religion there was an impetus for enhancing the role of Islam in society in late 1980s. Islam was welcomed and promoted as a guardian of social mores of Central Asian society. By the end of Soviet era there was a widespread consensus, that Islam's role in society should be greater, but there was not any concept as to how Islamic norms should be understood and observed in on-going conditions. As such, for the overwhelming majority of the population, Islam was still primarily interpreted in terms of tradition, culture or symbol (Akiner, 2003, p. 99). Religious freedom offered by Gorbachev's period was not unaffected by liberalization of religious life and modernization and also secularization wages. The promotion of secular values will only fan more fundamentalisms in the Muslim world.

In general, it can be said that in Soviet period, the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization is also highlighted in this period mean from the mid nineteenth century, which in turn provided a context for the activities of the Islamic reformist movements and actually the re-Islamization. In addition, the theory of Huntington's civilization clash is also applicable in this period, since in this period we can see the contradiction between Western civilization and Islamic civilization. In this period, the waves of Western civilization, such as modernization, and typically secularization and prudent confrontation to Islam are remarkable. Like the Tsarist Russsia period, sub-local factors such as, implementation of political-economic reforms during the Gorbachev period under the title Glasnost and Prostorica and subsequently highlighting of Islam's role in society and formation of identity, unsuitable economic conditions, severe suppression of Muslims during the Bolshevik regime, ethnic diversity, poverty and unemployment, starvation, unresolved territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts, played an important role in strengthening this confrontation and Islamic radicalization.

1.3. In post-Soviet period, the factors such as the role of external actors like Taliban rule over Afghanistan, and etc, in strengthening and supporting Islamic tendencies, economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning, social anomalies and ruling political corruption in Central Asian republics, drug trade, inequalities , the prominent role of Islam in determining part of the identity of the region, the development of religious self-awareness, the lack of legal frameworks for political campaigns, the inability of new independent governments to manage crisis of region , the civil war in Tajikistan and the hard-line positions of the leaders of the region specially Uzbekistan's leadership towards the development of Islamic political activities and democratic freedoms also contributed to the emergence and promotion of Islamic fundamentalism.

In this period, the theme of identity will be highlighted in Fergana valley. All the region's social-political processes inevitably are linked to identity.

Caught in a new crisis of identity, the political and cultural elites of all three countries scour the cultural heritages of their peoples in search of workable models for the present. This process has distinct features in the three countries, reflecting the differing process of state-building in each (Metz, 1973, p. 473).

During the Soviet period most conflicts were inter-ethnic and prompted by such practical issues as water and territory. In the post-Soviet era most conflicts had become ideological, mainly concerning religion (Starr, 2011, p. 280).

In this period we are witnessing emergence of Islam as a significant factor in the political life of Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union even where religion had declined to the status of a cultural artifact.

Meanwhile, the opening of the external borders and the nominal return of Central Asia to the lap of Islamic civilization led to increased public interest in Islam and to its politicization. At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR Central Asian countries benefited from major investments made by the Muslim world, mainly from the Gulf states (Starr, 2011, pp. 339-340).

Initially the new authorities region and elsewhere endeavored to show their commitment to Islamic tradition as a part of national culture. Later they came to treat the Islamic resurgence with more caution, seeking to submit Muslim organizations and movements to state control. In this period process of re-Islamization is taking place in all the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, and particularly in northern Tajikistan, most of which belongs geographically to the Fergana valley.

After the liberalization of religious life that started in the mid-1990s, religion began to emerge from under the onslaught of Soviet official atheism. It turned out that Islam not only had not lost its place in the worldview of the Tajik people, but was reviving with a new vigor that enabled it to encompass all areas of life, including the political. Divided among three countries, it is no surprise that the Fergana valley recently should have become the object of influence and pressures from beyond its borders. These arise from the intense competition for influence in the region, and result in efforts by outside groups to impose by various means their own religious, political, and ideological agendas. Inevitably, this has led to mounting tensions. Nevertheless, sub-local conditions also contribute to the increase in tensions. Specifically, prevalent social and economic hardships, ethnic diversity, and unresolved territorial disputes all give rise to destructive passions. The fact that there exists a high level of religious consciousness among the general population also becomes to some degree a factor of alienation and even conflics.

Rising poverty and unemployment in the Fergana valley led to a growing dissatisfaction and alienation among the population. In this period, the people of the region to withdraw from the difficult economic and social conditions are readily subjected to the ideological influence of radical and extremist religious and political groups. Feraing the growth f a genuine political opposition, Central Asia leaders quickly suppressed nascent political movements protesting the deteriorating economic conditions. Deprived of a genuine political alternative, opposition found an outlet in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asian leaders are now concerned with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, embodied in Wahhabism- a strict Islamic movement that originated in Saudi Arabia based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd el Wahhab (1704-1792)- throughout the region (Murtazin, 2000, p. 139). The appeal of Islamic-based political movements, in Fergana valley is owed largely to the fact that people lacked an outlet for secular political expression. People increasingly felt disenfranchised and alienated not only from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes but also from the traditional leaders of civil society. Increasingly, people turned to Islam as a means for political expression. Outsiders quickly radicalized this indigenous Islamic revival, particularly in Fergana valley where Islam retained its hold despite 70 years of Soviet rule (Rashid, p. 55).

The Islamic revival in Central Asia was a grassroots movement, as non-state groups asserted their presence in the public realm. Several Islamic forces emerged in the opposition with the governorates in the region of Fergana valley including Hizb ut-Tahrir, IRPT, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and so on.

The appearance of Islamic extremist movements and parties in Tajikistan has forced society there to reflect on the preservation of national unity and stability in the country once again (Bukhari-zade, December 23, 2008). It can be said that religion, can be also a force for consolidating society and protecting national and state interests.

The role of outsiders or external forces in stimulating Islamic revival or Islamic radicalization and finally fundamentalist activity, should not be ignored. The factors such as the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the end of the bipolar system and the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, indeed, Tajik civil war, the role and influence of Turkey as a development model by the West in competing with Iran, Taliban rule over Afghanistan, the role of the United States in supporting Islamist forces because of its rivalry with Russia and its presence in Afghanistan, the role and influence of Saudi Arabia with the Wahhabi ideology, and Pakistan's role in strengthening political and fundamentalist forces specially Taliban.

The surviving leaders of the communist era, who, in the light of new developments, sought to preserve their authority in the name of the leaders of national found political Islam as their most important competitor. Following the long-term, but failed, efforts of Soviet leaders to separate the people of Central Asia from their Islamic identity it soon became clear that Islam still constitutes part of the region's identity (Olcott, 1992, pp. 74-04).

The economic difficulties, social anomalies and political corruption ruling the these republics were provided the context for the activities of these serious political rivals of the elite of the region (Kolaie, 2002, p. 101).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic difficulties stemming from the destruction of the economic system based on centralized planning and massive subsidies of Moscow accompanied by threatening dimensions. The inability of new independent states to manage regional crises intensified the worry of spreading religious feelings. Several attempts to undermine the traditional construction of power in the region seriously threatened the leaders of the Central Asian republics (kolaei, 2005, p. 218). The civil war in Tajikistan caused the elite ruling Central Asia to point to it, to block the process of political developments in the region and prevent the spread of democratic freedoms (Kolaei, 1997, pp. 261-46). In fact, The experience of the Tajik civil war paved the way for the political elites to confront the development of the activities of Islamic fundamentalists.

The Uzbek leadership, who was deeply concerned about the spread of fundamentalism in the country, played an effective role in the fight against Dushanbe's administration opposition. In turn, these efforts have added to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalist tendencies (Abdul Karim, 2000, p. 106).

The September 11 events for Central Asian governments were a good pretext to confront fundamentalist movements in order to come out of the political crisis and confront the pressure of religious groups and thights.

Central Asian fundamentalist forces have been accused of interfering in smuggling affairs and Transportation of drugs to meet their financial needs. Given the inequalities and dire economic situation of the republics in the Fergana valley, there was activity in the narcotics trade to meet the financial needs of from people.

Rapid population growth and difficult economic conditions, political corruption, drug trafficking, inequalities and huge economic problems simultaneously contributed to the expansion of fundamentalism in Central Asia along the development of religious awareness. Lack of legal framework for political struggles has also contributed to strengthening these trends. Although religious thoughts have been suppressed in Central Asia as in other parts of the Soviet Union for decades, but the depth and influence of religious beliefs has led to its continuity and sustainability (Kolaei, 2005, p. 221).

In general, it should be said that in post-soviet period, the theory of the clash of civilizations can not properly explain the clashes and conflicts. In fact, it can be said that, in this period the contradiction between western civilization and the Islamic civilization is not highlighted, in other words, the formation of this process is related to the two previous periods and fundamentalism is not the product of the reaction of Islamic civilization to Western civilization in this period. Finally the theory of clash of civilizations has no applicability in this period and in fact, modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism seem to better explain the confrontations in the post-Soviet period.

1.3.1. Fundamentalism theory and violence

Fundamentalism is a poorly defined phenomenon and there is no clearly articulated fundamentalism theory. The term *fundamentalism* was originally used to explain a new conservative form of Christianity that emerged in the United States in the early 1900s, and that formed as a counterpoint to modernism. Therefore, for some, fundamentalism carries an inherently Christian connotation. More broadly the term has come to denote any individual or group that believes in the literal nature of scripture, clear-cut religious practices and beliefs, and the perception that there is an urgent need to get back to basics—the ‘‘fundamentals of the faith’’— which are being corrupted or have been lost, and to reassert religion into society and, in some cases, political life (Gregg, 2016, pp. 344-345).

Several scholars note that the term fundamentalism is also problematic because it carries negative connotations, suggesting that fundamentalists are by definition militant, extremist, irrational, unyielding, and even violent (Juergensmeyer, 1993 and 2008, pp. 4–5).

Furthermore, rarely do those associated with fundamentalism self-identify as such (Esposito and jurgensmeyer, 1995, 1993, pp. 7-8, pp. 4-6). However, fundamentalism does point to an important trend occurring across religious traditions and a phenomenon that has become entangled with violent action.

Overall, fundamentalists are different from their mainstream adherents in the sense of threat that they perceive to their faith and religious way of life. This sense of threat compels fundamentalists to take actions aimed at preserving what they believe to be the correct interpretation and practice of their religion. Literature on fundamentalism identifies two triggers that produce a religious reaction in particular. *First*, fundamentalists react to the rise of secularism. Fundamentalists perceive secularism encroaching on religion and forcing it to the margins of society and political life, and that secularism is leading to moral decay. Fox contends: ‘‘the two characteristics that define fundamentalism are its origins as a defensive reaction to modernity and the attempt to impose fundamentalist rules and standards of behavior on society as a whole in order to actualize this defense (Fox, 2004, p. 113).

In the post-Soviet period, especially after the events of September 11, we are witnessing the readiness of the Central Asian republics to confront radical and fundamentalist currents. The republics that are characterized by the nature of non-religious democratic regimes. The process of modernization and secularization and, in general, target of westernization remained from the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods are now the inheritance of the post-Soviet era.

Juergensmeyer argues that secularism and fundamentalism (what he calls religious nationalism) are both ideologies, complex systems of beliefs that aspire to shape political and social action. As such, secularism and fundamentalism are in direct competition with one another (Juergensmeyer, 1993 and 2008, pp. 30-35, pp. 9-38).

The rise of secularism is understood as a threat to the faith, and this threat requires the need for direct action to prevent the further erosion of religion from public life. Most scholars would agree that fundamentalism, including the violence it invokes, is defensive in nature.

A *second* distinct trigger of fundamentalism, one that is less discussed in the literature but as important, is new interpretations and practices that emerge from within a particular religious tradition and that challenge more conservative understandings of the faith. For example, source criticism—the practice of using historical evidence to identify the human sources of scripture in Christianity—ignited conflicts and schisms within several denominations between those that see Christian scriptures as the literal word of God and those that understand it to be divinely inspired, but also the product of humans (Queen II, and et al, 2009, p. 592–594).

More recent examples of new interpretations and practices within religious traditions include ordaining women as clerics and sanctioning gay marriage. Fundamentalist reactions to new interpretations and practices within a religious tradition aim to prevent what they believe to be false and destructive beliefs and practices from taking hold. This type of fundamentalist response looks more like a civil war within a tradition, rather than a religious reaction against wider society or a government’s policies (Gregg, 2016, p. 346).

Fundamentalists react in at least three distinct ways to the perceived threats from secularism and new interpretations of the faith. *First*, fundamentalists may choose to isolate themselves from the threat. This course of action could include physically isolating by creating separate communities, breaking off from the mainstream religion and forming new sects or denominations, or socially isolating the group from wider society by creating parallel institutions, such as schools, clinics, stores, and so on. Isolation is a possible course of action for either threats from secularization or new interpretations within the faith. *Second*, groups may attempt to change policies or other aspects of governance through political action, including through elections or pressuring the government for change through demonstrations and other means (Ibid).

Third, fundamentalists may choose violence as a course of action in an attempt to push back the perceived threat, either from society or from within the faith. Rapoport notes that a fundamentalist group ‘‘is characterized as militant because it pursues causes so aggressively that it breaks laws made by the state (Rapoport, 1993, p. 429).

An example of these cases can be seen in the confrontation of religious groups and fundamentalist movements with the repressive governments of Central Asia. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan was one of the republics that were deeply concerned about the spread of fundamentalism in the country.

The people of the region to withdraw from the difficult economic and social conditions are readily subjected to the ideological influence of radical and extremist religious and political groups. Feraing the growth a genuine political opposition, Central Asia leaders quickly suppressed nascent political movements protesting the deteriorating economic conditions. Deprived of a genuine political alternative, opposition found an outlet in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asian leaders are now concerned with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism (Murtazin, 2000, p. 139).

In fact, it can be said that Islam for the people of the region due to the lack of legal frameworks and campaigns to deal with the difficult economic conditions was conceived as a way out of political expression. People increasingly felt disenfranchised and alienated from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes.

As with social movements, violence for fundamentalists is primarily instrumental; it is a means for realizing larger goals. Also similar to social movements, fundamentalists may turn to violence if they feel they do not have adequate political avenues to affect change, or if the political process is taking too long; violence becomes necessary to stem the perceived tide against a growing threat. Second, fundamentalists may resort to violence if they feel betrayed by their political leaders. For example, in the 1956 elections in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) campaigned on promises of preferential treatment for the island’s majority Sinhalese Buddhists. When Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaika failed to deliver on these promises, he was assassinated by a Buddhist monk in 1959 (Little, 1994).

Third, violence can be a tool to clarify who is in the group and who is not; in this case it is an instrument to purify the movement from within and make examples of those that are not truly committed. Takfiri violence, killing apostate or wayward Muslims, is an example of this form of violence. Finally, fundamentalists may resort to violence if they feel threatened by society or government. Overall, fundamentalist violence is reactive, not proactive. This form of violence stands in sharp contrast to apocalyptic war (Gregg, 2016, pp. 346-347). In this regard, the theory of confronting modernity is also noteworthy to better explain the confrontations in the post-Soviet period.

Modernity has created multiple social and identity crises for traditional societies by creating a transformation in the role of religion in individual and social life. Religious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to these developments. Also, subsidiary and local factors also have different effects both in the severity and weakness of this reaction as well as how its emergence and outbreak (Hooshangi, 1389, p. 183). The theory of confronting modernity as one of the main factor of the emergence and development of fundamentalism must be regarded the product of those research that consider fundamentalism as the product and factor of more comprehensive social changes, rather than seeing it as a product of a particular religion, such as Islam. So that, if occurring in any other non-Muslim society, would produce similar consequences. In this regard, in particular, Abdullah Ahmad al-Naim argued that the fundamentalism is not the inevitable product of particular Islamic religious resources, but this phenomenon is an indigenous response to profound social, political and economic crises in Islamic societies (Ahmad Anna'im, 2003, pp.25-26). This category can be analyzed in the post-Soviet period.

From the viewpoint of these scholars, modernity creates structural changes in society that lead to the collapse of tradition. Civilization, ethnic and religious pluralism, and nation-state building are some of the most important of these changes (Haar, 2003, p. 5). Researchers in sociology of religion (bruce, 2008, pp. 1-10) often believe that the essence of fundamentalism movement is a kind of protest against the modernization process and its wide social, cultural, political and economic effects on societies that at least one of the most important sources of theoretical and practical inspiration of systems and social, political, and economic relations and even the family of these societies is "religion". Fundamentalism is one of a variety of protest reactions against modernity, which has a religious character. Therefore, it is expected that because religion is only one of the factors influencing and shaping values, causes and social systems in pre-modern times and other factors (such as agricultural-based economic system, political power relations, etc.) have also been involved in the formation of what is called traditional society, so fundamentalism must be a religious reaction to the theoretical and practical consequences of modernity, which specifically has challenged religious beliefs and practices. As the motivations of the fundamentalists have not necessarily and purely been defending the pure religion, and the numerous social, economic, and political factors have caused them to refer to that part of the tradition that has the greatest theorizing power (ie, religion) as the representative of the tradition and trying to restore it as the backbone of traditional life that is now threatened by modernity.

Overall, it should be said that, in the post-Soviet period, contrary to the previous periods, fundamentalism in the Fergana valley was not a product of a particular religion, such as Islam (or its confrontation with Western civilization), but it mainly is the result of the internal critical conditions of the its republics.

Conclusion and findings:

Consequently, it was examined that the contextualization of the emergence of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley related to the three periods of Tsarist Russia, Soviet, and post-Soviet. Given that in the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods, the confrontation between Islamic civilization and Western civilization was raised, thus the purpose of this thesis was to examine subject of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley from the window of theoretical framework of Huntington‘s clash of civilizations, theoretical framework that is comprehensively discussed in the second chapter.

The theory of the clash of civilizations was able to well explain the confrontations of the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods, but in order to explain the theses confrontations in the post-Soviet period this theory of the clash of civilizations was not applicable, therefore, it became clear that modernism and theories related to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism explained these confrontations properly. The process of the emergence of fundamentalism began gradually from the Tsarist Russia period with the expansionist policy of colonialism and continued until the end of the 20th century in the Soviet era. It can be said that the gradual evolution of the confrontation between the two Islamic and Western civilizations reached the point of perfection. In the post-Soviet period, the effects of this developed process in the Farangan Valley, even continued and expanded.

The Fergana valley is beset with numerous problems including, but not limited to, longstanding ethnic tensions exacerbated by a stagnant regional economy coupled with shortages in land distribution, water rights and housing. The period following the introduction of glasnost saw the unleashing of ethnic and religious forces that culminated in the series of violent events that took place between 1989 and 1992. Laid on the template of latent nationalism, the proliferation of religious sects divides the various ethnic populations, instead of unifying them. Religion is now used as a means to further divide and segment the already fractious mix of populations in Central Asia. In addition, there is the spector of renewed ethnic violence in the Fergana valley with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists who advocate the implementation of an Islamic state coupled with the emergence of religious tensions between the traditional religions of Central Asia (Islam and Orthodox Christianity) and recent converts of Christian sects (Ahmedova and Leitich, pp. 39-40).

Much of the tension in the region can be traced back directly to Soviet legacy. The Soviet authorities had a very specific approach to state-building; the consequences of these principles are still influencing the region. Between 1924 and 1928, the Central Asian republics were established to become the first administrative units in the region formed on the basis of ethnic nationality (Joldoshov, 2013).

The Soviet authorities divided people of the same religion and related language group into separate administrative units. The planners in Moscow determined that the Fergana valley region would be divided into three parts, although for most of its history it had been within the territory of a single state such as the Kokand Khanate or the Soviet Union. Intervention in the state-building process was based on a "merger" of nations under a central government and authority. In other words, while trying seemingly to create states based on the titular nationalities in the majority in a certain part of the region, the Soviet authorities in fact cared little about the great interdependence that existed in the Fergana valley. Ethnic issues are still extremely important for understanding much of the tension arising in the Valley. Not only is there division among the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik people, the issue is further complicated by the hostility between different identity-groups and minorities in the region. Additional pressure is arising due to the fact that not only does this tension exist inside each state, it could also escalate to the interstate level. Despite the containment of Islam during the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods, it continued to playing a key role in identification of the people of republics of the Fergana valley.

In the period of Tsarism Russia and the Soviet, our contextualizer factor was the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization, and factors such as ethnic tension and conflicts, suppression, starvation, poverty and so on and so forth., were the local sub-factors that played a double role in strengthening the rise of fundamentalism. In post-soviet period, these sub-local factors, in fact, are the contextualizer factors in the thesis. In other words, the main factor of emergence Islamic fundamentalism is the internal critical conditions in the Fergana valley republics. However, the development of Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana valley in this period has been influenced by external and mainly internal factors.

The past decade has seen a major growth in interest in Islam after decades of Soviet efforts to weaken its public and private influence. The independence has made it plain that during the years of militant atheism, Islam survived as a cultural-religious phenomenon. The ideological void created by the collapse of Marxism-Leninism nurtured the Islamic consciousness and raised concern about the practical implications for the latter's renaissance and its impact on the region's political development. This concern is warranted, considering the Islamic fundamentalism or extremism prevailing in some Islamic states.

The soviet experience with Islam was sufficient to produce the preconditions necessary for an Islamic revival. Soviet government viewed Islam as political and ideological threat and set out to destroy it like all other religious. The growing influence of the religion in the region has been accompanied by the emergence of fundamentalisms, which Central Asian governments have sought to suppress using tough measures. Islamic radicalism and subsequently Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley has primarily local causes, mainly autocratic policies of local governments, and although the impact of ideologies imported from neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran shouldn't be underestimated.

The introduction of Glasnost saw a loosening of the State's control and monopoly on political expression in Central Asia. Opposition groups soon began forming. The period following independence saw the emergence of opposition groups, ostensibly secular, to challenge the states monopoly on power. Faced with a myriad of domestic social and economic problems as well as weakened centralized government control coupled with public expectation, Central Asian leaders quickly consolidated power while silencing domestic dissent through political repression and censorship. Opposition political parties were banned, in addition, central Asia government quickly adopted policies limiting Islamic political activity fearing the importation of radical Islam and its allied social and political activities. However, Central Asian governments need to address the social and economic problems in the Fergana valley if they are to stem the growing disillusionment with existing regimes.

It is worth mentioning that the revival of Islam or Islamization in Central Asia normally refers to 'the recovery of Islamic communities' in these new states, which refers to going back to their old religious practices and traditions, which were practiced before the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917. The return to old practices and beliefs may entail a certain level of conservative attitudes towards modernity, but this should not be considered as Islamic extremism but rather it is *traditionalism*, especially in the case of Islamic culture and its revival in Central Asia.

In general, in response to this question that, in accordance with Huntington's clash of civilizations theory what are the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley, it can be said that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

In the third chapter, the thesis deals extensively with the contexts of the emergence of fundamentalism in the three periods of Tsarist Russia, Soviet, and post-Soviet countries.

By examining the roots of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley, we can understand the radical Islam and religious revival in central Asia, as well as radical movements and causes of ethnic conflicts and generally the radicalization of Fergana valley in this region and also we can understand the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism.

Throughout Fergana valley's history there have been decisive events that triggered a regrouping of forces, within the Islamic community. The Russian conquest was one, the Bolshevik revolution, another, Stalin's purges in the 1930s yet another.

Islamic revival refers to the support for an increased influence of Islamic values on the modern world as a response to Western and secular trends.

In Central Asia Islamic fundamentalism has a close relationship with radical Islam and its organisations. Radical Islamic movement had developed by the early 1990s, because there were ideological needs of people in response to the extensive social problems and the spiritual needs of people (Eastvold 2003, p. 22).

Considering the difficult economic and social conditions in Fergana valley and the lack of legal channels for political expression and solving the problems, the referring to Islam was considered as option to come out of this situation.

People increasingly felt disenfranchised and alienated not only from the autocratic and authoritarian regimes but also from the traditional leader of civil society. Increasingly, people turned to Islam as a means for political expression. Outsiders quickly radicalized this indigenous Isamic revival, particularly in the Fergana valley where Islam retained its hold despite 70 years of Soviet rule (Rashid, op. 55).

Central Asian governments due to fearing the importation of radical Islam and its allied social and political activities adopted policies limiting Islamic political activity. The emerging Islamic parties that have sought to insert religious ideas into political life were subject to constant harassment and while also declared illegal. The appeal of Islamic-based political movements in the Fergana valley is owed largely to the fact that people lacked an outlet for secular political expression. In soviet period, Bolsheviks eliminated any formal and public role for religion.

For all intents and purposes, Islam effectively disappeared, although the possibility of religious continuity was insured through the survival of a handful of people with religious education and the internal disposition to be spiritual leaders. Despite the best efforts of Stalin's terror machine and Soviet anti-religious propagandists illegal -- hujra -- schools continued to survive throughout the Soviet period, in Tashkent and in even larger numbers in the Fergana valley (Olcott, 2007, p. 8-13).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a growing interest in Islam among Central Asian populations and even enthusiasm on the part of elites to support revival of Islam because to gain support of masses in consolidating their powers and also fill the ideological vacuum created by the demise of Marxism-Leninism. However, Central Asian authorities had become more and more antagonistic towards forms of Islamic expression that were on the rise in the region soon after independence.

Although this increased interest in Islam did not immediately translate into the growing political threat, capable of challenging stability within these new countries but Islam is deeply ingrained in Central Asian ethnicity and culture. However, it is important, estimate the effects of the Soviet legacy that weakened Islam; and secondly, specific features inherent to Central Asia among the nomadic and sedentary populations. Although the Soviet regime did not cause Islam to entirely disappear, it eventually caused total de-Islamization. Certainly, today, Islam remains one of the strongest sources of identity.

The diversity of Islam in Central Asia's various parts is an important aspect of a more distant history that predated the establishment of the Soviet rule. This diversity, however, is instrumental in defining contemporary Islam today in the region. The degree of loyalty to Islam is strongest in the mentality of historically sedentary societies and lacks depth and substance among historically nomadic tribes. As such, historically sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks are the groups where Islam took an early and strong hold, touching almost every aspect of their life. Nomadic Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Turkmen are relative late-comers to Islam. Their Islamization took place much later as non-Islamic tribes existed as late as 19th century (Kulchik, 1996, p. 5). consequently, religious fanaticism, that is present in some parts of the south, is not characteristic of nomads, located in the north (Akiner, 1993, p. 38-39).

The effects of this historical distinction can still be strongly felt today. Soon after the Central Asian republics became independent, Islam was instrumental in identifying the course of events among the sedentary Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Tajikistan, Islamic factor was manipulated to be the dominant tool in the struggle for power, resulting in the bloody civil war with major human losses. In Uzbekistan, fears that the situation in Tajikistan would easily spill over and challenge the authorities resulted in the establishment of an extremely authoritarian regime by the Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Another important observation is that proclivity to Islam throughout Central Asia is closely related to the presence of region's numerically largest Uzbek population (Haghayeghi, 1996, pp.77-78).

This traditional division into sedentary and nomadic communities, however, has little relevance to the issue of Islamic fundamentalism in contemporary Central Asia. It does not mean that historically sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks have a strong potential for the rise of fundamentalist movements similar to those that evolved in the course of several last decades in the Middle East. It is rather an indication to the fact that nomadic societies were even less religious than sedentary ones and not vice-versa, and that in the process of Islamic revival this is still apparent (Botoiarova, 2005, p. 99).

In fact, Islamic revival in post-Soviet Central Asia can be characterized as moderate, given, first of all, lack of political experience in Islam, and the legacy of the Soviet rule, which had a major secularizing effect on Central Asian societies. the secularization process that came from the waves of Western civilization. In the post-Soviet period, some concerns were raised about Islamic activism and fears were conjured up about the possible threat emanating from Islam's extreme forms coming from abroad. The measures were seriously taken by the Central Asian elites to suppress different forms of Islamic expression, often labeling the ordinary believers 'fundamentalists'. It is necessary to point out that in post-Soviet Central Asia, Islamic revival is a natural process after a long period of suppression.

Islam in Central Asia took its moderate shape, free from fanaticism or political ambitions. Therefore, there is no breeding ground for genuine politicization of the faith, even if there are efforts by outside forces to import more radical form of Islam to Central Asia. However, if Islam is to be radicalized, it will still be not because of outside influence but conditioned by the discontent of people within the region, faced with the challenges of unstable economies and the excesses of authoritarian regimes that are increasing their powers across Central Asian republics at present (Akiner,1993, p. 69).

Islamic revival that is now taking place in Central Asia is a natural process, determined first of all by indigenous culture and tradition of Islam, which developed in isolation from its trends in broader Muslim world and preserved its specificity, being primarily a way of life and having a stronger hold in tradition of historically sedentary communities and being weaker in historically nomadic societies (although moderate in both) Given the specific nature of Islam practiced in Central Asia throughout its history, there is no scope for influence from external Islam, including its dangerous forms. Although there is some activism in political Islam in the region, it is not influenced by outside forces of religious extremism or radicalism, but it is an expression of discontent with current economic decline and authoritarian regimes (Steinberger, 2003, p. 223). In fact, this revival process is currently being influenced by internal socio-economic conditions and political situation. Radicalization of Islam, if it ever takes place, will not be because of outside influence, but will be the result of discontent with economic hardships and inability of authorities to build a just society with democratic principles. It can be said that the limited oppositional political activism of some Islamic groups is not a threat to the stability in society but is a threat to the position of elites that want to remain in power. Therefore, it should be said that effective internal factors in revival of Islam are concerned to political conditions, economic conditions, religious conditions.

In general, in response to this question that, what has been causes of propagation of radical Islam (Revival of Islam) in Fergana valley, it can be said that, considering Islam as a political ideology which is able to face the malfunctioning of the Soviet and at the same time confront the influence of western civilization propagated Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley.

External factors, of course, to some extend affect the process of Islamic revival, but the role of domestic factors is more prominent. In chapter four, these external factors (The role and influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia and, of course, Turkey in the region in competition with each other, Taliban movement in Afghanistan and 9/11 attacks) were explained and it was determined that internal factors played a primary role in stimulating Islamic radicalism. Overall, in the fourth chapter, the thesis examines the causes of propagation of radical Islam (revival of Islam) in Fergana valley.

In the third chapter, after examining the causes of propagation of radical Islam in Fergana valley, thesis addressed the issue of the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism. Religious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction to developments caused by identity and social crises of traditional societies that modernity has created by transforming the role of religion in social and individual life. However, subsidiary and local factors also have different effects both in the severity and weakness of this reaction as well as how its emergence and outbreak.

The theory of confronting modernity as one of the main factor of the emergence and development of fundamentalism must be regarded the product of those research that consider fundamentalism as the product and factor of more comprehensive social changes, rather than seeing it as a product of a particular religion, such as Islam. In this regard, in particular, Abdullah Ahmad al-Naim argued that the fundamentalism is not the inevitable product of particular Islamic religious resources, but this phenomenon is an indigenous response to profound social, political and economic crises in Islamic societies (Anna'im, 2003, pp.25-26).

From the viewpoint of these scholars, modernity creates structural changes in society that lead to the collapse of tradition. Civilization, ethnic and religious pluralism, and nation-state building are some of the most important of these changes (Haar, 2003, p. 5).

Researchers in sociology of religion (bruce, 2008, pp. 1-10) often believe that the essence of fundamentalism movement is a kind of protest against the modernization process and its wide social, cultural, political and economic effects on societies that at least one of the most important sources of theoretical and practical inspiration of systems and social, political, and economic relations and even the family of these societies is "religion". Fundamentalism is one of a variety of protest reactions against modernity, which has a religious character. Therefore, it is expected that because religion is only one of the factors influencing and shaping values, causes and social systems in pre-modern times and other factors (such as agricultural-based economic system, political power relations, etc.) have also been involved in the formation of what is called traditional society, so fundamentalism must be a religious reaction to the theoretical and practical consequences of modernity, which specifically has challenged religious beliefs and practices.

It is noteworthy that the purpose and motivation of fundamentalists did not necessarily defend the religion and the numerous social, economic, and political factors have caused them to refer to that part of the tradition that has the greatest theorizing power (ie, religion) as the representative of the tradition and trying to restore it as the backbone of traditional life that is now threatened by modernity.

Among the changes that modernity has created in traditional societies and has led to radical responses, we can mention the following: Creating the transformation in the economic structures of traditional societies, the division of the integrated and coherent life of traditional societies into multiple different areas, contradiction of religious values with new roles defined by the modern society for individuals, weakening pyramidal patterns of power in society and religion, religious pluralism caused by religious Reform, challenging religious absolutism by developments in science, cultural pluralism that was strengthened by the formation of nation-states and full-scale emigration and also was the contextualizer factor of secularization.

It should also mention the loss of the social and cultural links of the traditional community in migrants and the need to replace it with a new identity, which fundamentalism ideology usually provides such an alternative. Because fundamentalists usually emphasize the universal, trans-cultural and general nature of religion and this is an appropriate choice for those who have lost their ethnic, cultural, and geographical identities by migration .(Roy, 2007, pp. vii-xiii).

The role of the local contexts is also significant in strengthening fundamentalism, Including: cultural, ritual, political and social variations, being unbalanced and sudden of the modifications of modernity, colonization, as the result of encountering Europeans, lack of democracy and the existence of totalitarian governments, the rise of religious beliefs and general tendency toward spirituality throught the materialist and secular nature of modern culture, and lack of religious education among fundamentalists.

Finally, it response to this question that, what has been traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism, it can be said that, the traditional Islamic response to the rise of modernism was based on the revival of Islam as a cultural and political identity in a fundamentalist way. in final section of forth chapter this hypothesis illustrated in the form of an example.

The remarkable point about the responses to the west and modernization is that modernization is one of the waves of Western civilization, but it is not inherently in opposition to the Islam.The expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization and the Westernization of non-Western societies. Fundamentalists as political and intellectual leaders of societies responded to the Western influence based on idea of the rejectionism. The idea of rejectionism means rejecting both modernization and Westernization. This idea was discussed by the diagram in the second chapter of the thesis along with two other ideas, Kemalism and Reformism.

Initially, Westernization and modernization are closely linked, with the non-Western society absorbing substantial elements of Western culture and making slow progress toward modernization. As the pace of modernization increases, however, the rate of Westernizationp declines and the indigenous culture goes through a revival. Further modernization then alters the civilizational balance of power between the West and the non-Western society and strengthens commitment to the indigenous culture.

In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and lead to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 111). In fact, Islam and modernization do not clash. Modernization requires no one political ideology or set of institutions: elections, national boundaries, civic associations, and the other hallmarks of Western life are not necessary to economic growth. Westernization is a prerequisite by pointing to the conflicts between Islam and modernity. In fact, to find out the contexts of Islamic fundamentalism, the confrontation between Islamic civilization and western civilization is subject to consideration, not the confrontation between Islam and modernity.

Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices. The latter, indeed, may be almost impossible: whatever obstacles non-Western cultures pose to modernization pale before those they pose to Westernization (Braudel, pp. 212-213). Modernization, instead, strengthens historic cultures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less western.

In general, the revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies. That revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It is a rejection of what has been termed the "Westoxification" of non-Western societies. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that: "We will be modern but we won't be you" (Huntington, Summer 1993, p. 129). In other words, it can be said that Western civilization and its expansionist nature are in opposition to Islamic civilization and its conservative nature. West by promotion its ideas such as secularization will only fan more fundamentalism in the Muslim world. Finally, it should be said that religious fundamentalism fueled by Islamic radicalization is not equivalent with extremism and fanaticism but it refers to 'the recovery of Islamic communities', and going back to old religious practices and traditions. The return to old practices and beliefs may entail a certain level of conservative attitudes towards modernity, but this should not be considered as Islamic extremism but rather it is *traditionalism,* especially in the case of Islamic culture and its revival in Central Asia.

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فرم گردآوری اطلاعات پایان نامه/رساله

کتابخانه مرکزی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

عنوان به زبان فارسی : برخورد تمدن ها و ظهور بنیادگرایی در دره فرغانه
عنوان به زبان انگلیسی: The clash of civilizations and emergence of fundamentalism in the Fergana valley
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کلید واژه ها به زبان فارسی: بنیادگرایی اسلامی، برخورد تمدن ها، دره فرغانه، مدرنیزم، اسلام رادیکال
کلید واژه ها به زبان انگلیسی: Islamic fundamentalism, Clash of civilizations, Fergana valley, Modernism, Radical Islam

چکیده به زبان فارسی:

بنیادگرایی اصطلاحی است که در اصل برای اشاره به مسیحیت پروتستان آمریکایی بکار برده شد. مفهوم بنیادگرایی می تواند در تقابل با مدرنیته غربی مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. بنیادگرایی اسلامی با مشخصه های "ضد تجدد"، "ضد تمدن"، و "ضد غرب" شرح داده می شود و به طور کلی جنبه ضد تمدنی جدید آن خیلی برجسته است. اهمیت مطالعه حاضر فهم بسترهای ظهور بنیادگرایی اسلامی در چارچون نظریه برخورد تمدن های هانتینگتون می باشد. سوال اصلی پژوهش این است که مطابق با نظریه برخورد تمدن های هانتینگتون، بسترهای ظهور بنیادگرایی اسلامی در دره فرغانه چیست؟ فرضیه ای که در پاسخ به این پژوهش ارائه شده است، این است که تقابل بین طرفداران تمدن غربی و طرفداران تمدن اسلامی که به تدریج از اواسط قرن نوزدهم تا پایان قرن بیستم شکل گرفته است، بستر مناسبی را برای ظهور بنیادگرایی اسلامی در دره فرغانه ایجاد کرد. پایان نامه یک پژوهش تبیینی است که تلاش می کند توضیح دهد چگونه قطبی شدن جامعه بین نیروهای نوگرا و اسلام گرا باعث ظهور بنیادگرایی شد. فرمت مطالعه مبتنی بر یک تحلیل توصیفی و یک دیدگاه تاریخی و جامع از عقاید و رویداد های خاص است. دستاورد پژوهشی پایان نامه این است که بنیادگرایی مذهبی مترادف با افراط گرایی نیست بلکه هم سو با سنت گرایی است. برخورد تمدن اسلامی صرفا با مدریته نیست (به عنوان یکی از امواج تمدن غرب) بلکه تقابل آن به ماهیت توسعه طلب و برتری جوی غرب (غرب زدگی) مربوط می شود. نظریه برخورد تمدن ها می تواند برای دوره های روسیه تزاری و شوروی بکار برده شود اما از این کاربست پذیری برای دوره پساشوروی برخوردار نیست، و مدرنیته و نظریه های مربوط به بنیادگرایی، به نظر می رسد تقابل ها و بسترهای بنیادگرایی اسلامی در این دوره را بهتر توضیح می دهند.

کلید واژه ها: بنیادگرایی اسلامی، برخورد تمدن ها، دره فرغانه، نوگرایی، اسلام رادیکال

چکیده به زبان انگلیسی:

The fundamentalism is term which originally used to refer the American protestant Christianity. The concept of fundamentalism can be considered in contrast with Western modernism. Islamic fundamentalism is characterized by "anti-modernity", "anti-civilization" and "anti-West" features, and is generally very prominent its anti-new civilization aspect. The significance of the present study is to understand the contexts of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism within the framework of the Huntington's clash of civilization theory. The main question of the research is that in accordance with Huntington's clash of civilization theory what are the contexts of the emergence of Islmic fundamentalism in Fergana valley? The hypothesis that is presented in response to this research is that the contradiction between the followers of western civilization and the followers of Islamic civilization that has been gradually formed from the mid nineteenth century to the end of twentieth century, made a suitable context for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Fergana valley. Thesis is an explanatory research which attempts to explain how the polarization of society between forces of modernism and Islamism caused the emergence of fundamentalism. The format of study is based on a descriptive analysis, and a comprehensive and historical outlook of the specific events and opinions. The research achievement of thesis is that religious fundamentalism is not synonymous with extremism but consistent with traditionalism. The clash of Islamic civilization is not merely with modernity (as one of the waves of Western civilization) but, its contradiction is related to West's expansionist and supremacist nature (Westoxification). The theory of the clash of civilizations can be applied to the Tsarist Russia and Soviet periods but it does not have this applicability for post-soviet period, and the modernity and theories related to fundamentalism appear to better explain the confrontations and contexts of Islamic fundamentalism indeed, in this period.

Keywords: Islamic fundamentalism, Clash of civilizations, Fergana valley, Modernism, Radical Islam

صحت اطلاعات این فرم را براساس محتوای پایان نامه/رساله گواهی می نمایم.

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صورتجلسه دفاعیه پایان نامه تحصیلی

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"The Clash of Civilizations and Emergence of Fundamentalism in the Fergana Valley"

که به راهنمائی آقای دکتر محمدی تنظیم گردیده است در جلسه مورخ ۹۷/۶/۳۱ با حضور اعضاء هیأت داوران مطرح و با نمره (۱۸/۱۰) و درجه (بسیار خوب) به تصویب رسید.

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استاد راهنما	دکتر محمدی	
استاد مشاور	دکتر مؤمنی	
استاد داور	دکتر سعادتقلی پور آذر	
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تعهدنامه ی اصالت پایان نامه / رساله

اینجانب علی محمودی سرچقایی دانش آموخته مقطع تحصیلی کارشناسی ارشد / دکتری در رشته مطالعات منطقه ای که در تاریخ ۲۱/ ۷/ ۱۳۹۷ از پایان نامه / رساله خود تحت عنوان برخورد تمدن ها و ظهور بنیادگرایی در دره فرغانه با کسب نمره / درجه ۱۸/۵ دفاع نموده ام، متعهد می شوم:

۱- این پایان نامه / رساله حاصل تحقیق و پژوهش انجام شده توسط اینجانب بوده و درمواردی که از دستاوردهای علمی و پژوهشی دیگران (اعم از مقاله، کتاب، پایان نامه و غیره) استفاده نموده ام، مطابق ضوابط ورویه موجود، نام منبع مورد استفاده و سایر مشخصات آن را در فهرست مربوط ذکر و درج کرده ام.

۲- این پایان نامه / رساله قبلا برای دریافت هیچ مدرک تحصیلی (هم سطح، پایین تر یا بالاتر) در سایر دانشگاه ها و موسسات آموزش عالی ارائه نشده است.

۳- چنانچه بعد از فراغت از تحصیل، قصد استفاده از هرگونه بهره برداری اعم از چاپ کتاب، ثبت اختراع و ازین دست موارد از این پایان نامه / رساله را داشته باشم، از حوزه معاونت پژوهشی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی مجوزهای مربوطه را اخذ نمایم.

۴- چنانچه در هر مقطع زمانی خلاف موارد فوق ثابت شود، عواقب ناشی از آن را می پذیرم و دانشگاهی مجاز است با اینجانب مطابق ضوابط و مقررات رفتار نموده و درصورت ابطال مدرک تحصیلی ام هیچ گونه ادعائی نخواهم داشت.

نام و نام خانوادگی: علی محمودی سرچقایی

تاریخ و امضاء: ۱۳۹۷/۷/۲۱

به نام خدا

منشور اخلاق پژوهش

با یاری از خداوند سبحان و اعتقاد به این که عالم محضر خداوند است و همواره ناظر به اعمال انسان و به منظور پاس داشت مقام بلند دانش و پژوهش و نظر به اهمیت جایگاه دانشگاه در اعتلای فرهنگ و تمدن بشری ما دانشجویان دانشکده های دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی متعهد می گردیم اصول زیر را در انجام فعالیت های پژوهشی مد نظر قرار داده و از آن تخطی نکنیم:

۱- اصل حقیقت جوئی: تلاش در راستای پی جویی حقیقت و وفاداری به آن و دوری از هرگونه پنهان سازی حقیقت.

۲- اصل رعایت حقوق: التزام به رعایت کامل حقوق پژوهشگران و پژوهیدگان (انسان، حیوان و نبات) و سایر صاحبان حق.

۳- اصل مالکیت مادی و معنوی: تعهد به رعایت کامل حقوق مادی و معنوی دانشگاه و کلیه همکاران پژوهش.

۴- اصل منافع ملی: تعهد به رعایت مصالح ملی و در نظر داشتن پیشبرد و توسعه کشور در کلیه مراحل پژوهش.

۵- اصل رعایت انصاف و امانت: تعهد به اجتناب از هرگونه جانب داری غیر علمی و حفاظت از اموال، تجهیزات و منابع در اختیار.

۶- اصل رازداری: تعهد به صیانت از اسرار و اطلاعات محرمانه افراد، سازمان هاو کشور و کلیه افراد و نهادهای مرتبط با تحقیق.

۷- اصل احترام: تعهد به رعایت حریم ها و حرمت ها در انجام تحقیقات و رعایت جانب نقد و خودداری از هرگونه حرمت شکنی.

۸- اصل ترویج: تعهد به رواج دانش و اشاعه نتایج تحقیقات و انتقال آن به همکاران علمی و دانشجویان به غیر از مواردی که منع قانونی دارد.

۹- اصل برائت: التزام به برائت جوئی از هرگونه رفتار غیر حرفه ای و اعلام موضع نسبت به کسانی که حوزه علم و پژوهش را به شائبه های غیر علمی می آلایند.

نام و نام خانوادگی: علی محمودی سرچقای

تاریخ و امضاء: ۱۳۹۷/۷/۲۱

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

دانشکده بیمه اکو

پایان نامه کارشناسی ارشد رشته مطالعات منطقه ای گرایش آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز

عنوان:

برخورد تمدن ها و ظهور بنیادگرایی در دره فرغانه

استاد راهنما:

دکتر محمد محمدی

استاد مشاور:

دکتر مجیدرضا مومنی

استاد داور:

دکتر علی سعادت قلی پور آذر

پژوهشگر

علی محمودی سرچقایی

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